Ex Parte Shetty et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 30, 2016

13090258 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 30, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/090,258 04/20/2011
92791 7590 07/05/2016
Global IP Services, PLLC/LSI Corporation
10 Crestwood Lane
Nashua, NH 03062
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
V ARUN SHE TTY
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
Ll 0-0496US 1 2079
EXAMINER
DAVIS, ZACHARY A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2492
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/05/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
pnama@globalipservices.com
docketing@globalipservices.com
pradeep@globalipservices.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte V ARUN SHETTY, CHETHAN SURESH,
and
SHRIDHAR DODDAMATEKURKE GANGADHARAPP A
Appeal2015-000766
Application 13/090,258
Technology Center 2400
Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, CARLA M. KRIVAK, and
JEFFREY A. STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judges.
KRIVAK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1, 3-7, and 9-12. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Appeal2015-000766
Application 13/090,258
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants' invention is directed to the "secure exchange of keystroke
information between a kernel and an application in a computing system"
(Spec. ii 1 ).
Independent claim 7, reproduced below, is representative of the
subject matter on appeal.
7. A system for secure exchange of information in a
computing system, comprising:
a processor;
memory including an operating system, wherein the
operating system includes a kernel configured to
receive a request to switch to a safe mode from a
target application;
generate encryption/ decryption keystring based on
the received request;
respond to the target application with the decryption
keystring;
encrypt a key-stroke using the encryption keystring;
and
store the encrypted key-stroke in a keyboard buffer;
maintain a list of applications registered to be
notified of key-stroke event and
notify the registered applications of the stored key-
stroke in the keyboard buff er by the kernel; and
wherein the target application is configured to
retrieve the encrypted key-stroke from the keyboard
buffer upon receiving the notification; and
decrypt the encrypted key-stroke using the
decryption keystring.
REFERENCES and REJECTION
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3-7, and 9-12 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based upon the teachings of Breakthrough
("KeyScrambler-A Breakthrough in Battling Keyloggers," 2010), Manual
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Application 13/090,258
("KeyScrambler User Manual & Tutorial," 2010), Kassner ("KeyScrambler:
How Keystroke Encryption Works to Thwart Keylogging Threats," 2010),
Goh ("The Design and Implementation of Protocol-Based Hidden Key
Recovery," 2003), and Thomas ("Hooking the Keyboard," 2001).
ANALYSIS
With respect to claim 7, the Examiner finds Manual, Breakthrough,
and Kassner describe KeyScrambler technology that secures the exchange of
information by protecting a computing system from keylogger malware
(Ans. 3; Final Act. 3, 7). The Examiner finds KeyScrambler exists in the
operating system's kernel because "KeyScrambler 'encrypts your keystrokes
at the keyboard driver level in the kernel'" (Ans. 4 (citing Breakthrough
p. 1, i-f 4)). The Examiner further finds the kernel's KeyScrambler receives a
request to switch to a safe mode as claimed, because a hot key requests
KeyScrambler protection to be turned on (Ans. 4 (citing Manual p.1 ); Final
Act. 7).
Appellants contend Manual does not teach or suggest a kernel module
is requested to switch to a safe mode by a target application as required in
claim 7, rather, Manual only teaches changing default settings and enabling
KeyScrambler protection with a keyboard shortcut (Br. 11 ). Appellants'
arguments do not address the Examiner's findings that the kernel's
KeyScrambler component receives a request to switch to a safe mode in
which KeyScrambler encryption is activated to encrypt keystrokes in the
kernel (Ans. 4, 5). We agree with the Examiner's reasonable findings.
Appellants further contend Breakthrough and Kassner do not teach or
suggest a kernel configured to respond to a target application with a
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Application 13/090,258
decryption keystring, as required by claim 7 (Br. 11, 12). According to
Appellants, Breakthrough and Kassner at most describe a decryption
component of KeyScrambler that decrypts keystrokes at a destination
application, but do not teach or suggest "the decryption component of
KeyScrambler as being sent by Kernel to the target application" (Br.
12).
We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments as they do not
address the Examiner's rejection based on the combination of Breakthrough
and Kassner in combination with Goh. We agree with the Examiner's
findings that Breakthrough and Kassner teach a kernel KeyScrambler
component encrypting keystrokes in the kernel, and an application level
component of KeyScrambler decrypting keystrokes at a destination
application (Ans. 4, 6, 7 (citing Breakthrough p. 1, i-fi-14--5); Final Act. 7
(citing Kassner p. 2)). 1 Further, Kassner teaches KeyScrambler applies
"basically the same" principle as SSL/TLS encryption, and Goh teaches
SSL/TLS encryption uses a decryption keystring of "a common set of
cryptographic parameters which are used to secure further communication"
(Ans. 6, 7 (citing Kassner p. 2, i-f l O; Goh pp. 7-8); Final Act. 8). The
combination of Goh' s S SL/TLS decryption keystring with KeyScrambler' s
kernel-level encryption and application-level decryption teaches and
1 Kassner describes the operation of KeyScrambler's components as
follows: "[ w ]hat KeyScrambler does is to try to get to the keystrokes as early
as possible in the Windows kernel using our encryption module . ... When
these encrypted keystrokes finally arrive at the intended application, the
decryption component of KeyScrambler goes to work and turns them back
into the keys the user originally typed" (Kassner p. 2, i-fi-1 8-9 (emphasis
added)).
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Application 13/090,258
suggests the claimed kernel configured to respond with a decryption
keystring (Ans. 7). Appellants have not responded to or rebutted the
Examiner's reasonable and persuasive findings and conclusions in a Reply
Brief.
Appellants additionally contend Breakthrough and Kassner do not
teach or suggest a target application configured to decrypt an encrypted
key-stroke using the decryption keystring as required by claim 7 (Br. 11,
12). As discussed supra, we are persuaded the combination of
Breakthrough, Kassner, and Goh teaches a decryption keystring sent by a
kernel as claimed. Thus, we agree with the Examiner that "the decryption
component of KeyScrambler" and "the destination application" comprise a
target application that decrypts using the decryption keystring, as required
by claim 7 (Ans. 7, 8 (citing Breakthrough p. 1, i-f 5; Kassner p. 2, i-f 9)).
Appellants further argue Breakthrough, Kassner, and Thomas do not
teach or suggest configuring the kernel to maintain a list of applications
registered to be notified of a key-stroke event and notifying the registered
applications of the stored key-stroke in a keyboard buffer as required by
claim 7 (Br. 12, 13).
The Examiner finds Thomas' hook chain is "a list [of applications]
that you add a keylogger to" for receiving Windows' notifications of
keyboard inputs and Kassner' s KeyScrambler runs on Windows, concluding
it would have been obvious to maintain a list of applications in Windows
notified of key-stroke events by KeyScrambler (Ans. 9, 10 (citing Thomas
pp. 1-3; Kassner p. 2, i-f 4); Final Act. 7-9). Appellants' arguments have not
addressed these specific findings by the Examiner. We also agree with the
Examiner's findings that Kassner teaches and suggests KeyScrambler
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Application 13/090,258
maintains a list of applications for receiving encrypted KeyScrambler key-
strokes from the kernel (see Kassner p. 2, i-fi-1 5-9).
We also do not agree with Appellants' argument that Breakthrough,
Kassner, and Thomas do not teach or suggest the target application is
configured to retrieve the encrypted key-stroke from the keyboard buffer
upon receiving a notification, as required by claim 7 (Br. 13). As the
Examiner finds, KeyScrambler's ability to encrypt keystrokes, which are
then forwarded to the destination application and/or a keylogger, "is itself a
disclosure of a list of applications that receive keystroke events" as claimed
(Ans. 10 (citing Breakthrough p. 1 i-fi-14, 6)). Appellants have not
persuasively rebutted the Examiner's specific findings by identifying
specific errors; rather Appellants' arguments merely restate the claim
language without explanation of error in the Examiner's findings (see Br.
13).
In light of the above, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of
independent claim 7, independent claims 1 and 12, which fall with claim 7
(Br. 13), and dependent claims 3---6 and 9-11 argued for their dependency on
claims 1 and 7, respectively (Br. 13).
DECISION
The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1, 3-7, and 9-12 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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