Ex Parte Shannon

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Feb 5, 2010

10745182 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 5, 2010)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte THOMAS GERARD SHANNON
____________

Appeal 2009-002052
Application 10/745,182
Technology Center 1700
____________

Decided: February 05, 2010
____________

Before LINDA M. GAUDETTE, KAREN M. HASTINGS, and
JEFFREY B. ROBERTSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

GAUDETTE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision finally rejecting claims 1, 3, and 7-27 (Supplemental Final Office
Action (“Final”), mailed Nov. 1, 2006, 1). (Appeal Brief (“Br.”), filed Mar.
26, 2007, 1.) Claims 2 and 6 are also pending, but have been withdrawn
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Application 10/745,182

from consideration. (Final 1; Br. 1.) We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND

Claims 1, 18, and 27, the only independent claims on appeal, are
illustrative of the claimed invention and are reproduced below:
1. A dry wiping product consisting of one or more plies of an
absorbent fibrous sheet having a basis weight of from about 5 to about 200
grams per square meter, a sheet bulk of from about 5 to about 20 cubic
centimeters per gram and a sheet caliper of from about 100 to about 800
microns, wherein at least one of said plies contains one or more chemical
agents that react exothermically when the dry wiping product absorbs
external water in use during wiping such that the temperature of the sheet
increases at least 1°C or greater.

18. A dry tissue product selected from the group consisting of
facial tissue, bath tissue and paper towels, said product comprising one or
more sheets of cellulosic fibers and containing calcium chloride such that
when the calcium chloride-containing sheet absorbs external water during
use of the product, the temperature of the sheet increases 1°C or greater.

27. A dry tissue product selected from the group consisting of
facial tissue, bath tissue and paper towels, said product comprising one or
more sheets of cellulosic fibers containing a wet strength agent and calcium
chloride such that when the calcium chloride-containing sheet absorbs
external water during use of the product, the temperature of the sheet
increases 1°C or greater.

The Examiner maintains 10 grounds of rejection (Examiner’s Answer
(“Ans.”), mailed Feb. 29, 2008, 4-17).1 The evidence relied upon by the
Examiner is as follows:

1 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claim 17 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Black in view of Peterson. (Ans. 3.)
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Howells 2,573,791 Nov. 6, 1951
Caillouette 3,175,558 Mar. 30, 1965
Piazze 3,342,324 Sept. 19, 1967
Stanley 3,763,622 Oct. 09, 1973
Williams 3,804,077 Apr. 16, 1974
Black 3,942,511 Mar. 09, 1976
Peterson 5,433,987 Jul. 18, 1995
Smith 5,760,212 Jun. 02, 1998
Davis 6,146,732 Nov. 14, 2000
Fish 2002/0092199 A1 Jul. 18, 2002

“The Army’s Improved Intermediate Cold/Wet Boot”, Infantry Magazine
(Sept. 2000), available at http://www.findarticles.com.

“ply”, Random House Unabridged Dictionary (Random House 2006),
available at www.dictionary.com.

Appellant’s arguments are primarily directed to limitations found in
independent claims 1, 18, and 27. In other words, Appellant does not
present new, or additional arguments in response to each ground of rejection,
although Appellant does present separate arguments in support of
patentability of dependent claims 10 and 11. Based on our review of the
Appeal Brief and the Answer, we identify four primary issues, one or more
of which is relevant to our decision on each of the below-listed grounds of
rejection:
1. Claims 1, 7, 10-16, and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are
rejected as unpatentable over Black in view of Peterson. Appellant presents
separate arguments in support of patentability of claim 11. (See Issues 1(b)
and 2 infra pp. 6-13.) The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. (See
Issues 1(a) and 2 infra pp. 6-13.)
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2. Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Black in view of Peterson as applied to claims 1, 7, 10-16, and 26, and
further in view of Caillouette. (See Issues 1(a) and 2 infra pp. 6-13.)
3. Claims 7-9 and 18-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are rejected as
unpatentable over Black in view of Peterson as applied to claims 1, 7, 10-16,
and 26, and further in view of any one of Piazze, Stanley, Williams or Davis.
Appellant presents separate arguments for patentability based on a limitation
found in claim 18. Therefore, claims 19-25 stand or fall with claim 18. (See
Issues 1(b) and 2 infra pp. 6-13.) Claims 8 and 9 stand or fall with claim 7,
which depends from claim 12. (See Issues 1(a) and 2 infra pp. 6-13.)
4. Claim 27 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Black in view of Peterson in view of any one of Piazze, Stanley,
Williams or Davis, as applied to claims 7-9 and 18-25, and further in view of
Smith. (See Issues 1(b), 2, and 3 infra pp. 6-15.)
5. Claims 1, 7, 10-17, and 26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Black in view of Fish. Appellant presents
separate arguments in support of patentability of claim 11. (See Issue 1(b)
infra p. 6-10.) Appellant also presents separate arguments in support of
patentability of claim 10. (See Issues 1(a) and 4 infra pp. 6-10, 15-16.) The
remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. (See Issue 1(a) infra pp. 6-10.)
6. Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Black in view of Fish as applied to claims 1, 7, 10-17, and 26, and
further in view of Caillouette. (See Issue 1(a) infra pp. 6-10.)
7. Claims 7-9 and 18-25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Black in view of Fish as applied to claims 1, 7, 10-17, and

2 We note that claim 7 was also subject to ground of rejection 1.
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26, and further in view of any one of Piazze, Stanley, Williams or Davis.
Appellant presents separate arguments for patentability based on a limitation
found in claim 18. Therefore, claims 19-25 stand or fall with claim 18. (See
Issue 1(b) infra pp. 6-10.) Claims 8 and 9 stand or fall with claim 7, which
depends from claim 13. (See Issue 1(a) infra pp. 6-10.)
8. Claim 27 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Black in view of Fish in view of any one of Piazze, Stanley, Williams
or Davis, as applied to claims 7-9 and 18-25, and further in view of Smith.
(See Issues 1(b) and 3 infra pp. 6-10, 13-15.)
9. Claims 18-24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Howells in view of any one of Piazze, Stanley, Williams
or Davis. (See Issue 1(c), infra pp. 6-10.)
10. Claim 27 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Howells in view of any one of Piazze, Stanley, Williams or Davis, as
applied to claims 18-24, and further in view of Smith. (See Issue 1(c), infra
pp. 6-10.)
ISSUE 1
The Examiner relies on Black as the primary reference in rejecting all
of the appealed claims. (See grounds of rejection 1-8 supra pp. 3-5.) The
Examiner relies on Howells as the primary reference in rejecting appealed
18-24 and 27. (See grounds of rejection 9 and 10 supra p. 5.) Appellant
maintains the Examiner failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness
because Black and Howells do not disclose products of the type claimed by
Appellant. (See Br. 4 and 8-9.)

3 We note that claim 7 was also subject to ground of rejection 5.
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Based on Appellant’s arguments, we consider the issue of whether
Appellant has identified error in the Examiner’s findings that:
(a) Black discloses or suggests “[a] dry wiping product” as claimed
in claim 1 (see Br. 4, second paragraph);
(b) Black discloses or suggests “[a] dry tissue product selected
from the group consisting of facial tissue, bath tissue and paper towels” as
recited in claims 11 (see Br. 5), 18 and 27 (see Br. 4, second paragraph); and
(c) Howells discloses or suggests “[a] dry tissue product selected
from the group consisting of facial tissue, bath tissue and paper towels” as
recited in claims 18 (Br. 8) and 27 (Br. 9).
ISSUE 1: FINDINGS OF FACT, PRINCIPLES OF LAW,
AND ANALYSIS

According to the Specification, Appellant has “discovered that by
incorporating various salts into fibrous sheets, such as are useful as tissues,
towels or other personal wiping products, a significant endothermic or
exothermic temperature change is provided when the sheets are wetted. . . .
This temperature change is sufficient to be noticeable by the user.” (Spec.
2:18-25.) The products of the invention are described as having “a wide
range of applicability for wiping the hands, face and body since the
temperature change can be initiated by absorption of body fluids, such as
sweat or surface moisture on the skin.” (Spec. 2:26-28.)
Howells discloses a heat applying bandage for application to a patient
(col. 3, ll. 73-74) which includes an absorbent porous body 22 which may
comprise “[a] layer of fibrous material such as cotton batting, felt, or
blotting paper” (col. 2, ll. 14-18). The bandage includes a mixture of
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chemicals which generate heat when wetted with a fluid, preferably water.
(Col. 2, ll. 19-24.)
Appellant’s traversal of grounds of rejection 9 and 10 is based on
Appellant’s contention that Howells is directed to a heat-applying bandage
which cannot be considered a facial tissue, bath tissue or a paper towel. (Br.
8-9.)
Black is directed to “[a]n electrochemical source for the rapid
generation of heat and hydrogen gas upon activation by electrolyte.” (Black
claim 1.) The electrochemical source is an intimate mixture of active and
passive metals, e.g. iron particles embedded on magnesium particles
(“ironized magnesium particles” (col. 12, ll. 15-18)). (Col. 2, ll. 62-64.) In
exemplary embodiments, the particles and an absorbent material are
sandwiched between two sheets of plastic material to form a flexible heating
material. (Col. 2, l. 47; col. 11, ll. 54-57). Sodium chloride particles are
mixed with either the absorbent material or the ironized magnesium
particles, or both. (Col. 11, ll. 42-44.) Holes are provided in one or both of
the plastic sheets to admit water which dissolves the sodium chloride and
activates the micro electrochemical cells. (Col. 11, ll. 45-49.) Black teaches
that the flexible heating material may be used in “gloves, socks, boot liners,
foot pads and other garments for warming various parts of the body, as well
as for medical heat pads, warmers for food cans, and sleeping bag heaters to
provide a thermal barrier between the sleeping bag and cold ground, and the
like.” (Col. 11, ll. 26-31.)
Appellant argues that Black “discloses nothing more than a boot liner”
which is “not a ‘wiping product’ as claimed.” (Br. 4-5.) Appellant has not
provided (see generally, Br.; Ans. 20), nor do we find in the Specification, a
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definition for the claim term “dry wiping product.” Rather, the Specification
states that exemplary “dry wiping products” include “facial tissue, bath
tissue [and] paper towels.” (Spec. 3:12-13.) The Examiner interprets the
term “dry wiping product” as “a product that [is] intended to be used to
absorb water during wiping.” (Ans. 18.) Appellant has not objected to this
interpretation of the claim language. (Br. 4 (indicating that a “dry wiping
product” must absorb water “‘in use during wiping’”).)
Appellant further argues that one of ordinary skill in the tissue and
wipes art would have appreciated that the heating materials described in
Black “would not serve as a wiping product since the widely-spaced small
holes [in the plastic material] would not provide sufficient absorbency to be
effective as a wipe.” (Br. 4-5.) Appellant has not identified any evidence in
the record to support this assertion. (See generally, Br.)
Black describes the absorbent material used to form the flexible
heating material as “moisture retaining.” (Col. 12, l. 24; see also, col. 11, ll.
34-35.) Black explains that the use of holes in both sheets of plastic material
will allow “faster introduction of water.” (Col. 11, ll. 47-49.)
“A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a
different field from that of the inventor's endeavor, it is one which, because
of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to
an inventor's attention in considering his problem.” In re Clay, 966 F.2d
656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The field of endeavor can be correctly
determined “by consulting the structure and function of the claimed
invention as perceived by one of ordinary skill in the art” with “reference to
explanations of the invention's subject matter in the patent application.” In
re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming Board's finding
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that prior art toothbrush was in same field of endeavor as patentee's
hairbrush where Board concluded that “the structural similarities between
toothbrushes and small brushes for hair would have led one of ordinary skill
in the art working in the specific field of hairbrushes to consider all similar
brushes including toothbrushes”). Where an inventor is considering how to
design a particular mechanism to fit a specific type of device, he “would
naturally look to references employing” other forms of that mechanism, even
where they are found in different types of devices. In re ICON Health and
Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussing In re
Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1481-82 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). In other words, “familiar
items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes.” KSR Int'l Co.
v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420-21 (2007).
Contrary to Appellant’s contention, Black’s limited use of the
disclosed flexible heating material in garments, medical heat pads, etc., does
not mean that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have used the
material as a dry wiping product, such as a paper towel. Likewise, the mere
fact that Black and Howells do not explicitly disclose facial tissue, bath
tissue, or paper towels does not establish that one of ordinary skill in the art
would not have recognized that the disclosed prior art structures could be
used in forming Appellant’s claimed products. Rather, the relevant inquiry
is whether Black’s flexible heating material and Howells’ bandage would
have been part of the field of invention searched by one of ordinary skill in
the tissue and wipes art and whether the alternative use of these materials as
a dry wiping product would have been obvious.
The relied upon disclosures in Black and Howells support the
Examiner’s findings that these prior art materials are capable of absorbing
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water during use and are suitable for contacting human skin. These are the
same properties desired in a dry wiping product, such as a facial tissue, bath
tissue, or paper towel. Given the structural similarities, we think the
Examiner had a reasonable basis to conclude that the alternative use of the
Black’s and Howells’ materials as one of the claimed dry wiping/tissue
products would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. In
contrast, Appellant has not directed us to persuasive evidentiary support for
his arguments.
Based on the foregoing, we determine that a preponderance of the
evidence weighs in favor of the Examiner’s findings that Black discloses or
suggests “[a] dry wiping product” as claimed in claim 1 and “[a] dry tissue
product selected from the group consisting of facial tissue, bath tissue and
paper towels” as recited in claims 11, 18, and 27, and that Howells discloses
or suggests “[a] dry tissue product selected from the group consisting of
facial tissue, bath tissue and paper towels” as recited in claims 18 and 27.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of error in grounds of rejection 1-
8.
ISSUE 2
The Examiner relies on the combined teachings of Black and Peterson
in rejecting all of the appealed claims except claim 17. (See grounds of
rejection 1-4, supra, pp. 3-4.) Appellant contends that the Examiner failed
to establish proper motivation to modify Black in view of Peterson to
achieve the claimed invention because the products described in the
references perform different functions. (Br. 5.) These arguments present the
following issue:
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Has Appellant identified error in the Examiner’s determination that it
would have been obvious to have used a fibrous sheet as claimed as the
absorbent material in Black’s flexible heating material based on Peterson’s
disclosure that such materials were conventional for use in making absorbent
fabrics?
ISSUE 2: FINDINGS OF FACT, PRINCIPLES OF LAW,
AND ANALYSIS

The Examiner concedes that Black does not disclose the use of fibrous
material having Appellant’s claimed basis weight. (Ans. 4 (“Black is silent
with regards to specific absorbent shoe liner materials.”).) However, the
Examiner contends that it would have been obvious to have used an
absorbent fibrous sheet as claimed for the absorbent material in Black’s
flexible heating material based on Peterson’s disclosure that such materials
were conventional for use in making absorbent fabrics. (See Ans. 4-6.)
Peterson “relates to moisture-absorbent spun-laced fabrics . . . for use
in materials and apparel in contact with the body to absorb perspiration . . .
and collect or disperse the same away from the body for the comfort or
hygiene of wearers.” (Col. 1, ll. 10-15.)
Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s finding (Ans. 4-5) that
Peterson discloses an absorbent fibrous sheet comprising cellulosic fibers
and having Appellant’s claimed basis weight. (See Br. 5.) Rather,
Appellant essentially argues that the ordinary artisan would not have had a
reasonable expectation of success in using Peterson’s absorbent sheet, a
material designed to breathe, in Black’s boot liner, a material designed to
warm the foot and presumably having a much higher basis weight. (Id.)
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A prima facie case of obviousness is established where the Examiner
demonstrates that the invention is nothing more than the predictable result of
a combination of familiar elements according to known methods. KSR, 550
U.S. at 416-17. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a
person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve
similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its
actual application is beyond his or her skill.” Id. at 417. A reference stands
for all of its specific teachings, as well as the inferences one of ordinary skill
in this art would have reasonably been expected to draw therefrom. In re
Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264-65 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also, Perfect Web
Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“hold[ing] that while an analysis of obviousness always depends on
evidence that supports the required Graham factual findings, it also may
include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the
person of ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any
reference or expert opinion.”); DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co.
Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (“Our suggestion test is in actuality quite flexible and not only
permits, but requires, consideration of common knowledge and common
sense”).
Appellant’s arguments are directed to the obviousness of modifying a
boot liner. As explained in the discussion of Issue 1, Black’s disclosure is
not limited to, and is not relied on by the Examiner solely for a disclosure of
boot liners. (Supra, p. 6-10; see also, Ans. 20 (“Black discloses that the
product may be used for a variety of applications.”).) Further, as pointed out
by the Examiner, Appellant’s arguments are directed to the express
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teachings of the references, and fail to address the Examiner’s findings with
respect to the knowledge and level of skill of the ordinary artisan. (See Ans.
19.) In other words, Appellant has not explained why the Examiner erred in
determining that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated
to modify Black’s absorbent material to achieve a desired end use (e.g., a
dry wiping/tissue product), based on both the teachings of Peterson and “the
ability of one skilled in the art to vary the constituent amounts to obtain a
desired basis weight and bulk value” (Ans. 19).
In sum, Appellant has not identified error in the Examiner’s
determination that it would have been obvious to have used an absorbent
fibrous sheet as claimed for the absorbent material in Black’s flexible
heating material based on Peterson’s disclosure that such materials were
conventional for use in making absorbent fabrics. Therefore, the foregoing
arguments do not persuade us of error in grounds of rejection 1-4.
ISSUE 3
In grounds of rejection 4 and 8, the Examiner relies on Smith for a
teaching of the wet strength agent recited in dependent claim 27. The issue
presented for our review is: has Appellant identified error in the Examiner’s
proposed motivation for using a wet strength agent as taught by Smith in the
absorbent material of Black as modified by the secondary references?
ISSUE 3: FINDINGS OF FACT, PRINCIPLES OF LAW,
AND ANALYSIS

Smith discloses the addition of a wet strength agent to paper products
made from cellulose fiber (col. 1, l. 17), including paper towels, tissues, and
disposable hospital wear to enable their use in a moistened or wet condition.
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(Col. 1, ll. 10-15, and 39-42.) Smith notes, “[f]or example, moistened tissue
or towel may be used for body or other cleaning.” (Col. 1, ll. 15-16.)
The Examiner determined that it would have been obvious to add a
wet strength agent to Black’s absorbent material to “advantageously increase
[its] wet strength.” (Ans. 9 and 15.) Appellant contends that there would
have been no motivation to incorporate a wet strength agent into Black’s
boot liner because there is no teaching that the amount of moisture retained
by the liner is sufficient to require a wet strength agent. (Br. 6; see also, Br.
8.)
“As long as some motivation or suggestion to combine the references
is provided by the prior art taken as a whole, the law does not require that
the references be combined for the reasons contemplated by the inventor.”
In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Cf. KSR, 550 U.S. at
421 (explaining that it is erroneous to conclude “that a patent claim cannot
be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was
‘obvious to try’”).
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because Appellant has again
failed to take into account the Examiner’s findings with respect to the
knowledge of the ordinary artisan and motivation to modify Black’s
absorbent material to achieve a desired end use, i.e., a use other than as a
boot liner and one in which increased wet strength would be desirable. (See
Ans. 21 (noting that Appellant’s arguments fail to consider the teachings of
the references in combination with the knowledge generally available to one
of ordinary skill in the art).)
Appellant has not identified error in the Examiner’s proposed
motivation for modifying the applied prior art to include a wet strength agent
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as taught by Smith and, therefore, the foregoing arguments do not persuade
us of error in grounds of rejection 4 and 8.
ISSUE 4
The Examiner relies on the combined teachings of Black and Fish in
rejecting all of the appealed claims. (See above-listed grounds of rejection
5-8.) Appellant contends that the Examiner’s obviousness determination as
to claim 10 is based on an erroneous finding that Fish teaches or suggests a
substrate consisting essentially of cellulosic fibers. (Br. 7.) Therefore, we
consider the following issue:
Has Appellant identified error in the Examiner’s determination that it
would have been obvious to have used a material consisting essentially of
cellulosic fibers as recited in appealed claim 10 for the absorbent material in
Black’s flexible heating material based on the teachings of Fish?
ISSUE 4: FINDINGS OF FACT, PRINCIPLES OF LAW,
AND ANALYSIS

Claim 10 depends from independent claim 1 and requires that “the
fibers of the absorbent fibrous sheet consist essentially of cellulosic fibers.”
The Examiner’s rejection of claim 10 as unpatentable over Black in
view of Fish (see ground of rejection 5 supra p. 4) is based on a finding that
Fish teaches “it [was] known in the shoe liner art to use cellulosic fibers.”
(Ans. 11.) In support of this finding, the Examiner references the “entire
document including [0026]” of Fish. (Ans. 11.)
Appellant correctly points out that Fish, in paragraph [0026], actually
states the contrary, i.e., “the substrates can be generally free of cellulosic
materials.” (See Br. 7.) Appellant also specifically challenges the
Examiner’s finding that Fish, as a whole, teaches or suggests a substrate
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consisting essentially of cellulosic fibers. In response, the Examiner asserts
that “Fish does not teach that the fibers could not consist essentially of
cellulosic.” (Ans. 22.)
“[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere
conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning
with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417-18 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977,
988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)); see also, Perfect Web, 587 F.3d at 1330 (“[T]o invoke
‘common sense’ or any other basis for extrapolating from prior art to a
conclusion of obviousness, a district court must articulate its reasoning with
sufficient clarity for review.”).
Appellant has persuasively argued that the Examiner’s findings are
not sufficient to meet the PTO’s initial burden to establish a prima facie case
of obviousness. The Examiner’s finding that Fish teaches the known use of
cellulosic fibers is not sufficient to establish that it would have been obvious
to use an absorbent material “consisting essentially of” such fibers, given
Appellant’s unrefuted assertion that Fish requires the use of “synthetic
fibrous substrates.” (Br. 7.) Therefore, we do not sustain ground of
rejection 5 as to claim 10.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant has identified error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 10
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Black in view of Fish.
Therefore, we do not sustain ground of rejection 5 as to claim 10. However,
we do sustain ground of rejection 5 as to claims 1, 7, 11-17, and 26. We also
sustain grounds of rejection 1-4 and 6-10.
The decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1, 3, and 7-27 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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KIMBERLY-CLARK WORLDWIDE, INC.
TARA POHLKOTTE
401 NORTH LAKE STREET
NEENAH, WI 54956
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