Ex Parte Shaffer et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 26, 2018

13610749 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 26, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/610,749 09/11/2012 Joshua H. Shaffer 4860P14739 7764
45217 7590 02/28/2018
WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP/ APPLE INC.
Attn: IP Docketing
P.O. Box 7037
Atlanta, GA 30357-0037
EXAMINER
TSWEI, YU-JANG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2619
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/28/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
FIP_Group @bstz. com
PTO.MAIL@BSTZPTO.COM
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOSHUA H. SHAFFER and ANDREW M. MATUSCHAK
Appeal 2017-006811
Application 13/610,749
Technology Center 2600
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JEREMY J. CURCURI, and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.
MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2017-006811
Application 13/610,749
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1—14 and 16—18. Claims 15 and 19—22 have been cancelled. App.
Br. 15—16. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Representative Claim
Representative claim 1 under appeal reads as follows:
1. In an environment with a device having a display with
multiple views and executing a user interface software process that
interacts with multiple processes that alter the multiple views, a
method, comprising:
[A.] receiving, by a first service of the device, at least one request for
animation from a first process of the device;
[B.] establishing, by the user interface software process, a first barrier
to temporarily prevent the at least one request for animation
from transferring from the first service to a render server;
[C.] transferring, by the user interface software process, the at least
one request for animation from the first service to a second
service associated with a second process of the device;
[D.] establishing, by the user interface software process in response to
receiving a finish setup operation associated with the at least
one request for animation, a second barrier to temporarily
prevent the at least one request for animation from transferring
from the second service to the render server;
[E.] performing, by the user interface software process in response to
receiving the finish setup operation, the at least one request for
animation transferred to the second service;
[F.] allowing, by the user interface software process, the at least one
request for animation to transfer to the render server in response
to removing the first and second barriers; and
[G.] synchronizing the animation in the multiple views of the multiple
processes.
App. Br. 12 (Claims Appendix).
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Appeal 2017-006811
Application 13/610,749
Rejections
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 7, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over the combination of Platzer et al. (US
2008/0165161 Al, published July 10, 2008), Lau et al. (2012/0147012 Al,
pub. June 14, 2012), and Owens et al. (US 5,621,878, iss. April 15, 1997).1
The Examiner rejected claims2 2, 3, 8, 9, and 14 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Platzer, Lau, Owens,
and Wong et al. (US 2011/0087731 Al, pub. April 14, 2011).3
The Examiner rejected claims 4—6, 10-12, and 16—18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Platzer, Lau, Owens,
and Matic (US 2008/0071657 Al, pub. March 20, 2008).4
Issues on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 as being obvious?
1 Separate patentability is not argued for claims 7 and 13. Except for our
ultimate decision, these claims are not discussed further herein.
2 The Final Action contains a typographical error (“2-3, 8-9, 14-15” should
read—2, 3, 8, 9, and 14—) at page 8.
3 Separate patentability is not argued for claims 2, 3, 8, 9, and 14. Rather,
Appellants address these claims by referencing the argument for claim 1.
Thus, the rejection of these claims turns on our decision as to claim 1.
Except for our ultimate decision, these claims are not discussed further
herein.
4 Separate patentability is not argued for claims 4—6, 10-12, and 16—18.
Rather, Appellants address these claims by referencing the argument for
claim 1. Thus, the rejection of these claims turns on our decision as to
claim 1. Except for our ultimate decision, these claims are not discussed
further herein.
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Appeal 2017-006811
Application 13/610,749
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments (Appeal Brief) that the Examiner has erred. We disagree. We
concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner.
A
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because (formatting and emphasis added):
[T]he Examiner interprets Lau’s second application as
equivalent to Appellant’s claimed user interface software
process because the graphics of the second application can form
a user interface, and thus the second application must be
considered to be user interface software.
App. Br. 6.
First, in Lau, it is the coordinator that waits for the end
information before generating the frames of the transition
animation. Assume for the purposes of argument, that waiting for
the end information before generating the transition animation
can properly be considered as equivalent to establishing a first
barrier that prevents an animation request from being transferred
to a render server as claimed by Appellant. It follows then that it
is the coordinator in Lau that establishes the first barrier, not the
second application, because it is the coordinator that generates
the frames of the transition animation, not the second application.
Accordingly, Lau’s second application cannot be properly
interpreted as equivalent to Appellant’s claimed user interface
software process that establishes the first barrier as asserted by
the Examiner.
Second, the Examiner interprets the waiting of Lau’s
second application until it is ready as equivalent to establishing
a second barrier as claimed by Appellant. However, Appellant
claims that it is the user interface software process that
establishes the second barrier.
App. Br. 7 (emphasis added).
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Appeal 2017-006811
Application 13/610,749
We disagree. Appellants’ above contention is not supported by
citations to the Final Action showing where the Examiner has drawn the
specific equivalency argued by Appellants. Contrary to Appellants’
argument, our review does not find where the “Examiner interprets Lau’s
second application as equivalent to Appellant’s claimed user interface
software process.” Rather, we find the Examiner relies on Lau as teaching
an overall software process where the applications (e.g., second application)
have barriers. As Appellants acknowledge, it is the coordinator 620 in Lau
that establishes barriers, and is “configured to synchronize application 600
and application 610” (the second application). Lau | 51.
Appellants’ argument is a nonresponsive straw man argument that
addresses a finding not made by the Examiner in the rejection. As such, it
fails to demonstrate error in the Examiner’s findings and reasoning.
B
Appellants also contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
[T]he Examiner asserts that providing the GUI for the
transition animation to the second application is equivalent to
the user software interface transferring a request from
animation from a first application to a second application as
claimed by Appellant.
App. Br. 6.
Lau discloses that either [the] coordinator or the first
application provides the GUI to the second application. The
Examiner asserts that providing the GUI for the transition
animation to the first and second applications by the coordinator
is equivalent to transferring an animation request from a first
service to a second service by a user interface software process
as claimed by Appellant. Thus, the Examiner is interpreting this
embodiment in Lau as teaching that the coordinator, not Lau’s
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Appeal 2017-006811
Application 13/610,749
second application, is equivalent to Appellant’s user interface
software process. However, this interpretation contradicts the
Examiner’s position that the second application is equivalent to
Appellant’s user interface software process.
App. Br. 8 (emphasis added).
We disagree. We find no contradiction in the Examiner’s position for
the reasons discussed above at section A. Again, Appellants’ argument is a
nonresponsive straw man argument that addresses a finding not made by the
Examiner in the rejection.
C
Appellants further contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
Lau clearly states that, when the coordinator provides the GUI
to the second application, the GUI itself is generated by the
coordinator. In contrast, Appellant claims that the animation
request is received by the first service from the first process and
Appellant’s specification discloses that the first process
initiates the request, not the user interface software process
[see the description of process 310 at paragraph 50]. Therefore,
Appellant respectfully submits that, when the claims are properly
interpreted in light of the specification, the coordinator in this
embodiment of Lau cannot be regarded as equivalent to
Appellant’s user interface software process as claimed.
App. Br. 8 (emphasis added).
We disagree. Appellants’ reasoning is unpersuasive as Lau explicitly
states “Application 600 can initiate animation 624 by sending start
information 602 to coordinator 620.” Lau | 52. Therefore, Lau teaches that
an external process, not the coordinator, initiates the animation.
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Appeal 2017-006811
Application 13/610,749
CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1—14 and 16—18
as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
(2) Claims 1—14 and 16—18 are not patentable.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—14 and 16—18 are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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