Ex Parte Seshadri

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 23, 2013

10709791 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 23, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SREEKUMAR K. SESHADRI1
____________

Appeal 2010-005533
Application 10/709,791
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before DENISE M. POTHIER, JEFFREY S. SMITH,
and JAMES B. ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

ARPIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1-4, 6-10, 12-22, 27, 29, and 30. Claims 5, 11, 23-26,
and 28 are cancelled. App. Br. 2.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b). We affirm.

1 Oracle International Corporation is the real party in interest.
2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Appeal Brief (App. Br.) filed
June 10, 2009; (2) the Examiner’s Answer (Ans.) mailed September 2, 2009;
and (3) the Reply Brief (Reply Br.) filed November 2, 2009.
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INVENTION
Appellant’s invention relates to methods and computer-readable
media for use in digital processing systems to enable users to have custom
desired experiences while accessing electronic files. See generally Spec.
¶ [0002]. Claims 1 and 10 are illustrative and are reproduced below with
disputed limitations emphasized:
1. A method implemented in a digital processing system to enable
a user to have a custom desired experience while accessing
electronic files using an application, each electronic file storing
content in the form of corresponding data, said method being
performed in said digital processing system, said method
comprising:
providing said user the ability to specify a first experience
profile associated with a first electronic file and a second
experience profile associated with a second electronic file, said
first experience profile being provided external to said first
electronic file and said second experience profile being provided
external to said second electronic file, said first experience profile
containing a first set of values for a first set of experience attributes
and said second experience profile containing a second set of
values for a second set of experience attributes;
storing a first entry indicating that said first experience profile
is associated with said first electronic file and a second entry
indicating that said second experience profile is associated with
said second electronic file, both of said first entry and said second
entry being stored in a memory, said first entry being stored in
response to said user specifying that said first experience profile is
associated with said first electronic file and said second entry being
stored in response to said user specifying that said second
experience profile is associated with said second electronic file;
receiving a first request to open said first electronic file and a
second request to open said second electronic file, wherein both of
said first request and said second request are received after said
storing of said first entry and said second entry in said memory;
controlling said first set of experience attributes according to
said first set of values based on said first entry in said memory
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while providing access to a substantial portion of the data stored in
said first electronic file using said application in response to said
first request; and
controlling said second set of experience attributes according
to said second set of values based on said second entry in said
memory while providing access to a substantial portion of the data
stored in said second electronic file using said application in
response to said second request.

10. A method of enabling a user to play desired songs while editing
the content of corresponding files, said method comprising:
enabling said user to specify an experience attribute associated
with a first electronic file and a value for said experience attribute,
wherein said experience attribute identifies another file containing
data representing a song;
receiving an input to open said first electronic file;
opening said first electronic file using a word processing
application to enable said user to edit a substantial portion of the
data stored in said first electronic file in response to receiving said
input; and
playing said song also in response to receiving said input,
wherein said song is played also in response to said user specifying
said experience attribute associated with said electronic file while
said user edits the data stored in said first electronic file using said
word processing application.

The Examiner relies on the following as evidence of unpatentability:
Stucka
Novak
Craycroft
US 5,596,702
US 2002/0101444 A1
US 2002/0149629 A1
Jan. 21, 1997
Aug. 1, 2002
Oct. 17, 2002
THE REJECTION
The Examiner rejected claims 1-4, 6-10, 12-22, 27, 29, and 30 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Craycroft, Novak, and Stucka.
Ans. 3-13.

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OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER
CRAYCROFT, NOVAK, AND STUCKA
Regarding illustrative claim 1, the Examiner finds that Craycroft
teaches or suggests all of the limitations of claim 1 (Ans. 3-4), except for a
second experience profile containing a second set of values for a second set
of experience attributes associated with and for controlling a second
electronic file (Ans. 3-4). The Examiner finds, however, that Novak teaches
or suggests a second experience profile containing a second set of values for
a second set of experience attributes associated with a second electronic file.
Ans. 4. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to
combine the Craycroft and Novak to achieve a different look for various
applications and user interfaces. Id. Further, the Examiner finds that Stucka
teaches a second set of values for controlling a second electronic file and a
second entry which indicates that the second experience profile is associated
with the second electronic file and which is stored to and loaded from a
memory. Id. Therefore, the Examiner concludes that a person of ordinary
skill in the relevant art would have a reason to combine Stucka’s teaching
regarding control of a second electronic file with the custom experience
taught by Craycroft and Novak to achieve “a greater degree of control over
the interface through file and application interaction.” Id.
Independent claim 14 is substantially similar to claim 1, but claim 14
lacks the storing limitation of claim 1. App. Br. 26. Therefore, the
Examiner rejects claim 14 based on the same combination of references and
for substantially the same reasons as claim 1. Ans. 10-11.
Independent claim 29 is substantially similar to claim 1, but, like
claim 14, claim 29 lacks the storing limitation of claim 1 and includes a
default value specified by an application or an operating system executing
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the application, which default value may be overridden by attribute values in
the first experience profile or values internal to the first electronic file. App.
Br. 30. The Examiner finds, however, that the same combination of
references applies to this claim and that the additional limitations are taught
or suggested by Craycroft’s disclosure of an “Apple default” (Ans. 6 (citing
Craycroft, Fig. 11)) and Stucka’s disclosure of a default hierarchy (Ans. 6-7
(citing Stucka, col. 10, ll. 1-45)). Ans. 13 (noting that claims 29 and 30 are
rejected under the same rationale as claim 8).
Unlike claims 1, 14, and 29, independent claim 10 only recites
limitations with respect to a first electronic file and recites that the first
electronic file includes an experience attribute that identifies another file
containing data representing a song. App. Br. 25. According to claim 10,
when the first electronic file is opened, the user is enabled to edit a
“substantial portion” of the data stored in the first electronic file. Id.
Nevertheless, the Examiner finds that the same combination of references
applies to this claim and that these additional limitations are taught or
suggested by Novak. Ans. 8-9, 17 (citing Novak, ¶¶ [0160]-[0161]; Fig. 14).
Appellant argues that Craycroft, Novak, and Stucka fail to teach or
suggest all of the limitations of claims 1, 10, 14, 29, and 30. App. Br. 13-16,
18-21; Reply Br. 2-4, 6-7. Further, Appellant argues that the Examiner fails
to consider the alleged benefits of Appellant’s invention when considering
the proposed combination of references (App. Br. 16; Reply Br. 5); that the
Examiner misconstrues the combined references (App. Br. 16-17); that the
combined references are not analogous art (App. Br. 17-18; Reply Br. 5);
and that the technologies of the combined references are different, such that
the references cannot operate in combination (App. Br. 18).
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ISSUES
(1) Under § 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 by
finding that Craycroft, Novak, and Stucka, collectively, would have taught
or suggested all of the limitations of that claim?
(2) Is the Examiner’s reason to combine the teachings of Craycroft,
Novak, and Stucka supported by articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion with respect
to claim 1?
(3) Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding Craycroft, Novak,
and Stucka, collectively, would have taught or suggested:
(a)
[a] default value is specified by at least one of said application
and an operating system executing said application; and
. . . each of said first set of values for a corresponding
attribute is formed from said default value overridden by a
value specified in said first experience profile for the same
attribute if present within said first experience profile, which is
further overridden by another value internal to said first
electronic file for the same attribute if present within said first
electronic file,
as recited in claim 29?
(b) “opening said first electronic file using a word processing
application to enable said user to edit a substantial portion of the data stored
in said first electronic file in response to receiving said input,” as recited in
claim 10?
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ANALYSIS
1. Claims 1-4, 6-9, 14-22, and 27.
Based on the record before us, we find no error in the Examiner’s
rejection of representative claim 1. Appellant argues that independent
claim 1 includes at least the following features:
(F1) the user be provided the ability to specify
different experience profiles in relation to different
electronic files in the same digital processing system;
(F2) entries indicating the association of different
electronic files with corresponding experience profiles be
stored in a memory;
(F3) requests to open the two electronic files be
received after the entries are stored in the memory;
(F4) the files be opened in response to the open
requests and the experience for the respective files be
controlled according to the entries stored in the
memory;
(F5) access to content of both the files be
provided using the same application;
(F6) access to a substantial portion of the data
stored in each file be provided; and
(F7) the experience profiles be external to the
electronic files.3
App. Br. 13-14 (emphases in original); Reply Br. 2. Appellant identifies
these features in the arguments (App. Br. 13-16; Reply Br. 2-4), and, in turn,

3 With respect to feature F6, Appellant merely argues that Craycroft’s data
would not be “substantial.” App. Br. 16 (emphasis omitted). Appellant
provides no evidence to support this argument. It is well settled that
arguments of counsel cannot take the place of factually supported objective
evidence. See In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139-40 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Further,
Appellant makes no arguments regarding feature F7. Therefore, we do not
consider feature F6 or F7 further.
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the Examiner refers to the identified feature in responding to Appellant’s
arguments (Ans. 13-15). Nevertheless, we consider these features only to
the extent that they are related to the language of representative claim 1.
Initially, Appellant argues that Craycroft describes a method of
creating a theme which would affect the display of the content of a file, and
which would also affect the display of all other files by that program. App.
Br. 14. Similarly, Appellant argues that Novak describes opening a file to
play a song or a playlist, such that a skin4 change would affect all songs
played thereafter. Id. Appellant then argues that Stucka describes sharing
user interface displays across multiple application programs, such that a
change in user interface would affect access to all files controlled by that
application. Id. Thus, Appellant contends that neither Craycroft nor Novak
nor Stucka teaches or suggests tailoring separate files to have different
displays. Id. We disagree.
Appellant misunderstands the Examiner’s combination of the
teachings of these references. “The test for obviousness is not whether the
features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference . . . . Rather, the test is what the combined
teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill
in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981); see also In re
Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is not necessary that the
inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the
invention under review.”). Rather, “if a technique has been used to improve

4 Novak describes a “skin” as the visual portion of a user interface, e.g., “the
portion that a user sees when [he or she] interact[s] with an application.”
Novak, ¶ [0004].
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one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it
would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is
obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.” KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). Thus, the Examiner is not
simply combining steps or portions of the steps of the methods described by
Craycroft, Novak, and Stucka. Instead, the Examiner finds here that, in view
of the techniques taught or suggested by Novak and Stucka, a person of
ordinary skill in the relevant art would have reason to modify the teachings
of Craycroft to achieve Appellant’s invention, as recited in claim 1.
In particular, the Examiner finds that Craycroft teaches or suggests
that a theme corresponding to a first experience profile may be associated
with a first electronic file (Ans. 3 (citing Craycroft, Fig. 2C (“Look and
Feel”)); see also Craycroft, ¶ [0038] (discussing themes in regard to Figures
2C-2E)); that the theme may be external to the electronic file (Ans. 3 (citing
Craycroft, Figs. 2A-2C (“Views” of Figure 2C control files such as “untitled
2”))); that the theme may contain values that correspond to theme attributes
(Ans. 3-4 (citing Craycroft, Fig. 2C (“Font for views,” “Icon Views,” and
“List Views”)); and that the identification of a selected theme, corresponding
to a first entry, may be stored to or retrieved from memory (Ans. 3-4 (citing
Craycroft, Figs. 2C-2E (depicting alternative themes))). Appellant argues
that Craycroft applies the selected “theme” (or experience profile) to all files
in a particular application. App. Br. 14. Even if correct, the Examiner does
not rely on Craycroft to teach or suggest applying different experience
profiles to different electronic files. Ans. 4.
The Examiner, instead, finds that Novak teaches or suggests that first
and second electronic files may be assigned first and second experience
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profiles, respectively. Ans. 4 (citing Novak, ¶ [0003]; Figs. 18-22 (depicting
the setting of volume levels)). In particular, Novak states that, “against the
backdrop of standardized [user interfaces (UIs)], there began to surface
concerns associated with providing the ability to impart a different look to
various UIs.” Novak, ¶ [0003] (emphases added). In view of Novak’s focus
on branding by and flexibility in the selection of skins, the Examiner finds
that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have reason to
combine the teachings of Craycroft and Novak to achieve the limitations of
claim 1, except for those relating to a second set of values for controlling the
a second electronic file and to a second entry which may be stored to and
loaded from memory. Ans. 4. We agree. Moreover, the Examiner relies on
Stucka to supply the remaining limitations and to tie the teachings of
Craycroft and Novak together. Id.
Referring to Stucka’s Figures 4 and 5, the Examiner finds that Stucka
teaches or suggests that one of a plurality of interfaces, Interface-1 thru
Interface-N, may be associated with at least one of a plurality of
applications, Application-A thru Application-Z. Ans. 13, 15. The Examiner
finds that Stucka’s interfaces correspond to Appellant’s experience profiles.
See Stucka, col. 6, ll. 25-65. Stucka states that user interfaces may consist of
sub-hierarchies of interface user components and that if, for example, “the
user selects the print function[,] the application will command the user
interface server [(UIS)] to load the print sub-hierarchy from the display
object store.” Stucka, col. 10, ll. 23-35 (cited at Ans. 4). Thus, the
Examiner finds that Stucka teaches or suggests that a particular interface
may be associated with a particular application and that an entry identifying
the interface associated with the application may be stored to and loaded
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from memory. Ans. 13, 15. Further, referring to Stucka’s Figure 5, which
depicts the display object store, we note that the display object store contains
Interface-1 thru Interface-N and that Stucka explains that “[t]he user
interfaces are stored externally from the UIS, window management system,
and the applications. . . . The UIS can retrieve user interfaces from the
display object store or have the display object store retrieve a specified user
interface or a list of user interface names.” Stucka, col. 17, ll. 1-11
(describing the display object store depicted in Figure 5) (emphasis added).
Therefore, the Examiner concludes that a person of ordinary skill in the
relevant art would combine Stucka’s teachings regarding the external storage
and the retrieval of an interface that is associated with an application, with
Craycroft and Novak, to achieve Appellant’s invention as described in claim
1. Ans. 4. We agree.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Appellant’s arguments regarding
features F1-F7. With respect to feature F1, Appellant argues that, although
claim 1 recites that “users” specify different experience profiles, Stucka
contemplates that “developers” provide an application with a “user”
interface. App. Br. 15; see Stucka, col. 1, ll. 18-21. Appellant argues that
developers cannot be equated with users. App. Br. 15. Appellant, however,
misunderstands the Examiner’s combination of the references. The
Examiner does not rely upon Stucka to teach or suggest the user
specification of experience profiles and does not attempt to equate
developers with users. Ans. 3. As the Examiner explains, the combination
teaches or suggests “providing said user the ability to specify a first
experience profile associated with a first electronic file and a second
experience profile associated with a second electronic file” because Stucka
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teaches or suggests that a particular interface may be associated with a
particular application. Ans. 13.
With respect to features F2 and F3, Appellant argues that, because
none of the combined references describes associating a change in a user
interface with an individual electronic file, as opposed to an application, no
entry related to an individual electronic file can be stored in memory (F2),
and no request to open the files can be received “after” the entries are stored
(F3). App. Br. 13. Again, Appellant misunderstands the Examiner’s
combination of the references. As the Examiner notes, Craycroft teaches or
suggests that a theme, e.g., a first experience profile, may be associated with
all of the electronic files accessed through an application. Ans. 3, 13-14.
Stucka teaches that application programs and interfaces may be stored in
memory, that such programs may be associated with a particular interface,
and that a previously-associated interface may be retrieved when the
program is opened. Ans. 13-14 (citing Stucka, col. 7, l. 54–col. 8, l. 3), see
also Stucka, col. 8, ll. 4-5 (discussing the interaction of user interface server
48 with display object store 46). Thus, the Examiner appropriately applies
Stucka’s teaching to Craycroft and Novak to find that the combination
teaches or suggests “receiving a first request to open said first electronic file
and a second request to open said second electronic file, wherein both of
said first request and said second request are received after said storing of
said first entry and said second entry in said memory.”
Referring to features F3 and F4, Appellant argues that Stucka relates
to sharing user interface displays among multiple application programs.
App. Br. 14. Hence, Appellant argues that changes to Stucka’s user
interfaces would affect access by the application program to all files. Id.
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Consequently, Appellant argues that no request to open the files can be
received “after” the entries are stored for particular electronic files (F3) and
that, because, Stucka’s changes affect the entire application, the experiences
for the respective files are not controlled according to the entries (F4). Id.
For the reasons set forth above, we remain unpersuaded by Appellant’s
arguments concerning feature F3. Regarding feature F4, Appellant again
misunderstands the Examiner’s combination of the references. The
Examiner relies upon the teachings of Novak, rather than Stucka, to teach or
suggest that “experience profiles” may be applied to different electronic files
which are governed by the same application. Ans. 4, 14-15. Therefore, we
are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments.
Referring to feature F5, Appellant argues that the proposed
combination of references fails to teach or suggest that the first and second
electronic files are provided using “the same application.” App. Br. 13-15;
Reply Br. 2-4; see also App. Br. 16-17 (arguing that the Examiner
misconstrues Stucka because Stucka’s Application A-Application Z do not
correspond to the claimed “application”). Claim 1 recites that the method
enables a user to have a custom desired experience “while accessing
electronic files using an application.” Initially, we note that, in patent
claims, the indefinite article “a” or “an” means “one or more.” KCJ Corp. v.
Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Moreover,
this construction is consistent with the description of an embodiment of
Appellant’s invention depicted in Figure 5. See Spec. ¶¶ [0017], [0052]
(describing application blocks 510-A and 510-B). Nevertheless, Appellant
notes that each of Craycroft, Novak, and Stucka uses the term “application”
and argues that, because these uses are not identical to Appellant’s use of the
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term “application,” the combination does not teach or suggest Appellant’s
claimed invention. App. Br. 13-15; Reply Br. 2-4. The test for obviousness,
however, is what the combined teachings of those references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. Because we do not find that
claim 1 is limited to accessing an electronic file through a single application
and because the Examiner has demonstrated that the combined references
teach or suggest accessing files through one or more “applications,” we are
not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments regarding this feature.
Appellant cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references
individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references.
See Keller, 642 F.2d at 426; In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097
(Fed. Cir. 1986). For this reason, as well as the reasons discussed above, we
are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments with respect to the alleged
absence of features F1-F5 from particular references.
Appellant raises three additional arguments regarding the
appropriateness of the Examiner’s combination of Craycroft, Novak, and
Stucka. First, Appellant argues that the Examiner has failed to demonstrate
that the new benefits of the claimed invention are taught or suggested by the
combined references. App. Br. 16; Reply Br. 5. We disagree and note that,
for the reasons discussed above, the Examiner has demonstrated sufficiently
that the combined references teach or suggest providing a user with different
desired experiences associated with accessing different electronic files.
Ans. 3-4, 13-17. Thus, we find that the Examiner has adequately addressed
these benefits, as argued by the Examiner. See MPEP § 707.07(f).
Second, Appellant argues that the “environments” of the combined
references are fundamentally different, such that their combination is
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improper. App. Br. 17-18; Reply Br. 5-6. As the U.S. Supreme Court
explained in KSR,
[w]hen a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of
ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103
likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless
its actual application is beyond his or her skill.
550 U.S. at 417 (emphasis added). Even if the technologies represented by
the combined references are not the same, that does not, in and of itself,
prevent their combination in the manner proposed by the Examiner.
Moreover, although Stucka describes actions by application developers (e.g.,
Stucka, col. 1, ll. 18-21), Stucka teaches or suggests the dynamic sharing of
“user” interfaces and “user” interface components (e.g., id. at ll. 16-18).
Thus, we are not persuaded that the teachings of Stucka may not be
combined with those of Craycroft and/or Novak.
Third, Appellant argues that, because the environments of the three
references are in fundamentally different technology areas, the Examiner’s
combination of these references relies on impermissible hindsight. App. Br.
18. In a sense, any judgment on obviousness is necessarily a reconstruction
based on hindsight reasoning. Because we are not persuaded that the
references are from fundamentally different technology areas, Appellant
fails to demonstrate that the Examiner improperly relied on knowledge
gleaned only from Appellant’s disclosure. In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392,
1395 (CCPA 1971).
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For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in
the obviousness rejection of independent claim 1 or of independent claim 14
and dependent claims 2-4, 6-9, 15-22 and 27, which are not separately
argued with particularity. App. Br. 19, 21. Therefore, we sustain the
rejection of these claims.
2. Claims 29 and 30.
Based on the record before us, we do not find that the Examiner erred
by finding that Craycroft, Novak, and Stucka, collectively, would have
taught or suggested the allegedly missing limitation of claim 29. App.
Br. 30. With respect to the independent claim 29, Appellant argues that
Craycroft, Novak, and Stucka fail to teach or suggest limitations of claim 29
that are shared by claim 1. App. Br. 19-20 (arguing that the combination
would apply the same experience profile to all of the electronic files); see
also Reply Br. 6 (discussing the application of Craycroft’s theme to all of its
electronic files). Appellant makes substantially the same arguments
regarding the rejection of dependent claim 30. App. Br. 20-21. In view of
the foregoing discussion of the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, we find
these arguments unpersuasive.
In addition, Appellant argues that the Examiner relies on different
disclosures in the Examiner’s Answer, i.e., Craycroft, Fig. 11 (describing
“Apple Default”), from those relied upon in the Final Rejection. Reply
Br. 6. We note, however, that, in the Final Rejection, the Examiner referred
to the rationale for rejecting claim 8 in rejecting claim 29 and 30. Final
Rej. 12; see also Ans. 13. Because the Examiner relied on Craycroft’s
Figure 11 in rejecting claim 8 (see Final Rej. 5-7; Ans. 6-7), we find these
arguments unpersuasive.
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For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in
the obviousness rejection of: (1) independent claim 29 and (2) dependent
claim 30. Therefore, we sustain these rejections.
3. Claims 10, 12, and 13.
Based on the record before us, we do not find that the Examiner erred
by finding that Craycroft, Novak, and Stucka, collectively, would have
taught or suggested the allegedly missing limitation of claim 10. App.
Br. 25. In particular, Appellant argues that claim 10 recites that “opening
said first electronic file using a word processing application to enable said
user to edit a substantial portion of the data stored in said first electronic file
in response to receiving said input; and playing said song also in response to
receiving said input” (emphases added) and that this recitation requires a
“single open action” both to open the first electronic file for editing of that
file and for playing a song. App. Br. 18-19. Nevertheless, we do not find
that Appellant’s claim 10 requires that “an input” comprises only a single
open action, nor does Appellant identify claim language or disclosure in the
Specification requiring this construction. Id. As noted above, in patent
claims, the indefinite article “an” means “one or more.” KCJ Corp., 223
F.3d at 1356. Therefore, regardless of whether Novak teaches or suggests
more than one action to achieve both opening the file for editing and playing
a song (Ans. 17), we find that Appellant’s arguments are not commensurate
with the scope of the claim, as construed.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in
the obviousness rejection of: (1) independent claim 10 and (2) dependent
claims 12 and 13, which are not separately argued with particularity.
Therefore, we sustain these rejections.
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CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-4, 6-10, 12-22, 27, 29,
and 30 under § 103.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-4, 6-10, 12-22, 27, 29,
and 30 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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