Ex Parte Serisky

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 16, 2014

12210675 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 16, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DAVID KARL SERISKY
___________

Appeal 2012-002656
Application 12/210,675
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before ERIC B. CHEN, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
CATHERINE SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges.

CHEN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2012-002656
Application 12/210,675

2
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of
claims 1–19, all the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates to detecting access to a serial port of a
video teleconferencing endpoint hard device. In response, actions are
performed, including alerting a user that the serial port has been accessed.
(Abstract.)
Claim 1 is exemplary, with disputed limitations in italics:
1. A method comprising:
detecting that a serial port of a video teleconferencing
endpoint hardware device has been accessed, wherein said
serial port is an input point for commands changing a
configuration of said video teleconferencing endpoint; and,
in response to detecting that the serial port of the video
teleconferencing endpoint hardware device has been accessed,
performing one or more actions,
wherein the actions comprise:
alerting a user that the serial port of the video
teleconferencing endpoint hardware device has been
accessed.

Claims 1–6, 10–12, 15, 16, 18, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Fang (US 2007/0139513 A1; June 21, 2007) and
Touboul (US 2007/0199060 A1; Aug. 23, 2007).
Claims 7, 8, 13, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over Fang, Touboul, and Carley (US 2003/0233583 A1; Dec. 18,
2003).
Appeal 2012-002656
Application 12/210,675

3
Claims 9 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Fang, Touboul, Carley, and Brooks (US 2008/0316940 A1; Dec. 25,
2008).

ANALYSIS
§ 103 Rejection — Fang and Touboul
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments (App. Br. 9–10; see
also Reply Br. 4–6) that the combination of Fang and Touboul would not
have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes the limitation
“detecting that a serial port of a video teleconferencing endpoint hardware
device has been accessed.”
The Examiner found that operatively connecting the mobile phone of
Fang to the laptop PC corresponds to the limitation “detecting that a serial
port of a video teleconferencing endpoint hardware device has been
accessed.” (Ans. 5–6, 24.) We agree with the Examiner.
Fang relates to a videophone soft client that runs on an electronic
device (e.g., a personal computer) that interfaces with a mobile phone
having a built-in camera. (Abstract.) Figure 8 of Fang illustrates an
“arrangement in which the mobile phone 100 is operatively connected to a
laptop PC 800” such that the “[l]aptop PC 800 also includes an internal
microphone 842.” (¶ 44.) Figure 8 of Fang further illustrates a cable 820
having a device connector 550 on one end, which is coupled to an accessory
connector 525 of a mobile phone 100. (¶ 45.) “The videophone soft client
running on laptop PC 800 also includes an application programming
interface . . . [that] interact and support a GUI that displays windows 850
and 852 on display screen 835.” (¶ 49.) Because the laptop PC 800 of Fang
Appeal 2012-002656
Application 12/210,675

4
is “operatively connected” to the mobile phone 100 via the cable 820, such
that the GUI of the laptop PC 800 activates display windows 850 and 852 ,
Fang teaches the limitation “detecting that a serial port of a video
teleconferencing endpoint hardware device has been accessed.”
Appellant argues “[i]f the USB port 832 must be in use between the
laptop and mobile phone taught by Fang for a video telephony device to
functionally exist, then there is no open port of the resulting video telephony
device for which a method can detect whether or not that port has been
accessed.” (App. Br. 10 (citation omitted).) However, the claim 1 limitation
“detecting that a serial port of a video teleconferencing endpoint hardware
device has been accessed” is broad enough to encompass the laptop PC 800
of Fang, which detects the cable 820 for connecting a mobile phone 100.
The claim does not expressly require detection when an open serial port of
the video teleconferencing endpoint hardware device has been accessed.
Appellant further argues that “according to Fang, a laptop, by itself, is
not a ‘video teleconferencing endpoint.’” (Reply Br. 5.) Accordingly,
Appellant argues, “Fang expressly teaches that, to form a video
teleconferencing system, the laptop must be connected to a mobile phone”
and “[o]nly when connected together do the mobile phone and host device
form a video telephony device.” (Id.) Contrary to Appellant’s arguments,
the laptop PC 800 of Fang can be construed as the claimed “video
teleconferencing endpoint hardware device” because the laptop PC 800 has
an internal microphone.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Fang and
Touboul would have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes
Appeal 2012-002656
Application 12/210,675

5
the limitation “detecting that a serial port of a video teleconferencing
endpoint hardware device has been accessed.”
We are further unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments (App. Br. 10–
12; see also Reply Br. 7–8) that the combination of Fang and Touboul would
not have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes the
limitation “wherein said serial port is an input point for commands changing
a configuration of said video teleconferencing endpoint.”
The Examiner found that the security engines of Touboul that execute
security programs, via a UBS connection, correspond to the limitation
“wherein said serial port is an input point for commands changing a
configuration of said video teleconferencing endpoint.” (Ans. 7, 24–25.)
We agree with the Examiner.
Touboul relates to “[a] small piece of hardware [that] connects to a
mobile device and filters out attacks and malicious code.” (Abstract.)
Figure 5 of Touboul illustrates a mobile security system 345 that is
incorporated within a mobile device 310. (¶ 43.) The mobile security
system 345 of Touboul includes security engines 530 (¶ 43) that “execute
security programs based on the security policies 535” (¶ 48). In one
embodiment, the mobile security system 345 is connected to the mobile
device 310 using a USB cable. (¶ 53.) Because the mobile device 310 of
Touboul connects to the mobile security system 345 via a USB cable and the
security engines 530 executes security programs, Touboul teaches the
limitation “wherein said serial port is an input point for commands changing
a configuration of said video teleconferencing endpoint.”
Appellant argues that “Touboul is completely unrelated to a video
teleconferencing endpoint” and “Touboul never even mentions video
Appeal 2012-002656
Application 12/210,675

6
telephony or a video teleconferencing endpoint.” (App. Br. 11; see also
Reply Br. 7.) However, the Examiner cited Fang, rather than Touboul, for
teaching the limitation “a video teleconferencing endpoint hardware device.”
(Ans. 6.)
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Fang and
Touboul would have rendered obvious independent claim 1, which includes
the limitation “wherein said serial port is an input point for commands
changing a configuration of said video teleconferencing endpoint.”
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 3–5 depend from claim 1, and Appellant has not
presented any substantive arguments with respect to these claims.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 3–5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a),
for the same reasons discussed with respect to independent claim 1.
Independent claim 10 recites limitations similar to those discussed
with respect to independent claim 1, and Appellant has not presented any
additional substantive arguments with respect to this claim. We sustain the
rejection of claim 10, as well as dependent claims 11, 12, and 18, for the
same reasons discussed with respect to claim 1.
Although Appellant nominally argues the rejection of dependent
claims 2, 6, 15, 16, and 19 separately (App. Br. 14–17; see also Reply Br. 9–
13), the arguments presented do not point out with particularity or explain
why the limitations of the dependent claims are separately patentable. See In
re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Board reasonably
interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal
brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that
the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”). Instead,
Appeal 2012-002656
Application 12/210,675

7
Appellant merely provides a conclusory statement that Fang does not teach
the features of these dependent claims without a sufficient explanation as to
why these dependent claims are patentable over Fang. (App. Br. 14–17; see
also Reply Br. 9–13.) We are not persuaded by these arguments for the
reasons discussed with respect to claims 1 and 10, from which claims 2, 6,
15, 16, and 19 depend. Accordingly, we sustain this rejection.

§ 103 Rejection — Fang, Touboul, and Carley
Although Appellant nominally argues the rejection of dependent
claims 7, 8, 13, and 17 separately (App. Br. 18; see also Reply Br. 14–15),
the arguments presented do not point out with particularity or explain why
the limitations of these dependent claims are separately patentable. See
Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357. Instead, Appellant merely provides a conclusory
statement that Carley does not teach the features of these dependent claims
without a sufficient explanation as to why these dependent claims are
patentable over Carley. (App. Br. 18; see also Reply Br. 14–15.) We are
not persuaded by these arguments for the reasons discussed with respect to
claims 1 and 10, from which claims 7, 8, 13, and 17 depend. Accordingly,
we sustain this rejection.

§ 103 Rejection — Fang, Touboul, Carley, and Brooks
Although Appellant nominally argues the rejection of dependent
claims 9 and 14 separately (App. Br. 18–19), the arguments presented do not
point out with particularity or explain why the limitations of these dependent
claims are separately patentable. See Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357. Instead,
Appellant merely provides a conclusory statement that Brooks does not
Appeal 2012-002656
Application 12/210,675

8
teach the features of these dependent claims without a sufficient explanation
as to why these dependent claims are patentable over Brooks. (App. Br. 18–
19.) We are not persuaded by these arguments for the reasons discussed
with respect to claims 1 and 10, from which claims 9 and 14 depend.
Accordingly, we sustain this rejection.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–19 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

msc