Ex Parte Seligmann

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 29, 2013

10350399 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 29, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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Ex parte DOREE DUNCAN SELIGMANN
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Appeal 2010-011464
Application 10/350,399
Technology Center 2400
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Before SCOTT R. BOALICK, BRUCE R. WINSOR, GREGG I.
ANDERSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

ANDERSON, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 8-10, and 21-33, which constitute all the claims
pending in this application. Claims 2, 4, 7 and 11-20 are cancelled. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part and make a new
ground of rejection under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention enables a wireless device to intelligently remind
a user about a pending task in its to-do list whose accomplishment has a
geographic aspect. In particular, the illustrative embodiment employs a to-
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do list in which tasks have an associated geo-location, and optionally, a
priority and/or due date, and determines whether to remind the user about a
task in the to-do list based on information including the user's current
location; the user's speed and direction of travel; the geo-locations of tasks in
the to-do list; the priorities of tasks in the to-do list; and the due dates of
tasks in the to-do list. See generally Spec. [0004].
Claim 1 is illustrative of outputting a reminder based in part on speed:
1. An apparatus comprising:
a memory for storing a to-do list, wherein said to-do list comprises at
least one task, and wherein each said task is associated with a respective
geo-location; and
a processor for:
(a) receiving a current geo-location and a speed; and
(b) determining whether to output a reminder based on said current
geo-location, said speed, and said respective geo-locations.

Claim 21 is illustrative of outputting a reminder based in part on
direction:
21. An apparatus comprising:
a memory for storing a to-do list, wherein said to-do list comprises at
least one task, and wherein each said task is associated with a respective
geo-location; and
a processor for:
(a) receiving a current geo-location and a direction; and
(b) determining whether to output a reminder based on said current
geo-location, said direction, and said respective geo-locations.

THE REJECTION
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 8-10, and 21-33 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Robertson (US Pub. 2002/0067308 A1;
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published June 6, 2002)(“Robertson”) and Tognazzini (US Patent No.
5,790,974; issued August 4, 1998) (“Tognazzini”). Ans. 3-10.1
The Examiner finds that Robertson teaches every recited element of
exemplary claims 1 and 21 except Robertson does not explicitly teach
determining whether to output a reminder based on current geo-location,
speed, and respective geo-locations, but cites Tognazzini as teaching these
features in concluding that the claims would have been obvious. Ans. 4-5
and 8-9.
Appellant argues Robertson and Tognazzini do not, either alone or in
combination, teach or suggest using speed, as recited in claim 1, or direction,
as recited in claim 21, in conjunction with location to determine whether to
output a reminder for a task in a to-do list. Br. 11-12.
ISSUES
(1) Under § 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 by
finding that Robertson and Tognazzini collectively would have taught or
suggested using speed, in conjunction with location, to determine whether to
output a reminder for a task in a to-do list?
(2) Under § 103, has the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 21 by
finding that Robertson and Tognazzini collectively would have taught or
suggested using direction, in conjunction with location, to determine
whether to output a reminder for a task in a to-do list?

1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Replacement Appeal Brief
filed December 17, 2009 (“Br.”); and (2) the Examiner’s Answer mailed
May 24, 2010 (“Ans.”). The Appeal Briefs filed December 15, 2007 and
March 24, 2009, and the Answer mailed March 27, 2008, have not been
considered as they are deemed to have been superseded.
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Appellant does not separately argue with particularity grounds for
patentability of any of the dependent claims 3, 5, 6, 8-10, 22-27, and 29-33.

ANALYSIS
Claims 1and 28
On this record, we find no error in the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection of claim 1 which recites, in pertinent part, “(a) receiving a current
geo-location and a speed; and (b) determining whether to output a reminder
based on said current geo-location, said speed, and said respective geo-
locations.”
The Examiner found Robertson discloses memory for storing a to-do
list, wherein said to-do list comprises at least one task. Ans. 4 (citing
Robertson, ¶ [0004]). The to-do list is created, organized, edited, and
maintained in the resident memory of the PDA. Id. A reminder of each task
is associated with a particular location which may be convenient to complete
the task. For example, the user of the PDA type device is reminded to pick
up a prescription when near the drug store. Robertson, ¶ [0007]. The actual
or current location is compared to the location-based reminder. Id. The user
is advised of a current geo-location or status and a speed or degree of
completion, as well as the designated location. Robertson, ¶ [0040].
Robertson discloses that each task may be a time based reminder associated
therewith a due date or deadline. Ans. 4.The user may selectively set
reminders to alert him that a particular due date is approaching or past. Id.
In this manner, the user is prompted to carry out the task at a specified time,
preferably, prior to or on the due date. Ans. 4 (citing Robertson, ¶ [0005]).
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The selected point in time for finishing a task at a particular date or time can
be interpreted as the speed in carrying out a task in the to-do list. Ans. 4-5.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in finding that the
combination of Robertson and Tognazzini teaches outputting a reminder
based on current geo-location, speed, and other “respective geo-locations”
associated with any given task in the to-do list. Br. 11. The Examiner finds
Robertson does not show determining whether to output a reminder based on
said current geo-location, speed, and respective geo-locations, but finds the
feature would have been obvious from Robertson and Tognazzini. Ans. 4-5.
Tognazzini is a calendar system which resolves conflicts between an
office calendar and a portable one, each having calendar entries or tasks.
They are interconnected wirelessly. Geo-location data is accessed, as is
traffic information. Scheduled travel times and associated reminder alarms
are updated in response to detected changes in traffic or the location of the
portable calendaring system, both of which are input parameters. Ans. 5, 12;
Tognazzini, col. 2, ll. 15-26; see also, Tognazzini, col. 8, l. 1-col. 9, l. 5
(travel times updated based on traffic information).
Appellant asserts there is a distinction between using speed to warn
the user will be late for a scheduled appointment, as taught by Tognazzini,
and outputting a reminder based on speed as recited. Br. 11. Appellant does
not explain why an indication that a user will be late is not encompassed by
the recited term “reminder.” Mere lawyer’s arguments and conclusory
statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little
probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see
also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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Based on the preceding, we conclude the Examiner has shown a
reasonable basis for finding that the cited combination shows updating a to-
do list based on a current and a respective geo-location and speed which
Appellant has not persuasively rebutted. Specifically, Tognazzini shows
inputting estimated travel times to update a calendar or task list. Estimated
travel times are necessarily based on speed. Traffic information is based on
speed of travel as well. Ultimately, the calendar is updated, i.e., a reminder
is generated based on the speed information.
Accordingly, the rejection of claims 1 and 28, which was argued on
the same basis as claim 1 (Br. 12), is sustained.
Claims 3, 5, 6, 8-10, and 29-33
Appellant has not separately argued the patentability any of claims 3,
5, 6, 8-10, and 29-33 which depend from claim 1 or 28. Accordingly, we
sustain the rejection of claims 3, 5, 6, 8-10, and 29-33.
Claim 21
Claim 21 is similar to claim 1 but includes a direction element in lieu
of speed. We find the Examiner erred in the obviousness rejection of
representative claim 21 which recites, in pertinent part, “(a) receiving a
current geo-location and a direction; and (b) determining whether to output a
reminder based on said current geo-location, said direction, and said
respective geo-locations.”
The Examiner uses virtually the same basis for rejection as was used
in regard to claim 1. Ans. 8-9, 13. The Examiner made no finding about
“direction” other than to assert the Robertson combination with Tognazzini
shows it. Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21 fails to
address how Robertson and Tognazzini teaches or suggests considering a
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user's direction as an input to the processor. Br. 12. We agree with
Appellant.
The Examiner has failed to provide a reasonable basis to show that
direction is a parameter used, in conjunction with the location of the task or
“respective geo-location,” to output a reminder.
Accordingly, the rejection is not sustained.
Claims 22-27
Claims 22-27 depend from claim 21. Accordingly, we do not sustain
the rejection of claims 22-27.

NEW GROUND OF REJECTION UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)
Claim 21 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being obvious over
Robertson, as applied by the Examiner in rejecting claim 3, in view of
Tognazzini.
In rejecting claim 3, the Examiner relied on the combination of
Robertson and Tognazzini as disclosing a processor for receiving a direction
and determining whether to output a reminder. The Examiner found the
combination disclosed using direction as an input. Ans. 5. More
specifically, the Examiner points to Tognazzini as teaching a “a portable
calendar system that generates an alternate travel route if a selected travel
route is determined to have a travel time conflicting with a scheduled
appointment.” Tognazzini, col. 2, ll. 1-4. We find, as did the Examiner,
generating a reminder based on geo-location is shown in Robertson.
Robertson, ¶ [0007].
The calendar system of Tognazzini shows a selected travel route and
an alternative travel route. Tognazzini, Figs. 4A- 4C; col. 13, l. 44-col. 14, l.
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39; col. 2, ll. 1-4. Tognazzini shows it is known to determine the distance
between two points, current and respective geo-locations, input the speed of
travel and estimated travel time as analyzed above in regard to claim 1, and
identify a scheduling conflict. Tognazzini, col. 8, ll. 1-15.
Direction information is also necessarily a part of the information
needed for Tognazzini to identify a scheduling conflict and create an
alternate travel route. Tognazzini, Figs. 4A- 4C; col. 13, l. 44-col. 14, l. 39;
col. 2, ll. 1-4. Any given route between two points includes direction
information, as claimed in claim 21. When the selected travel route would
result in a conflict with a scheduled appointment, the alternative route is
generated. New direction information is required. Thus based on the
direction, i.e. route, and speed the portable calendar system of Tognazzini
generates the alternative route.
In sum, direction information is input into Tognazzini’s calendar
system based on the selected route. It is determined whether a conflict with
a scheduled appointment will occur. If so, the alternative route, based on
new direction information, is generated and used in determining whether or
not to output a subsequent user alert (i.e., a “reminder”). Tognazzini Figs.
4A- 4C; col. 13, l. 44-col. 14, l. 39; col. 2, ll. 1-4.
Further, one of ordinary skill would consult GPS systems associated
with calendars, to do or task lists in approaching the problem purportedly
presented in claim 21, as taught by both Robertson and Tognazzini.
Robertson shows geo-location information from a GPS system in a PDA.
Robertson, Abstract. Similarly, Tognazzini shows the use of GPS to
determine location in the disclosed calendar system. Tognazzini, col. 6, ll.
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8-18. Further, the portable calendar system of Tognazzini can also be a
PDA. Tognazzini, col. 5, ll. 13-16.
As stated by the Examiner, and not persuasively disputed by
Appellant:
[I]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
at the time the invention was made to modify Robertson
invention with Tognazzini to provide an improvement to the
personal calendar system and ensures that the office calendar
system and the portable calendar system remain synchronized
by exchanging updated information related to the personal
calendar. Hence, the personal calendar system enables updating
by either a user of the office calendar system or a user of the
portable calendar system. The secondary user calendar
information output from the second agent of the portable
calendar system may also include arbitration information
between conflicting entries in the office calendar system and
the portable calendar system, ensuring avoidance of conflicts
between the office calendar system and the portable calendar
system. ([Tognazzini,] Col 3, lines 23-33)
Ans. 8-9.
We conclude that claim 21 would have been obvious over Robertson
in view of Tognazzini and enter a new ground of rejection of claim 21 under
§ 103.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 8-10, and 28-
33 under § 103.
The Examiner erred in rejecting claims 21-27 under § 103.
New grounds of rejection are entered for claim 21.

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ORDER
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 8-10, and 28-33 is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 22-27 is reversed.
We enter a new ground of rejection for claim 212 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103.
This decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides that “[a] new ground of rejection . . .
shall not be considered final for judicial review.”
Section 41.50(b) also provides that Appellant, WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of
the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to
avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the
claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both,
and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the
proceeding will be remanded to the examiner. . . .
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under
§ 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).

2 We leave to the Examiner to ascertain whether claims 22-27 should be
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious.

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2010).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)

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