Ex Parte Seawall

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 16, 2018

13792110 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 16, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
131792,110 03/10/2013
68371 7590 04/18/2018
DEEP AK MALHOTRA
MALHOTRA LAW FIRM, PLLC
P.O. BOX 1433
SPOKANE, WA 99210
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Stephen L. Seawall
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
SEAW-001 3790
EXAMINER
CHEIN, ALLEN C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3687
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/18/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
dmalhotra@patentsusa.com
docketing@patentsusa.com
malhotraspokane@hotmail.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEPHEN L. SEAWALL
Appeal2017-000109
Application 13/792,110 1
Technology Center 3600
Before JOHN A. EVANS, CATHERINE SHIANG, and
SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Non-Final
Rejection of claims 1-3 and 5-20, which constitute all of the claims pending
in this application. Claim 4 has been cancelled. Non-Final Act. 2. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.3l(a)(l) ("Every
applicant, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the
decision of the examiner to the Board.").
We affirm.
1 Appellant identifies the applicant, Stephen L. Seawall, as the real party in
interest. App. Br. 3.
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Application 13/792,110
THE INVENTION
The disclosed and claimed invention is directed to a systems and
methods for financial accounting. Spec. i-f 1.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A computerized accounting system comprising a
memory defining a data warehouse, a processor in
communication with the memory, and a communications
interface coupled to the processor and memory, for user input,
the system being configured to record single entry transactions,
in the data warehouse, including transactions for cash receipts,
cash disbursements, accounts payable, payroll payable, and
legal commitments and to generate, using the processor, in
response to a selection by a user, using the communications
interface, made after the transactions have been recorded in the
memory, a selected one of a cash basis statement including, for
a period, beginning cash balance, cash receipts, cash
disbursements, and ending cash balance, and a budgetary basis
statement including, for a period, beginning uncommitted cash,
receipts, expenditures, including legal commitments, and
uncommitted cash.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence in rejecting the
claims on appeal is:
McCarthy, Jr.
Sall eh
Olaiya et al.
Zubizarreta et al.
Basu et al.
US 2006/0089889 Al
US 2008/0286728 Al
US 8,055,536B1
US 2013/0046573 Al
US 2013/0179313 Al
Apr. 27, 2006
Nov. 20, 2008
Nov. 8, 2011
Feb.21,2013
July 11, 2013
State of South Carolina Blueprint GAP, 1.2 Definition of
Organizational Structures and Financial Master Data (hereinafter
"SCEIS").
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Thawan Baig, "Conversion from Single entry to Double entry,"
https://www.slideshare.net/thawban/ conversion-from-single-entry-to-
double-entry03 (Sept. 27, 2011) (hereinafter "Baig").
"How to Convert Cash Basis to Accrual Basis Accounting,"
Accountingtools.com (Nov. 4, 2011) (hereinafter "Accounting
Tools2").
Oracle, "PeopleSoft Enterprise General Ledger 9 .1 PeopleBook,"
(Nov. 2009) (hereinafter "GL91 ").
Letter from Matthew R. Serakowski, Township Manager, Township
Upper St. Clair to Board of Commissioners, Township Upper St. Clair
(Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.twpusc.org/finance/pdf/2011-Adopted-
Budget.pdf (hereinafter "St. Clair").
Oracle, "Setting Up the General Accounting System," (hereinafter
"Oracle").
REJECTIONS
Claims 1-3 and 5-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because
the claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Non-Final Act. 4--
5.
Claims 1 and 2 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over SCEIS in view of Salleh and McCarthy. Non-Final
Act. 5-14.
Claim 3 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over SCEIS in view of Salleh, McCarthy, and Baig. Non-Final
Act. 14--18.
Claims 5 and 6 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over SCEIS in view of Salleh, McCarthy, and Applicant
Admitted Prior Art. Non-Final Act. 18-20.
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Claims 7-9 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over SCEIS in view of Salleh, McCarthy, Olaiya, and GL91.
Non-Final Act. 20-24.
Claims 10 and 11 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over SCEIS in view of Salleh, McCarthy, Olaiya, and
Applicant Admitted Prior Art. Non-Final Act. 24--25.
Claim 18 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over SCEIS in view of Salleh, McCarthy, and St. Clair. Non-
Final Act. 25-26.
Claims 19 and 20 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over SCEIS in view of Salleh, McCarthy, St. Clair, and
Oracle. Non-Final Act. 26-29.
Claim 12, 13, and 15 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over SCEIS in view of Salleh, McCarthy,
Baig, and Zubizarreta. Non-Final Act. 29-35.
Claim 16 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over SCEIS in view of GL91, Olaiya, Salleh, Applicant
Admitted Prior Art, and McCarthy. Non-Final Act. 35-37.
Claim 17 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over SCEIS in view of GL91, Olaiya, Salleh, McCarthy, Baig,
and Basu. Non-Final Act. 37--40.
Claim 14 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over SCEIS in view of Salleh, McCarthy, Baig, Accounting
Tools2, and Basu. Non-Final Act. 41.
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ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejection in light of Appellant's
arguments that the Examiner erred. In reaching this decision, we have
considered all evidence presented and all arguments made by Appellant. We
are not persuaded by Appellant's arguments regarding the Examiner's
rejection of the claims under section 101. However, we are persuaded that,
based on the current record, the Examiner erred in rejecting the claim under
section 103.
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
The Alice/Mayo Framework
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in § 101 of the Patent Act,
which recites: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title."
There are, however, three judicially created exceptions to the broad
categories of patent-eligible subject matter in § 101: laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 134
S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70-71 (2012). Although an abstract idea, itself, is patent-
ineligible, an application of the abstract idea may be patent-eligible. Alice,
134 S. Ct. at 2355. Thus, we must consider "the elements of each claim both
individually and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the
additional elements 'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible
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application." Id. (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. 79). The claim must contain
elements or a combination of elements that are "sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[abstract idea] itself." Id. (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. 79).
The Supreme Court set forth a two-part "framework for distinguishing
patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Id. at
2355.
Id.
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to
one of those patent-ineligible concepts. [Mayo,] 132 S. Ct., at
1296-1297. If so, we then ask, "[w]hat else is there in the
claims before us?" Id., at--, 132 S. Ct., at 1297. To answer
that question, we consider the elements of each claim both
individually and "as an ordered combination" to determine
whether the additional elements "transform the nature of the
claim" into a patent-eligible application. Id., at--, 132 S.
Ct., at 1298, 1297. We have described step two of this analysis
as a search for an "'inventive concept"'-i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is "sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself." Id., at--, 132 S. Ct., at
1294.
"The 'abstract idea' step of the inquiry calls upon us to look at the
'focus of the claimed advance over the prior art' to determine if the claim's
'character as a whole' is directed to excluded subject matter." Affinity Labs
of Tex. v. DirectTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting
Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2016)); see also Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). There is no definitive rule to determine what constitutes an
"abstract idea." Rather, the Federal Circuit has explained that "both [it] and
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the Supreme Court have found it sufficient to compare claims at issue to
those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in previous
cases." Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1334; see also Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet
Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that, in
determining whether claims are patent-eligible under § 101, "the decisional
mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier cases in which a similar
or parallel descriptive nature can be seen-what prior cases were about, and
which way they were decided").
Under the second step of the Alice/Mayo framework, we examine the
claim limitations "more microscopically," Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1354,
to determine whether they contain "additional features" sufficient to
"'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application."
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355, 2357 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78). "[M]ere
recitation of concrete, tangible components is insufficient to confer patent
eligibility to an otherwise abstract idea. Rather, the components must
involve more than performance of 'well-understood, routine, conventional
activit[ies]' previously known to the industry." In re TL! Commc 'ns LLC
Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at
2359).
In re Alappat Has Been Superseded
Appellant's first argument ignores the Alice/Mayo framework and
instead, relies on In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1993). App. Br. 11.
According to Appellant, Alappat holds that "programming creates a new
machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special
purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions
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pursuant to instructions from program software." App. Br. 11 (quoting
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545). Appellant further argues that the Federal Circuit
and the USPTO "have long acknowledged that 'improvements thereof'
through interchangeable software or hardware enhancements deserve patent
protection." Id. (quoting Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545). Therefore, according to
Appellant, "the programming required for the implementation of claims 1-3
and 5-20 of the present application create a new machine equivalent in
patent eligibility to that of hardware circuits" and the claims are patent-
eligible. Id.
However, Appellant's reliance on Alappat is misplaced. The Federal
Circuit has held "that Alappat has been superseded by Bilski [ v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 605---06 (2010)], and Alice." Eon Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Abstract Idea
The Examiner concluded the claims are directed to abstract ideas
relating to methods of accounting:
For example, claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of
recording accounting transactions and generating financial
statements. Claim 11 is directed to the abstract idea of making
accounting adjustments, reporting, and generating financial
statements. Claim 17 is directed to the abstract idea of
receiving accounting data generating accounting data in a
payroll system.
Non-Final Act. 4; see also id. at 3 ("The [E]xaminer understands these to be
abstract ideas (ie. methods of accounting)."). The Examiner further
determines that accounting involves "collecting, storing and processing
financial data" and that the claims are similar to claims courts have
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previously found to be directed to abstract idea. Ans. 2-3 (citing Content
Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'! Ass 'n., 776 F.3d
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Additionally, the Examiner determines the claim do
not address an issue in computerized accounting and, instead, the claim are
directed to "abstract ideas that predate computing/Internet and could be
manually practiced by a human accountant." Id. at 3.
Appellant argues the Examiner failed to make a prima facie case.
App. Br. 12, 14. More specifically, Appellant argues that a proper rejection
requires a comparison of the claimed invention to "concepts to prior court
decisions to identify a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract
idea." Id. at 14. Appellant further argues that Examiner has not identified
the abstract idea as recited in the claim. Reply Br. 3-5.
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the Examiner
erred. The Examiner identifies the abstract idea and states that it is
something that could be performed by a human mind. See Ans. 3. Although
the Examiner did not explicitly cite a court case, the Examiner describes the
reasoning used by the Federal Circuit in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc.:
Thus, claim 3 's steps can all be performed in the human mind.
Such a method that can be performed by human thought alone
is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101.
Methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind
are unpatentable not because there is anything wrong with
claiming mental method steps as part of a process containing
non-mental steps, but rather because computational methods
which can be performed entirely in the human mind are the
types of methods that embody the "basic tools of scientific and
technological work" that are free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.
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CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (quoting Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)) (footnote
omitted)).
Moreover, in the Answer the Examiner identifies Contract Extraction
as an analogous case. Appellant does not address that determination in the
Reply Brief or demonstrate why it is incorrect. "If an [A ]ppellant fails to
present arguments on a particular issue - or, more broadly, on a particular
rejection-the Board will not, as a general matter, unilaterally review those
uncontested aspects of the rejection." Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072,
107 5 (BP AI 2010) (precedential).
Appellant also asserts that "[i]f the Office is taking the position that
all patent claims including software are abstract, the Office is mistaken."
App. Br. 14. Because neither the Examiner nor the Office has taken that
position, we are not persuaded by Appellant's strawman argument that the
Examiner erred.
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed
to an abstract idea.
Significantly More
The Examiner determines that the claims "do[] not include additional
elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception because the computer as recited is a generic computer component
that performs functions." Final Act. 4. The Examiner further determines
those functions "are generic computer functions (i.e., record keeping,
obtaining data, adjusting balances, reporting statements) that are well-
understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the
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industry." Final Act. 4. The Examiner also determines even if there is some
memory improvement from using the claimed invention, "recording of
single entries and conversion to double was already known in the art [and]
... the improvement described is at best ancillary to the inventive concept
and [there is] a performance tradeoff." Ans. 4.
Appellant argues the claims recite "more than routine conventional
activities previously known to industry are being performed by computer."
App. Br. 15. According to Appellant, the specific limitations recited in the
claim are not known to the industry. Id.; see also id. at 16 ("Additional
reasons why more than routine conventional activities previously known to
industry are being performed by the computer will be provided below in
connection with the arguments below against the rejections under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103."); Reply Br. 6 ("Appellant's invention adds new and inventive
concepts to financial accounting and reporting technology ....
Embodiments of Appellant's invention contain significantly more computer
function than is recognized in prior art or by the courts as being well-
understood, routine, or conventional, as will also be shown in the following
section.").
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the Examiner
erred. Although the second step in the Alice/Mayo framework is termed a
search for an "inventive concept," the analysis is not an evaluation of
novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a search for "an element or
combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself."' Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. A novel and nonobvious claim
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directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304.
Appellant further argues that the claimed invention, like the one in
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotel.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
recites a "solution ... rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a
problem specifically arising in the realm of computerized accounting
systems-how to be able to generate statements using different bases of
accounting, such as cash basis and budgetary basis, from stored data." App.
Br. 15-16. According to Appellant, "Appellant has not merely taken a
known financial accounting method and automated it." Reply Br. 6.
We are not persuaded by Appellant's arguments. First, as our
reviewing court held in DDR, "not all claims purporting to address Internet-
centric challenges are eligible for patent." DDR, 773 F.3d at 1258. As the
Federal Circuit recognized:
For example, in our recently-decided Ultramercial[ 2J opinion,
the patentee argued that its claims were "directed to a specific
method of advertising and content distribution that was
previously unknown and never employed on the Internet
before." 772 F.3d at 714. But this alone could not render its
claims patent-eligible. In particular, we found the claims to
merely recite the abstract idea of "offering media content in
exchange for viewing an advertisement," along with "routine
additional steps such as updating an activity log, requiring a
request from the consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public
access, and use of the Internet." Id. at 715-16.
Id. Because Appellant has merely identified routine additional steps, they
are insufficient to render the claims patent-eligible.
2 Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014), vacated
and remanded, WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870
(2014) (remanding for consideration in light of Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347).
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Moreover, we disagree with that the claims in this case are directed to
a computer-centric problem similar to that in DDR. In DDR, the Court
found that the claims "do not merely recite the performance of some
business practice known from the pre-Internet world along with the
requirement to perform it on the Internet. Instead, the claimed solution is
necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem
specifically arising in the realm of computer networks." Id. at 1257. Unlike
the claims in DDR, we agree with and the adopt the Examiner's
determination that the claims in this case are merely adopting a pre-existing
business practice, in this case using methods of accounting and generating
reports, for use with computer technology. See Non-Final Act. 3--4.
Instead of DDR, this case is similar to Electric Power, in which our
reviewing court found the claims patent-ineligible because "[t]he claims at
issue do not require any nonconventional computer, network, or display
components, or even a 'non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of
known, conventional pieces,' but merely call for performance of the claimed
information collection, analysis, and display functions 'on a set of generic
computer components' and display devices." Electric Power, 830 F.3d at
1355 (citing BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
827 F.3d 1341, 1349--52 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Similarly, the claims in this case
merely recite the use of generic computer components to generate financial
reports. Such an arrangement is not patent eligible. Id.
Appellant also argues that the recited invention "improve[ s] the
functioning of the computer in that less memory is required because
databases include single entry data instead of double entry data such that
data is not duplicated for each entry. In addition, data is not duplicated for
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multiple bases of accounting." App. Br. 18. According to Appellant,
because the functioning of the computer itself is improved, the claim recites
significantly more. Id. (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347).
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the Examiner
erred. It is well settled that mere attorney arguments and conclusory
statements, which are unsupported by factual evidence, are entitled to little
probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see
also In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (attorney argument is
not evidence). Appellant cites to neither evidence nor support in the
Specification for the supposed memory improvement. Nor does Appellant
attempt to quantify the amount of the improvement or discuss any negative
tradeoffs associated with the claimed invention. 3
Finally, Appellant argues that the claims "do not pre-empt the entire
field of financial accounting." Reply Br. 6. However, although the extent of
preemption is a consideration, the absence of complete preemption is not
dispositive. See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d
13 71, 13 79 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("While preemption may signal patent ineligible
subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate
patent eligibility."); Ultramercial, 722 F.3d at 1346.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-3 and
5-20 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter.
3 In the Reply Brief, Appellant asserts the Examiner's response to this
argument is based on an improper claim construction. See Reply Br. 5---6.
Because we do not rely on the Examiner's claim construction, that argument
is moot.
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Prior Art Rejections
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding a reason to combine
the teachings of SCEIS and Salleh. App. Br. 19.4 More specifically,
Appellant asserts that although "SCIES discloses a double entry accounting
methodology," "Salleh relates to a teaching methodology." Id. at 17, 19.
Appellant further argues that "because one of ordinary skill in the art
looking to improve an accounting system would not look to a teaching
methodology," a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have combined
the references. Id. at 19.
The Examiner finds "Salleh is directed to an accounting simulator
which allows a student to experience an entire accounting cycle and generate
financial statements." Non-Final Act. 9. The Examiner further finds that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have combined the teachings of
Salleh with the teaching of SCEIS "with the motivation of performing all
processes involved in financial statements. " Id. at 10 (citing Sall eh,
abstract).
"In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the examiner bears the
initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of obviousness." In re
Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d
1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Rejections based on obviousness must be
supported by "some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning
to support the legal conclusion of obviousness." In re Kahn, 441F.3d977,
988 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with approval in KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
4 Although we focus on Appellant's arguments regarding claim 1, because
the Examiner relies on, inter alia, a combination of Salleh and SCEIS for all
of the pending claims, our reasoning applies equally to all of the pending
claims.
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550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Based on the current record and the Examiner's
findings, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner did not provide a
sufficient reasoning as to why the person of ordinary skill in the art would
have taken specific teachings from the accounting simulator taught in Salleh
with the accounting methodology of SCEIS. The mere fact that a teaching
simulator teaches single entry data entry is not a sufficiently articulate
reasoning to support a finding of obviousness. See Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
Because this argument is dispositive, we need not reach the merits of
Appellant's other arguments.
Accordingly, we are constrained on this record to reverse the
Examiner's rejection of claims 1-3 and 5-20 as unpatentable under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION
For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting
claims 1-3 and 5-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
For the above reasons, we reverse the Examiner's decisions rejecting
claims 1-3 and 5-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection with respect to
each claim on appeal, we affirm the Examiner's decision to reject all of the
pending claims.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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