Ex Parte Scott-Nash et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 28, 201713537347 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 28, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/537,347 06/29/2012 Mark Scott-Nash ITL.2798US (P44448) 3588 47795 7590 03/02/2017 TROP, PRUNER & HU, P.C. 1616 S. VOSS RD., SUITE 750 HOUSTON, TX 77057-2631 EXAMINER AQUINO, WYNUEL S ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2199 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/02/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): tphpto@tphm.com Inteldocs_docketing @ cpaglobal.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MARK SCOTT-NASH, ALBERTO MUNOZ, and ASHER ALTMAN Appeal 2015-007271 Application 13/537,347 Technology Center 2100 Before JEFFREY S. SMITH, IRVIN E. BRANCH, and AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims 1—11 and 13—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. Appeal 2015-007271 Application 13/537,347 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a virtual trusted platform module for a virtual machine. Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method comprising: providing a virtual trusted platform module for a virtual machine; and containing the virtual trusted platform module within a secure enclave of a physical platform. REJECTION Claims 1—11 and 13—20 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Stumpf (NPL, Aug. 2008, “Enhancing Trusted Platform Modules with Hardware-Based Virtualization Techniques”). Ans. 2-16. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellants’ arguments the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’ conclusions and, except as discussed below, we adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 4—13) and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief 2 Appeal 2015-007271 Application 13/537,347 (Ans. 16—26). We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we highlight the following for emphasis.1 Claim 1 The Examiner maps claim 1 ’s “virtual platform trusted module for a virtual machine” to Stumpf’s Trusted Program Module (TPM) instance and the claimed “secure enclave” to Stumpf’s multi-context TPM. Ans. 17 (“Stumpf teaches that a TPM instance (i.e. virtual trusted platform module) of a virtual machine is loaded into a hardware structure TPM (i.e. secure enclave of a physical platform).”). See Stumpf, Section B. Appellants argue the Examiner has improperly construed “secure enclave” because the Examiner has failed to consider Appellants’ Specification, which recites that “a secure enclave 30 is a set of memory locations that provides a safe place for an application to execute program instructions and store data inside the enclave 30 in the context of an operating system (OS) process.” Reply Br. 1—3 (quoting Spec. 117). We are unpersuaded of error. Appellants provide insufficient persuasive argument or evidence to convince us that “secure enclave” fails to read on Stumpf’s multi-context TMP. We note Appellants’ argument that “the specification describes several features that allow the safe execution of program instructions, such as an enclave page cache, cryptographic productions, and so forth” (id. 2), but find this argument unpersuasive of error because, although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Appellants always 1 Only those arguments made by Appellants have been considered in this decision. Arguments Appellants did not make in the briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). 3 Appeal 2015-007271 Application 13/537,347 have the opportunity to amend the claims during prosecution, and broad interpretation by the Examiner reduces the possibility that the claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than is justified. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (CCPA 1969). Appellants also argue error in the Examiner’s finding that “Stumpf teaches that a TPM instance (i.e. virtual trusted platform module) of a virtual machine is loaded into a hardware structure TPM (i.e. secure enclave of a physical platform)” because Stumpf “fails to disclose loading a virtual machine into the TPM, as contended by the Examiner's Answer.” Reply Br. 3 (quoting Ans. 17). We do not agree because the Examiner’s finding does not say that a virtual machine is loaded “into” the TPM. Rather, the Examiner finds Stumpf discloses a TMP “of’ (i.e., corresponding to) a virtual machine is loaded into the TPM, which is true. See, e.g., Stumpf, Section B. Appellants do not otherwise persuade us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Claims 2 and 3 Appellants’ arguments against claims 2 and 3 are rooted in the unpersuasive claim construction arguments Appellants advance against claim 1. App. Br. 10—11; Reply Br. 1—3. We are unpersuaded of error and adopt the Examiner’s response (Ans. 19-20) to Appellants’ arguments, which Appellants do not persuasively rebut (see generally Reply Br. 1—3). Claim 4 Claim 4 depends from claims 1 and 2 and recites “assigning at least one security key to the virtual trusted platform module to identify the virtual trusted platform_module.” Appellants argue that “[ajlthough the expressly- recited key arguably identifies the virtual trusted platform, it does not 4 Appeal 2015-007271 Application 13/537,347 necessarily follow that any item that identifies a virtual trusted platform module is a key or a security key.” App. Br. 11. Appellants further assert that “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would not consider a mere identifier to be a security key.” Reply Br. 4. We do not find Appellants’ unsupported assertion persuasive of what one of ordinary skill in the art “would not consider.” Id. Appellants do not direct us to persuasive evidence that “the expressly-recited language is being improperly eviscerated by” the Examiner’s construction of “security key” (Reply Br. 3) or that “security key” fails to read on Stumpf’s “unique ID” as the Examiner finds (Ans. 20—21 (citing Stumpf, Section B)). Accordingly, we are unpersuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 4. Claim 5 Claim 5 depends from claim 4 and recites “the supervisor signing an attestation identification credential for the virtual trusted platform module.” Appellants argue that “Stumpf fails to disclose the VMM (the alleged supervisor) assigning an attestation identification credential for a provisioned virtual trusted platform module.” App. Br. 12. In addition to being an unsupported assertion, Appellants’ argument is unpersuasive because it is not commensurate with the scope of the claim. Claim 5 recites “signing,” not “assigning” an attestation identification credential. In the Reply Brief, Appellants argue that “[i]n essence, the Examiner’s Answer is relying on inherency for the missing claim elements.” Reply Br. 4. This is in reference to the Examiner’s further citation to Stumpf’s “Secure TPM Context Migration” section (Ans. 21—22 (citing Stumpf, Section VI.)) and the Examiner’s finding that “the act of encrypting by the TPM key teaches ‘signing an attestation identification credential’.” Id. 5 Appeal 2015-007271 Application 13/537,347 Appellants’ argument that the Examiner is relying on inherency is a strawman. The Examiner is not relying on inherency but is, instead, finding that the claimed “signing,” broadly construed, includes Stumpf’s “encrypting.” Id. Appellants’ arguments against the strawman are unavailing, and Appellants do not present argument or evidence sufficient to persuade us that the Examiner’s construction of “signing” is unreasonably broad or that, broadly construed, the claimed “signing” does not include Stumpf’s “encrypting.” Accordingly, we are unpersuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 5. Remaining claims We have reviewed Appellants’ remaining arguments alleging error in the Examiner’s rejection of the remaining claims (App. Br. 9—16; Reply Br. 1—6) and find them unpersuasive of error for the reasons stated by the Examiner (Ans. 16—26). DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—11 and 13—20. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 6 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation