Ex Parte Scott et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 3, 2017

12242445 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 3, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/242,445 09/30/2008 Steven J. Scott 08AB276-US (ORD) 8690
70640 7590 02/07/2017
ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC / SR
Attn: Linda Kasulke
1201 S. 2nd Street
E-7C19
Milwaukee, WI 53204
EXAMINER
CHOI, DAVID E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2174
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/07/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
s arah @ setterroche. com
u spto @ setterroche .com
raintellectu alproperty @ ra.rockwell .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEVEN J. SCOTT, THONG T. NGUYEN,
GREGGORY CIESLAK,
THOMAS LLOYD HEIDEBRECHT, PETE J. KLEIN, and
GARY DAN DOTSON
Appeal 2016-004819
Application 12/242,4451
Technology Center 2100
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, NABEEL U. KHAN, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.
ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1, 5—10, and 14—20, which are all of the claims pending in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Technology
The application relates to a touch-sensitive user interface in an
automation environment that receives multiple touches. Abstract.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Rockwell Automation
Technologies, Inc. Br. 1.
Appeal 2016-004819
Application 12/242,445
Representative Claim
Claim 1 is representative and reproduced below with the limitations at
issue emphasized:
1. A method of operating a Human-Machine Interface (HMI)
system, the method comprising:
displaying on a user interface a plurality of machine
systems in an automation environment having a plurality of
automation information;
displaying an information menu on the user interface
indicating a plurality of information types associated with the
plurality of machine systems;
receiving a first touch on a surface of the user interface
selecting an information type from the plurality of information
types;
while still receiving the first touch, receiving second and
third touches on the surface of the user interface selecting a first
machine system comprising at least one machine and at least one
control system configured to control the at least one machine,
wherein the at least one control system includes operation code
to operate the at least one machine, and a second machine system
from the plurality of machine systems',
processing the first touch, the second touch, and the third
touch to select from the plurality of automation information a
first automation information associated with the information
type and the first machine system and a second automation
information associated with the information type and the second
machine system; and
displaying the first automation information comprising
displaying the operation code as a ladder diagram and the
second automation information.
Rejection
Claims 1, 5—10, and 14—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over the combination of Dillon et al. (US 2009/0077055 Al; Mar.
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Appeal 2016-004819
Application 12/242,445
19, 2009), Vrielink et al. (US 2005/0149639 Al; July 7, 2005),2 Porat (US
2009/0282332 Al; Nov. 12, 2009), and Nagashima et al. (US 7,152,030 B2;
Dec. 19, 2006). Final Act. 2.
ISSUES
1. Did the Examiner err in finding Porat teaches or suggests
“while still receiving the first touch, receiving second and third touches on
the surface of the user interface selecting a first machine system . . . and a
second machine system” and “to select... a first automation information . . .
and a second automation information,” as recited in claim 1?
2. Did the Examiner err in finding Vrielink teaches or suggests
“machine systems,” as recited in claim 1?
3. Did the Examiner err in finding Nagashima teaches or suggests
“displaying the operation code as a ladder diagram,” as recited in claim 1?
ANALYSIS
Porat
Claim 1 recites “while still receiving the first touch, receiving second
and third touches.” The Examiner relies on Porat for teaching this
limitation. Porat teaches “in order to select a graphical item and its
corresponding object, a user may touch the touchscreen using two or more of
his or her fingers, or other selection devices [e.g., stylus].” Porat || 37
(emphasis added), 5. “In one embodiment, the user may leave at least one
of his or her fingers, or other selection devices, at the first location while
2 As Appellants note (Br. 9), the introduction of the rejection incorrectly lists
Arezina (Final Act. 2) whereas the discussion instead relies on Vrielink.
Final Act. 4. Given Vrielink’s discussion, we deem this a harmless error.
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Appeal 2016-004819
Application 12/242,445
tapping the other fmger(s), or other selection device(s), at the second
location.” Id. 146 (emphasis added).
Appellants contend “Porat defines the first touch as comprising two or
more fingers” and “once one or more of these fingers are lifted, it is no
longer the complete first touch maintained on the screen, but some portion of
the first touch.'1'’ Br. 12. We are not persuaded the Examiner erred. The
proper inquiry is how the present application defines the “first touch,” not
how the prior art defines it. Appellants have not sufficiently persuaded us
that anything in the claims or Specification requires the “complete” first
touch to be maintained rather than just a “portion.” Ans. 4.
Claim 1 further recites the second and third touches are for “selecting
a first machine system . . . and a second machine system” and are processed
“to select... a first automation information . . . and a second automation
information.”
Appellants contend Porat only teaches to “select a single object,” not
two. Br. 11—12. However, we agree with the Examiner that “FIG. 3 is only
an exemplary embodiment” and “selecting a third object would be
overwhelmingly obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art even if FIG. 3
does not explicitly disclose that feature,” including because an “inventive
goal of Porat is to demonstrate selecting multiple items using multi-touch.”
Ans. 5. For example, Porat’s title is an apparatus “for selecting multiple
items using multi-touch.” Contrary to Appellants’ assertion, the Examiner’s
conclusion of obviousness has not “precluded all methods and techniques of
selecting objects using multi-touch” (Br. 13), but instead has merely
concluded that applying the same specific technique taught by Porat to
multiple fingers to achieve the same predictable result would have been
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Appeal 2016-004819
Application 12/242,445
obvious. “A court must ask whether the improvement is more than the
predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.” KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007).
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that Porat teaches or suggests
“while still receiving the first touch, receiving second and third touches . . .
selecting a first machine system . . . and a second machine system” which
are processed “to select... a first automation information . . . and a second
automation information.”
Vrielink
Claim 1 recites the touches are for “selecting a first machine system
comprising at least one machine and at least one control system configured
to control the at least one machine, wherein the at least one control system
includes operation code to operate the at least one machine, and a second
machine system.”
Appellants concede “Vrielink teaches that a single point may be used
to control a plurality of remote devices such as a TV connected over a
network,” but argues “the term ‘machine system’ has a specific meaning”
which Vrielink fails to teach. Br. 13. However, we agree with the Examiner
that Appellants do not explain what that specific meaning is beyond merely
repeating the words in claim 1. Ans. 5. The Federal Circuit has “reasonably
interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal
brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that
the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.” In re Toxin,
652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (“A
statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be
considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim.”).
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Application 12/242,445
Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner finding Vrielink
teaches or suggests this limitation.
Nagashima
Claim 1 recites “displaying the operation code as a ladder diagram.”
Appellants contend “Nagashima teaches displaying ‘digital data’ as a
ladder diagram, not operation code.” Br. 14. However, Appellants have not
sufficiently addressed the basis of the Examiner’s rejection that Nagashima
expressly discloses “a sequence program executed by the programmable
controller is displayed in the form of a ladder diagramNagashima 1:12—
15 (emphasis added); Ans. 7. Appellants’ generic discussion of “digital
data” (Br. 14) fails to address Nagashima’s teaching of a “sequence
program” and the Examiner finding a sequence program teaches or at least
suggests the claimed “operation code.” Ans. 7—8; see also Nagashima 1:30—
45, 5:1—28.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and
claims 5—10 and 14—20, which Appellants argue are patentable for similar
reasons. See App. Br. 15; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
DECISION
For the reasons above, we affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting
claims 1, 5—10, and 14—20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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