Ex Parte Schwarze

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 7, 2017

13818931 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 7, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/818,931 05/15/2013 Klaus Schwarze BOSC.P7634US/11603155 3503
24972 7590 02/09/2017
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
1301 Avenue of the Americas
NEW YORK, NY 10019-6022
EXAMINER
SARKER, SANCHIT K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2495
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/09/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
nyipdocket@nortonrosefulbright.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KLAUS SCHWARZE1
Appeal 2016-001479
Application 13/818,931
Technology Center 2400
Before HUNG H. BUI, JOHN F. HORVATH, and
DAVID J. CUTITTAII, Administrative Patent Judges.
Opinion for the Board filed by Administrative Patent Judge CUTITTA.
Opinion Dissenting-in-Part filed by Administrative Patent Judge
HORVATH.
CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final
Rejection of claims 11—13 and 15—21, all pending claims of the application.2
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Robert Bosch GmbH.
See Appeal Brief 2.
2 Claims 1—10 and 14 are cancelled.
Appeal 2016-001479
Application 13/818,931
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According to Appellant, the application relates to ensuring the
authenticity of sensor data. Spec. 3.3 Claims 11, 18, and 20 are
independent. Claims 11 and 18 are representative and are reproduced below
with disputed limitations italicized:
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
11. A method for transmitting sensor data, the method
comprising:
outputting, via a sensor, an analog signal;
generating a digital signal as a function of the analog
signal;
encrypting the digital signal to provide an encrypted
digital signal;
simultaneously transmitting the analog signal and the
encrypted digital signal to a receiver unit; and
comparing the analog signal and the encrypted digital
signal to one another in the receiver unit to detect whether the
analog signal has been falsified.
18. A sensor system, comprising:
a sensor, which receives measured values and which
provides an analog signal;
an analog/digital converter that outputs a digital signal as
a function of the analog signal;
an encryption unit that encrypts the digital signal to
provide an encrypted digital signal; and
3 Throughout this Opinion, we refer to: (1) Appellant’s Substitute
Specification filed Feb. 25, 2013 (“Spec.”); (2) the Final Office Action
(“Final Act.”) mailed Sept. 25, 2014; (3) the Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”)
filed Mar. 25, 2015; (4) the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. ”) mailed Sept. 21,
2015; and (5) the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed Nov. 17, 2015.
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Application 13/818,931
a transmitting arrangement that simultaneously transmits
the analog signal and the encrypted digital signal to a receiving
unit.
App. Br. 9-10 (Claims App’x).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal includes:
Cox et al. (“Cox”)
Grupp et al. (“Grupp”)
Hauck et al. (“Hauck”)
Schill et al. (“Schill”)
Zhao
Hsu
Soares, Jr. (“Soares”)
US 4,847,888
US 5,764,540
US 2001/0043363
US 2004/0043730
US 6,751,336 B2
US 2005/0220073
US 2008/0291042
Jul. 11, 1989
Jun. 9, 1998
Al Nov. 21,2001
Al Mar. 4, 2004
June 15, 2004
Al Oct. 6, 2005
Al Nov. 27, 2008
REJECTIONS
(1) Claims 18—21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being
indefinite. Final Act. 2-4.
(2) Claims 11, 12, 15, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Soares, Schill, and Zhao. Final Act. 5—
8.
(3) Claim 13 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Soares, Schill, Zhao, and Cox. Final Act. 8—9.
(4) Claims 16, 17, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Soares, Schill, Zhao, and Grupp. Final Act. 9—
11.
(5) Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Hsu, Zhao, and Schill. Final Act. 11—13.
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Application 13/818,931
(6) Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Hsu, Zhao, Schill, and Hauck. Final Act. 13.
Our review in this appeal is limited only to the above rejections and
issues raised by Appellant. We have not considered other possible issues
that have not been raised by Appellant and which are, therefore, not before
us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2014).
ISSUES
Appellant’s arguments present the following issues:
1. Does the Examiner err in rejecting claims 18—21 under 35
U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite, based on the
Examiner’s construction of “an encryption unit that encrypts,” “an
arithmetic unit that performs,” “a receiver unit receiving,” and “a decryption
unit that decrypts” as means-plus-fimction limitations lacking corresponding
structure in the Specification.
2. Does the Examiner err in finding the combination of Soares,
Schill, and Zhao teaches or suggests “comparing the analog signal and the
encrypted digital signal to one another in the receiver unit to detect whether
the analog signal has been falsified,” as recited in claim 11?
3. Does the Examiner err in finding the combination of Soares,
Schill, and Zhao teaches or suggests “a transmitting arrangement that
simultaneously transmits the analog signal and the encrypted digital signal to
a receiving unit,” as recited in claim 18?
4. Does the Examiner err in concluding it would have been
obvious to combine the teachings and suggestions of Soares, Schill, and
Zhao in the manner recited in claim 18?
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Application 13/818,931
ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 112 (b): Claims 18-20
The Examiner, relying on our Precedential Opinion in Ex Parte
Rodriguez, 92 USPQ2d 1395 (BPAI 2009) (discussing functional claiming
and claim definiteness), finds terms variously recited in claim 18—20
including “an encryption unit that encrypts,” “an arithmetic unit that
performs,” “a receiver unit receiving,” and “a decryption unit that decrypts”
to be non-structural terms used to substitute for the term “means-plus-
fimction,” thus invoking the application of § 112, sixth paragraph. Final
Act. 2-4; Ans. 2. Furthermore, because Appellant’s Specification “fails to
clearly link or associate the disclosed structure, material, or acts to the
claimed functions such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize
what structure, material, or acts perform the claimed functions,” the
Examiner concludes claims 18—20 are indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph. Ans. 3.
We agree with the Examiner’s findings and conclusions. Final
Act. 2-4; Ans. 2. Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph,
[a]n element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the
recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such
claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof.
When a claim term does not use the term “means,” the claim term is
presumed not to invoke § 112, sixth paragraph. See Williamson v. Citrix
Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The presumption can
be overcome and § 112, sixth paragraph, applies, however, if “the claim
term fails to ‘recite[] sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function
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without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’” Id.
(quoting Watts v. XISys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Here, the Examiner finds, and we agree, each of the claimed units is a
non-structural term, coupled with functional language that does not recite
sufficient structure to achieve the function. Final Act. 2—A.
Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s characterization of these
terms as “means-plus-fimction” limitations that invoke the application of
§ 112, sixth paragraph. Appeal Br. 2—\\ Reply Br. 2. Instead, Appellant
contends because “the Substitute Specification makes it clear that the
various claimed units are parts of hardware processing units,” the written
description “clearly links the disclosed structure to the claimed functions
such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize what structures
perform the claimed functions.” Appeal Br. 3^4
According to Appellant, the structures corresponding to the variously
claimed “units” are disclosed in the Specification as “a hardware processor
that performs the recited functions of the respective unit,” i.e., as a processor
that is capable of executing software instructions. App. Br. 4; see also
Reply Br. 2 (“Applicant noted that each of the receiver unit, encryption unit,
decryption unit and arithmetic unit encompasses at least a hardware
processor”). Appellant points to nothing other than the hardware processor
as allegedly constituting “structure” for the disputed units. Appellant’s
“encryption unit,” “arithmetic unit,” “receiver unit,” and “decryption unit”
limitations, therefore, are each tantamount to a recitation of “a hardware
processor configured to” perform various functions in software, which we
have held is a means-plus-function limitation. See Ex parte Lakkala, Appeal
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Application 13/818,931
2011-001526, 2013 WL 1341108, *2 (PTAB 2013) (informative). As our
reviewing court has held, “the fact that one of skill in the art could program
a computer to perform the recited functions cannot create structure where
none otherwise is disclosed.” Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 708
F.3d 1310, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
For these reasons, we conclude the limitations “an encryption unit that
encrypts . . . ,” “an arithmetic unit that performs . . .,” “a receiver unit
receiving . . .,” and “a decryption unit that decrypts . . .” fail to recite
sufficiently definite structure and so the presumption against means-plus-
function claiming is rebutted. We, therefore, agree with the Examiner that
this limitation is subject to the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth
paragraph.
When means-plus-fimction language is employed in a claim, the
Specification must provide an adequate disclosure showing what is meant by
that language. If an adequate disclosure is not set forth, an applicant has in
effect failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the invention as
required by the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. In re Donaldson Co.,
Inc., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (enbanc). Moreover, fora
computer-implemented claim limitation interpreted under § 112, sixth
paragraph, the corresponding structure must include the algorithm needed to
transform the general purpose computer or processor disclosed in the
specification into the special purpose computer programmed to perform the
disclosed algorithm. Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty Ltd. v. Int 7 Game
Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Function Media, 708
F.3d at 1318. Thus, the Specification must sufficiently disclose an algorithm
to transform the general purpose computer or processor to a special purpose
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Application 13/818,931
processor programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm. Aristocrat, 521
F.3d at 1338. An algorithm may be expressed in any understandable terms
including as a mathematical formula, in prose, in a flow chart, or “in any
other manner that provides sufficient structure.” Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV
Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
An indefiniteness rejection under § 112, second paragraph, is
appropriate if the Specification discloses no corresponding algorithm
associated with a computer or processor. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337—38.
Mere reference to a general purpose computer or processor with appropriate
programming, without providing an explanation of the appropriate
programming, or reference to software, without providing detail about the
means to accomplish the software function, is not an adequate disclosure.
Id. at 1334; Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1340-41. In addition, simply reciting the
claimed function in the Specification, while saying nothing about how the
computer or processor ensures that those functions are performed, does not
constitute an adequate disclosure for an algorithm which, by definition, must
contain a sequence of steps. Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 574
F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
According to Appellant,
the Substitute Specification indicates the following: (i) the
“receiver unit 32 ... is designed as a control unit” (p. 5, 1. 18);
(ii) the “receiver unit 32 has an analog/digital converter 42, an
arithmetic unit 44 . . . , a decryption unit 46, and an arithmetic
unit 48” (p. 5, 1.23—26); and (iii) the “sensor system 30 includes
a sensor 34, an analog/digital converter 36, an arithmetic unit 38
. . . , and an encryption unit” (col. 5, 1. 21—23). Since the
Substitute Specification indicates that each of the claimed units
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Application 13/818,931
encompasses a hardware processor that performs the recited
functions of the respective unit, there is no indefmiteness.
App. Br. 3^4.
As the Examiner finds, however, and we agree, this description does
not define the algorithm used to perform the recited functions: “Hardware
processing unit is not sufficient to define structure to achieve the function.
Hardware processing unit is not enough, it does not include algorithm or
structures that clearly define the item that equal to means for.” Ans. 2.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that because the Specification does not
provide one or more algorithms for performing the functions recited in claim
18—21, these claims are indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
For the reasons above, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in
concluding the claimed “encryption unit,” “arithmetic unit,” “receiver unit,”
and “decryption unit” limitations are subject to § 112, sixth paragraph. In
the absence of the corresponding structure for the limitations (such as
disclosure of a software algorithm) in Appellant’s Specification, we sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claims 18—21 as indefinite under 35 U.S.C.
§112, second paragraph.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (a): Claims 11—17 and 20
The Examiner finds “Zhao teaches that a program is used for
encrypting and decrypting digital representations for managing,
authenticating and confirming that a digital representation is authentic.”
Final Act. 6 (citing Zhao col. 2,11. 13—27, col. 4,11. 28—50, col. 7,11. 16—23).
The Examiner finds Zhao suggests “comparing the analog signal and the
encrypted digital signal to one another in the receiver unit to detect whether
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Application 13/818,931
the analog signal has been falsified,” as recited in claim 11. Final Act. 6;
Ans. 5.
Appellant argues
Zhao does not compare the analog signal and the encrypted
digital signal to one another because: (i) the analog form is
digitized (e.g., via optical character recognition) and further
processed in order to form the new digest, and (ii) nothing is
compared to the analog form itself, rather the new digest is
digitally compared to the old digest. In other words, the digest
of Zhao is a type of derived information (like a checksum) which
is provided together with the document, which digest is derived
from the original analogue text by OCR following digitalization.
Appeal Br. 5—6.
We agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not demonstrated that
these findings are supported by the teachings or suggestions of Zhao. The
Examiner has not demonstrated that Zhao describes comparing an analog
signal and an encrypted digital signal to one another. Zhao describes
checking the authenticity of an analog form that contains embedded first
authentication information by making a digital representation of the first
authentication information. Zhao, col. 4,11. 28—33. The digital
representation and a reference code are then sent to a verification system that
employs the reference code and the first authentication information to
determine whether the analog form is authentic. Zhao, col. 4,11. 33—39. The
Examiner fails to establish, however, that the verification system compares
the digital representation to the original analog form, or any digitized
version of the original analog form, in order to authenticate the analog form.
We do not agree that comparing a digital digest derived from the original
analog form with another digital digest teaches or suggests comparing the
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original analog signal with a simultaneously transmitted digital signal in the
manner recited by Appellant’s claim 11. See Zhao, col. 7,11. 16—23.
Accordingly, we concur with Appellant that the Examiner has failed
to establish the combination of Soares, Schill, and Zhao teaches, suggests, or
renders obvious “comparing the analog signal and the encrypted digital
signal to one another in the receiver unit to detect whether the analog signal
has been falsified,” as recited in claim 11. We therefore reverse the
Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 11.
Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments
advanced by Appellant for claim 11, we need not reach the merits of
Appellant’s other contentions relative to claim 11.
We also reverse the rejection of independent claim 20, which recites
commensurate limitations, and of dependent claims 12, 13, 15—17 and 21,
which stand with their respective independent claims.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (a): Claim 18
As an initial matter, we note that independent claim 18, although
argued by Appellant together with independent claim 11, does not include
the “comparing the analog signal and the encrypted digital signal” limitation
discussed above with respect to the reversal of the rejection of claim 11.
App. Br. 9-10 (Claims App’x).
The Examiner relies on Schill and Soares or Zhao to teach or suggest
“a transmitting arrangement that simultaneously transmits the analog signal
and the encrypted digital signal to a receiving unit,” as recited in claim 18.
Ans. 3—A. Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection of claim 18 is
erroneous because Schill doesn’t teach an encrypted signal. Appeal Br. 5.
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Application 13/818,931
We disagree because the Examiner relies on either Soares or Zhao to
teach encrypting a signal. Ans. 3. Specifically, the Examiner finds: (1)
Schill teaches a digitally encoded signal and an analog modulated signal are
transmitted via a same channel simultaneously (Ans. 3 (citing Schill 133));
(2) Soares teaches that an analog signal may be converted to a digital signal
and then encrypted (Ans. 3 (citing Soares 117)); and (3) Zhao teaches that
encryption techniques are used on the digital representation to make it
unreadable except by its intended recipients (Ans. 3 (citing Zhao col. 1 11.
46-49, col. 2 11. 18-27 and col. 4 11. 28-50)).
In the Reply, Appellant also argues “there is no logical motivation for
an encryption of the digital signal [of Schill] since such an encryption would
make switching between the analog and digital signals much harder” and
“[g]iven the aim of the present invention . . . there is no reason a person of
ordinary skill in the art would . . us[e] the dual-transmission mechanism of
Schill.” Reply Br. 3.
Appellant’s argument that the combination lacks the required
motivation is not persuasive of error because Appellant does not address the
motivation identified by the Examiner. See Final Act. 6-7; Ans. 3.
Moreover, Appellant has presented no persuasive evidence, only attorney
argument, that there is no motivation for an encryption of the digital signal
because “such an encryption would make switching between the analog and
digital signals much harder.” Reply Br. 3.
Appellant acknowledges “Schill teaches simultaneous transmission of
an audio signal both as an analog signal and digital signal” but argues
“Schill has absolutely nothing to do with transmitting a sensor signal since,
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Application 13/818,931
for a sensor signal, there is no utility in switching between an analog signal
and a digital signal.” Reply Br. 3.
We are not persuaded because Appellant’s argument does not address
the actual reasoning of the Examiner’s rejection and because the Examiner
relies on Soares rather than Schill to teach a sensor signal. Final Act. 5
(citing Soares 117.) Appellant thus attacks the references individually for
lacking teachings that the Examiner relied on a combination of references to
show. It is well established that one cannot show nonobviousness by
attacking references individually where the rejections are based on
combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413 (CCPA 1981); In
re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1986). This form of argument is
inherently unpersuasive to show Examiner error. Our reviewing court
requires that references must be read, not in isolation, but for what they
fairly teach in combination with the prior art as a whole. Merck, 800 F.2d at
1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
For these reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 18, as well as the
rejections of claim 19, for which no additional arguments are offered. See
Appeal Br. 6.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 18—21 under
35U.S.C. § 112(b).
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 18 and 19 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 11—13, 15—17,
20, and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
14
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KLAUS SCHWARZE4
Appeal 2016-001479
Application 13/818,931
Technology Center 2400
Before HUNG H. BUI, JOHN F. HORVATH, and
DAVID J. CUTITTAII, Administrative Patent Judges.
HORVATH, Administrative Patent Judge, Dissenting-in-Part.
I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s decision to reverse the
Examiner’s rejections of claims 11—13, 15—17, 20, and 21 for the reasons
stated in the Examiner’s Answer. See Ans. 3—5.
The Examiner finds Soares teaches receiving an analog signal from a
sensor, digitizing and encrypting the analog signal, and transmitting the
encrypted signal to a receiver. Final Act. 5 (citing Soares 17—18). The
Examiner finds S chill teaches simultaneously transmitting an analog signal
and a digitized version of the analog signal to a receiver, and concludes that
it would have been obvious to modify Soares to transmit both the analog
signal and the encrypted digitized version of the analog signal to Soares’
4 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Robert Bosch GmbH.
See Appeal Brief 2.
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receiver. Id. at 6 (citing Schill 133). The Examiner finds Zhao teaches
comparing an analog signal to an encrypted digitized version of the analog
signal to authenticate the analog signal, and concludes that it would have
been obvious to further modify Soares to authenticate the transmitted analog
signal by comparing it to the transmitted, encrypted, digitized version of the
analog signal. Id. at 6—7 (citing Zhao 4:28—50, 7:16—23).
Appellant first argues the Examiner erred because “Schill mention[s]
simultaneous transmission of an analog signal and a digital signal, without
any suggestion of an encrypted digital signal.” App. Br. 5. This argument is
unpersuasive of Examiner error because the Examiner relies on Soares, not
Schill, for teaching transmitting an encrypted digital signal. See Final Act.
5; Ans. 3. “Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references
individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a
combination of references.” In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
Appellant next argues the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 11
because:
Zhao does not compare the analog signal and the encrypted
digital signal to one another because: (i) the analog form is
digitized . . . and further processed in order to form the new
digest, and (ii) nothing is compared to the analog form itself,
rather the new digest is digitally compared to the old digest. In
other words, the digest of Zhao is a type of derived information
(like a checksum) which is provided together with the document,
which digest is derived from the original analogue text by OCR
following digitalization. In addition, Zhao has nothing to do with
transmission of sensor signals; instead, Zhao deals with normal
text which is printed on a piece of paper.
App. Br. 5—6.
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Regarding the second part of Appellant’s argument, that Zhao has
nothing to do with the transmission of sensor signals, the Examiner relies on
Soares or the combination of Soares and Schill, not Zhao, for teaching the
transmission of sensor signals. See Final Act. 5—6. As noted supra, “[n]on-
obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually
where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of
references.” In re Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097.
Regarding the first part of Appellant’s argument, that Zhao does not
compare the analog signal to the encrypted digitized signal because Zhao’s
analog signal is digitized and processed, and nothing is compared to the
analog signal itself, I agree with the Examiner that per Appellant’s
Specification, “an analog signal is not really compared with the digital
signal.” Ans. 4. Rather, “[t]he analog signal is converted to a digital form
prior to the comparison and then compared with [the] digital signal.” Id.
Thus, “comparing the analog signal and the encrypted digital signal... to
detect whether the analog signal has been falsified,” as recited in claim 11,
does not literally mean comparing the analog signal to the encrypted digital
signal as Appellant contends.
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Figure 2 of Appellant’s Specification is reproduced below:
Figure 2 is a graphical illustration of sensor system 30 and receiver 32 for
carrying out Appellant’s claimed method. Spec. 4:20-22.
Figure 2 discloses sensor system 30 includes sensor 34 for generating
an analog signal. Spec. 6:1. The analog signal is transmitted from sensor
system 30 to receiver 32 over line 62. Id. at 6:15—16. Sensor 34 also
digitizes the analog signal via analog-to-digital converter 36, and calculates
a mean value from the digitized analog signal via arithmetic unit 38. Id. at
6:1—2. The digital mean value is encrypted by encryption unit 40, and sent
to receiver 32 over line 60. Id. at 6:1—3, 6:13—14.
Receiver 32 receives the analog signal over line 62, and the encrypted
digital mean value over line 60. See Spec., Fig. 2. The received analog
signal “goes through the same process” that occurred in sensor system 30 to
calculate the digital mean value. Id. at 6:23—26. That is, the received analog
signal is first digitized by analog-to-digital converter 42, and a digital mean
value is calculated by arithmetic unit 44. Id. at 6:3—4. The received
encrypted digital mean value is decrypted by decryption unit 46. Id. at 6:3—
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5. The two digital mean values, one calculated from the received analog
signal and the other obtained by decrypting the received encrypted digital
mean value are then compared in arithmetic unit 48 to determine whether the
analog signal has been falsified. Id. at 6:3—6, 6:24—27. According to
Appellant’s Specification, “[t]he analog signal is thus compared to the
encrypted digital signal.” Id. at 6:27—28 (emphasis added).
From this description explaining how Appellant’s receiver compares
an analog signal to an encrypted digital signal, it is apparent that Appellant’s
receiver doesn’t literally compare the analog signal to anything as Appellant
now contends. Accordingly, Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred
because Zhao fails to teach comparing the analog signal to anything, and
instead teaches comparing information derived from the analog signal (a
new digest) to information similarly derived by the transmitter of the analog
signal (an old digest), is not persuasive of Examiner error.5
I, therefore, would affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11, and of
claims 12, 13, 15—17, 20, and 21, which Appellant argues are patentable for
the same reasons as claim 11. See App. Br. 6—8.
5 Zhao teaches a transmitter generating a digital digest (old digest) from
semantic information contained in a portion of an analog form, embedding
the digest in the analog form, and transmitting the analog form to a receiver.
Zhao 7:24—34. The old digest can be encrypted before embedding it in the
analog form. Id. at 7:40-42. Zhao teaches a receiver generating a digital
digest (new digest) from the same portion of the received analog form, and
comparing the new digital digest to the old digital digest to determine if the
analog form is authentic. Id. at 7:16—23.
5