Ex Parte Schooler

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jan 7, 2004

09908709 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 7, 2004)

1
The opinion in support of the decision being entered today was not written
for publication and is not binding precedent of the Board.
Paper No. 15
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
__________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
__________
Ex parte STUART D. SCHOOLER
___________
Appeal No. 2004-0200
Application No. 09/908,709
__________
ON BRIEF
__________
Before KIMLIN, OWENS, and JEFFREY T. SMITH, Administrative Patent
Judges.
OWENS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This appeal is from the final rejection of claims 1 and 3-9,
which are all of the claims pending in the application.
THE INVENTION
The appellant claims a hybrid vehicle which includes an
internal combustion engine, a battery-powered electric motor, and
pedals for helping to recharge the electric motor’s battery.
Claim 1 is illustrative:
An alternative fuel vehicle, comprising:
a battery supplying electrical energy;
an electric motor receiving said electrical energy from
Appeal No. 2004-0200
Application No. 09/908,709
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said battery and converting said electrical energy into
mechanical energy;
a drive train receiving said mechanical energy for
moving said vehicle;
pedals operable by an occupant of said vehicle to
create mechanical energy;
a first generator converting said mechanical energy
from said pedals to first electrical energy, said first
electrical energy from said generator supplied to said electrical
motor; and
an internal combustion engine supplying energy to said
drive train.
THE REFERENCES
Dessert 4,181,188 Jan. 1, 1980
Deguchi et al. (Deguchi) 6,083,139 Jul. 4, 2000
Chung et al. (Chung) 6,114,775 Sep. 5, 2000
THE REJECTIONS
The claims stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as follows:
claims 1, 3-6, 8 and 9 over Dessert in view of Deguchi, and
claim 7 over Dessert in view of Deguchi and Chung.
OPINION
We affirm the aforementioned rejections.
The appellant states that the claims stand or fall together
(brief, page 2). Although an additional reference is applied to
claim 7, the appellant does not separately argue that claim. We
therefore limit our discussion to one claim, i.e., claim 1, which
is the sole independent claim. See In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565,
1566 n.2, 37 USPQ2d 1127, 1129 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1995); 37 CFR
§ 1.192(c)(7)(1997).
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Dessert discloses “a battery powered electric vehicle that
can be charged by all free energy sources, namely, the sun, the
wind, human muscles and momentum” (abstract). The vehicle has
two power modules having pedals similar to bicycle pedals for
driving generators to help recharge electric motor batteries or
for directly helping to drive the vehicle’s wheels (abstract;
col. 1, line 66 - col. 2, line 2; col. 3, lines 53-58; col. 4,
lines 39-42).
Deguchi discloses a hybrid vehicle having electric motors
and a heat engine (abstract).
The examiner argues that it would have been prima facie
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, in view of the
combined teachings of Dessert and Deguchi, to include a small,
lightweight internal combustion engine in Dessert’s vehicle to
provide means for recharging the batteries without pedaling, such
as on uphill terrain, and to increase the overall power of the
vehicle drive train (answer, pages 3-5).
The appellant argues that the use of an internal combustion
engine is not congruent with the purpose of Dessert’s vehicle
which is restricted to free energy sources (brief, pages 3-4).
Dessert discloses that the vehicle “can be charged by all free
energy sources” (abstract). In view of Deguchi, however, one of
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Application No. 09/908,709
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ordinary skill in the art would have appreciated the balance
between the benefits of Dessert’s clean operation and the
effectiveness of Deguchi’s internal combustion engine for
recharging electric motor batteries. Consequently, the
references, taken together, would have rendered it prima facie
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to use a combination
of Dessert’s pedals and Deguchi’s internal combustion engine for
recharging the electric motor batteries in Dessert’s vehicle.
The appellant argues that including an internal combustion
engine in Dessert’s vehicle would increase the weight of the
vehicle sufficiently that the engine would have to be used to
move the vehicle (brief, page 3). This argument is not
persuasive because, as pointed out by the examiner (answer,
page 5), small internal combustion engines were available at the
time of the appellant’s invention.
Moreover, the disclosure by Dessert that pedals are
effective for recharging electric motor batteries (abstract;
col. 1, line 66 - col. 2, line 2; col. 3, lines 53-58; col. 4,
lines 39-42) would have fairly suggested, to one of ordinary
skill in the art, including pedals in Deguchi’s hybrid vehicle to
help recharge the electric motor batteries.
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For the above reasons we conclude that a prima facie case of
obviousness of the appellant’s claimed invention has been
established and has not been effectively rebutted by the
appellant. Accordingly, we affirm the examiner’s rejections.
DECISION
The rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims 1, 3-6, 8
and 9 over Dessert in view of Deguchi, and claim 7 over Dessert
in view of Deguchi and Chung, are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in
connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 CFR §
1.136(a).
AFFIRMED
)
Edward C. Kimlin )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
) BOARD OF PATENT
Terry J. Owens )
Administrative Patent Judge ) APPEALS AND
)
) INTERFERENCES
)
Jeffrey T. Smith )
Administrative Patent Judge )
TJO/eld
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Christopher J. McDonald, Esq.
Hoffman, Wasson & Gitler, PC
Suite 522
2361 Jefferson Davis Highway
Arlington, VA 22202