Ex Parte Schmidt et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 28, 2017

12491825 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 28, 2017)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/491,825 06/25/2009 Martin Schmidt 77434-30 / ELV0014PA 6111
146524 7590 07/31/2017
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP
255 E. Fifth Street
Suite 1900
Cincinnati, OH 45202
EXAMINER
BAHL, SANGEETA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3629
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/31/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MARTIN SCHMIDT and MARIO DIWERSY
____________

Appeal 2016-002602
Application 12/491,8251
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, and
AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges.

LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 6–14, 16, 17, and 20–23.
Claims 3, 5, 15, 18, and 19 have been canceled. See App. Br. 37–41 (Claims
App’x). We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.

1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Elsevier, Inc. App.
Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ Invention
Appellants’ invention generally relates to methods and systems for
social networking. Spec. ¶ 2. Claims 1 and 10, which are illustrative, read
as follows:
1. A method for disambiguation, comprising:
receiving, from a computer interface, an identifier shared
by a plurality of entities;
determining, by a program controlled data processor, a
plurality of publications associated with the identifier, wherein
each of the plurality of publications comprises a plurality of
attributes;
constructing, by said program controlled data processor, a
plurality of clusters of publications, wherein each cluster is based
on at least one of the plurality of attributes of each publication,
and said construction comprises:
comparing a first of the plurality of publications to
the remaining plurality of publications;
determining if a similarity is above a predetermined
threshold; and
clustering the publications having a similarity above
the determined threshold;
associating, in computer memory, each of the plurality of
clusters with a different one of the plurality of entities; and
outputting one of the plurality of clusters and the
identifier.
10. A method for social networking, comprising:
determining, based on computer readable data, a plurality
of clusters of items, wherein each cluster is associated with a
unique entity;
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determining, by a program controlled data processor, one
or more connections between the pluralities of clusters, wherein
said one or more connections relate to co-authorship;
storing, in a non-transitory computer readable storage
medium, said one or more connections between clusters;
constructing, in computer memory, a profile for a first
unique entity, wherein the profile comprises a first of the
plurality of clusters associated with the first unique entity and the
one or more connections between the first of the plurality of
clusters and the remaining clusters of the plurality of clusters;
and
outputting the profile.

Rejections
Claims 1, 2, 4, 6–14, 16, 17, and 20–23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter. Final Act. 2–3.
Claims 1, 2, 4, and 6–9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Zeng et al. (US 7,685,201 B2;
issued Mar. 23, 2010) (“Zeng”), Blume et al. (US 7,672,833 B2; issued Mar.
2, 2010) (“Blume”), and Bunescu et al. (US 2007/0233656 A1; published
Oct. 4, 2007) (“Bunescu”). Final Act. 4–8.
Claims 10–14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Zeng and Ellis (US 2008/0065621 A1;
published Mar. 13, 2008). Final Act. 8–10.
Claims 16, 17, and 20–23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Stackpole (US 2008/0140650
A1; published June 12, 2008), Zeng, Ellis, and Marin et al. (US
2003/0033208 A1; published Feb. 13, 2003). Final Act. 11–15.

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ANALYSIS
§ 101 Rejection
Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that claims 1, 2, 4, 6–14, 16, 17, and
20–23 are directed to nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101?
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” The Supreme Court has “long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2116
(2013)).
The Supreme Court in Alice reiterated the two-step framework, set
forth previously in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
132 S.Ct. 1289, 1300 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355. The first
step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed
to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. (citing Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at
1296–97). If so, the second step is to consider the elements of the claims
“individually and ‘as an ordered combination”’ to determine whether the
additional elements “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297–98). In other words, the
second step is to “search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
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concept] itself.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at
1294). The Court acknowledged in Mayo that “all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena,
or abstract ideas.” Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293. We, therefore, look to whether
the claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea, and merely invoke generic processes and machinery. See
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Turning to the first step, the Examiner finds claims 1, 2, 4, 6–14, 16,
17, and 20–23 are directed to “the concept of disambiguation for entities
associated with publications to form clusters based on similarity.” Final
Act. 2. The Examiner finds, based on the Specification, the claimed
disambiguation process is a fundamental business documentation practice
and a method for organizing human activities. Id. The Examiner also finds
the recited limitations can be performed mentally or are well-known,
routine, and conventional practices that require no more than a generic
computer to perform generic computer functions. Id. Based on these
findings, the Examiner concludes the claims are directed to an abstract idea.
Id.
Appellants contend the claims are not directed to an abstract idea
because
the claims are not directed to a fundamental economic practice,
a method of organizing human activities, an idea of itself or a
mathematical relationship/formula. Furthermore, the claims are
not similar to any of the examples of patent-ineligible subject
matter that were set forth in the 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility or in the Examples: Abstract Ideas
published by the USPTO on January 27, 2015 of the July 2015
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Update Appendix 1: Examples published by the USPTO in July
2015. Instead, the claims of the present application are
necessarily rooted in computer technology and recite very
particular manners for disambiguation and social networking.
App. Br. 15. Appellants argue the claims are similar to the claims addressed
in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
because they similarly address a computer-centric challenge with a claimed
solution that is necessarily rooted in computer technology. App. Br. 15–20.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. “Distinguishing
between claims that recite a patent-eligible invention and claims that add too
little to a patent-ineligible abstract concept can be difficult, as the line
separating the two is not always clear.” DDR, 773 F.3d at 1255. Often,
“there is considerable overlap between step one and step two.” Amdocs
(Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
“[T]he decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier cases in
which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen.” Id.
We disagree with Appellants that the claims are similar to those of
DDR, because they are not “necessarily rooted in computer technology in
order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer
networks” (DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257). Instead, we find the claims are similar
to those of Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2016). Here, as in Electric Power, the claims do not go beyond requiring the
collection and analysis of data, and outputting certain results of the
collection and analysis, without limiting the recited steps to technical means
for performing the functions that are arguably an advance over conventional
computer and network technology. See Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354.
When “the focus of the asserted claims” is “on collecting information,
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analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis,”
the claims are directed to an abstract idea. Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1353.
In the second step, we “consider the elements of each claim both
individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the
additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible
application.” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355. The Supreme Court has “described
step two of this analysis as a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The Examiner further finds the claims do not recite limitations that are
“significantly more” than the abstract idea because the claims do not recite
an improvement to another technology or technical field, an improvement to
the functioning of the computer itself, or meaningful limitations beyond
generally linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological
environment. Final Act. 2–3.
Appellants contend that even if the claims were directed to an abstract
idea, the claims recite patentable subject matter because “[e]ach of
independent claims 1, 10, and 16 at least add specific limitations to what is
well-understood, routine and conventional in the field, and add
unconventional steps that confine the claims to a particular useful
application.” App. Br. 21.
We find unpersuasive Appellants’ argument that the claims are
significantly more than the abstract idea because the claims recite
[S]pecific and concrete steps [that] add limitations to the claims
beyond what is well-understood, routine and conventional in the
field, and confine the claims to a particular useful application of
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identifying publications (e.g., technical or journal articles) stored
in a computer database that are associated with an identifier (e.g.,
an author name) and clustering the identified publications into a
plurality of clusters of publications, each of which is associated
with a unique entity (e.g., a unique person sharing the author
name) that shares the identifier (e.g., the author name).
App. Br. 22–23. The steps of receiving an identifier shared by a plurality of
entities; determining a plurality of publications associated with the identifier;
constructing a plurality of clusters of publications by comparing a first of the
plurality of publications to the remaining publications, determining if a
similarity is above a threshold, and clustering publications having a
similarity above the threshold; and associating each cluster with a different
one of the plurality of entities (as, for example, recited in claim 1) are all
steps that can be performed using well-understood, routine, and conventional
functions of a general purpose computer. And Appellants do not provide
adequate evidence to the contrary. See Content Extraction and Transmission
LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347–49 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“The concept of data collection, recognition, and storage is
undisputedly well-known.”). The Specification supports this view in
discussing general purpose computer(s) for performing the steps of the
method. See Spec. ¶¶ 15–27. In particular, the Specification provides “one
skilled in the art will appreciate that the system and method disclosed herein
can be implemented via a general-purpose computing device in the form of a
computer [].” Spec. 18. There is no further description, in the claims or the
Specification, of any particular technology for performing the limitations
recited in the claims other than generic computer components used in their
ordinary capacity. See Enfish, 822 F.3d. at 1336 (focusing on whether the
claim is directed to “an improvement to [the] computer functionality itself,
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not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary
capacity”); DDR, 773 F.3d at 1256 (“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no
doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise
ineligible claim patent-eligible.”) (citing Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2358)).
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner
erred in rejecting claims 1, 2, 4, 6–14, 16, 17, and 20–23 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.

§ 103 Rejection of Claims 1, 2, 4, and 6–9
CLAIM 1
Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Zeng, Blume,
and Bunescu teaches or suggests “comparing a first of the plurality of
publications to the remaining plurality of publications; determining if a
similarity is above a predetermined threshold; and clustering the publications
having a similarity above the determined threshold,” as recited in claim 1?
Appellants contend the cited references fail to teach or suggest the
disputed limitation because Zeng “does not teach or fairly suggest
comparing a first of the plurality of publications to the remaining plurality of
publications, as recited in independent claim 1.” App. Br. 26. Appellants
argue the Examiner “fails to properly address the language of claim 1”
because the Examiner asserts Zeng teaches or suggests “comparing [the]
first of the plurality of items to the remaining plurality of items” and not
“comparing [the] first of the plurality of publications to the remaining
plurality of publications,” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 26 (citing Final
Act. 6). Appellants further argue “Zeng merely discloses retrieving search
results and clustering person-related documents for person disambiguation”
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and “[t]he cited portion [of Zeng] is wholly silent with respect to comparing
publications in any capacity.” App. Br. 26 (citing Zeng 6:9–31).
We do not find Appellants’ contention persuasive. The Examiner
finds, and we agree, Zeng is directed to “disambiguating data corresponding
to persons that are located from search results, so that different persons
having the same name can be clearly distinguished.” Ans. 5–6 (citing Zeng,
Abstract). The Examiner further finds, and we agree, Zeng teaches
representing each person as a vector, calculating a similarity among vectors,
and based on the calculated similarity, clustering person vectors that
represent the same person so that each cluster represents (to a high
probability) only one distinct person. Ans. 6 (citing Zeng, Abstract).
Clustering person vectors that represent the same person based on calculated
similarity data, as taught by Zeng (Zeng, Abstract), teaches, or at least
suggests, comparing a first person vector to each of the remaining person
vectors to determine with which of the remaining person vectors the first
person vector should be clustered. The Examiner finds, and we agree,
Bunescu teaches clustering publications associated with an entity. Final
Act. 5 (citing Bunescu ¶¶ 64, 73); Ans. 6. As such, we are not persuaded the
Examiner erred by finding the combination of Zeng and Bunescu teaches or
suggests the disputed limitation. We are also not persuaded by Appellants’
contention that the Examiner fails to properly address the disputed limitation
because Appellants’ contention fails to address the Examiner’s reliance on
the combined teachings of Zeng and Bunescu. See In re Merck & Co. Inc.,
800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Appellants further contend the cited references fail to teach or suggest
the disputed limitations because Blume does not teach or suggest “clustering
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the publications having a similarity above a predetermined threshold.” App.
Br. 27. Appellants argue the Examiner “fails to properly address the
language of claim 1 because the Examiner asserts Blume allegedly discloses
‘determining similarities and clustering the entities having a similarity above
the predetermined threshold,’ not clustering the publications having a
similarity above a predetermined threshold.” App. Br. 27 (citing Final
Act. 5). Appellants further argue the cited portions of Blume “merely teach
merging entity names when a calculated sum of distance measure for the
entity names exceeds a predetermined threshold” and “Blume is silent with
respect to clustering publications.” App. Br. 27 (citing Blume, Fig. 3; 5:1–
12, 6:12–25).
We do not find Appellants’ contentions persuasive. Nonobviousness
cannot be established by attacking the references individually when the
rejection is predicated upon a combination of prior art disclosures. See In re
Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097. Here, the Examiner relies on the combined
teachings of Zeng, Blume, and Bunescu for teaching or suggesting
“determining if a similarity is above a predetermined threshold; and
clustering the publications having a similarity above the determined
threshold,” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 5–6. Appellants’ contention
fails to address the combined teachings of the references and, therefore, is
unpersuasive of error.
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1, or claims 2, 4, 7, and 8, which depend from claim 1 and
are not separately argued with particularity, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

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CLAIM 6
Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Zeng, Blume,
and Bunescu teaches or suggests “comparing a first of the plurality of
clusters to the remaining plurality of clusters; determining if a similarity is
above a predetermined threshold; and clustering the clusters having a
similarity above the predetermined threshold,” as recited in claim 6?
Appellants contend the cited references fail to teach or suggest the
disputed limitations of claim 6. App. Br. 27–29. In particular, Appellants
contend “the cited portion of Zeng merely teaches retrieving search results
and generically clustering person-related documents for person
disambiguation” and “is wholly silent with respect to comparing clusters in
any capacity.” App. Br. 28 (citing Zeng 6:9–31). Appellants further
contend “[t]he cited portions of Blume (Figure 3, column 6, lines 13-25,
column 5, lines 1-12, and column 6, lines 20-25) merely teach merging
entity names when a calculated sum of distance measure for the entities
exceeds a predetermined threshold” and “Blume is silent with respect to
clusters in any capacity.” App. Br. 29.
We do not find Appellants’ contentions persuasive. Nonobviousness
cannot be established by attacking the references individually when the
rejection is predicated upon a combination of prior art disclosures. See In re
Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097. Here, the Examiner finds Zeng teaches merging
clusters representing the same entity. Ans. 7 (citing Zeng, Fig. 2; 4:49–60,
6:9–31); see also Zeng 5:1–9. The Examiner finds Zeng, therefore, teaches
or suggests “comparing a first of the plurality of clusters to the remaining
plurality of clusters;” “determining if a similarity [exists between the
clusters];” and “clustering the clusters having a similarity.” Ans. 7; Final
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Act. 6. The Examiner finds Blume teaches determining similarities and
clustering entities having a similarity above a predetermined threshold.
Ans. 8 (citing Blume, Fig. 3; 5:1–12, 6:13–25); Final Act. 7. Based on these
findings, the Examiner concludes the combined teachings of Zeng and
Blume teach or suggest the disputed limitations. Final Act. 7. Appellants’
contention fails to address the combined teachings of the references and,
therefore, is unpersuasive of error.

CLAIM 9
Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Zeng, Blume,
and Bunescu teaches or suggests “wherein the at least one of the plurality of
attributes is co-author and the co-author has been previously
disambiguated,” as recited in claim 9?
Regarding claim 9, the Examiner finds:
Zeng teaches about wherein the at least one of the plurality of
attributes is coauthor and the co-author has been previously
disambiguated (Col 3 lines 18-23, 38-55 retuned snippets/text
documents/publications include data related to person’s
organization, location and co-occurred relationships with other
person., Col 6 lines 29-40 (The examiner interprets ‘co-author’
as co-occurred relationships of a user with other person and
related persons, related locations, affiliations and/or related
keyword as described in Col 6 lines 29-40)).
Ans. 9.
Appellants contend the cited references fail to teach or suggest the
disputed limitation because Zeng fails to teach or suggest that at least one of
the plurality of attributes is co-author and the co-author has been previously
disambiguated, as required by claim 9. App. Br. 30.
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We find Appellants’ arguments persuasive. The Examiner failed to
specifically address the limitation of claim 9 requiring the co-author to have
been previously disambiguated. As such, we are constrained by the record
to not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 9 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).2 Because we find this issue to be dispositive as to the
rejection of claim 9, we do not reach Appellants’ remaining contentions
regarding the patentability of this claim.

§ 103 Rejection of Claims 10–14
CLAIM 10
Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Zeng and
Ellis teaches or suggests “determining, based on computer readable data, a
plurality of clusters of items, wherein each cluster is associated with a
unique entity; [and] determining, by a program controlled data processor,

2 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)(2) (“In rejecting claims for want of novelty or for
obviousness, the examiner must cite the best references at his or her
command. When a reference is complex or shows or describes inventions
other than that claimed by the applicant, the particular part relied on must be
designated as nearly as practicable. The pertinence of each reference, if not
apparent, must be clearly explained and each rejected claim specified.”).
The procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case is carried when the
rejection satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132, in “notify[ing] the applicant . . . [by]
stating the reasons for [its] rejection, or objection or requirement, together
with such information and references as may be useful in judging of the
propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 132. This section “‘is violated when a rejection is so uninformative that it
prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds
for rejection.’” In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting
Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).

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one or more connections between the pluralities of clusters, wherein said one
or more connections relate to co-authorship,” as recited in claim 10?
Appellants contend the cited references fail to teach or suggest the
disputed limitations. App. Br. 30–33. In particular, Appellants contend
Zeng fails to teach or suggest “determining . . . one or more connections
between the pluralities of clusters,” as recited in claim 10. App. Br. 30–31.
According to Appellants, claim 10 requires that the one or more connections
be determined between clusters associated with unique entities. App. Br. 31.
Appellants contend Zeng teaches merging clusters associated with the same
entity and, therefore, fails to teach or suggest determining connections
between clusters associated with unique entities, as required by claim 10. Id.
We find Appellants’ contention persuasive. The Examiner finds Zeng
teaches “determining . . . one or more connections between the pluralities of
clusters,” because Zeng teaches identifying and merging clusters that share
common entities. Ans. 10 (citing Zeng, Figs. 1, 2; 4:35–65, 5:1–10).
However, the Examiner’s findings fail to explain how identifying and
merging clusters representing the same person, as taught by Zeng, teaches or
suggests determining one or more connections between clusters, each of the
clusters being associated with a unique entity (e.g., person). The Examiner
does not find the teachings of Ellis remedies the deficiency in the teachings
of Zeng. As such, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 10 or
claims 11–14, which depend therefrom, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Because we find this issue to be dispositive as to the rejection of
claims 10–14, we do not reach Appellants’ remaining contentions regarding
the patentability of claim 10.

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§ 103 Rejection of Claims 16, 17, and 20–23
CLAIM 16
Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Zeng, Ellis,
and Marin teaches or suggests “determining, based on computer readable
data, a plurality of clusters of items, wherein each cluster is associated with a
unique entity; [and] determining, by a program controlled data processor,
one or more connections between the pluralities of clusters,” as recited in
claim 16?
Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on
Stackpole, Zeng, Ellis, and Marin and recites “determining, based on
computer readable data, a plurality of clusters of items, wherein each cluster
is associated with a unique entity; [and] determining, by a program
controlled data processor, one or more connections between the pluralities of
clusters.” The Examiner does not find the teachings of Stackpole and Marin
cure the deficiencies in the teachings of Zeng and Ellis discussed supra, with
respect to claim 10. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 16 and claims 17 and 20–23, which depend therefrom, for
the reasons discussed above with respect to claim 10.
Because we find this issue to be dispositive as to the rejection of
claims 16, 17, and 20–23, we do not reach Appellants’ remaining
contentions regarding the patentability of claim 16.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, 6–14, 16, 17,
and 20–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, and 6–8 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 9–14, 16, 17, and 20–
23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Because at least one rejection encompassing all claims on appeal is
affirmed, the decision of the Examiner is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED