Ex Parte Schinke et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 25, 2013

11596450 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/596,450 08/09/2007 Stefan Schinke 11150/106 8596
26646 7590 03/26/2013
KENYON & KENYON LLP
ONE BROADWAY
NEW YORK, NY 10004
EXAMINER
PEDDER, DENNIS H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3612
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/26/2013 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte STEFAN SCHINKE, THORSTEN GAAS, and
ANDRE ZANDER
____________________

Appeal 2010-010967
Application 11/596,450
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before: MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD,
and LYNNE H. BROWNE, Administrative Patent Judges.

WOOD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2010-010967
Application 11/596,450

2
STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims
15-28. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
THE INVENTION
The claims are directed to a pedestrian protection system for motor
vehicles. Claim 15, reproduced below with emphasis added, is illustrative of
the claimed subject matter:
15. A pedestrian protection system for a
motor vehicle, comprising:
an impact detection sensor adapted to detect
an impact of a pedestrian on the motor vehicle, the
impact detection sensor arranged one of (a) in a
front bumper of the motor vehicle and nearly
touching an outer skin for covering the bumper and
(b) in a front part of the motor vehicle and nearly
touching an outer skin for covering the front part
of the motor vehicle;
wherein the impact detection sensor is
separated from the outer skin by an unfilled gap;
and
wherein the impact detection sensor is
arranged in a segmented manner.

REFERENCES
Carpenter US 5,154,462 Oct. 13, 1992
Toshiaki JP 60-139552 July 24, 1985
Hewerer EP1281582 Feb. 5, 2003

REJECTIONS
Claims 15-28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C §112 first paragraph as
failing to comply with the written-description requirement. Ans. 3.
Appeal 2010-010967
Application 11/596,450

3
Claims 15-28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C § 112 second paragraph
as indefinite. Ans. 4.
Claims 15, 18, and 26 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C § 102(b) as
anticipated by Hewerer. Ans. 5.
Claims 16-17, 19-22, and 24-25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Hewerer. Ans. 6.
Claim 23 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Hewerer and Carpenter. Ans. 6.
Claims 27 and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hewerer and Toshiaki. Ans. 6.
ANALYSIS
Claims 15-28 – Written Description & Indefiniteness

Independent claim 15 is drawn to a pedestrian impact protection
system for a motor vehicle comprising “an impact detection sensor”
arranged on the front of the vehicle “in a segmented manner.” Claims
Appx. 1. Independent claims 18 and 26 contain similar limitations. Id. at
1-2. The Examiner found that the Specification fails to adequately describe
this limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Ans. 3. The
Examiner acknowledged that the term “segmented” appears in the
Specification, but determined that the term itself was indefinite, which, in
the Examiner’s view, “raises questions as to whether applicant had
possession, at [the] time of filing, of the segmented single sensor and what
that term means.” Id. For the same reason the Examiner rejected the claims
at issue as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Id. at 4.
Thus both the written description and indefiniteness rejections turn on
whether the term “sensor . . . arranged in a segmented manner” is indefinite.
Appeal 2010-010967
Application 11/596,450

4
In attempting to construe the meaning of this term, the Examiner first
found that “the conventional meaning of segmented is something separated
or divided into parts.” Ans. 3 (citing Random House College Dictionary,
1980). The Examiner then looked to the Specification and found that the
word “segmented” was used in the Specification both to refer to multiple
sensors arranged in multiple locations around the front of a vehicle, and also
to a single sensor arranged in a segmented manner at a single location.
According to the Specification,
[R]eference numerals 51, 52, 61, 62, 63, and 64 [in figures 3
and 4] indicate regions (e.g., not visible from outside) in which
impact detection sensors may be situated in a segmented or in a
continuous manner. Thus, e.g., motor vehicle 50 [figure 3] may
correspond to motor vehicle 10 [figures 1 and 2], it being
possible for impact detection sensor 32 to be situated in a
segmented or in a continuous manner in region 51 and impact
detection sensor 36 to be situated in a segmented or in a
continuous manner in region 52.

Spec., 6, l. 29 – 7, l. 2; see Ans. 3-4. The Examiner observed that “[w]hile
multiple sensors may be segmented or divided from each other in each of
regions 51, 52, 61, 62, 63, and 64 and a single sensor may be positioned in
each of these regions, it is not clear how the claimed single sensor (an
sensor) may be arranged in a divided manner (segmented), either in a single
region or in multiple regions.” Ans. 4. The Examiner therefore determined
that “the term ‘segmented’ in association with a single ‘sensor’ [is]
indefinite.” Ans. 3.
The Appellants respond that the Examiner is improperly reading
“single” into the claim. Reply Br. 2. According to Appellants, “an impact
detection sensor” should be read as “one or more” such sensors. Id. (citing
Appeal 2010-010967
Application 11/596,450

5
Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 F.3d 958, 966, n.4
(Fed. Cir. 2000)). Appellants add, without further supporting evidence or
argument, that “one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term
‘segmented’ in association with ‘sensor.’” Id. at 3.
We think Appellants point in asserting that “an impact detection
sensor” should be read as “one or more” sensors is that placing multiple
sensors in multiple locations may satisfy this requirement. However,
reading “an” as “one or more” simply means that the claim encompasses a
system with more than one sensor; the claim still requires that “an” impact
detection sensor – that is, a single sensor – be “arranged in a segmented
manner.” The Specification supports this interpretation by stating that it is
possible for a single sensor – “impact detection sensor 32” – to be arranged
in a segmented manner in a single location – region 51. Spec. 6, l. 29 – 7, 1.
2.
Further, while we acknowledge the Examiner’s concerns that the
Specification does not elaborate on this point, we believe that lack of detail
broadens the term’s scope rather than renders it indefinite. See In re
Johnson, 558 F.2d 1008, 1016 n.17 (CCPA 1977) (breadth is not
indefiniteness). In short, “an impact detection sensor . . . arranged in a
segmented manner” means that that sensor is arranged in separate parts,
portions or segments.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 15-28 as inadequately described
and indefinite are not sustained.
Claims 15, 18, and 26 – Anticipation – Hewerer

The Examiner found that Hewerer discloses “a single sensor with
segments 4, 5, 6, [and] 7 joined via connector 8.” Ans. 5. “The sensor is
Appeal 2010-010967
Application 11/596,450

6
adapted to detect pedestrian impact and is separated from the outer skin 3 by
an unfilled gas as seen in figure 3 and confirmed by paragraph [0009] of the
translation-‘behind an outer covering 3 of the front bumper 2.’” Id.
Appellants respond that “nowhere does Hewerer et al. disclose that sensors
4, 5, 6, and 7 are arranged in a segmented manner.” App. Br. 6; Reply Br. 4.
Instead, according to Appellants, “Hewerer merely states that its elements 4,
5, 6, and 7 are formed of elastically deformable hose with an internal volume
connected directly to a pressure sensor 10,” and thus, “the hoses 4, 5, 6, and
7 of Hewerer et al. must be continuous with each other in order to remain in
operative connection with the pressure sensor 10.” Id.
Appellants have not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in finding
claims 15, 18, and 26 anticipated by Hewerer. As the Examiner found,
Hewerer figure 2 discloses a “sensor device,” mounted on the front bumper
of a vehicle. Hewerer translation 5, fig. 2. The sensor device has four hoses
4, 5, 6, and 7, joined together in the middle of the bumper and extending
outwardly in different directions. We agree with the Examiner that hoses 4-
7 are parts or “segments” of the sensor device, arranged in a segmented
manner – i.e., each segment extends in different directions. We see nothing
in the claims or the Specification that would require us to read “arranged in a
segmented manner” to require more. That hoses 4-7 are connected together
and “connected directly to a pressure sensor 10” does not mean that they
cannot be arranged in a segmented manner. Indeed, the parts of a sensor
arranged in a segmented manner would still have to be connected together in
some fashion for the sensor to operate.
We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 15, 18, and 26 as
anticipated by Hewerer.
Appeal 2010-010967
Application 11/596,450

7
Claims 16, 17, 19-22, 24, and 25 – Obviousness – Hewerer

In responding to the Examiner’s rejection of claims 16, 17, 19-22, 24,
and 25 as obvious over Hewerer, Appellants rely on the same argument that
we considered above in the context of the anticipation rejection. Because we
found that argument to be unpersuasive, we sustain the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection.
Claim 23 – Obviousness – Hewerer and Carpenter
In responding to the Examiner’s rejection of claim 23 as obvious over
Hewerer and Carpenter, Appellants rely on the same argument that we
considered above in the context of the anticipation rejection. Because we
found that argument to be unpersuasive, we sustain the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection.
Claims 27 and 28 – Obviousness – Hewerer and Toshiaki

In responding to the Examiner’s rejection of claims 27 and 28 as
obvious over Hewerer and Toshiaki, Appellants rely on the same argument
that we considered above in the context of the anticipation rejection.
Because we found that argument to be unpersuasive, we sustain the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection.
DECISION
For the above reasons,
 the Examiner’s rejection of claims 15-28 as failing the written-
description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is
reversed;
 the Examiner’s rejection of claims 15-28 as indefinite under 35
U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is reversed;
Appeal 2010-010967
Application 11/596,450

8
 the Examiner’s rejection of claims 15, 18, and 26 as anticipated
by Hewerer is affirmed;
 the Examiner’s rejection of claims 16-17, 19-22, and 24-25 as
unpatentable over Hewerer is affirmed;
 the Examiner’s rejection of claim 23 as unpatentable over
Hewerer and Carpenter is affirmed; and
 The Examiner’s rejection of claims 27 and 28 as unpatentable
over Hewerer and Toshiaki is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

Klh