Ex Parte Schaefer et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 23, 201612296219 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 23, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 12/296,219 12/11/2008 22045 7590 06/27/2016 BROOKS KUSHMAN P,C 1000 TOWN CENTER TWENTY-SECOND FLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Marcus Schaefer UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. W AS0984PUSA 5488 EXAMINER BUTLER, MICHAELE ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3653 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/27/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): docketing@brookskushman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MARCUS SCHAEFER and REINER PECH Appeal2014-000942 Application 12/296,219 Technology Center 3600 Before BRUCE T. WIEDER, KENNETH G. SCHOPPER, and BRADLEY B. BAY AT, Administrative Patent Judges. SCHOPPER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING Appellants request rehearing of the decision entered April 11, 2016, ("Decision"), which reversed the Examiner's rejections of claims 17-21 and 28-32 and entered a new ground of rejection as to claims 17 and 29 over Schantz. 1 Appellants contend that the new rejection is improper because it "is based on a misunderstanding of the teachings of the prior art reference and the differences between the prior art reference and the claimed invention." Request for Rehearing ("Request") at 1. As discussed below, 1 Schantz et al., US 6,040,544, iss. Mar. 21, 2000. Appeal2014-000942 Application 12/296,219 we are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments and find no point of law or fact that we overlooked or misapprehended in arriving at our Decision. DISCUSSION Appellants first argue that Schantz "teaches directly away from the use of mechanical screening methods." Request 3--4. We are not persuaded. We find that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim requires that the mechanical screening system is a system that is capable of mechanically separating crushed polysilicon into fine and residual components. This interpretation is consistent with the language of the claim itself and the Specification, which only provides non-limiting examples of screening systems including oscillatory screening machines and mesh and hole screens. See Spec. 3, 11. 18-22. We note that the claim itself does not recite a particular structure for the screening system and only defines the system in terms of its functionality. Thus, the claimed system is not limited to a device with a screen having holes, slots, etc., and the claim does not distinguish the screening system from the screening methods known in the art, as described in the Specification. See id. Further, although Schantz discloses that the types of screens identified in the Specification have disadvantages, we found that Schantz discloses a mechanical screening system in the form of a vibrating conveyor that separates fragments of silicon, i.e. a screening system with the functionality required by the claims. Decision 8. Thus, we are not persuaded that Schantz teaches away from a mechanical screening system as claimed. Next, Appellants argue that "[a] 'fraction' of fragments is not constituted by a single fragment." Request 5. We disagree. The plain meaning of fraction refers to a portion of a whole and we fail to see why one 2 Appeal2014-000942 Application 12/296,219 piece may not be considered a fraction. This interpretation is consistent with the claims and Specification, which do not provide a narrower meaning or definition of the term. In light of the discussion of the two points above, we are also not persuaded that we have interpreted Schantz incorrectly. See Request 5. First, Appellants argue that Schantz's conveyor separates particles but does not classify them. Id. This argument is not commensurate with the scope of the claim, which requires only that the mechanical screening system is capable of separating crushed polysilicon fragments. Second, Appellants assert that Schantz does not teach "a mechanical screening device, a device with holes, slots, or steps which separates fine fragments .... " Request 6. As discussed above, we find that Schantz discloses a mechanical screening device under the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim. Finally, Appellants argue that "the claim does not merely require 'that the mechanical screening system and optoelectronic sorting system be capable of separating polycrystalline silicon as the claim describes."' Id. at 7 (citing Decision 7). We are not persuaded that we have interpreted the claim incorrectly, and we also note that our Decision found that Schantz teaches or suggests a mechanical screening system and optoelectronic sorting system and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found the claimed invention obvious in light of Schantz's disclosure. Decision 8. Appellants' argument does not apprise us of any error in our Decision. CONCLUSION We have carefully reviewed the original Decision in light of Appellants' request, but we find no point of law or fact that we overlooked 3 Appeal2014-000942 Application 12/296,219 or misapprehended in arriving at our decision. Therefore, Appellants' request for rehearing is denied. DENIED 4 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation