Ex Parte SauerweinDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 29, 201713780158 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/780,158 02/28/2013 James Timothy Sauerwein JR. H0030571 9146 108134 7590 12/01/2017 HONFYWFT T /ADHTTON EXAMINER 115 Tabor Road TACSIK, ERNEST G P.O. Box 377 MORRIS PLAINS, NJ 07950 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2641 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/01/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): patentservices-us @ honey well, com docket @ ahpapatent. com Katharine.Lawther@Honeywell.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JAMES TIMOTHY SAUERWEIN JR. Appeal 2017-003856 Application 13/780,1581 Technology Center 2600 Before DENISE M. POTHIER, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-20, which are all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 The Applicant is Hand Held Products, Inc. According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Honeywell International Inc., the Applicant’s parent company. Br. 3. Appeal 2017-003856 Application 13/780,158 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellant’s application relates to a distraction avoidance system for mobile devices. Spec. ^ 2. The distraction avoidance system disables the tactile control of the mobile device’s user interface in response to detecting a threshold amount of motion by the mobile device. Id. at ^ 6. Claim 1 illustrates the appealed subject matter and reads as follows: 1. A mobile device, comprising: a motion sensing device; a user-interface system comprising a tactile-control system; a wireless communication system; and a processor communicatively coupled to the motion sensing device, the user-interface system, and the wireless communication system, the processor configured for: involuntarily disabling the user-interface system's tactile-control system in response to a threshold amount of motion sensed by the motion sensing device; and involuntarily enabling the user-interface system's tactile-control system only in response to the amount of motion sensed by the motion sensing device that is less than said threshold amount; wherein, the processor does not provide the user with any active participation to prevent the disabling of the user-interface system's tactile-control system, either prior to disabling or after disabling. The Examiner’s Rejections Claims 1,11, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. Final Act. 9-10. 2 Appeal 2017-003856 Application 13/780,158 Claims 1-3, 6, 8, 9, 11-13, 15, 16, and 18-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Dietz et al. (US 2009/0224931 Al; Sept. 10, 2009), Schlesener et al. (US 2010/0113073 Al; May 6, 2010), and Riemer et al. (US 2010/0216509 Al; Aug. 26, 2010). Final Act. 10-35. The Examiner adds Ghazarian et al. (US 2010/0105356 Al; Apr. 29, 2010) to reject claims 4, 5, and 14 (Final Act. 35^40); Wormald et al. (US 2010/0042911 Al; Feb. 18, 2010) to reject claims 7 and 17 (Final Act. 41- 43); and Rutledge (US 2009/0221279 Al; Sept. 3, 2009) to reject claim 10 (Final Act. 43). ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellant’s contentions. Except as noted below, we adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Final Action from which this appeal is taken; and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur with the Examiner’s conclusions. We highlight the following additional points. Written Description The Examiner rejected claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 as failing to satisfy the written description requirement because the Specification does not show that Appellant possessed a mobile device “wherein, the processor does not provide the user with any active participation to prevent the disabling of the user-interface system's tactile-control system, either prior to disabling or after disabling,” as claimed. Final Act. 9-10. The Examiner 3 Appeal 2017-003856 Application 13/780,158 also rejected claims 11 and 15, which recite commensurate limitations, for the same reasons. Id. Appellant argues the Examiner erred because the Specification supports the disputed “wherein” limitation, citing paragraphs 4, 5, 56, and 86 of the Specification. Br. 10. In particular, Appellant argues the Specification describes that conventionally available solutions rely on the user to actively participate in the process. Id. Appellant further explains the Specification addresses a solution (i.e., the claimed invention) that does not rely on user participation or rule obedience. Id. Appellant argues an ordinarily skilled artisan would understand from the disclosure’s example regarding “a parent. . . enabling the claimed process on a child’s device” that the parent would not want the child to be able to choose to obey the parent’s enabled process. Id. at 10-11. Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Specification indicate that conventional solutions to prevent distracted driving rely on the user to actively participate in the process and a need exists for a solution that does not rely on active user participation. Spec. 4-5. Paragraph 56 discloses that the present invention does not rely on a mobile device user’s active participation to prevent distracted driving. Id. at 56. Paragraph 86 indicates that a central management authority (e.g., a parent of a child using a mobile device) may send instructions to a mobile device to prevent distracted driving. Id. at 86. The cited paragraphs indicate that a user’s active participation is not required for disabling the tactile control of a mobile device’s user interface. In particular, a central management authority may disable portions of a mobile device to prevent distracted driving. Moreover, none of the cited paragraphs indicate whether 4 Appeal 2017-003856 Application 13/780,158 or not a mobile device user is provided the ability to prevent the disabling prior to or after the disabling occurs, as claimed. Accordingly, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred in finding the Specification does not establish that Appellant possessed the invention as claimed. We, therefore, sustain the written description rejection of independent claim 1. We also sustain the written description rejection of independent claims 11 and 15, which Appellant did not argue separately. Br. 10-11. Obviousness Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as obvious over Dietz, Schlesener, and Riemer because Dietz does not disclose involuntary disabling, instead teaching voluntary disabling. Br. 11. In particular, Appellant argues Dietz teaches giving a user an opportunity to override the disabling action, which means the disabling is voluntary, not involuntary. Id. at 12-13 (citing Dietz ^ 15-16). Appellant further argues that Dietz teaches the user configuring a device to perform disabling actions and the actions are, therefore, voluntary. Id. at 13 (citing Dietz 20-21). Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. Claim 1 recites “involuntarily disabling the user-interface system’s tactile-control system in response to a threshold amount of motion sensed by the motion sensing device.” Claim 1 further recites “wherein, the processor does not provide the user with any active participation to prevent the disabling of the user- interface system’s tactile-control system, either prior to disabling or after disabling.” In other words, claim 1 separately recites involuntarily disabling the tactile control system and not providing the user any ability to prevent the disabling either prior to or after the disabling. The Examiner relies on Dietz for teaching the “involuntarily disabling” limitation and Riemer for 5 Appeal 2017-003856 Application 13/780,158 teaching the “wherein, the processor does not provide” limitation. Final Act. 12-14. Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because it presumes that providing a user with the ability to prevent disabling, either prior to or after disabling, renders the disabling “voluntary.” See Br. 11-13. However, the claim separately recites “involuntarily disabling” and the “wherein” prevention clause. Also, the rejection relies on different references to teach these limitations. Dietz teaches a mobile device that automatically disables functions when the device’s speed exceeds a threshold. See, e.g., Dietz 10. We agree with the Examiner that this satisfies the “involuntarily disabling” limitation. See Final Act. 12. The Examiner finds Riemer teaches the “wherein” clause that prevents the user from overriding the claimed involuntary disabling (e.g., an administrator preventing a user from overriding a policy of no text messaging in safe mode). See id. at 14 (citing Riemer 151). Appellant’s argument ignores the combination of Dietz and Riemer, instead focusing solely on the teachings of Riemer. One cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually when the rejection is based on a combination of references. In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). Each reference cited by the Examiner must be read, not in isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a whole. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). For these reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as unpatentable over Dietz, Schlesener, and Riemer such that we sustain that rejection. We also sustain the rejection of independent 6 Appeal 2017-003856 Application 13/780,158 claims 11 and 15, for which Appellant offers the same arguments (Br. 11- 14). We also sustain the obviousness rejections of dependent claims 2-10, 12-14, and 16-20, for which Appellant offers no separate argument (App. Br. 14-15). DECISION We affirm the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-20. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. §41.50(f). AFFIRMED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation