Ex Parte Sambhar

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 21, 2016

12611655 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 21, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/611,655 11103/2009
48500 7590 06/23/2016
SHERIDAN ROSS P,C
1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 1200
DENVER, CO 80202
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Ankur Sambhar
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
4366YDT-269 2920
EXAMINER
CHOI, DAVIDE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2174
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/23/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
cjacquet@sheridanross.com
pair_Avaya@firsttofile.com
edocket@sheridanross.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ANKUR SAMBHAR
Appeal2014-009247
Application 12/611,655
Technology Center 2100
Before ERIC S. FRAHM, NATHAN A. ENGELS, and
CARLL. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
ENGELS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
1--4, 6-16, 18, 19, and 21-23. Claims 5, 17, and 20 are canceled. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Appeal2014-009247
Application 12/611,655
ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
Claim 1, reproduced below with reference letters added, is illustrative
of the claimed subject matter:
[A J 1. A method for enhancing a conference comprising:
[BJ designating a virtual meeting attendant (VMA) to act on
behalf of a previously invited conference attendee;
[CJ recognizing one or more of a triggering event in the
conference and a tagged agenda item;
[DJ taking an action item on behalf of the conference attendee
based on at least one of the one or more triggering events in the
conference, wherein the VMA has access to information that
allows patching on demand, based on the at least one of the one
or more triggering events in the conference, via an initiation of
an outbound communication, of the conference attendee into the
conference to allow the conference attendee to contribute to the
conference and interact with one or more other conference
attendees attending the conference in real-time;
[EJ determining, based on preferences and presence
information, how to contact the conference attendee; and
[FJ in response to detecting the triggering event in the
conference, initiating a contact to the conference attendee.
APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) claims 1, 3--4, 6, 7, 9-13, 15-16, 18, and 19 as being unpatentable
over the combination of Gudipaty (US 2009/0319916 Al; Dec. 24, 2009),
Rapaport (US 2010/0205541 Al; Aug. 21, 2010), and Karlsson (US
2005/0221808 Al; Oct. 6, 2005); claims 2, 8, and 14 as being unpatentable
in view of Gudipaty, Rapaport, Karlsson, and Vijayakumar (US
2011/0022967 Al; Jan. 27, 2011); and claims 21-23 as being unpatentable
in view of Gudipaty, Rapaport, Karlsson, and Myers (US 7,065,186 B 1;
June 20, 2006).
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Application 12/611,655
ANALYSIS
Claims 1--4, 6, 7, 9-16, 18, and 19
The Examiner finds Gudipaty describes a multimedia-conference
system with an "auto-attend" feature that allows conference invitees who
cannot attend a conference to record the conference and to collaborate with
actual attendees, among other functionality. See Final Act. 3-9; Ans. 3--4;
Gudipaty i-fi-f 19-22, 58, 69-70. In combination with the teachings of
Gudipaty, the Examiner cites Rapaport for its disclosures of "patching on
demand" based on a triggering event and Karlsson as an additional
disclosure of initiating communications with a contact in response to a
triggering event. Final Act. 7-9 (citing Rapaport i124 and Karlsson i-f 11 );
see also Final Act. 24; Ans. 4.
Appellant argues the combination of references fails to teach or
suggest element H, as labeled above in claim 1. See App. Br. 8.
Specifically, contrasting Rapaport, Appellant argues claim 1 requires "the
initiation of the outbound communication to be to the conference attendee
(an attendee that was previously invited) to join the conference attendee to a
conference currently in progress," but Rapaport teaches away from that
requirement with its disclosures of a system that invites "individuals to join
a new online chat room or session that has not yet commenced." App. Br.
8. Further, Appellant asserts the Examiner's combination of Gudipaty and
Rapaport would not work as claimed because:
Using the Examiner's logic, the user is invited to the original
conference (as disclosed in Gudipaty). Based on events in the
original conference, the user would then be invited to join the
new conference of Rapaport so that the conference attendee
can contribute and interact, in real-time, with one or more
conference attendees attending the original conference. The
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Application 12/611,655
Examiner's logic fails to answer one question: how can the user
interact with the attendees of the original conference in real-
time when the user is in a new (different) conference with
different users (users defined by the clustering results)? The
Examiner is trying to combine the two references in a way that
not only contradicts the conflicting teachings of the references
but also would not work as claimed claim 1.
App. Br. 9. Appellant's Reply brief additionally argues "the
Examiner has not established that Gudipaty discloses an outbound
communication that allows the conference attendee to interact with
the other conference attendees in real time as required by claim 1"
because Gudipaty only describes communication by a single meeting
participant with an auto-attendee via e-mail or IM. Reply Br. 5-7
(citing Gudipaty i-f 69-70).
We find Appellant's arguments unpersuasive. Contrary to
Appellant's arguments regarding the form of communication described in
Gudipaty (see Reply Br. 6-7), the plain language of claim 1 requires
"initiating a contact to the conference attendee," and Appellant's
Specification broadly describes such contact to include a "patch" by instant
message (Spec. 5), "via text, via a messaging service, via a multimedia
service, or the like" (Spec. 14). Gudipaty similarly lists "email, IM, chat,
voice, device, etc." as exemplary communication channels with which
meeting participants can "establish a communication channel using the
appropriate communications modality, and engage in interactive
communications with the auto-attendee." Gudipaty i-f 70 (emphasis added).
That Gudipaty describes an example of one meeting participant asking a
question of an auto-attendee does not limit or detract from Gudipaty' s clear
teaching of "interactive communications with the auto-attendee." Gudipaty
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Application 12/611,655
if 70; accord id. if 69 ("This published presence state information informs
others that desire to contact the presentity of his/her availability and
willingness to communicate.").
We are also unpersuaded by Appellant's arguments that the Rapaport
teaches away from Gudipaty or that the combination of references would
result in users invited to an original conference, as disclosed in Gudipaty,
communicating in real time with users in a new, different conference, as
disclosed in Rapaport. See App. Br. 8-9; Reply Br. 5---6. "The test for
obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference." See In re
Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). The test for obviousness "is what
the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art." Id. (citations omitted); accord KSR Int 'l Co. v.
TeleFlex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (S. Ct. 2007) (obviousness analysis does
not require precise teachings of the claimed subject; the analysis should
account for the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would employ). Here, the Examiner provided detailed findings with
reasonable explanations for the combinations of references supported by
rational underpinnings to reach the conclusion of obviousness, and
Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the Examiner's findings and
conclusions. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of
independent claim 1, as well as independent claim 13 and dependent claims
2--4, 6, 7, 9-12, 14--16, 18, and 19, for which Appellant relies on the same
arguments as claim 1.
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Claim 8
Claim 8 recites "[t]he method of claim 1, wherein VMA's are ranked
based on one or more of a title and an order received." In addition to the
Examiner's findings regarding claim 1, the Examiner cites Vijayakumar's
disclosures of an online-meeting system that displays a ranked list of
meeting participants based on meeting participants' work experience and
other variables. See Final Act. 16-7; Vijayakumar i-fi-f 15-18, 21, and 28.
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in citing Vijayakumar's
disclosures regarding rankings of meeting participants (i.e., people) based
on work experience, while "claim 8 requires that VMA's be ranked based
on a title or order received." App. Br. 10; accord Reply Br. 8. Appellant
clarified in the Reply Brief that "Appellant is not arguing that Gudipaty does
not disclose a VMA. The Appellant is arguing that neither Gudipaty,
Rapaport, nor Vijayakumar disclose the ranking of a VMA." Reply Br. 8;
accord App. Br. 10 ("Vijayakumar does not even discuss a Virtual Meeting
Assistant (VMA), let alone ranking a VMA as required by claim 8. How
can Vijayakumar disclose ranking a VMA when it does not disclose any
type of VMA ?").
We find Appellant's arguments unpersuasive as Appellant again
attacks the references individually without addressing the substance of
combined teaches of the prior art. See Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Further, we
agree with the Examiner (Ans. 4--5) that a reasonable interpretation of "title"
in claim 8 includes a conference attendee's title (see Spec. 13(listing
"attendee title")) and that claim 8 would have been obvious in view of
Gudipaty' s disclosures addressed above in further of view of Vijayakumar' s
suggestions of ranking the online representations of meeting participants
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based on variables such as work experience, which, as Appellant
acknowledges may equate to, or at least suggest, a title (App. Br. 10 ("A
person's work experience may or may not have anything to do with the
person's title."); Reply Br. 8 ("a person's title does not necessarily equate to
a person's expertise")). See also Gudipaty i-fi-141 ("organizational
information (e.g., a title)"), 58. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's
rejection of claim 8.
Claims 21-23
Claim 21 depends from claim 1 and recites the following disputed
limitation, with emphasis added by Appellant (App. Br. 11 ): "wherein the
triggering event in the conference comprises detection of the conference
attendee's name spoken in the conference and detection of a question to
the conference attendee spoken in the conference." Appellant argues
Gudipaty does not teach this limitation because, similar to the arguments
addressed above regarding claim 1, "it is clear that the communication
channel used to ask the question [in Gudipaty] is a separate communication
channel from the multi-media conference." App. Br. 11-12 (citing Gudipaty
,-r,-r 67, 69-70).
We find Appellant's argument unpersuasive for the reasons addressed
above. In addition, claim 21 expressly includes within its scope both
"converting the question to text and sending the text over an Instant Message
(IM) to the conference attendee" and "calling the conference attendee and
playing the question to the conference attendee" (App. Br. 18 (Claims
App'x)), both of which are consistent with the modalities disclosed in
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Gudipaty (see Gudipaty if 70 (reciting questions sent to an auto-attendee by
IM and voice, among other means)).
We are also unpersuaded by Appellant's argument that Gudipaty does
not disclose "detection of a question asked in the conference." App. Br. 12.
As the Examiner finds (Final Act. 4, 17-20, 25-26), Gudipaty teaches using
triggers such as agenda items, the presence or availability of a certain
meeting participant, and questions or requests from meeting participants to
determine when to present auto-attendee files to actual attendees, to allow an
auto-attendee to ask a questions, or to indicate when an auto-attendee
becomes available to answer a question. See Gudipaty iii! 21 ("An auto-
attendee may desire to ... ask a question on an agenda topic .... "), 58
("presentation parameters may specify certain logical event segments
suitable for the auto-attend file 208 (e.g., agenda iteml), context indicators
suitable to trigger presentation of the auto-attend file 208 (e.g., presence of a
certain meeting participant 154-1-p ), ... [explicit or] implicit requests from
a meeting participant 154-1-p and so forth."); 69-70 (describing a presence
detection module to monitor and retrieve presence information of auto-
attendees to "inform[] others that desire to contact the [auto-attendee's]
presentity of his/her availability and willingness to communicate"); see also
Gudipaty Fig. 3 (identifying "John" as an auto-attendee; stating "Present
John's Slide Deck for Agenda Item]" and "John ... Available").
In addition, for each of claims 21, 22, and 23, Appellant argues that
when a name is detected in Myers, the user is not in a conference, but the
Examiner does not rely on Myers for conference-related limitations.
Instead, the Examiner cites Myers as evidence that methods for recognizing
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Application 12/611,655
a spoken name were known in the art at the time of Appellant's invention, a
fact Appellant acknowledges. See App. Br. 12-13.
We agree with the Examiner that the combination of such teachings in
Myers's with the teachings of Gudipaty, Rapaport, and Karlsson would have
taught or suggests the limitations of claim 21, as well as claims 22 and 23
which recite related limitations and for which Appellant relies on the same
arguments. Appellant's arguments do not substantively address the
references' combined teachings as cited by the Examiner, and Appellant
cannot establish nonobviousness by attacking Myers individually without
addressing the references' combined teachings. See Keller, 642 F.2d at 425;
KSR Int'!, 550 U.S. at 418 (obviousness analysis does not require precise
teachings of the claimed subject; the analysis should account for the
inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
employ). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejections of claims 21-
23.
CONCLUSION
Having considered each of Appellant's arguments regarding claims 1-
4, 6-16, 18, 19, and 21-23 in view of the Examiner's rejections and the
evidence of record, we are unpersuaded of Examiner error and adopt as our
own the Examiner's findings, conclusions, and reasoning consistent with the
above.
DECISION
The Examiner's rejections of claims 1--4, 6-16, 18, 19, and 21-23 are
affirmed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended. 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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