Ex Parte Salihu et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 12, 2018

14523521 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 12, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/523,521 10/24/2014
25883 7590 04/16/2018
MUNCK WILSON MANDALA L.L.P
P.O. Drawer 800889
DALLAS, TX 75380
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Mohamed Safir SALIHU
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
GNRT-32206 2084
EXAMINER
ANDREI, RADU
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3682
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/16/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
admin@dalpat.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
IPdocketing@munckwilson.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MOHAMED SAFIR SALIHU, WAYNE THOMAS MCHUGH,
ARTHUR MARTIN HOLBROOK, PURNENDU MISHRA, and
LEE COLEMAN
(Applicant: GANART TECHNOLOGIES, INC.)
Appeal2017-000228
Application 14/523,521 1
Technology Center 3600
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, and
AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges.
HAGY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
1 Appellant has identified several applications as related to the present
application: Application Serial No. 13/915,387; Application Serial No.
13/826,537 (see Appeal No. 2017-003799); Application Serial No.
14/245,523 (see Appeal No. 2017-003828); Application Serial No.
14/309,699 (see Appeal No. 2017-003598); Application Serial No.
14/278,843; and Application Serial No. 12/684,932 (see Appeal No. 2017-
004356). (App. Br. 1-2.)
Appeal2017-000228
Application 14/523,521
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Final Rejection of claims 1-18, which are all of the pending claims. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
According to Appellant, the "disclosure relates to a system and
method of enabling an employee to utilize earned and unpaid earnings and a
method and system for an accretive value store loyalty card program." The
claims are directed to method and system of accretive value store loyalty
card program. (Spec. i-f 1.) By way of Background, Appellant's
Specification provides the following summary:
Employers typically pay employees accrued earnings on a
fixed schedule, for example every two weeks. At the end of a
pay period, employees are paid the earnings they have accrued
during the pay period. During the pay period, before the
designated payday, employees typically have no means or
method of accessing or using the earnings that they have accrued
during the pay period. Although payday loans may be available,
typically such loans involve high interest rates and have no direct
connection to the employee's accrued earnings. Thus, there
exists a system and method for enabling [an] employee to access
and utilize accrued and unpaid earnings during the pay period in
which the earnings have accrued.
(Id. i-f 2.)
2 References herein to "Appellant" are to applicant Ganart Technologies,
Inc., who is also identified in the Appeal Brief as the real party in interest.
(Br. 1.)
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Appellant purports to address this need by enabling employees to
access their record of accrued but unpaid earnings and convey a portion of
those unpaid earnings to a participating store, from which the employees
may purchase items. (Id. i-f 9.) Appellant's claimed invention also includes
at least one participating store offering to the employees "at least one
incentive" for purchasing goods and services at that store. (Id. i-f 10.)
Exemplary Claim
Claims 1 and 11 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below with the
disputed limitations italicized, is exemplary of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method of enabling an employee to utilize earned
and unpaid earnings; comprising:
receiving, from an employer database associated with the
employer's payroll record, with a central office processor, a
record of an employee's accrued and unpaid earnings for a
predetermined time period and storing the employee's accrued
and unpaid earnings in a central office database;
receiving, by an employee, at a remote network access
device, an electronic request to access the employee's record of
accrued and unpaid earnings for the predetermined time period
stored at the central office database and transmitting the request
to the central office;
receiving, from a remote network access device, with the
central office processor, the electronic request from the
employee to access the employee's record of accrued and unpaid
earnings for the predetermined time period;
accessing, with the central office processor, the central
office database including the record of the requested employee's
accrued and unpaid earnings for the predetermined time period
and determining an amount of the employee's accrued and
unpaid earnings for the predetermined time period available to
the employee;
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transm1ttmg, with the central office processor, the
employee's available accrued and unpaid earnings to the remote
network access device for display to the employee with the
remote network access device;
receiving, with the central office processor, an electronic
request from the remote network access device to transfer a
desired portion of the employee's accrued and unpaid earnings
and comparing the desired portion of the employee's accrued and
unpaid earnings to the employee's available accrued and unpaid
earnmgs;
comparing, with the central office processor, the amount
of the desired portion of the employee's accrued and unpaid
earnings with the employee's available accrued and unpaid
earnings and transmitting, from the central office processor, to
the remote network access device, at least one participating store
and at least one incentive offered to [the] employee for
purchasing goods and services at the participating store with the
employee's accrued and unpaid earnings and displaying the at
least one participating store and the at least one incentive with
the remote network device and wherein the incentive is defined
by the at least one participating store;
generating, at the remote network device, an electronic
request for the desired portion of the employee's accrued and
unpaid earnings to be transferred for the employee's benefit to
an employee[-]selected participating store;
receiving, with the central office processor, the electronic
request from the employee to transfer the desired portion of the
employee's available accrued and unpaid earnings to the
employee[-]selected participating store;
transferring, from a bank associated with the central
office, the desired amount of accrued and unpaid earnings to a
sponsoring bank where the participating store maintains an
account wherein the employee's conveyed accrued and unpaid
earnings are held; and
updating, with the central office processor, the employee's
record of accrued and unpaid earnings for the predetermined time
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period in the database to reflect the transferred desired amount of
the employee's accrued and unpaid earnings.
References
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Cacheria, III et al.
("Cacheria")
Hunt
US 2010/0179887 Al
US 2010/0257040 Al
Rejections3
July 15, 2010
Oct. 7, 2010
Claims 1-18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. (Final Act. 2-3, 10-13.)
Claims 1-18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Cacheria and Hunt. (Final Act. 4--10, 13-14.)
Issues
1. Whether the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-18 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
2. Whether the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Cacheria and Hunt teaches or suggests
at least one incentive offered to [the] employee for purchasing
goods and services at the participating store with the employee's
accrued and unpaid earnings and displaying the at least one
participating store and the at least one incentive with the remote
network device and wherein the incentive is defined by the at
least one participating store[,]
3 All rejections are under the provisions of 35 U.S.C. in effect prior to the
effective date of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011.
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as recited in independent claim 1 and commensurately recited in
independent claim 11.
3. Whether the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Cacheria and Hunt teaches or suggests "transferring, from a bank associated
with the central office, the desired amount of accrued and unpaid earnings to
a sponsoring bank where the participating store maintains an account
wherein the employee's conveyed accrued and unpaid earnings are held," as
recited in independent claim 1 and commensurately recited in independent
claim 11.
ANALYSIS
A. Rejection Under 35 USC§ 101
The Supreme Court has set forth an analytical "framework for
distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those
concepts." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355
(2014) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
U.S. 66, 71-73 (2012)). In the first step of the analysis, we determine
whether the claims at issue are "directed to" a judicial exception, such as an
abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. If not, the inquiry ends. Thales
Visionix Inc. v. US., 850 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Enfzsh, LLC v.
Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016). If the claims are
determined to be directed to an abstract idea, then we consider under step
two whether the claims contain an "inventive concept" sufficient to
"transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application." Alice,
134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quotations and citation omitted).
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Noting that the two stages involve "overlapping scrutiny of the
content of the claims," the Federal Circuit has described "the first-stage
inquiry" as "looking at the 'focus' of the claims, their 'character as a
whole,"' and "the second-stage inquiry (where reached)" as "looking more
precisely at what the claim elements add-specifically, whether, in the
Supreme Court's terms, they identify an 'inventive concept' in the
application of the ineligible matter to which (by assumption at stage two) the
claim is directed." Electric Power Grp, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In considering whether a claim is directed to an
abstract idea, we acknowledge, as did the Court in Mayo, that "all inventions
at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas." Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. We, therefore, look
to: (1) whether the claims focus on a specific means or method that
improves the relevant technology, or (2) are directed to a result or effect that
itself is the abstract idea, in which the claims merely invoke generic
processes and machinery. See Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1336.
Step One: Whether the Claims Are Directed to a Patent-Ineligible
Concept (Abstract Idea)
The Examiner concludes the claims are directed to an abstract ideas of
"enabling an employee to utilize earned and unpaid earnings" and marketing
to consumers by offering incentives to patronize a store, which the Examiner
finds are "fundamental economic practice[s]." (Final Act. 2-3.) We agree.
Appellant's claims are directed to allowing employees to receive payday
advances that the employees may then use to shop at participating stores,
which may offer incentives to the employees to shop there. Payday
advances and marketing to consumers by offering shopping incentives are
fundamental economic practices.
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Appellant, however, argues that the claimed concept is not "similar to
those found by the courts to be abstract." (App. Br. 22.) We disagree. Our
reviewing court has explained that claims directed to "the mere formation
and manipulation of economic relations" and "the performance of certain
financial transactions" are properly held to be directed to abstract ideas.
Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass 'n,
776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v.
Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding computer-
implemented system for "using advertising as a currency [on] the Internet"
to be ineligible); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1352, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding computer-implemented system for guaranteeing
performance of an online transaction to be ineligible.); CyberSource Corp. v.
Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding
computer-implemented system for "verifying the validity of a credit card
transaction[] over the Internet" to be ineligible). (See Final Act. 2-3; Ans.
10-11.)
The Examiner further finds additional limitations in the claims are
directed to the abstract idea of "receiving, storing, and processing data."
(Ans. 11.) In particular, "in the claimed invention, the system receives
employee records, an access request (receiving data), stores [all] records and
requests (storing data) and compares the available accrued and unpaid
earnings with the amount needed for redeeming an option (processing
data)." (Id.)
We agree. Our reviewing court has repeatedly held that information
collection and analysis, including when limited to particular content, is
within the realm of abstract ideas. See, e.g., Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at
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1353 (holding that "collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying
certain results of the collection and analysis" are "a familiar class of claims
'directed to' a patent-ineligible concept"); Fair Warning IP, LLC v. Iatric
Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims directed to
collecting information and analyzing it according to certain rules were
directed to an abstract idea); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,
654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (computer-implemented system for
"verifying the validity of a credit card transaction[] over the Internet" was
patent-ineligible).
We additionally note that a claim need not be addressed to a single
abstract idea to be patent ineligible. As our reviewing court has held,
combining several abstract ideas does not render the combination any less
abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2017) ("Adding one abstract idea ... to another abstract idea ...
does not render the claim non-abstract."); see also FairWarning IP, 839 F.3d
at 1093-94 (patent-ineligible claims were directed to a combination of
abstract ideas).
Appellant's argument that the Examiner has failed to consider the
claims as a whole is not persuasive. (See App. Br. 20-21; Reply Br. 2-3.)
The Examiner explicitly points out that each claim was considered as a
whole (Final Act. 3; see also Ans. 2), and the Examiner's overall analysis
bears this out. In addition, the Examiner's characterization of the claims as
directed to "enabling an employee to utilize earned and unpaid earnings"
(Final Act. 2) is consistent with Appellant's statement in the Specification
that the "disclosure relates to a system and method of enabling an employee
to utilize earned and unpaid earnings and a method and system for an
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accretive value store loyalty card program." (Spec. i-f 1; see also App. Br. 2
("The present invention, as set forth in independent claim 1, relates to a
method of enabling an employee to utilize earned and unpaid earnings.").)
Appellant also argues error in the Examiner's analysis for failing to
provide "evidence" to support the Examiner's "assertion that the invention,
defined by the above-listed particular claim limitations, is directed to
prevalent and well-known commercial methods." (Br. 23.) First, Appellant
misstates the Examiner's rejection, which does not make such an assertion.
Second, to the extent Appellant argues that the Court's decisions in Alice
and Bilski (Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)) require "evidence" to
support a § 101 rejection, Appellant misstates the law. Nothing in Alice or
Bilski requires the Examiner to provide evidence as part of the Examiner's
prima facie case.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly noted that "the prima
facie case is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of
the burden of production." Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The
court has, thus, held that the Office carries its procedural burden of
establishing a prima facie case when its rejection satisfies the requirements
of 35 U.S.C. § 132 by notifying the applicant of the reasons for rejection,
"together with such information and references as may be useful in judging
of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application." See In
re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Put simply, all that is required of the Office is that it set forth the
statutory basis of the rejection in a sufficiently articulate and informative
manner as to meet the notice requirement of§ 132. Id.; see also Chester v.
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Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that section 132 "is
violated when a rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant
from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection").
Here, in rejecting the pending claims under § 101, the Examiner
analyzed the claims using the Mayol Alice two-step framework, consistent
with the guidance set forth in the US PTO' s "2014 Interim Guidance on
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility," 79 Fed. Reg. 74618 (Dec. 16, 2014), in
effect at the time the Final Office Action was mailed. (Final Act. 2-3.) In
so doing, the Examiner notified Appellant of the reasons for the rejection
"together with such information and references as may be useful in judging
of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application."
35 U.S.C. § 132.
Because we agree with the Examiner, at step one of the Alice analysis,
that the claims are directed to one or more abstract ideas, we tum to the
second step of the Alice analysis, in which we must determine whether the
additional elements of the claims transform them into patent-eligible subject
matter.
Step Two: Whether Additional Elements Transform the Idea into
Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
Having concluded that the claims are directed to an abstract idea, the
Examiner also concludes that the additional elements or combinations of
elements beyond the abstract idea do not amount to "significantly more"
than the abstract idea itself, finding "the generically recited computer
elements ... do not add a meaningful limitation to the abstract idea because
they would be routine in any computer implementation." (Final Act. 3.)
Appellant argues the claims amount to "significantly more" than
"some unidentified abstract idea," and cites as support, the Federal Circuit's
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holding in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed.
Cir. 2014). (App. Br. 23.) Appellant also argues the claims "include
specific steps that cannot be performed mentally and do not describe
conventional well-known generic computer functions." (Reply Br. 4.)
We disagree. Appellant overstates the technical nature of the claims.
At most, the claims (and Specification) refer to the use of a "network access
device" to access records via a "central office processor" from a "central
office database." But even under Appellant's argument that the claimed
invention requires the use of a computer, mere application of an abstract idea
on a computer system does not make a claimed invention patentable. See
Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2358 ("[I]f a patent's recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to 'implemen[t]' an abstract idea 'on ... a
computer,' []that addition cannot impart patent eligibility.") (citations
omitted). Notably, Appellant's Specification broadly describes a "network
access device" as including generic computing devices such as a "smart
phone" or "personal computer." (Spec. i-f 36.) Appellant does not argue, nor
does Appellant's Specification state, that the claimed "processor" and
"database" require specialized or improved technology.
In that regard, we conclude Appellant's claims are distinguished from
those claims that our reviewing court has found to be patent eligible by
virtue of reciting technological improvements to a computer system. See,
e.g., DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1249, 1257 (holding that claims reciting
computer processor for serving "composite web page" were patent eligible
because "the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology
in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer
networks"); Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1338 (holding that claims directed to a self-
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referential table for a computer database were patent eligible because the
claims were directed to an improvement in the functioning of a computer);
Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., 867 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding that claims directed to "an improved computer memory system"
having many benefits were patent eligible).
Unlike the situations addressed in cases such as these, Appellant does
not claim to change how the underlying technology operates. (See Ans. 16.)
Moreover, the tasks recited in the claims-such as receiving, accessing,
transmitting, comparing, and updating records (e.g., pertaining to an
employee's payroll), and generating, receiving, and transferring data (e.g.,
pertaining to an electronic request to transfer funds }-are common computer
functions. (See id. at 16, 18.)
In short, and contrary to Appellant's argument, the solution here is not
a technical solution. Rather, the solution here is rooted in routine use of
conventional computer technology to carry out the abstract idea of enabling
employees to use their accrued and unpaid earnings at participating stores
that offer the employees incentives to shop there. (See also Ans. 14--19.)
For at least the aforementioned reasons, Appellant has not persuaded
us the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims 1 and 11 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, or in rejecting
on the same basis dependent claims 2-10 and 12-18, which Appellant
argues collectively with the independent claims. (App. Br. 25.)
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-18. 4
4 To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments
for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
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B. Rejection Under 35 USC§ 103(a)
The Examiner also rejects claims 1-18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Cacheria and Hunt. (Final Act. 4--10,
13-14.) Appellant argues the claims collectively (App. Br. 28); accordingly,
we designate claim 1 as representative. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
1. "at least one incentive offered to the employee . .. defined by
the ... participating store"
Appellant argues "Cacheria and Hunt, alone or in combination, do not
teach or suggest offering an employee a store-defined incentive to use
accrued and unpaid earnings to purchase goods and services, as recited in
independent claims 1 and 11." (App. Br. 27.) Appellant concedes Hunt
depicts a shopper interface that shows a discounted price offered to the
consumer, but argues that merely offering discounted merchandise does not
fall within the scope of the disputed limitation. (Id. at 26-27; see Hunt
Fig. 2A.) In particular, Appellant argues the discount depicted in Hunt is
"available to any shopper using any method of payment." (Id. at 26.)
From this argument, we understand Appellant's position to be
premised on the claims requiring the "incentive" offered by a participating
store be available only if the employee uses "accrued and unpaid earnings"
for the purchase, as opposed to any other form of payment. Appellant's
argument is unpersuasive because it is not commensurate with the scope of
the claims. See In re Self, 671F.2d1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982)
("[A]ppellant's arguments fail from the outset because, ... they are not
based on limitations appearing in the claims.").
Although the claims require "at least one incentive offered to [the]
employee," and also require the incentive to be "defined by the at least one
participating store," the claims do not require the incentive be available only
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if the employee pays with "accrued and unpaid earnings." The phrase "for
purchasing goods and services at the participating store with the employee's
accrued and unpaid earnings," broadly but reasonably construed,
encompasses an incentive (e.g., discount) offered by a store to the
employees who purchase items using their accrued and unpaid earnings,
even if the same discount is offered to shoppers who use another form of
payment.
Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's finding that
Cacheria combined with Hunt's disclosure of merchants that offer
discounted merchandise to consumers as an incentive and also allow them to
purchase the discounted merchandise using "reward points"---even if the
same discount is available to those who pay with cash-teaches or suggests
the disputed limitation. (Final Act. 6-7; Ans. 19--20.)
2. "transferring ... the desired amount of accrued and unpaid
earnings to a sponsoring bank"
Appellant also argues the Examiner's findings are in error because,
although Cacheria discloses a funds transfer, "there is no teaching or
suggestion that the transfer is to a sponsoring bank where the participating
store maintains an account wherein the employee's conveyed accrued and
unpaid earnings are held." (App. Br. 28 (emphasis added).) In the Reply
Brief, Appellant further argues that the claims require a "functional
relationship between a sponsoring bank (as defined) and a participating
store, [point-of-sale (POS)] operator[,] and subscribing employee." (Reply
Br. 9.) Appellant argues the Examiner's findings regarding Cacheria's
disclosure "ignore[]" this requirement. (Id.) We disagree with Appellant's
contentions, and we are not persuaded of error.
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The Examiner finds:
Pursuant [to] the broadest reasonable interpretation requirement
(MPEP 2111 ), Examiner interpret[ s] that disbursing funds to
[the] payee, i.e. to the participating store, is a transfer from the
accrued and unpaid earnings account of the employee (the
collection of all employees' accounts [from] a bank) to the
participating store (the payee) bank account. The participating
store bank account must have a mechanism to identify the payer,
i.e. the customer who is paying with the accrued and unpaid
earnings. This mechanism [need] not be separate physical
accounts for each customer; it can be virtual accounts (i.e.
identifiable based on customer personal data).
(Final Act. 14.)
In other words, the Examiner finds, and we agree, a "sponsoring
bank" is a bank at which the participating store maintains an account, and
into which the desired amount of the employee's accrued and unpaid
earnings are transferred on behalf of the employee, from a bank associated
with the central office. (See id.) This reading is supported by Appellant's
Specification, which states:
As used herein, a "sponsoring bank" 124 is a financial institution
such as a bank or credit union that maintains an account for a
participating store and has elected to interface directly or
indirectly with central office 102, a participating store 126,
and/or a POS operator 122 to provide the earned and unpaid
earnings service to subscribing employees. . . . A participating
bank 124 may maintain an account on behalf of a participating
store 126 and receive transfers of accrued and unpaid earnings
from central office 102 on behalf of employees and maintain
records of such transfers and employee balances.
(Spec. i-f 46 (emphases added).)
Cacheria discloses a bill pay service that an employee may use to pay
bills with the employee's accrued but unpaid earnings. (Cacheria i-fi-1 119,
122.) As part of that service, Cacheria's system, through a central office
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processor, electronically disburses funds to a payee on behalf of the
employee. (Id. i-f 122.)
In particular, Cacheria discloses a "central processing center" that
includes "an employee access node to execute a predetermined sequence of
actions to enable a subscribing employee to transfer value to a third party
provider in exchange for a selected goods or services based upon the
subscribing employee's accrued and unpaid earnings." (Id. at claim 1
(emphasis added).) Cacheria also discloses the "central office processor" is
connected to one or more "financial institution(s)," as are the "service
provider[s]," via a "financial network." (Id. i-f 122, Figs. 18, 19.)
As the Examiner finds, and we agree, Cacheria's payee "must
maintain an account" at a financial institution for this electronic
disbursement of funds ("transfer [of] value") to take place. (Final Act. 20.)
As the Examiner also finds, and we further agree, Cacheria teaches the
employee's funds are transferred to the payee's (participating store's) bank
account, whereupon the funds are held there. (Id. at 14.)
Thus, we agree Cacheria teaches or suggests transferring, from a bank
associated with the central office, "the desired amount of accrued and unpaid
earnings to a sponsoring bank where the participating store [Cacheria's
payee] maintains an account wherein the employee's conveyed accrued and
unpaid earnings are held," as recited in the claims.
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded of error in the
Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of independent claims 1 or 11, or of
dependent claims 2-10 and 12-18, which are argued collectively with
claim 1. We, therefore, sustain the rejection of those claims.
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DECISION
The Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claims 1-18 is affirmed.
The Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 1-18 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.13 6( a )(1 )(iv).
AFFIRMED
18