Ex Parte Russak

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 28, 2017

13985314 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 28, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/985,314 08/14/2013 Ze'ev Russak LIVNE-008-US 6641
35938 7590
Acuity Law Group, P.C.
12707 High Bluff Drive
Suite 200
San Diego, CA 92130-2037
05/02/2017 EXAMINER
BORIN, MICHAEL L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1631
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/02/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @ acuitylg.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ZE'EV RUSSAK1
Appeal 2017-002629
Application 13/985,314
Technology Center 1600
Before CHRISTOPHER G. PAULRAJ, TAWEN CHANG, and
RYAN H. FLAX, Administrative Patent Judges.
CHANG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) involving claims to an
apparatus and method for identifying transition points in a chemical reaction,
which have been rejected as being directed to non-statutory subject matter.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According to the Specification, “[t]he present invention relates to
analyzing, monitoring and controlling chemical reactions and, more
particularly, but not exclusively to systems and method for identifying
1 Appellant identifies the Real Party in Interest as Azure Vault Ltd. (Appeal
Br. 4.)
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specific points in chemical reactions, such as a point in a chemical reaction,
in which a new stage of the chemical reaction begins.” (Spec. 1:4—7.)
Claims 1—10, 12—13, 21—30, 32, and 33 are on appeal.2 Claims 1 and
21 are illustrative and reproduced below:
1. An apparatus for identifying transition points in a chemical
reaction, the apparatus comprising:
an electronic computing device comprising:
a property value receiver, implemented on said electronic
computing device, configured to receive a plurality of values of a
physical property of the chemical reaction;
a function calculator, associated with said property value
receiver, configured to calculate a linear function parallel to and
different from a linear function connecting two of the received values,
the two values pertaining to a start and end of a time period;
a difference calculator, associated with said function calculator,
configured to calculate a difference between the calculated function
and a plurality of the received values pertaining to the time period
having said start and end; and
a transition point identifier, associated with said difference
calculator, configured to identify at least one transition point of the
chemical reaction, using the calculated difference, thereby proving for
at least one of a group consisting of controlling the reaction,
monitoring the reaction, and analyzing the reaction.
21. A computer implemented method for identifying transition
points in a chemical reaction, the method comprising steps the
computer is programmed to perform, the steps comprising:
a) receiving a plurality of values of a physical property of the
chemical reaction;
b) calculating a linear function parallel to and different from a
linear function connecting two of the received values, the two values
pertaining to a start and end of a time period;
2 In the Answer, the Examiner withdrew the rejection of claims 11 and 31
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Ans. 3.) Appellant cancelled claims 14 and 15 in
an amendment filed concurrently with the Appeal Brief. (Appeal Br. 4.)
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c) calculating a difference between the calculated function and
a plurality of the received values pertaining to the time period having
said start and end; and
d) identifying at least one transition point of the chemical
reaction, using the calculated difference, thereby proving for at least
one of a group consisting of controlling the reaction, monitoring the
reaction, and analyzing the reaction.
(Appeal Br. 26, 27—28.)
The Examiner rejects claims 1—10, 12—13, 21—30, 32, and 33 under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. (Ans. 4.)
DISCUSSION
Issue
The Examiner finds that the claims are directed to “a computational
method of data analysis to identify a transitional point of chemical reaction”
and an apparatus for performing such a method. (Ans. 4, 6.) The Examiner
finds that the method is drawn to
receiving data, calculating function, calculating a difference between
the calculated function and received values, plotting data and
identifying a transition point reflecting transition point of chemical
reaction. As such, the method steps are directed to processing
information and converting one form of numerical representation into
another. In other words, the method steps simply address the concept
of gathering and combining data by reciting steps of organizing
information through mathematical relationships. The gathering and
combining merely employs mathematical relationships to manipulate
existing information to generate additional information. These
limitations set forth a judicial exception, because mathematical
relationships have been characterized by the courts as abstract ideas.
(Ans. 4—5, 6—7.) The Examiner further finds that “the claims as a whole do
not provide significantly more than a generic computer upon which the
claimed method steps are executed,” and that “there are no positive process
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limitations recited in the claim for actually using the information produced
by the abstract idea outside of the computer (e.g. a real-world practical
application or solution to a problem).” {Id. at 5.)
Appellant contends that the Examiner incorrectly applied the
framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Alice Corp. Pty, Ltd. v. CLS
Bnaklnt’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014) and Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). (Appeal Br.3 8—11.) Appellant
further contends that the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible
abstract idea and that, in any event, the claims amount to significantly more
than the alleged abstract idea. {Id. at 11—13, 14—19.)
The issue with respect to this rejection is whether the evidence of
record supports the Examiner’s conclusion that the claims on appeal are
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
Analysis
In determining whether a claim is directed to patent ineligible subject
matter, we apply the analytical framework set out in Mayo and elaborated by
Alice'.
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to [laws of
nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas]. If so, we then ask,
“[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?” To answer that
question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually
and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional
elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible
application. [The Supreme Court has] described step two of this
analysis as a search for an “inventive concept” — i.e., an element or
3 Appellant filed three versions of the Appeal Brief, on September 22, 2015,
December 31, 2015, and May 16, 2016, respectively. The briefs contain
substantially the same arguments. Citation to the Appeal Brief in this
decision refers to the brief filed on May 16, 2016.
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combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.”
Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355 (second and fourth alternations original) (citations
omitted). Having considered the claims in light of this framework, we adopt
the Examiner’s findings of fact and reasoning (Ans. 4—8) and agree that the
claims are directed to non-statutory subject matter. We address Appellant’s
arguments below.
Claims 1 and 21
The Examiner Correctly Applied the Alice / Mayo Framework
Appellant first contends that the Examiner incorrectly applied the
framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Alice, 134 S.Ct. 2347, and
Mayo, 566 U.S. 66. (Appeal Br. 8—11.) Appellant argues that, under Alice
and Mayo, as well as the Federal Circuit opinions in DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) and McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016), “in order to be
patent-ineligible, the alleged to be abstract idea has to preempt or improperly
tie up the future use of the building blocks of human ingenuity.” {Id. at 9;
see also id. at 10-11, Reply Br. 11—13.)
We are not persuaded. “While preemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter,” the Federal Circuit has explained that “the
absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”
Ariosa Diagnostics Inc. v. Sequenom Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015).4 Instead, “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose
4 DDR Holdings and McRO do not contradict Ariosa. DDR Holdings does
not hold that lack of preemption by itself renders a claim patent eligible.
Instead, the Federal Circuit found that the claims at issue in that case “do not
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patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, . . . preemption
concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Id', see also Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978) (holding claims directed to mathematical formula
to be invalid even though claims “do not. .. cover every conceivable
application of the formula”).
Appellant further argues that the Examiner has not provided reasoning
or evidence supporting the conclusion that the claims on appeal are directed
to the abstract idea of “[identifying transition points in a curve reflecting a
chemical reaction.” (Appeal Br. 9.) In particular, Appellant argues that the
Examiner has not “explained how the specific features of. . . the pending
claims ... aid in monopolizing the whole allegedly abstract idea” or
“provided any reasoning or evidence as to how every single claim element
of every single one of the claims and the claims as a whole, relates solely to
merely recite the performance of some . . . practice known from the pre-
internet world along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet,”
“overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer
networks,” and also specify manipulative steps that yield “a desired result
. . . that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily
triggered by the click of a hyperlink.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257—59.
Likewise, while McRO discussed lack of preemption in determining that the
claims at issue in that case were not directed to an abstract idea, McRO also
acknowledged that lack of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315—16. Appellant further cites Cyberfone
for the proposition that the Alice / Mayo analysis requires determining
whether “‘additional substantive limitations . . . narrow, confine, or
otherwise tie down the claim so that, in practical terms, it does not cover the
full abstract idea itself.’” Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. CNN Interactive Group,
Inc., 558 Fed.Appx. 988 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (citations omitted).
However, the Federal Circuit in fact found the claims at issue in Cyberfone
to be directed to non-patentable subject matter, despite patentee’s argument
that the claims are limited by the requirement of a specific machine (i.e., the
telephone).
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the alleged abstract idea (or to any other known concept / abstract idea)” and
“to the building blocks of human ingenuity.” (Id.; see also id. at 10—11.)
These arguments are similarly unpersuasive. We have explained
above that a claim may be directed to non-statutory subject matter even if
there is no complete preemption. Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1376. Neither does
case law support Appellant’s apparent contention that every single element
of the claim as well as the claim as a whole must be directed solely to an
abstract idea in order for the claim to be patent ineligible. If this were the
case, there would be no need for the second step of the Alice / Mayo
analysis, which seeks to determine, e.g., whether a claim does significantly
more than simply describe a patent-ineligible natural law. Mayo, 566 U.S. at
77. Instead, the first step of the Alice / Mayo test merely requires that “the
claims [be] considered in their entirety to ascertain whether their character as
a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1312
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
As discussed above, the Examiner bases the § 101 rejection on an
analysis of the steps of the claims, which he finds to be “drawn to receiving
data, calculating function, calculating a difference between the calculated
function and received values, plotting data and identifying a transition point
reflecting transition point of chemical reaction.” (Ans. 4.) The Examiner
explains that the claims are thus directed to patent ineligible subject matter,
because “mathematical relationships have been characterized by the courts
as abstract ideas.” (Id. at 5.) Given this, we find that the Examiner has
sufficiently explained the basis of the rejection and correctly applied the
Alice / Mayo test. Furthermore, while we agree with Appellant that each
claim should be individually examined for subject matter eligibility, we do
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not find the Examiner to have improperly judged claims to “automatically
stand or fall with similar claims in the application.” (Appeal Br. 9 (internal
quotation marks omitted.) As an example, while we do not opine on the
validity of claims 11 and 31 because they are not on appeal before us, the
Examiner has withdrawn the rejection as to these two dependent claims
despite finding the independent claims to be directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter. (Ans. 3.)
Finally, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the
Examiner has not shown that the claimed concept “is similar to at least one
concept that the courts have identified as an abstract idea.” (Appeal Br. 10.)
The Examiner finds that the claims are directed to mathematical
relationships, which “have been characterized by the courts as abstract
ideas.” (Ans. 5.) In particular, we find the facts of this case to be similar to
those in Flook, in which the Supreme Court invalidated claims directed to a
method of updating alarm limits by measuring a process variable, calculating
an updated alarm limit, and adjusting the alarm limit to the updated value,
where the only difference between the conventional and claimed methods
rests in the mathematical algorithm or formula used to calculate the alarm
limit. Flook, 437 U.S. at 595—86.
The Claims Are Directed to an Abstract Idea
Appellant next contends that the claims are not directed to a patent-
ineligible abstract idea. (Appeal Br. 11—13.) Appellant argues that
none of the claims . . . attempt to pre-empt the allegedly . . . abstract
idea of “[identifying transition points in a curve reflecting a chemical
reaction”, as identified by the Office.
Rather, the claims relate to a specific way of identifying at least
one transition point of the chemical reaction, thereby proving [sic] for
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at least one of a group consisting of controlling the reaction,
monitoring the reaction, and analyzing the reaction.
{Id. at 12; see also Reply 4—8.) Appellant also argues that there are
“numerous other ways — which are very different from the novel and
inventive way of any one of the pending claims — for ‘ [identifying transition
points in a curve reflecting a chemical reaction.’” {Id. at 12—13; see also
Reply Br. 6.)
We are not persuaded. We note once again that “the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa, 788
F.3d at 1379. Neither does the existence of other methods of identifying
transition points in a chemical reaction mean that the claims are directed to
patentable subject matter. In Flook, for instance, the Supreme Court found
claims directed to a method of updating alarm limits to be directed to non-
statutory subject matter, despite the fact that there were other, conventional
methods of determining alarm limits. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585—86 (explaining
that “[t]he only difference between the conventional methods of changing
alarm limits and . . . respondent’s application rests in the second step—the
mathematical algorithm or formula”) (emphasis added).
Appellant argues, however, that recent Federal Circuit cases show that
“when a claim recites a specific way of accomplishing a desired outcome, as
opposed to merely claiming an abstract end, the claim passes through the
coarse eligibility filter of 35 U.S.C. §101, and more particularly, through the
first step of the framework.” (Reply Br. 4 (emphasis original).) Appellant
further argues that the Examiner “over-generalized” the claims in
characterizing them as directed to “receiving data, calculating function,
calculating a difference between the calculated function and received values,
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plotting the data and identifying a transition point,” because the claims
require
the transition point [to] be identified in a specific way that involves,
for example, a calculation of a linear function that is parallel to and
different from a linear function connecting two of the received values,
the two values pertaining to a start and end of a time period, the
calculation of a difference between the calculated function and a
plurality of the received values pertaining to the time period having
the start and end, and the identifying of at least one transition point of
the chemical reaction, using the calculated difference, thereby
providing for controlling the reaction, monitoring the reaction and/or
analyzing the reaction.
(Reply Br. 7 (emphasis original).)
We are not persuaded. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion
that “‘implementing] a principle in some specific fashion’ will
‘automatically fal[l] within the patentable subject matter of § 101.”’ Alice,
134 S.Ct. at 2358 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). Appellant
essentially argues that the claims are more specific than characterized by the
Examiner, because they require a particular mathematical formula (i.e., use
of a linear function that is parallel to and different from a linear function
connecting two of the received values). However, the claims at issue in
Flook, which the Supreme Court found to be directed to patent ineligible
subject matter, also recited a specific formula for updating alarm limits.
Flook, 437 U.S. at 596—97 (Appendix to Opinion of the Court).
The Federal Circuit cases cited by Appellant are likewise not
applicable to the facts of this case. In Amdocs, the specific way in which the
claim accomplished a desired outcome required “arguably generic
components” to “operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an
improvement in computer functionality.” Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet
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Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300-1 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, the claimed
components perform only generic computer tasks of, e.g., calculating a
mathematical function and the difference between the function and received
values, even if the mathematical function itself is allegedly novel.
Similarly, the rules specified in the claims in McRO allowed
automation that “goes beyond merely ‘organizing [existing] information into
a new form’” to “produce ‘accurate and realistic lip synchronization and
facial expressions in animated characters’ that previously could only be
produced by human animators.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313, 1315.
In contrast, the claims in this case essentially inform a relevant
audience of the natural relationship between a linear function having a slope
representing a “nearly average rate of the chemical reaction” and transition
points in a chemical reaction (i.e., points where the reaction rate
“substantially deviates from the nearly average rate of the chemical
reaction”). (Spec. 9:30-10:8.) More specifically, while the claims
generically recite “identifying] at least one transition point. . . thereby
proving [sic] for at least one of a group consisting of controlling the
reaction, monitoring the reaction, and analyzing the reaction” (Appeal Br.
26, 27—28 (Claims App’x)), the claims provide no specific application (e.g.,
specific types of control, monitoring, or analysis) regarding any transition
points identified. Accordingly, we find this case to be similar to Electric
Power Group, where the Federal Circuit found claims generically directed to
gathering, analyzing, and displaying certain types of information to be
directed to an abstract idea and explained:
[W]e have treated collection information, including when limited to
particular content (which does not change its character as
information), as within the realm of abstract ideas. In a similar vein,
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we have treated analyzing information by steps people go through in
their minds, or by mathematical algorithms without more, as
essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category. And
we have recognized that merely presenting the results of abstract
processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more (such
as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an
ancillary part of such collection and analysis. Here, the claims are
clearly focused on the combination of these abstract-idea processes.
Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353—54 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
Claims do not Amount to “Significantly More ” than Abstract Idea
Appellant finally contends that, in any event, the claims on appeal
amount to significantly more than the alleged abstract idea. (Appeal Br. 14—
19; Reply Br. 8—10.) In particular, Appellant argues that the claims on
appeal “attempt[] to improve the technical field of chemical reaction
technologies,” contain “an inventive concept,” and encompass only a
“particular application” of any alleged abstract idea. (Id.)
We are not persuaded. While we agree claims that improve an
existing technological process may be patent eligible even if they recite or
require a mathematical formula, Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187
(1981), Appellant provides no persuasive evidence, and only attorney
argument, that the claims at issue are directed to an “improvement to the
technical field of chemical reaction technologies used for monitoring,
controlling, and/or analyzing chemical reactions.” (Appeal Br. 15 (emphasis
omitted); see also Reply Br. 9-10). More specifically, Appellant argues that
paragraphs 1^4 of the Specification “‘describes how its particular
arrangement of elements is a technical improvement over prior art’
systems.” (Reply Br. 10 (citing Bascomb Global Internet Servs., Inc. v.
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AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); see also
Appeal Br. 15.) These paragraphs, however, merely describe why it is
useful to identify transition points of a chemical reaction. (Spec. 1:4—20.)
They do not suggest that the particular arrangement of elements of the claim
on appeal constitutes a technical improvement or how such alleged
improvement is achieved. Thus, the claims here are unlike those in Diehr,
which resulted in an improved process for curing synthetic rubber that
“significantly lessens the possibility of ‘overcuring’ or ‘undercuring.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
We are similarly unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument regarding
“inventive concept.” (Appeal Br. 15—16; Reply Br. 8—9.) Although
Appellant argues that the Examiner did not maintain the rejection of the
claims as anticipated or obvious, no such rejection is required in order to
support a rejection under § 101. Appellant fails to point out how any
manipulative steps or corresponding structure in the claims, whether
individually or in combination, are not conventional or routine. Methods for
identifying transition points (e.g., points of exponential growth) on a graph
representing quantitative measurement of a chemical reaction over time are
admittedly known in the art. (Spec. 2:29-4:20.) Thus, as in Flook, the only
arguably novel feature in the claims is the particular mathematical formula
or algorithm for identifying the transition point of a chemical reaction.
Accordingly, we find as in Flook that the limitations in the claims on appeal,
whether viewed individually or as an ordered combination, are not sufficient
to transform the unpatentable abstract idea into a patentable application of
the idea.
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For reasons already discussed, we are also not persuaded by
Appellant’s argument that the claims are patentable because they allegedly
encompass only a particular application of the abstract idea. See, e.g., Alice,
134 S.Ct. at 2358 (rejecting the notion that implement[ing] a principle in
some specific fashion’ will ‘automatically fal[l] within the patentable subject
matter of § 101 ’”) (citation omitted and alterations in original).
Claims 8—10 and 28—30
Appellant argues that claims 8—10 and 28—30 together. (Appeal Br.
20—21.) We take claim 8 as representative. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Appellant argues that claim 8 is patent eligible for the same reasons as claim
1, and because claim 8 further comprises “a phase indicator, associated with
said transition point identifier, configured to indicate a beginning of a phase
of the chemical reaction upon the transition point being identified.” (Id.)
Appellant argues that “the specific limitations added by the dependent
claims . . . confine the alleged to be abstract idea to an even more specific
useful application, and further improve the other technical field in an even
more specific way.” (Id. at 21.) We are not persuaded. The additional
limitation merely claims a generic computer configured to inform a relevant
audience that a transition point has been identified and thus a phase of a
chemical reaction is beginning. As in Flook, incorporation of a limitation
that provides a potential user feedback, e.g., an alarm, does not render a
claim directed to a mathematical formula patentable. Flook, 437 U.S. 584;
see also Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79—80 (claim limitation that merely “inform a
relevant audience about certain laws of nature” does not render claim patent
eligible).
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Claims 12 and 32
Appellant argues that claims 12 and 32 together. We take claim 12 as
representative. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Claim 12 depends from claim 1
and further comprises “a monitoring data generator, associated with said
transition point identifier, configured to generate monitoring data based on
the identified transition point.” (Appeal Br. 27 (Claims App’x).) Appellant
argues that, in addition to the arguments presented for claim 1, claim 12 is
patent eligible both because the additional limitation confines any abstract
idea to a more specific application and improve the technical field in a more
specific way, and because claim 12 is “tied to a specific machine with which
monitoring data is generated.” {Id. at 23.) We are not persuaded for all the
reasons already discussed. We also do not find the additional limitation
regarding monitoring data generator to add “significantly more” to the
abstract idea to which claim 12 is directed, whether individually or in
combination with other limitations in the claim. Generating monitoring data
relating to a chemical reaction is not novel or unconventional. (Spec. 2:29—
4:20 (describing “traditional methods” of determining time points of
exponential growth).) Likewise, the monitoring data generator appears to be
a generic computer configured to perform the data generating function.
“[M]ere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2358.
Claims 13 and 33
Appellant argues claims 13 and 33 together. We take claim 13 as
representative. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Claim 13 depends from claim 1
and further comprises “a photometric measurement device, associated with
[the] property value receiver, configured to measure the value of the
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physical property.” (Appeal Br. 27 (Claims App’x.).) Appellant argues that,
in addition to the arguments presented for claim 1, claim 13 is patent eligible
both because the additional limitation confines any abstract idea to a more
specific application and improve the technical field in a more specific way,
and because claim 13 is “tied to a specific machine with which the physical
property values are measured.” {Id. at 23.) We are not persuaded for all the
reasons already discussed. We also do not find the additional limitation
regarding use of the photometric measurement device to add “significantly
more” to the abstract idea to which claim 13 is directed, whether
individually or in combination with other limitations in the claim. Using
photometric measurement to determine transition points in chemical
reactions is not novel or unconventional. (Spec. 2:32—33 (“One traditional
method involves an n-derivative of light intensity used to determine time
periods of exponential growth.”). Furthermore, collecting information, even
when limited to particular content, is within the realm of abstract ideas when
such collection does not change the information’s character as information.
Electric Power Group, 830 F.3d at 1353.
SUMMARY
For the reasons above, we affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting
claims 1—10, 12—13, 21—30, 32, and 33.
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED
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