Ex Parte Ross et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 18, 2016

12016779 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 18, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/016,779 01/18/2008
6147 7590 02/22/2016
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
GLOBAL RESEARCH
ONE RESEARCH CIRCLE
BLDG. Kl-3A59
NISKAYUNA, NY 12309
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
John Anderson Fergus Ross
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
205553 (GEGR8082.095) 4986
EXAMINER
LIAO, HSINCHUN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2649
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/22/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
haeckl@ge.com
gpo.mail@ge.com
Lori.e.rooney@ge.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOHN ANDERSON FERGUS ROSS,
DAVID MICHAEL DAVENPORT,
MICHAEL JAMES HARTMAN, JOHN ERIK HERSHEY,
DAVID GEORGE HERNKE, NEAL JOHN SEIDL, and
MATTHEW GEORGE GRUBIS
Appeal2014-003440
Application 12/016,779 1
Technology Center 2600
Before CATHERINE SHIANG, MICHELLE N. WORMMEESTER, and
JOHN A. HUDALLA, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUDALLA, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
1-3, 5-10, 12-20, and 22-25. Claims 4, 11, and 21 have been canceled.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is General Electric
Company. Br. 3.
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Application 12/016, 779
THE INVENTION
Appellants' invention is directed to determining network association
status for electronic devices in wireless networks for patient monitoring.
Spec. if 1; Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A wireless system comprising:
[a] a first electronic device having a wireless
communication system and a proximity system, wherein the
first electronic device is a central hub device configured to
communicate with a plurality of peripheral devices;
[b] a second electronic device in the plurality of
peripheral devices that has a wireless communication system
and a proximity system, the wireless communication systems of
the first and second electronic devices having a communication
range therebetween greater than an interaction range between
the proximity systems of the first and second electronic devices;
[ c] wherein the proximity system of one of the first and
second electronic devices is configured to interact with the
proximity system of the other of the first and second electronic
devices to detect proximity between the first and second
electronic devices;
[d] one or more timers coupled to the first electronic
device and the second electronic device, wherein the timers are
enabled substantially synchronously upon detecting proximity
between the first and second electronic devices and are set for a
predetermined time period, wherein the second electronic
device is identified via a correspondence between the respective
timers coupled to the first electronic device and the second
electronic device before expiration of the predetermined time
period;
[ e] wherein the communication system of only the first
electronic device is configured to initiate an association status
communication with the communication system of the second
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electronic device after the identification of the second electronic
device;
[ f] wherein the second electronic device is configured to
determine an association status of the second electronic device
with the first electronic device from the association status
communication received from the first electronic device;
[g] wherein the second electronic device is configured to
disassociate itself from the first electronic device if the second
electronic device determines from the association status that the
second electronic device is associated with the first electronic
device; and
[h] wherein at least one of the first and second electronic
devices is configured to provide a notification of association
and disassociation of the second electronic device to the first
electronic device.
Br. 31-32 (Claims App.) (lettering applied).
THE EXAMINER'S REJECTIONS
Claims 1-3, 6-10, 14--20, and 22-25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Cahn (US 2004/0203381 Al, Oct. 14, 2004),
Heitzmann (US 2007 /0109117 Al, May 17, 2007), and Rekimoto (US
2004/0215815 Al, Oct. 28, 2004). Final Act. 3-10.
Claims 5, 12, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Cahn, Heitzmann, Rekimoto, and Scott (US 5,689,502,
Nov. 18, 1997). Final Act. 10-12.
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Application 12/016, 779
ISSUES
Does the Examiner err in finding the combination of Cahn,
Heitzmann, and Rekimoto teaches or suggests parts [a], [d], [e], [g], and [h]
in claim 1?
Does the Examiner err in finding the combination of Cahn,
Heitzmann, and Rekimoto teaches or suggests (1) enabling timers
"substantially synchronously"; and (2) initiating or activating an association
status communication "using one or more default parameters," as recited in
claims 9 and 16?
Does the Examiner err in finding the combination of Cahn,
Heitzmann, Rekimoto, and Scott teaches or suggests the communication slot
limitations in claims 5, 12, and 13?
ANALYSIS
A. Claims 1-3 and 5--8
1. Claim 1, Part [d] - "Jdentifi[cation] via a correspondence
between the respective timers "
In the obviousness rejection of claim 1, the Examiner relies on
Rekimoto for teaching "the second electronic device is identified via a
correspondence between the respective timers" in part [ d]. Final Act. 6.
Specifically, the Examiner finds Rekimoto teaches the activation time of
timer S (associated with apparatus B) is compared to the activation time of
timer T (associated with apparatus A). Ans. 3 (citing Rekimoto Fig. 3). The
Examiner further finds Rekimoto' s "apparatuses A and B identify each
other" based on C 1, which the Examiner characterizes as "the
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Application 12/016, 779
correspondence between timer T and timer S." Id. (quoting Rekimoto i-f 111 2
and citing Rekimoto Fig. 3). Appellants argue "Rekimoto ... appears to
suggest identification of communication counterparts by merely using
differences in time information managed at each individual apparatus rather
than using correspondence between the respective timers." Id. at 16
(citing Rekimoto i-f 30) (underlining omitted).
We do not find Appellants' argument persuasive. C 1 is a "limit of
error" that is described in Rekimoto as "the permitted range of synchronicity
for the time interval for a user to simultaneously press down and
simultaneously release the pressing down of the Sync Tap buttons of the two
devices using both hands." Rekimoto i-f 108 (cited at Final Act. 6).
Paragraph 123 of Rekimoto teaches that when the time difference between
timer S and timer T is less than C 1, this results in identifying "the presence
of a communication counterpart." Id. i-f 123 (cited at Ans. 3). Because the
correspondence of timer S with timer T results in the identification, we are
not persuaded of error in the Examiner's analysis.
2. Claim 1, Part [a] - "Central hub device"
Claim 1 recites "the first electronic device is a central hub device
configured to communicate with a plurality of peripheral devices." The
Examiner finds the recited "central hub device" reads on Heitzmann's
"central server computer" and the recited "peripheral devices" read on
Heitzmann's EKG. Final Act. 5 (citing Heitzmann i-fi-12, 6). The Examiner
2 The Examiner mistakenly cites Rekimoto i-f 11, but the quoted language
makes clear the Examiner meant to cite Rekimoto i-f 111. See Ans. 3.
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also finds Cahn discloses the Bluetooth standard and states that "[a]
Bluetooth network is a piconet" in which "[a] master device ... can be
connected (communicate) to seven slave devices." Ans. 4; Final Act. 2
(both citing Cahn if 20).
Appellants argue "Heitzmann teaches away from the use of central
master or hub device" because Heitzmann states that the disclosed system
"does not require a master controller" and "does not require a central
server." Br. 19 (citing Heitzmann iii! 12-13, 25-27) (emphasis omitted).
Appellants also argue Cahn teaches "an impromptu or ad hoc process" in
which "neither the first device nor the second device is an established
master, or slave, between the two devices." Id. (quoting Cahn if 29)
(emphasis added by Appellants). Thus, "Appellants contend that reference
to the Bluetooth network or the ad-hoc 'master' device in Cahn may not be
equated to the central hub device." Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellants; arguments. "A known or
obvious composition does not become patentable simply because it has been
described as somewhat inferior to some other product for the same use." In
re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Despite Appellants'
arguments, Cahn still teaches that one of the connected devices "plays the
role of the 'master' device," albeit on an ad-hoc basis. Cahn if 29.
Heitzmann also teaches a variation of the well-known master/slave
architecture:
[I]nstead of only one master for a communication network, each
frequency can have its own master that controls the timeslots
for that frequency ....
. . . [I]nstead of organizing around a single, unchanging,
unmoving master, the communication protocol organizes
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around one master per frequency that may change from one
sensor transmitter to another. The communication protocol
network is therefore more dynamic than traditional network.
Heitzmann i-fi-126-27; see also Ans. 4; Final Act. 5 (both citing Heitzmann
i1 6 for teaching a "central server computer"). Therefore, even though Cahn
and Heitzmann teach variations on the master/slave relationship, Appellants
have not persuasively shown that these references "criticize, discredit, or
otherwise discourage" the use of a central master architecture such that the
variations undermine the Examiner's rejection of claim 1. In re Fulton, 391
F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Because Cahn and Heitzmann at least
would have suggested a "central hub device" to the ordinarily skilled artisan,
we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's analysis.
3. Claim 1, Part [e] - "Only the first electronic device is
configured to initiate an association status communication"
As is recited in part [ e] of claim 1, "only the first electronic device
[i.e., the "central hub device"] is configured to initiate an association status
communication with the communication system of the second electronic
device after the identification of the second electronic device." The
Examiner finds Cahn teaches a requesting device that "takes on the role of
the master and controls the communication link" after an exchange of
messages with a receiving device: a request message followed by an
acknowledgement message. Ans. 5 (citing Cahn i1 30). The Examiner
likens the "receiving device" in paragraph 30 of Cahn to the "second
electronic device" in part [ e] and finds the acknowledgement message sent
by the receiving device corresponds to the recited "identification of the
second electronic device." Id. (citing Cahn i130). Appellants argue that, in
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Cahn, both devices transmit "are you here" messages at random times and
intervals. Br. 21 (citing Cahn i-f 30).
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument because the Examiner
establishes that "only the master controls the communication link" in Cahn
after an acknowledgement message from the receiving device "identifi[ es]
... the second electronic device." Ans. 5 (citing Cahn i-f 30). In support of
this, the Examiner finds Cahn's teachings on establishing a link correspond
to the recited "association status communication."3 Ans. 6 (citing Cahn
i-fi-131, 37); Final Act. 4 (citing Cahn i-fi-117-18). Because Cahn's discovery
messages transmitted prior to device identification do not undermine the
Examiner's analysis of the requesting device acting as a master, Appellant's
argument does not persuasively show error in the Examiner's analysis.
4. Claim 1, Part [g] - "The second electronic device is configured
to disassociate itself from the first electronic device"
The Examiner finds part [g] of claim 1 reads on "disassembling or
tearing down links" in paragraph 37 of Cahn. Final Act. 4--5. The Examiner
further finds the "'association status' ... reads on Cahn's communication
link," and that Cahn teaches "establishing a communication link between
two devices." Ans. 6 (citing Cahn i-fi-131, 37); Final Act. 4 (citing Cahn
i-fi-117-18). The Examiner reasons "[i]f there were no links between devices,
there would be no need to tear down the links," so "an 'association status'
has been determined prior to tearing down the link." Ans. 6.
3 This finding is consistent with other parts of the Examiner's rejection. See
infra Sec. A.4.
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Appellants argue that, "in the present application, upon determining
an association with the central hub device, the peripheral device is
configured to actively disassociate from the central hub device and provide
a notification of such disassociation before associating with any other
devices." Br. 22 (citing Spec. i-f 33) (underlining omitted). Accordingly,
Appellants argue "Cahn fails to teach the active disassociation claimed in the
present application." Id. at 23.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments. Appellants'
Specification states "[ t ]he current association status is a status of association
between the gateway 12 and peripheral device 18 based on data stored in
internal memory of peripheral device 18." Spec. i-f 28. Based on this
passage, "determin[ing] from the association status that the second
electronic device is associated with the first electronic device" in the recited
system of claim 1 requires little more than a system's awareness of an active
communication link between devices. Accordingly, we agree with the
Examiner that Cahn's establishment of a communication link, which
prompts an acknowledgement message, may be regarded as the determined
"association status." See Cahn i-f 31 ("If the first device 702 does receive an
acknowledgment 824, a link between the two devices has been established
and data can be sent 826.") (cited at Ans. 6, Final Act. 5). Furthermore, we
do not agree with Appellants that "disassociat[ing] itself' in part [g] requires
what Appellants call "active disassociation." See Br. 22-23. Contrary to
Appellants' arguments, claim 1 does not preclude disassociation when
devices leave the proximity of one another or when a timer has expired. See
id. at 23 (citing Cahn i-f 37). Thus, we agree with the Examiner that Cahn's
disassembly or tearing down of links, see Cahn i-f 37, which is done with
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Application 12/016, 779
foreknowledge that the link is in existence by virtue of an acknowledgment
message, see id. i-f 31, teaches or suggests part [g] of claim 1.
5. Claim 1, Part [h} - "Provide a notification of association and
disassociation"
The Examiner finds step 1010 of Figure 10 in Cahn teaches
"provid[ ing] a notification of association and disassociation" in limitation
[h] of claim 1. Final Act. 5 (citing Cahn Fig. 10 [ 101 OJ) ("Provide quick
audio, haptic or visual confirmation that all addresses have been collected.");
Ans. 7 (citing Cahn i-f 35). The Examiner also finds Cahn's teaching that
"the user may be asked to save or discard data that has been exchanged"
upon disassembly of an electronic community group represents a
"'notification' [that is] is provided to the user." Ans. 7 (citing Cahn i-f 3 7).
Appellants argue "step 1010 of Cahn is drawn to alerting the user on
comnletion of address collection from all devices rather than nrovidirn.! the
~ ~ ~
user with an indication of association or disassociation of a particular
peripheral device." Br. 24 (citing Cahn Fig. 10, i-f 35).
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument. Taken in context, the
"completion of address collection" in step 1010 of Cahn is part of a process
for creating an "electronic community group (ECG)" of linked devices. See
Cahn i-f 35. As part of that process, each device collects the addresses from
"proximal devices" via links that are established. See id. at Fig. 10 [1006],
i-f 35. We agree with the Examiner that the "audio, haptic or visual
confirmation" that occurs at the end of the address collection-with its
associated links established-may be regarded as a "notification of
association." See Ans. 7 (citing Cahn i-f 35). The Examiner also establishes
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Cahn teaches "notification of ... disassociation" by way of asking a user to
save or discard data upon disassembly of links in the ECG. See id. (citing
Cahn ,-r 37). For these reasons, we are not persuaded of error in the
Examiner's analysis of limitation [h] in claim 1.
6. Claims 1-3 and 6--8 Conclusion
For the reasons above, we are not persuaded of error in the
Examiner's rejection of claims 1, so we sustain the rejection. Appellants
rely on the same arguments with respect to claims 2, 3, and 6-8, so we
likewise sustain the Examiner's rejections of these claims.
B. Claims 9, 10, 14-20 and 22-25
Claims 9 and 16 both recite that one or more timers are enabled
"substantially synchronously." The Examiner finds Rekimoto teaches that
timer T and timer S are started with simultaneous presses of Sync Tap
buttons, which can result in "synchronicity." Final Act. 6 (citing Rekimoto
i-fi-1 7 6, 108). Appellants argue Rekimoto teaches "it is not necessary for the
system timers to be synchronized between apparatuses because
communication counterparts are identified using differences in time
information managed at each individual apparatus, not by using times given
at each individual apparatus." Br. 16 (quoting Rekimoto ,-r 30) (emphasis
omitted).
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument because claims 9 and
16 only require "substantial sychron[icity]," not perfect synchronicity. We
agree with the Examiner that, in Rekimoto, substantial synchronicity is
achieved as long as the time differential between timer T and timer S is
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below a specified limit of error, such as C 1. See Ans. 3 (citing Rekimoto
Fig. 3); Final Act. 6 (citing Rekimoto i-f 108); see also supra Sec. A. I.
Claims 9 and 16 also recite that initiating or activating an association
status communication after the identification of the peripheral device is done
"using one or more default parameters." The Examiner cites Cahn's
teachings on establishing an ECG; the Examiner finds "default parameters"
read on "the addresses of the devices in the ECG have already been stored in
the memory." Ans. 5 (citing Cahn i-f 35); see also Final Act. 2 (citing Cahn
i-fi-12, 18 as teaching "default parameters read on device ID, addresses ... ").
Appellants argue "addresses exchanged during physical contact between
different devices are different, [so] Cahn fails to teach using default
parameters to initiate an association status communication." Br. 21
(emphasis omitted).
Regarding default parameters, Appellants' Specification discloses:
[T]he gateway association frame is transmitted using a default
radio channel and a default address where the default values
are known to all devices that may be associated or
disassociated. The use of default parameters permits successful
association or disassociation without the exchange of wireless
discovery messages prior to the proximity of devices 12 and 18.
Spec. i-f 27 (emphasis added). In light of this description, we agree with the
Examiner that the "addresses ... collected into the device[']s buffer" for
each device in Cahn's ECG, Cahn i-f 35, may be regarded as "default
parameters." See Ans. 5. The fact that the ECG addresses may have been
collected during physical contact does not undermine the Examiner's
finding.
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Accordingly, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner's
rejection of claims 9 and 16. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of these
claims. Appellants rely on the same arguments with respect to the rejections
of claims 10, 14, 15, 17-20, and 22-25, so we likewise sustain the rejections
of these claims.
C. Claims 5, 12, and 13
Dependent claims 5, 12, and 13 all recite limitations directed to
communication slots. As with the independent claims, the Examiner's
obviousness rejection of claims 5, 12, and 13 starts with citations to Cahn,
Heitzmann, and Rekimoto; the Examiner additionally cites, inter alia, Scott
for teaching the communication slot limitations. Final Act. 10-12 (citing
Scott Abstract, 10:50-65, 14:20-30). Regarding the Examiner's rejection,
Appellants contend:
Scott is drawn to a system for efficient time division duplex
communication between a base station and a plurality of user
stations over multiple frequency bands, where guard time
overhead is reduced through use of an interleaved frame
structure and active adjustment of reverse link transmission
timing as a function of round trip propagation time. While
Scott describes a system for efficient time division duplex
communication, Appellants submit that Scott fails to supply the
deficiencies of Cahn, Heitzmann, and Rekimoto.
Br. 29.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' contention, which merely
purports to characterize Scott. Beyond this characterization, Appellants'
contention amounts to a conclusory statement that "Scott fails to supply the
deficiencies" of the other references. Because Appellants' contention is
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unsupported by any analysis of the relevant claim limitations or developed
argument, and because Appellants otherwise rely on the same arguments
discussed above, see id. at 28-29, we are not persuaded of error in the
Examiner's rejection of claims 5, 12, and 13. We therefore sustain the
rejection of these claims.
DECISION
The Examiner's rejections of claims 1-3, 5-10, 12-20, and 22-25 are
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l).
AFFIRMED
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