11017001 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 4, 2012)

Ex Parte Rokosz et al

Board of Patent Appeals and InterferencesJun 4, 2012

11017001 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 4, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/017,001 12/20/2004 Vaughn Rokosz LOT920040087US1 (067) 7416 46321 7590 06/04/2012 CAREY, RODRIGUEZ, GREENBERG & O''KEEFE, LLP STEVEN M. GREENBERG 950 PENINSULA CORPORATE CIRCLE SUITE 2022 BOCA RATON, FL 33487 EXAMINER PHAM, LINH K ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2174 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/04/2012 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES ____________ Ex parte VAUGHN ROKOSZ and PATRICK O’SULLIVAN ____________ Appeal 2010-003750 Application 11/017,001 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before DAVID M. KOHUT, DEBRA K. STEPHENS, and JOHNNY A. KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judges. KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2010-003750 Application 11/017,001 2 This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 7-13. Claims 1-6 and 14-20 have been cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ invention relates to a method of integrating an attendance list for a hybrid meeting. See generally Spec. ¶ [0013]. Claim 7 is illustrative with key disputed limitations emphasized: 7. A method for integrating an attendance list for a hybrid meeting, the method comprising the steps of: establishing an attendance list for an in-person meeting; further establishing an attendance list for an e-meeting; consolidating the attendance lists into a single attendance list for a hybrid meeting comprising said in-person meeting and said e-meeting; and, redrawing the single attendance list in a display for the e- meeting. THE REJECTIONS Claim 7 is rejected as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being obvious over Lee (US 7,016,935 B2, Mar. 21, 2006) and Callegari (US 2003/0055983 A1, Mar. 20, 2003). Ans. 3-4. Claims 8-13 are rejected as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being obvious over Lee, Callegari, and Ferren (US 2005/0062844 A1, Mar. 24, 2005). Ans. 4-6. CLAIM 7 Appellants assert their invention is not obvious over Lee and Callegari because the Examiner has misconstrued the claim term “e-meeting” (App. Br. 6). Specifically, Appellants admit that Lee discloses a “communication Appeal 2010-003750 Application 11/017,001 3 network 1” between the first and second conference rooms (61a, 61b, Lee, Figs. 1, 4A), but assert that in Lee “both conference rooms are in-person meetings”. Id at 6. Appellants assert that the e-meeting is “an electronic meeting in which attendees attend remotely by way of a computer”. Id. Appellants thus assert that Lee fails to disclose the e-meeting. Id. ISSUES Did the Examiner err in finding that Lee teaches an e-meeting as provided in independent claim 7 of the appeal? Did the Examiner err in concluding it would have been obvious to combine Lee and Callegari? ANALYSIS Appellants have not provided an explicit definition of “e-meeting” in their Specification or in their claims but argue that the Examiner has interpreted “e-meeting” to be an “in-person conference.” App. Br. 6. We disagree. The Examiner finds that “all the participants in element 61b [the second conference room] can be interpreted to be in an e-meeting because they are participating with members of group 61a [the first conference room] through the use of the internet. (Ans. 7). The Examiner has set forth a broad, but reasonable interpretation of “e-meeting” in light of the Specification (id. at 7). The Examiner finds that the use of internet in Lee is an “e-meeting” because “the members of the conference rooms are interacting with each other and they are in different Appeal 2010-003750 Application 11/017,001 4 rooms physically and visually (GUI), they have to be in an e-meeting when they are interacting with each other” (Ans. 7) and we agree. Appellants have not presented any persuasive evidence or argument to convince us that the Examiner’s interpretation of “e-meeting” is in error. Thus, the Examiner’s interpretation of “e-meeting” is reasonable and consistent with Appellants’ Specification. Additionally, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument (App. Br. 8) that the Examiner does not properly articulate a rationale for combining the Lee and Callegari references. The Examiner finds that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the two references to “provide the user with a simpler method of locating a particular entry in a list since all the entries will be located in one list versus multiple lists.” Ans. 4. Appellants do not dispute that Callegari discloses consolidating the attendance into a single attendance list for a hybrid meeting. Instead, Appellants argue that the Examiner fails to articulate a finding that “the actual combination of the elements [is found] in a single prior art reference” App. Br. 8. We do not find Appellants’ arguments persuasive. The relevant inquiry is whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of the references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). “Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.” (emphasis added) In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973). We therefore, find no error with the Examiner’s finding that one of skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Lee and Callegari. Appeal 2010-003750 Application 11/017,001 5 For these reasons, Appellants have not shown error in the obviousness rejection of representative claim 7. CLAIMS 8-13 We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 8-13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Lee, Callegari and Ferren. Ans. 4- 6. Appellants rely on the same arguments previously presented for representative claim 7 to demonstrate that Lee, Callegari and Ferren collectively fail to teach all the limitations of claims 8-13. As discussed above, we do not find these arguments persuasive. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over Lee and Callegari is affirmed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 8-13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over Lee, Callegari and Ferren is affirmed. ORDER The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 7-13 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). AFFIRMED Ke