Ex Parte Rofougaran

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 31, 2012

11536123 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 31, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/536,123 09/28/2006 Ahmadreza Rofougaran 0250352 8558
25700 7590 10/31/2012
FARJAMI & FARJAMI LLP
26522 LA ALAMEDA AVENUE, SUITE 360
MISSION VIEJO, CA 92691
EXAMINER
CHANG, JOSEPH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2817
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/31/2012 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte AHMADREZA ROFOUGARAN
________________

Appeal 2010-004018
Application 11/536,123
Technology Center 2800
________________

Before SCOTT R. BOALICK, ERIC B. CHEN, and
JEREMY J. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judges.

CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

SUMMARY
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1-33, all the claims pending in the application. App.
Br. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Claims 1, 2, 11-13, 22-24, and 33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Harrer (US 6,091,304; issued July 18, 2000; filed
Sep. 22, 1998). Ans. 3-4.
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Application 11/536,123

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Claims 1-33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over
Harrer, Nieri (US 6,838,951 B1; issued Jan. 4, 2005; filed June 3, 2003),
Kim (US 6,836,193 B1; issued Dec. 28, 2004; filed Dec. 20, 2002), Duncan
(US 6,426,680 B1; issued July 30, 2002; filed May 26, 2000), Takahashi
(US 7,259,638 B2; issued Aug. 21, 2007; filed Sep. 8, 2005), and Yin (US
6,909,332 B2; issued June 21, 2005; filed Aug. 12, 2003). Ans. 4-5.
We affirm-in-part.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellant’s invention relates to a local oscillator (LO) generator
architecture for multi-band wireless systems. Spec. [002]. Claim 1 is
illustrative and reproduced below with the key disputed limitations
emphasized:
1. A method for generating timing signals, the method
comprising:

in a multi-standard wireless communication system that processes a
plurality of RF signals located in different frequency bands using a single
VCO, selecting from a plurality of frequencies, a frequency of oscillation of
a signal generated by said single VCO by configuring at least one of the
following: a capacitor circuit and a varactor circuit; and

in response to said selecting, generating, utilizing said single VCO, a
local oscillator signal having a frequency within a plurality of frequency
ranges comprising 850 MHz to 1 GHz, 1.7 GHz to 2.1 GHz, 2.4 GHz to 2.5
GHz, and 4.9 GHz to 5.9 GHz.

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CONTENTIONS1
The Examiner finds that Harrer, Nieri, Kim, Duncan, Takahashi, and
Yin teach all recited claim limitations of claim 1, except the specific recited
frequency ranges. Ans. 5. The Examiner further states:
As one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that such
frequency ranges are wireless communication system standard
frequency ranges, and as suggested by references that the VCO may
be tuned to desired frequency ranges, it would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to tune the
VCO so that it can be used within the frequency ranges for the
wireless communication frequency standard.

Ans. 5; see also Ans. 4-5, 7.

Appellant argues that
the combination of Harrer, Nieri, Kim, Duncan, Takahashi and Yin
does not teach or disclose ‘generating, utilizing said single VCO, a
local oscillator signal having a frequency within a plurality of
frequency ranges comprising 850 MHz to 1 GHz, 1.7 GHz to 2.1
GHz, 2.4 GHz to 2.5 GHz[,] and 4.9 GHz to 5.9 GHz,’ as is recited in
claim 1.

App. Br. 17.

Appellant further argues that “the Examiner has provided no evidence
of the existence of a VCO circuit, which may be tuned to every frequency
range specified by multiple communication standards,” and that Takahashi
teaches away from a VCO that can be tuned to every frequency range

1 Rather than repeat the Examiner’s positions and Appellant’s arguments in
their entirety, we refer to the following documents for their respective
details: the Appeal Brief (App. Br.) filed June 1, 2009; the Examiner’s
Answer (Ans.) mailed September 2, 2009; and the Reply Brief (Reply Br.)
filed October 30, 2009.
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specified by multiple communication standards. App. Br. 19-20; see also
App. Br. 16-23; Reply Br. 7-8.

ISSUE
Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), has the Examiner erred by finding that
Harrer, Nieri, Kim, Duncan, Takahashi, and Yin collectively teach
“generating, utilizing said single VCO, a local oscillator signal having a
frequency within a plurality of frequency ranges comprising 850 MHz to 1
GHz, 1.7 GHz to 2.1 GHz, 2.4 GHz to 2.5 GHz, and 4.9 GHz to 5.9 GHz” as
recited in claim 1?

ANALYSIS
Regarding claim 1, we agree with the Examiner’s position that Harrer,
Nieri, Kim, Duncan, Takahashi, and Yin collectively teach all claim
limitations. Although the Examiner acknowledges that the cited art does not
disclose the specific frequency ranges recited in claim 1, the Examiner
nonetheless rationally explains why the claimed invention would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. Ans. 5.
Appellant argues that the cited art does not teach “generating, utilizing
said single VCO, a local oscillator signal having a frequency within a
plurality of frequency ranges comprising 850 MHz to 1 GHz, 1.7 GHz to 2.1
GHz, 2.4 GHz to 2.5 GHz, and 4.9 GHz to 5.9 GHz” as recited in claim 1.
App. Br. 17. However, the Examiner explains that one of ordinary skill in
the art would have recognized that such frequency ranges are wireless
communication system standard frequency ranges, and that it would have
been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to
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tune the VCO so that it can be used within wireless communication system
standard frequency ranges. Ans. 5.
Further, the claims do not recite that the VCO circuit may be tuned to
every frequency range specified by multiple communication standards as
Appellant argues (App. Br. 19). Whether the VCO may be tuned to every
frequency range specified by multiple communication standards is irrelevant
to the language of the claims at issue; the claims recite that the VCO is
utilized to generate a local oscillator signal having a frequency within a
plurality of specified frequency ranges. Finally, with regard to Appellant’s
argument (App. Br. 19-20) that Takahashi teaches away from a VCO that
can be tuned to every frequency range specified by multiple communication
standards, as explained above, the claims do not recite that the VCO circuit
may be tuned to every frequency range specified by multiple communication
standards.
Appellant has not provided any persuasive rebuttal or persuasive
explanation as to why the Examiner’s explanation is insufficient. Weighing
Appellant’s arguments against the Examiner’s specific and detailed findings,
we conclude Appellant has not shown error in the Examiner’s obviousness
rejection based on Harrer, Nieri, Kim, Duncan, Takahashi, and Yin
regarding claim 1. We therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim
1, as well as claims 2, 3, 5, 11-14, 16, 22-25, 27, and 33, which are not
separately argued.
We also agree with the Examiner’s position, with regard to claims 4,
6, 15, 17, 26, and 28, that Harrer, Nieri, Kim, Duncan, Takahashi, and Yin
collectively teach all claim limitations. Ans. 4-5, 7-8. Appellant argues
(App. Br. 24-26) that the cited art does not support the Examiner’s assertions
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that the VCO may be tuned to desired frequency ranges, and refers to
Appellant’s arguments for claim 1. As previously discussed with respect to
claim 1, we are not persuaded that the Examiner’s explanation is
insufficient, and accordingly, are not persuaded that the Examiner has erred
in rejecting claims 4, 6, 15, 17, 26, and 28. We therefore, sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 6, 15, 17, 26, and 28.
With regard to claims 7, 9, 18, 20, 29, and 31, the Examiner did not
clearly map the recited limitations to the cited art, or otherwise explain why
the recited limitations would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in
the art. Ans. 4-5. The Examiner did not squarely address Appellant’s
specific arguments in this regard (App. Br. 28-32) in the Response to
Arguments section of the Answer (see Ans. 5-9) or elsewhere. The
Examiner has not shown that the cited art meets the recited limitations. We
therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7, 9, 18, 20, 29,
and 31, as well as claims 8, 10, 19, 21, 30, and 32, which depend therefrom.
Our review of the Examiner’s obvious rejection of claims 1-33 (Ans.
4-5) is dispositive of our review of the adverse decision of the Examiner.
Accordingly, we do not reach the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claims
1, 2, 11-13, 22-24, and 33. Ans. 3-4.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-6, 11-17, 22-28, and 33 is
affirmed. The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 7-10, 18-21, and 29-32
is reversed.

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2010).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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