Ex Parte Reuter

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 11, 2012

11009214 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 11, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte JAMES M. REUTER
____________________

Appeal 2009-012939
Application 11/009,214
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, HUNG H. BUI, and LYNNE E. PETTIGREW,
Administrative Patent Judges.

BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant
1
seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1-3, 9-22, and 26-34.
2
We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1
Party in Interest is Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. Appeal
Brief filed August 2, 2007 (“App. Br.”).
2
Claims 4-8 and 23-25 are withdrawn due to a Restriction Requirement and,
thus, are not on appeal. App. Br. 2.
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s Invention
Appellant’s claims relate to a distributed lock and distributed locking
protocol to allow multiple communicating entities to share access to a
computing resource in a distributed computing system. A data storage
register can be implemented by the communicating entities to hold a value
reflective of a distributive lock state. See generally Spec. pg. 2, ll. 2-8, and
Abstract.
Claims on Appeal
Claims 1 and 21 are independent and representative of the invention,
as reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized:

1. A distributed lock, collectively implemented by a
number of intercommunicating entities, the distributed lock
comprising:

a distributed storage register having a value determined
by a majority of the entities; and

a distributed lock protocol.

21. A method for controlling access to a resource by
multiple concurrently or simultaneously accessing entities, the
method comprising:

implementing, by the concurrently or simultaneously
accessing entities, a distributed storage register; and

storing a locked indication in the distributed storage
register by an entity to indicate that the resource is locked in
accordance with a distributed lock protocol.

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Evidence Considered
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Morrison U.S. 5,809,220 Sep. 15, 1998
Jeffords U.S. 6,041,383 Mar. 21, 2000
Louzoun U.S. 2003/0135677 A1 Jul. 17, 2003
E U.S. 2004/0019892 A1 Jan. 29, 2004
McKenney U.S. 2005/0149634 A1 Jul. 7, 2005

Examiner’s Rejection
Claims 1-3, 20-22, and 34 stand rejected under 35 USC § 102(b) as
being anticipated by Jeffords. Ans. 3-4.
Claims 1-3, 10, 20-22, and 34 stand rejected under 35 USC § 102(e)
as being anticipated by McKenney. Ans. 4-5.
Claims 9, 11-12, 15-16, 26-27, and 30-31 stand rejected under 35
USC § l03(a) as being unpatentable over McKenney, Louzoun and E. Ans.
6-8.
Claims 13-14, 17-18, 28-29, and 32-33 stand rejected under 35 USC
§ l03(a) as being unpatentable over McKenney, Louzoun, E and Jeffords.
Ans. 8.
Claim 19 stand rejected under 35 USC § l03(a) as being unpatentable
over McKenney, E and Morrison. Ans. 9.

II. ISSUE
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether Jeffords and McKenney
individually discloses a distributed lock comprising “a distributed storage
register having a value determined by a majority of the entities” and “a
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distributed lock protocol,” as recited in independent claims 1 and 21. App.
Br. 6-11 (emphasis ours).

III. ANALYSIS
We have considered Appellant’s arguments raised in the Briefs, but
do not find them persuasive to demonstrate reversible error in the
Examiner’s position. In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Arguments that Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the
Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). As such,
we adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner
in the final Office Action, and (2) the detailed findings and responses set
forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to each of the
arguments raised by Appellant in the Briefs. We further highlight and
address specific findings and arguments for emphasis as follows.

CLAIMS 1-3, 20-22, and 34 REJECTED UNDER 35 U.S.C § 102(b)
AS RENDERED ANTICIPATED BY JEFFORDS

With respect to independent claims 1 and 21, Appellant contends that
Jeffords does not disclose “a distributed storage register having a value
determined by a majority of the entities.” App. Br. 6-7 (emphasis ours). In
particular, Appellant acknowledges that Jeffords discloses a system and
method for controlling access to a shared object among a plurality of
processes in a distributed system in which a lock token is used to coordinate
access to the shared object, i.e., used by one of the processes when the
process desires control of the shared object, and then the lock token can be
passed from one process to another process. Ans. 6-7. Nevertheless,
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Appellant argues that: (1) Jeffords does not utilize a distributed storage
register, App. Br. 7; and (2) the words “token” and “storage register” are two
different concepts and have two very different meanings, i.e., a storage
register is used to store bits of information (for example, in hardware),
whereas a token is an object that represents the right to perform an operation
and is passed or transmitted from one process to another process. Reply Br.
2.
However, Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. The Examiner is
not equating Jeffords’ “token” with Appellant’s claimed “storage register.”
Ans. 8. Rather, the Examiner equates the description of “pass[ing] a token
from one process to another process” (Ans. 9) and the disclosure that
Jeffords’ “token” is cached (stored) among storage locations in several
processes with Appellant’s claimed “storage register.” Ans. 9-10; see also
Jeffords, col. 5, ll. 64-66.
During prosecution before the USPTO, claims are to be given their
broadest reasonable interpretation. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
However, "limitations are not to be read into the claims from the
specification." In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(citing In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). According to the
Webster’s New World Dictionary, 3
rd
College Edition, the word “register”
of Appellant’s claims 1 and 21 is defined simply as “a storage location” and
this definition is consistent with Appellant’s own Specification (see Spec.
pg. 8, ll. 6-19, where the “distributed storage register” is described as
preferably an abstract, or virtual register, rather than a physical register
implemented in the hardware of one particular electronic device, and can be
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implemented by each process employing a small number of values stored in
dynamic memory, and optionally backed up in non-volatile memory, along
with a small number of distributed-storage-register related routines).
In view of such a broad definition of the word “register,” we agree
with the Examiner’s interpretation that the limitation “a distributed storage
register having a value determined by a majority of the entities,” as recited
in independent claims 1 and 21 encompasses Jeffords’ “pass[ing] a token
from one process to another process" and Jeffords’ “token” as cached
(stored) among storage locations in several processes. Ans. 9-10.
With respect to claims 3 and 22, Appellant contends that Jeffords does
not teach that the distributed storage register is a virtual register. However,
for reasons discussed supra, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that
Jeffords’ “token passing arrangement among several distributed physical
locations” can be considered as Appellant’s claimed “virtual register.”
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant has not persuaded us of
error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 21 and respective
dependent claims 3 and 22 as well as claims 2, 20, and 34 which were not
separately argued. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1-3, 20-22, and 34 under 35 USC § 102(b) as being anticipated by
Jeffords.

CLAIMS 1-3, 10, 20-22, and 34 REJECTED UNDER 35 U.S.C
§ 102(e) AS RENDERED ANTICIPATED BY McKENNEY

With respect to independent claims 1 and 21, Appellant also contends
that McKenney does not disclose “a distributed storage register having a
value determined by a majority of the entities.” App. Br. 6-7 (emphasis
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ours). In particular, Appellant argues that: (1) McKenney only discloses a
reader-writer lock structure which uses semaphores “stored in memory local
to the processor” to acquire a lock and avoid memory contention, App. Br.
10-11; Reply Br. 3-4; and (2) the words “reader-writer lock” and “storage
register” are two different concepts, i.e., a storage register is used to
coordinate access to storage between various processes, whereas reader-
writer locks use semaphores “stored in memory local to the processor” to
acquire a lock and avoid memory contention. Reply Br. 3.
Again, Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Likewise, the
Examiner is not equating McKenney’s “reader-write lock structure” or
McKenney’s “locking algorithm [which] allocates one semaphore per
processor, stored in memory local to the processor” with Appellant’s
claimed “storage register.” Ans. 9-10. Rather, the Examiner considers the
acquisition of “semaphores” [as stored in local memory of each processor]
as a form of distributed storage, and equates that form of distributed storage
with Appellant’s claimed “storage register.” Ans. 10-11; see also
McKenney, ¶0012 and ¶0034.
In view of the breadth of Appellant’s independent claims 1 and 21, we
agree with the Examiner’s finding that McKenney’s “semaphore
arrangement among several distributed physical locations” can be
considered as Appellant’s claimed “distributed [virtual] storage register.”
Ans. 11. Therefore, we do not find any error in the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1 and 21 and respective dependent claims 3 and 22 as well as claims
2, 10, 20, and 34 which were not separately argued. Accordingly, we sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-3, 10, 20-22, and 34 under 35 USC
§ 102(e) as being anticipated by McKenney.
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CLAIMS 9, 11-19, 26-29, and 31-33 REJECTED UNDER 35 U.S.C
§ 103(a) AS RENDERED UNPATENTABLE OVER VARIOUS
COMBINATIONS OF McKENNEY, E, LOUZOUN, JEFFORDS, AND
MORRISON

With respect to claims 9, 11-19, 26-29, and 31-33, Appellant presents
no arguments for patentability of these claims separately from independent
claims 1 and 21. App. Br. 11-12. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 9, 11-19, 26-29, and 31-33 under 35 USC § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over McKenney, Louzoun, E, Jeffords, and Morrison for
the same reasons discussed with respect to the anticipation rejection of
claims 1 and 21.

V. CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude that the Examiner has not erred
in rejecting: (1) claims 1-3, 20-22, and 34 under 35 USC § 102(b) as being
anticipated by Jeffords; (2) claims 1-3, 10, 20-22, and 34 under 35 USC
§ 102(e) as being anticipated by McKenney; (3) claims 9, 11-12, 15-16, 26-
27, and 31-31 under 35 USC § l03(a) as being unpatentable over McKenney
and E; (4) claims 13-14, 17-18, 28-29, and 32-33 under 35 USC § l03(a) as
being unpatentable over McKenney, Louzoun, E and Jeffords; and (5) claim
19 under 35 USC § l03(a) as being unpatentable 35 USC § l03(a) as being
unpatentable over McKenney, E and Morrison.

VI. DECISION
As such, we affirm the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-3, 20-
22, and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), claims 1-3, 10, 20-22, and 34 under
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35 U.S.C. § 102(e), and claim 9, 11-19, 26-29, and 31-33 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011).

AFFIRMED

ELD