Ex Parte Resch et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 18, 201814575538 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 18, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/575,538 12/18/2014 106306 7590 06/20/2018 DIEDERIKS &WHITELAW, PLC 13885 Hedgewood Dr., Suite 317 Woodbridge, VA 22193-7932 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Jeffrey J. Resch UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 8008US01 9091 EXAMINER TRAN, LIEN THUY ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1793 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/20/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): mail@dwpatentlaw.com gmi.mail@dwpatentlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JEFFREY J. RESCH and LAURA ZIMMERER Appeal2017-010170 Application 14/575,538 Technology Center 1700 Before TERRY J. OWENS, KAREN M. HASTINGS, and MICHAEL G. McMANUS, Administrative Patent Judges. HASTINGS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 requests our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner's final decision rejecting claims 1-28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over at least Dally et al. (US 6,299,916 Bl; issued Oct. 9, 2001) ("Dally")2; and the rejection of claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(l) as being 1 Appellant is the Applicant, General Mills, Inc., which is also stated to be the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 4). 2 The Examiner additionally applies Rapaport to dependent claim 3 (Final Action 4). Appellant states: "Claim 3 will not be argued separately but will stand or fall with claim l." (Appeal Br. 19). Appeal2017-010170 Application 14/575,538 anticipated by Zimeri et al. (US Pub. No. 2004/0126464 Al; pub. July 1, 2 004) ("Zimeri"). We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM. Independent claims 1 and 12 are illustrative (emphasis added to highlight key disputed limitations): 1. A snack bar comprising: a base establishing a crust; and a cheesecake filling made with real cream cheese provided on the crust, said cheesecake filling having a water activity of less than .6, wherein said snack product has an extensive shelf stable life, without refrigeration. 12. A cheesecake filling made with real cream cheese and having both a water activity of less than . 6 and an extensive shelf stable life, without refrigeration. ANALYSIS The§ 102 of claim 12 We have reviewed each of Appellant's arguments for patentability. However, we determine that a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's finding that the claimed subject matter of claim 12 is anticipated within the meaning of§ 102 in view of the applied prior art of Zimeri. Accordingly, we will sustain the Examiner's § 102 rejection for essentially those reasons expressed in the Answer, including the Examiner's Response to Argument section, and we add the following primarily for emphasis. "[T]he PTO must give claims their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. . . . Therefore, we look to the specification to see if it provides a definition for claim terms, but otherwise apply a broad 2 Appeal2017-010170 Application 14/575,538 interpretation." In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). "[A]s applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or patentee." ICON Health, 496 F.3d at 1379. The main limitation in dispute is whether the "real cream cheese" of claim 12 encompasses the dried cream cheese powder of Zimeri (App. Br. 6, 7; Ans. 6, 7). The Examiner explains that powdered cream cheese is real cream cheese, albeit in a powder form (Ans. 7). Appellant contends that since the Specification "draws a distinction between real cream cheese and cream cheese powder," real cream cheese as recited in the claim does not encompass the powder form (Reply Br. 4; Appeal Br. 6 (relying on Spec. ,r 10) ). This argument is not persuasive of reversible error. Appellant's paragraph 10 does not rise to the level of a disclaimer ( that is, that real cream cheese does not encompass a powdered form of real cream cheese); rather, paragraph 10 distinguishes between "firm and non-flowable" real cream cheese and cream cheese powder (Spec. ,r 10). Appellant's Specification contains no limiting or special definition of "real cream cheese." Notably, as pointed out by the Examiner, claim 12 is not limited to a firm and non-flowable cream cheese; this form of cream cheese is only recited in dependent claim 13 (Ans. 3). Appellant has not directed our attention to any persuasive reasoning or credible evidence to establish that the Examiner's interpretation that real cream cheese encompasses a powdered form is unreasonable. 3 Appeal2017-010170 Application 14/575,538 Thus, a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's position that real cream cheese may encompass Zimeri' s powdered form of cream cheese. Contrary to Appellant's assertion that the Examiner has not properly established that the claimed property of extensive shelf life is met in Zimeri, a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's finding that Zimeri's disclosure of water activity of .39 properly establishes a prima facie case of inherency with respect to the claimed property of "extensive shelf stable life" (Ans. 2, 7, 8). The Examiner points out that Appellant's Specification states that "[ t ]he extensive shelf life is achieved by establishing a low water activity of .6 or less") (Spec. ,r 4; Ans. 7). The burden has properly shifted to Appellant to show that Zimeri' s product would not have an extensive shelf life as claimed. See In re Spada, 911 F .2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1254--56 (CCPA 1977) ( when the Examiner establishes a reasonable basis that the product claimed by the Applicant and disclosed in the prior art appear to be the same or substantially similar, the burden is properly shifted to the Applicant to show that they are not). Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner's anticipation rejection of claim 12. The§ 103 Rejection We have reviewed each of Appellant's arguments for patentability. However, we determine that a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's determination that the claimed subject matter is unpatentable within the meaning of§ 103 in view of the applied prior art. Accordingly, 4 Appeal2017-010170 Application 14/575,538 we will sustain the Examiner's§ 103 rejections, for essentially those reasons expressed in the Answer, including the Examiner's Response to Argument section, and we add the following primarily for emphasis. Appellant's argument that Dally does not disclose a water activity below 0.6 and there is no reason to further decrease it from the levels taught therein is not persuasive for reasons explained by the Examiner (Ans. 8-9). This argument is not persuasive of error in the Examiner's rejection. The cheesecake filling and bar of Dally appear to be substantially identical to those as claimed and disclosed (Ans. 3, 4). Furthermore, Appellant has not pointed out any error in the Examiner's determination that the extensive shelf life is a function of the water activity. It has been held that when the Examiner establishes a reasonable basis that the products ( or processes) claimed by the Applicant and disclosed in the prior art appear to be the same or substantially similar, the burden is properly shifted to the Applicant to show that they are not. See Spada, 911 F.2d at 708; Best, 562 F.2d at 1254--56; cf In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also In Re Dillion, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (a prima facie case of obviousness does not require both structural similarity and a suggestion in or expectation from the prior art that the claimed compound will have the same or a similar usefulness as the Applicant's newly discovered compound; exactly what amounts to a prima facie case varies from case to case.) Here, the Examiner's determination, that the product of Dally encompasses a product that appears to be substantially similar to those as claimed and disclosed (since, for example, 0.5999 is below 0.6, the disclosed lower endpoint of Dally for water activity), is reasonable (e.g., Ans. 9-11; 5 Appeal2017-010170 Application 14/575,538 Dally, claim 1). In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (it has been "consistently held that even a slight overlap in range establishes a prima facie case of obviousness" and that a prima facie case of obviousness exists when the claimed range and the prior art range do not overlap but are close enough such that one skilled in the art would have expected them to have the same properties. Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 783 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Appellant has not provided any persuasive reasoning or credible evidence to refute the Examiner's determination that the predictable use of a cheesecake filling (with or without the bar) having a water activity of 0.6 of Daly would have resulted in the claimed shelf stable product. Attorney's arguments in a brief cannot take the place of evidence. In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974). It has been established that "the [obviousness] analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ." KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); see also In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264-- 65 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (a reference stands for all of the specific teachings thereof as well as the inferences one of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably been expected to draw therefrom). Appellant also fails to identify any reversible error in the Examiner's determination that it would have been obvious to adjust the glycerin levels "to bind further moisture and thus help obtain a desired water activity value" below 0.60, to 0.59 for example (Dally, col. 2, 11. 62---65; Ans. 9, 10). In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (a "recognition in the prior art that a property is affected by the variable is 6 Appeal2017-010170 Application 14/575,538 sufficient to find the variable result-effective.") Moreover, it is well settled that it would have been obvious for an artisan with ordinary skill to develop workable or even optimum ranges for result-effective parameters. In re Boesch, 617 F.2d 272,276 (CCPA 1980); In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (where the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art is some range, the Applicant must show that the particular range is critical, generally by showing that the claimed range achieves unexpected results). Appellant's arguments, thus, do not point out reversible error in the Examiner's rejection of independent claims 1, 12, and 20 (as well as not separately argued dependent claims) and a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's obviousness determination. With respect to dependent claims 8, 17, and 26 (which require the inclusion of a "leavening system" or "leavener"), Appellant argues that egg white is not a leavening agent (Reply Br. 2, responding to the Examiner's new ground of rejection (in the Answer) relying upon the egg white entrapment of air in Dally as a leavening system). On the contrary, the entrapment of air via beating egg whites is a well-known leavening system 3. Thus, Appellant has not shown reversible error in the rejection of these claims. With respect to dependent claims 9, 18, and 22, which all recite that the cheesecake filling lacks a preservative, Appellant has not shown 3 See, e.g., https://www.britannica.com/topic/leavening-agent which states: "Leavening of baked foods with air is achieved by vigorous mixing that incorporates air bubbles, producing foam. Egg white is well suited to this purpose because it produces voluminous and strong foams that retain their expanded structure when dried by the baking process." 7 Appeal2017-010170 Application 14/575,538 reversible error in the Examiner's determination that Dally describes that the use of preservatives is optional (Ans. 12). We also note these claims do not preclude a preservative in the base portion of the snack bar. With respect to dependent claims 10, 19, and 27, which all require a source of fiber and either 5 grams of fiber ( claim 10) or 6.4--22.4% by weight of fiber (claims 19 and 27), Appellant has not shown reversible error in the Examiner's determination that Dally includes a source of fiber and adjusting the amount to any appropriate fiber level would have been obvious (Ans. 11, 12). One of ordinary skill in the art would have been well aware of the ubiquitous use of adding fiber to obtain high fiber food snack products. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 ("A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton"); Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Under the flexible inquiry set forth by the Supreme Court, the PTO must take account of the "inferences and creative steps," as well as routine steps, that an ordinary artisan would employ). Appellant does not argue the separate § 103 rejection of claim 3 (Appeal Br. 19). Accordingly, the Examiner's§ 103 rejections are affirmed with respect to all of the claims on appeal. DECISION The Examiner's§§ 102 and 103 rejections are affirmed. 8 Appeal2017-010170 Application 14/575,538 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation