Ex Parte Razza et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 21, 2013

10687366 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 21, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 1
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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 4
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6
Ex parte ANNE MARIE RAZZA, MICHAEL ALFORD and 7
GILLIAN JETSON TARINELLI 8
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10
Appeal 2011-007551 11
Application 10/687,366 12
Technology Center 3600 13
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Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, ANTON W. FETTING, and 17
THOMAS F. SMEGAL, Administrative Patent Judges. 18
SMEGAL, Administrative Patent Judge. 19
20
DECISION ON APPEAL 21
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 1
Anne Marie Razza, Michael Alford and Gillian Jetson Tarinelli 2
(Appellants) seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of a final rejection of claims 3
1-9, 11-20, 29, 30 and 32-41, the only claims pending in the application on 4
appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 5
SUMMARY OF DECISION 6
We AFFIRM. 7
THE INVENTION 8
Appellants invented a method and system for identifying multiple 9
travel date pairs to meet a user’s flexible travel requirements (Spec. 2, ll. 11-10
13). 11
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of 12
exemplary claim 1. 13
1. A computer implemented method of identifying a 14
plurality of alternate travel itineraries, the method comprising 15
the steps of: 16
simultaneously providing a plurality of flexible 17
date search options to a user with a web server, one of the 18
plurality of flexible date search options comprising 19
performing a search based on a user entered trip date 20
interval and a user entered trip length, the user entered 21
trip date interval comprising a user entered departure date 22
and a user entered return date, wherein the user entered 23
trip length is less than a period of time between the user 24
entered departure date and the user entered return date; 25

1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App.
Br.,” filed September 14, 2010) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed January
24, 2011), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed November 24, 2010).
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receiving a search option selection from the user 1
via a network; 2
requesting travel date information from the user 3
based on the search option selection; 4
receiving the travel date information from the user 5
via the network; 6
determining all pairs of departure dates and return 7
dates that satisfy the travel date information with an 8
application server; 9
identifying fares for itineraries corresponding to 10
each of the departure date and return date pairs with a 11
search engine; and 12
displaying the fares on a display. 13
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art: 14
Keller US 6,304,850 B1 Oct. 16, 2001 15
Kwoh US 2001/0034625 A1 Oct. 25, 2001 16
Daughtrey US 2004/0078252 A1 Apr. 22, 2004 17
REJECTIONS ON APPEAL2 18
Claims 1-6, 9, 11-16, 19, 20, 29, 30 and 32-41 stand rejected under 35 19
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Daughtrey and Kwoh. 20
Claims 7, 8, 17 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as 21
unpatentable over Daughtrey, Kwoh and Keller. 22

2 Appellants also argue that the final rejection is contradictory to the
Examiner’s remarks in an earlier provided voicemail (App. Br. 13-14). In an
appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), it is the Examiner's final rejection that we
review. See In re Webb, 916 F.2d 1553, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Thus, this
argument is moot.

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ISSUE 1
Did the Examiner err in rejecting the claims because Daughtrey does 2
not disclose providing a plurality of alternate travel itineraries that include a 3
return date and a trip length less than a period of time between the earliest 4
departure date and the latest return date? 5
FINDINGS OF FACT 6
We find that the findings of fact, which appear in the Analysis below, 7
are supported by at least a preponderance of the evidence. Ethicon, Inc. v. 8
Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the general 9
evidentiary standard for proceedings before the Office). 10
ANALYSIS 11
The rejection of claims 1-6, 9, 11-16, 19, 20, 29, 30 and 32-41 under 35 12
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Daughtrey and Kwoh. 13
Claims 1-6, 9, 11, 12 and 34 14
Appellants argue claims 1-6, 9, 11, 12 and 34 as a group (App. Br. 28 15
and 37)3. We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group and the 16
remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. §41.37 (c) (1) (vii) 17
(2011). 18
“Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when ‘the differences 19
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such 20
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 21

3 Without explanation, Appellants included claims 7 and 8 in this portion of
their argument (App. Br. 12 and Reply Br. 1). In that such grouping is
inconsistent with the final rejection, we will evaluate the rejection of claims
7 and 8 as set forth in the rejections on appeal.
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invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 1
subject matter pertains.’” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U. S. 398, 406 2
(2007). The question before us is whether sufficient difference exists 3
between the prior art and Appellants’ claims to render the claims 4
nonobvious. 5
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner 6
failed to establish a prima facie showing of obviousness in rejecting claim 1 7
over the combination of Daughtrey and Kwoh. Appellants first argue that the 8
phrase “simultaneously providing a plurality of flexible date search options 9
to a user,” distinguishes the claims from Daughtrey (App. Br. 12-15). 10
Appellants misread the reference. In particular, Daughtrey teaches at 11
paragraph [0031], in describing the graphical user interface 40 of Figure 2, 12
that “pane 41e for providing flexible-date queries includes a field 42 where 13
the users specify the approximate duration of the trip” as well as optionally 14
entering “an outbound date range,” thus providing “a plurality of flexible 15
date search options to a user.” 16
Appellants next argue that Daughtrey “does not allow a user to 17
specify a return date (see Fig. 2 of Daughtrey)” (App. Br. 15) and that 18
“paragraph 25 and the rest of Daughtrey actually teaches away from entering 19
return dates” (App. Br. 16). Appellants also argue that “Daughtrey does not 20
teach or suggest a user entering all three of: a departure date, a return date, 21
and a trip length. Therefore, Daughtrey cannot teach or suggest a trip length 22
being less than the period of time between a departure date and return date” 23
(App. Br. 20). Appellants again misread the reference. 24
Daughtrey discloses (para. [0011]) the technique of processing a 25
flexible-date query “that allows users to specify a flexible range of outbound 26
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and return dates for their travel plans, using a specification of their preferred 1
layover length.” Daughtrey also teaches at paragraph [0025] that “[o]ne 2
approach would be to request four dates to be input by the user, earliest 3
possible departure date, latest possible departure date, earliest possible return 4
date, and latest possible return date.” Recognizing that this approach would 5
result in a large number of trip combinations, Daughtrey explains in 6
paragraphs [0025]-[0026] that “[i]n practice a travelers’ trips are constrained 7
in duration, even if they are flexible in departure date.” 8
Thereafter, in paragraphs [0027]-[0030], Daughtrey provides several 9
examples of flexible date search options of limited duration between the 10
earliest departure date and latest return date, including a “short weekend in 11
October” (para. [0028]) corresponding to Appellants’ dependent claims 3-6 12
and 14-16. Daughtrey also teaches that in each of the foregoing examples 13
(paras. [0027]-[0030]) a user enters an earliest departure date and a latest 14
departure date along with the length of time to be spent at the destination 15
(see also para. [0031]). 16
We find all of the alternatives set forth above illustrate that Daughtrey 17
discloses a plurality of flexible date search options having a user entered trip 18
length less than a period of time between the earliest user entered departure 19
date and the latest user entered departure date. “[T]he prior art's mere 20
disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away 21
from any of these alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, 22
discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed ...” In re Fulton, 391 23
F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Ans. 22). 24
Appellants also argue that Daughtrey does not teach or suggest 25
“receiving a search option selection from a user” because Daughtrey “only 26
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discloses a single flexible date search option” (App. Br. 24). In response, the 1
Examiner references paragraph [0033] where Daughtrey teaches permitting 2
a user to select specific layover lengths, each of which the Examiner finds to 3
be “a flexible date search option” (Ans. 21). We agree with the Examiner 4
that when Daughtrey is read in its entirety “the cited portions of Daughtrey 5
have shown that contrary to Appellant[s’] assertions, the user of the system 6
of Daughtrey does indeed make a search option selection” (Ans. 23). 7
Finally, Appellants argue that “Daughtrey cannot teach or suggest 8
‘requesting travel date information from the user based on the search option 9
selection’ (emphasis added), since Daughtrey does not teach or suggest 10
offering multiple flexible search date options or receiving a search option 11
selection“(App. Br. 26). Having received a search option selection from the 12
user, as detailed above, Daughtrey further teaches at paragraph [0037] that 13
the user is provided with a “results calendar, highlighting properties of the 14
best solutions(s) corresponding to each departure date” from which the user 15
may select or modify filters to provide ‘new filter criteria’. 16
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of 17
claim 1 as being unpatentable over Daughtrey and Kwoh. We will also 18
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2-6, 9, 11, 12 and 34 as being 19
unpatentable over Daughtrey and Kwoh for the reason that Appellants have 20
not challenged such with any reasonable specificity (see In re Nielson, 816 21
F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 22
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Claims 13-16, 19, 20 and 35-374 1
In that Appellants have made no specific argument in response to this 2
rejection, other than to rely upon the remarks presented to distinguish claim 3
1 (App. Br. 30-32), we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 13-16, 19, 4
20 and 35-37 as being unpatentable over Daughtrey and Kwoh for the same 5
reasons stated above with respect to claim 1. 6
Claims 29 and 38-40 7
In that Appellants have made no specific argument in response to this 8
rejection, other than to rely upon the remarks presented to distinguish claim 9
1 (App. Br. 32-35), we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 29 and 38-10
40 as being unpatentable over Daughtrey and Kwoh for the same reasons 11
stated above with respect to claim 1. 12
Claims 30, 32, 33 and 41 13
In that Appellants have made no specific argument in response to this 14
rejection, other than to rely upon the remarks presented to distinguish claim 15
1 (App. Br. 35-37), we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 30, 32, 33 16
and 41 as being unpatentable over Daughtrey and Kwoh for the same 17
reasons stated above with respect to claim 1. 18
The rejection of claims 7, 8, 17 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as 19
unpatentable over Daughtrey and Kwoh in view of Keller. 20
In that Appellants have made no specific argument in response to this 21
rejection, including failing to rebut the Examiner’s reliance on Keller, while 22

4 Again without explanation, Appellants included claims 17 and 18 in this
portion of their argument (App. Br. 30-32 and Reply Br. 2). In that such
grouping is inconsistent with the final rejection, we will evaluate the
rejection of claims 17 and 18 as set forth in the rejections on appeal.
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relying on the remarks presented to distinguish claim 1 (App. Br. 37), we 1
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 7, 8, 17 and 18 as 2
being unpatentable for the same reasons stated above with respect to claims 3
1 and 13. 4
DECISION 5
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-6, 9, 11-16, 19, 20, 6
29, 30 and 32-41 over Daughtrey and Kwoh is affirmed. 7
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 7, 8, 17 and 18 over 8
Daughtrey, Kwoh and Keller is affirmed. 9
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with 10
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. 11
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv). 12
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AFFIRMED 14
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