Ex Parte Rangarajan et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 26, 2017

13601680 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 26, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/601,680 08/31/2012 Bharath Kumar Rangarajan 201201457 1043
10782 7590
Target Brands Inc.
1000 Nicollet Mall, TPS-3165
Minneapolis, MN 55403
EXAMINER
GOLDBERG, IVAN R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/30/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USPTO.Mail@target.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte BHARATH KUMAR RANGARAJAN,
JAMES C. NELSON, and
ABHISHEK SINGH VERMA
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,68c1
Technology Center 3600
Before HUBERT C. LORIN, BRADLEY B. BAYAT, and
TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.
LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Bharath Kumar Rangarajan, et al. (Appellants) seek our review under
35 U.S.C. § 134 of the final rejection of claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.
1 The Appellants identify Target Brands, Inc. as the real party in interest.
App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,680
THE INVENTION
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on
appeal.
1. A method of using a computing system for generating an
optimized product merchandising plan determining an allocated
merchandising area per product category, the method
comprising:
providing at least one computer;
the at least one computer receiving user inputs defining a
financial metric for each of a plurality of product categories
assigned to a product department;
providing a linear regression model that forecasts
responses of the financial metric for each of the product
categories to endogenous variables, wherein the endogenous
variables comprise historical sales per merchandising area per
product category for each of a plurality of stores, and historical
total sales volume for each of the plurality of stores;
using the at least one computer, generating a
merchandising plan for the product department that optimizes
for the combined total of the financial metric for each of the
product categories for the product department in accordance
with the linear regression model, the merchandising plan being
within at least one user selectable constraint upon the at least
one user selectable constraint being selected by a user, the at
least one user selectable constraint includes one of: (i) a
minimum and a maximum merchandising area and (ii) a
minimum and a maximum change for a current merchandising
area; and
using the at least one computer, generating an output
based on the merchandising plan for the product department,
wherein the output comprises changes in the current
merchandising area for each of a plurality of the product
categories.
(App. Br. 54, Claims App’x).
2
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,680
THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Chappel
Kane
Klaubauf
Dagum
US 2002/0174005 A1
US 2003/0014291 A1
US 2003/0200129 A1
US 2009/0210355 A1
Nov. 21,2002
Jan. 16, 2003
Oct. 23, 2003
Aug. 20, 2009
Albert van Dijk, et al., “Similarity-Based Spatial Methods to Estimate
Shelf Space Elasticities,” 2 Quantitative Marketing and
Economics, 257-277 (2004) (“Dijk”).
Jens Irion, at el., “A Piecewise Linearization Framework for Retail
Shelf Space Management Models," Technical Report, School of
Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of
Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332-0205 (July 9, 2004) (“Irion”).
Pierre Desmet, et al., “Estimation of product category sales
responsiveness to allocated shelf space,” 15 International J. of
Research in Marketing, 443^457 (1998) (“Desmet”).
R. J. Kuo, et al, “A decision support system for selecting convenience
store location through integration of fuzzy AHP and artificial neural
network,” 47 Computers in Industry, 199-214 (2002) (“Kuo”).
The following rejections are before us for review:
1. Claims 1—20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
non-statutory subject matter.
2. Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9—11, and 14—17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Dijk and Klaubauf.
3. Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Dijk, Klaubauf, Irion, and Dagum.
4. Claim 7 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Dijk, Klaubauf, and Kane.
3
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,680
5. Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Dijk, Klaubauf, and Chappel.
6. Claim 12 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Dijk, Klaubauf, and Desmet.
7. Claim 13 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Dijk, Klaubauf, and Kuo.
ISSUES
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as being directed to non-statutory subject matter?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9—11, and 14—17
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Dijk and Klaubauf?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Dijk, Klaubauf, Irion, and Dagum?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Dijk, Klaubauf, and Kane?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Dijk, Klaubauf, and Chappel?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Dijk, Klaubauf, and Desmet?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Dijk, Klaubauf, and Kuo?
4
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,680
ANALYSIS
The rejection of claims 1—20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Claim 1
Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct.
2347 (2014) identifies a two-step framework for determining whether
claimed subject matter is judicially-excepted from patent-eligibility under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
According to Alice step one, “[w]e must first determine whether the
claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept,” such as an
abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
In that regard, the Examiner determined that “[cjlaim 1 has been
found to be directed to an abstract idea, specifically receiving user inputs
defining a financial metric, providing a linear regression model that
forecasts responses of the financial metrics, generating a merchandising plan
that optimizes the financial metrics, generating an output based on
merchandising plan that comprises changes in a merchandising area.” Final
Act. 7.
The Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s characterization of the
concept to which claim 1 is directed to. Nor do Appellants dispute that the
concept the Examiner characterized claim 1 as being directed to is an
abstract idea.
Rather, the Appellants argue that “this record lacks any evidence or
citation to any court decision supporting the conclusory statement that what
is asserted to be an abstract idea is in fact an abstract idea within the
meaning of the Alice analysis, i.e., a fundamental truth, an original cause or
5
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,680
a motive. Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International et al., 134
S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).” App. Br. 14; see also Reply Br. 8. This is not a
persuasive argument.
Notwithstanding the Alice Court relied, inter alia, on Emery,
Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States, in 7
Studies in History, Economics and Public Law 283, 346—356 (1896) in
reaching the determination that intermediated settlement is an abstract idea,
as a general matter, relying on extrinsic evidence in order to characterize the
abstract nature of what claims are directed to is not mandatory. Examining
earlier cases can play that role. See Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet
Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Instead of a definition
[for what an “abstract idea” encompasses], then, the decisional mechanism
courts now apply is to examine earlier cases in which a similar or parallel
descriptive nature can be seen—what prior cases were about, and which way
they were decided.”) Evidence may be helpful in certain situations where,
for instance, facts are in dispute. But it is not always necessary. It is not
necessary in this case. As the Appellants are certainly aware, the Federal
Circuit has determined concepts analogous to the concept the Examiner
characterized claim 1 as being directed to as being abstract ideas. See, e.g.,
OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (“claim 1 has the following relevant limitations: (1) testing a plurality
of prices; (2) gathering statistics generated about how customers reacted to
the offers testing the prices; (3) using that data to estimate outcomes (i.e.
mapping the demand curve over time for a given product); and (4)
automatically selecting and offering a new price based on the estimated
6
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,680
outcome;” that is, claim 1 is “directed to the concept of offer-based price
optimization”, an abstract idea). See also eResearchTechnology, Inc. v.
CRF, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 3d 463 (W. D. Pa., 2016), aff d, 2017 WL 1033672
(Mem) (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“obtaining data, generating an algorithm by
quantitative analysis, and translating said algorithm into a more useful rule”
is an abstract idea).
We have considered all of the Appellants’ remaining arguments as to
the Alice step 1 determination and have found them unpersuasive.
Accordingly, we are unpersuaded as to error in the Examiner’s
determination that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
Step two is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72—
73).
In that regard, the Examiner determined that
in this claim, there is no element or combination of elements in
the claims that are sufficient to ensure that the claims amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea itself. The claim fails
to recite any improvements to another technology or technical
field, improvements to the functioning of the computer itself,
and/or meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use
of an abstract idea to a particular environment. Claim 1 is
directed to a “computing system” for performing the method
steps in only the preamble and this limitation adds nothing of
substance to the underlying abstract idea.
Final Act. 8.
7
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,680
Argument 1. “Appellants] respectfully submit[] that an invention
that is both novel and unobvious clearly and unequivocally involves an
‘inventive concept.’” App. Br. 9. That is not true.
A finding of novelty or nonobviousness does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that subject matter is patentable eligible. “Groundbreaking,
innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101
inquiry.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2107,2117 (2013).
Indeed, “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or
even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining
whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188—89 (1981) (emphasis added); see also
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303-04 (rejecting “the Government’s
invitation to substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the
better established inquiry under § 101”). Here, the jury’s
general finding that Symantec did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that three particular prior art references do
not disclose all the limitations of or render obvious the asserted
claims does not resolve the question of whether the claims
embody an inventive concept at the second step of Mayo/Alice.
Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
Argument 2. “Appellants] further respectfully submit[] that legal
error exists as the 101 rejections in this application were applied without
consideration of novelty or non-obviousness of the inventions set forth in the
appealed claims.” App. Br. 9; see also Reply Br. 1—7. We disagree.
The Appellants emphasize that the Examiner stated that
[t]he issue, after determination of an abstract idea, is whether
‘significantly more’ is recited. Here, there is not ‘significantly more.’
8
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,680
. . . Whether or not prior [art] is applied has no bearing on whether a
101 rejection can be made.
Final Act. 4, (emphasis added). The Examiner’s statements are consistent
with the law. Claim limitations found to be novel and/or nonobvious can
affect a patent-eligibility determination. Cf. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., v.
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“For process claims that
encompass natural phenomenon, the process steps are the additional features
that must be new and useful.”) Thus, novelty is a factor to be considered
when determining “whether the claims contain an ‘inventive concept’ to
‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.”
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hutu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014). But
the question under step two (“novelty in implementation of the idea is a
factor to be considered only in the second step of the Alice analysis.” Id.) of
the Alice framework is not whether an additional feature is novel but
whether the implementation of the abstract idea involves “more than the
performance of ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities
previously known to the industry.’” Content Extraction and Transmission
LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass % 776 F.3d 1343, 1347^18 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359). See also RapidLitig. Mgmt. Ltd.
v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Patent-
eligibility does not turn on ease of execution or obviousness of application.
Those are questions that are examined under separate provisions of the
Patent Act.” (citingMayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 90 (2012)).
Argument 3.
9
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,680
Appellants] further note[] that the following steps of
Claim 1 individually and/or collectively include an inventive
concept:
the at least one computer receiving user inputs
defining a financial metric for each of a plurality of
product categories assigned to a product department;
providing a linear regression model that forecasts
responses of the financial metric for each of the product
categories to endogenous variables, wherein the
endogenous variables comprise historical sales per
merchandising area per product category for each of a
plurality of stores, and historical total sales volume for
each of the plurality of stores;
using the at least one computer, generating a
merchandising plan for the product department that
optimizes for the combined total of the financial metric
for each of the product categories for the product
department in accordance with the linear regression
model, the merchandising plan being within at least one
user selectable constraint upon the at least one user
selectable constraint being selected by a user, the at least
one user selectable constraint includes one of: (i) a
minimum and a maximum merchandising area and (ii) a
minimum and a maximum change for a current
merchandising area; and
using the at least one computer, generating an
output based on the merchandising plan for the product
department, wherein the output comprises changes in the
current merchandising area for each of a plurality of the
product categories.
App. Br. 24.
This argument is unpersuasive. The Appellants reproduce supra
nearly all of claim 1 and then argue that “this is not a case where the claims
simply state the abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it to a computer’
10
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,680
or ‘a case where the claims simply append conventional steps to a computer
specified at a high level of generality.’” App. Br. 25. Setting aside that this
argument is another way of arguing that “the computer implemented method
of Claim 1 is admittedly novel and as established below is unobvious” (id. )
which we have previously addressed, we do not see, and the Appellants have
not explained, what elements or combination of elements claim 1 provides
that is “significantly more” than the abstract idea. The Examiner articulated
the concept that he determined claim 1 to be directed to and that he
determined to be an abstract idea, neither of which the Appellants have
persuasively disputed. What does claim 1 provide that is “significantly
more” than that concept? Reproducing claim 1 is not a sufficient answer. In
our view, claim 1 describes a combination of an abstract idea, albeit the
particular scheme claim 1 describes is described at lower level of abstraction
than the concept the Examiner articulated claim 1 as being directed to, and a
generic computer. There can be no dispute that claim 1 simply recites using
a “computer” which reasonably broadly covers employing a generic
computer to perform the scheme as claimed. See Specification, 125
(“desktop computers, tablet computers, laptop computers, smartphones, or
other portable, non-portable, or mobile devices”). “[T]he use of a computer
in an otherwise patent-ineligible process for no more than its most basic
function—making calculations or computations—fails to circumvent the
prohibition against patenting abstract ideas and mental processes.” Bancorp
Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266,
1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
11
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,680
We have considered all of the Appellants’ remaining arguments as to
the Alice step 2 determination and have found them unpersuasive.
Accordingly, we are unpersuaded as to error in the Examiner’s
determination that claim 1 does not include “significantly more” than the
abstract idea itself.
Accordingly, the Examiner’s conclusion that “because there are no
meaningful limitations in the claim to transform the exception into a patent
eligible application such that the claim amounts to “significantly more” than
the exception itself, the claim is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to non-statutory subject matter” has not been shown to be in error
and thus, the rejection is sustained. (Final Act. 8).
Claim 1 is an independent method claim. The other independent
claims on appeal, claims 15 and 18, are apparatus and article claims,
respectively, and they parallel claim 1. The Examiner takes the same
position as to claims 15 and 18 that he has taken with respect to claim 1. See
Final Act. 9—11.
The Appellants discuss claim 15 (App. Br. 25—27) and claim 18 (App.
Br. 17—19), but these arguments are the same as those challenging the
rejection of claim 1. For the reasons discussed above, we find the arguments
unpersuasive as to error in the rejection of claims 15 and 18, and therefore,
their rejection is sustained.
Claims 2—14 depend from claim 1; claims 16 and 17 depend from
claim 15; and claims 19 and 20 depend from claim 18. We have reviewed
the arguments made in the Appeal Brief: App Br. 27—28 (claim 2); App. Br.
28—29 (claim 3); App. Br. 21—23 (claim 4); App. Br. 29—30 (claim 5); App.
12
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,680
Br. 30-31 (claim 6); App. Br. 31 (claim 7); App. Br. 32 (claim 8); App. Br.
32—33 (claim 9); App. Br. 33—34 (claim 10); App. Br. 34—35 (claim 11);
App. Br. 35 (claim 12); App. Br. 35—36 (claim 13); App. Br. 36—37 (claim
14); App. Br. 37—38 (claim 16); App. Br. 38—39 (claim 17); App. Br. 19—20
(claim 19); and App. Br. 20-21 (claim 20). For each claim, the same
argument is raised; that is, the Examiner did not separately consider every
claim. And yet the Appellants concede that the Examiner “rejected [each
claim] based on the same rationale [used in rejecting the corresponding
independent claim], wherein the language does not recite ‘significantly
more’ than the abstract idea” (e.g., Final Act. 10 for claims 16—17). The
Appellants do not explain what more is needed to be said. Where all claims
are directed to the same abstract idea, “addressing each claim of the asserted
patents . . . [is] unnecessary.” Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v.
Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Novelty and evidentiary arguments (see, e.g., App. Br. 21 (for claim 20) and
App. Br. 22 (for claim 4), respectively) are also repeated. They are
unpersuasive as to error in the rejection for the reasons already discussed.
We have considered all of the Appellants’ remaining arguments as to the
rejection of the dependent claims and have found them unpersuasive. Their
rejection is sustained.
The rejection of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9—11, and 14—17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Dijk and Klaubauf.
All the claims require “providing a linear regression model that
forecasts responses of the financial metric for each of the product categories
to endogenous variables, wherein the endogenous variables comprise
13
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,680
historical sales per merchandising area per product category for each of a
plurality of stores, and historical total sales volume for each of the plurality
of stores.” See independent claim 1. Claim 15, the other independent claim,
has a similar limitation.
The Examiner finds that “Dijk discloses predicting changes in sales
due to changes in shelf space (See pg. 271 )” but does not disclose providing
a linear regression model as claimed, relying instead on Klaubauf (1 89).
Final Act. 14—15.
The difficulty with the rejection, as the Appellants have argued (see
e.g., App. Br. 42), is that Dijk is concerned with allocating shelf space to
brands based on certain factors and Klaubauf is concerned with “factors to
predict not only how shelf space allocation and promotions will increase
sales of the promoted product, but how they will affect sales of other
products as well, including products in other categories or products from
other manufacturers or products that might not seem related at first glance”
(Klaubauf 1 82). How modifying Dijk to employ Klaubauf s linear
regression model for allocating shelf space to affect sales would lead one of
ordinary skill in the art to provide a linear regression model that forecasts
responses of a financial metric for each of a plurality of product categories
assigned to a product department to endogenous variables as claimed is not
adequately explained. The Examiner appears to equate the claim phrase
“financial metric” with changes of sales resulting from shelf space
adjustments. See Final Act. 12 (“changes in sales is a metric that is
financially related”). In addition, the Examiner notes that
Appellants’ Specification gives an example of a plan as being
“the physical arrangement of all these products in a store.” See
14
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,680
paragraph 0002, 0043 as filed/published. Dijk is directed to the
same type of “plan” -in that it discloses solving the issue of
how shelf space is allocated (See e.g. pg. 274-275 ; Final
Rejection pg. 12-13).
Ans. 12. This would explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would
modify Dijk to employ Klaubauf s linear regression model to affect sales
through shelf space allocation. But that does not address all that is claimed.
Claim 1 further requires the linear regression model to forecast responses of
a financial metric for each of a plurality of product categories assigned to a
product department to certain endogenous variables, which comprise
historical sales per merchandising area per product category for each of a
plurality of stores, and historical total sales volume for each of the plurality
of stores.” How Dijk and Klaubauf would lead one to provide a linear
regression model to forecast responses of a financial metric for each of a
plurality of product categories assigned to a product department to the
endogenous variables as claimed is not adequately explained. Because a
prima facie case of obviousness has not been made out in the first instance
by a preponderance of the evidence, the rejection is not sustained.
The rejection of claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Dijk, Klaubauf Irion, and Dagum.
The rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Dijk, Klaubauf, and Kane.
The rejection of claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Dijk, Klaubauf, and Chappel.
The rejection of claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Dijk, Klaubauf, and Desmet.
15
Appeal 2015-007504
Application 13/601,680
The rejection of claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Dijk, Klaubauf and Kuo.
These rejections of claims variously depending from claims 1 and 15
are reversed for the same reasons as discussed above.
CONCLUSIONS
The rejection of claims 1—20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to non-statutory subject matter is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 9—11, and 14—17 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Dijk and Klaubauf is reversed.
The rejection of claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Dijk, Klaubauf, Irion, and Dagum is reversed.
The rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Dijk, Klaubauf, and Kane is reversed.
The rejection of claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Dijk, Klaubauf, and Chappel is reversed.
The rejection of claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Dijk, Klaubauf, and Desmet is reversed.
The rejection of claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Dijk, Klaubauf, and Kuo is reversed.
DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1—20 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
16