Ex Parte Ranganath et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 20, 201813764747 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 20, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 13/764,747 02/11/2013 87851 7590 Facebook/Fenwick Silicon Valley Center 801 California Street Mountain View, CA 94041 09/24/2018 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Rama Ranganath UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 26295-20628/US 1849 EXAMINER CIVAN,ETHAND ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3684 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/24/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ptoc@fenwick.com fwfacebookpatents@fenwick.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte RAMA RANGANATH, JARED MORGENSTERN, and MARK RABKIN Appeal2017-004207 Application 13/764,747 1 Technology Center 3600 Before: JAMES R. HUGHES, ERIC S. FRAHM, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges. HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner's Final decision rejecting claims 1, 3, 4, 6-12, 14, 15, and 17-22. Claims 2, 5, 13, and 16 have been canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 According to Appellants, Facebook, Inc. is the real party in interest. App. Br. 1. Appeal2017-004207 Application 13/764,747 Appellants 'Invention The invention generally relates to suggesting gift giving between users of a social networking system. Spec. ,r 1. Specifically, a social networking system may present information regarding important events in a user's life, for example, a birthday, wedding, or anniversary, to the user's connections along with gift suggestions of gifts provided by merchants advertising products on the social networking system. Spec. ,r,r 22-23. However, because the user may prefer a different gift than one selected by a user's connection, the social network system may present alternative gifts to the user along with the gift selected by the user's connection. Spec. ,r 25. If the user selects to receive an alternative gift, the social networking system may generate revenue based on the price difference between the gift selected by the user's connection and the alternative gift selected by the user. Id. Representative Claim Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A computer implemented method comprising: storing user profiles of each of a plurality of users of a social networking system, each user profile including data identifying one or more interests of a corresponding user; identifying, by the social networking system, a life event of a target user of the social networking system; receiving a selection of an offered gift from one or more users connected to the target user via the social networking system for presenting to the target user for the life event; 2 Appeal2017-004207 Application 13/764,747 determining for each of a plurality of candidate alternative gifts, an expected revenue for the social networking system presenting the candidate alternative gift to the target user, the expected revenue for a candidate alternative gift determined based on a difference in price between the candidate alternative gift and the offered gift and a matching between attributes of the candidate alternative gift and interests of the target user retrieved from the user profile of the target user; selecting an alternative gift from the one or more candidate alternative gifts based at least in part on the expected revenue; sending to the target user an option to redeem the offered gift or the selected alternative gift; receiving a choice from the target user of the selected alternative gift instead of the offered gift; and receiving as revenue at least a portion of a difference in price between the offered gift and the selected alternative gift. Rejection on Appeal The Examiner rejects claims 1, 3, 4, 6-12, 14, 15, and 17-22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. ANALYSIS Appellants argue claims 1, 3, 4, 6-12, 14, 15, and 17-22 together as a group. See App. Br. 6-14. We select claim 1 as representative in addressing Appellants' arguments below. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) ("When multiple claims subject to the same ground of rejection are argued as a group or subgroup by appellant, the Board may select a single claim from the group or subgroup and may decide the appeal as to the ground of rejection 3 Appeal2017-004207 Application 13/764,747 with respect to the group or subgroup on the basis of the selected claim alone."). Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." The Supreme Court has "long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLSBankint'l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quotingAss'nfor Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), "for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355. Assuming that a claim nominally falls within one of the statutory categories of machine, manufacture, process, or composition of matter, the first step in the analysis is to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concept[s]." Id. For example, abstract ideas include, but are not limited to, fundamental economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, an idea of itself, and mathematical formulas or relationships. Id. at 2355-57. If the claim is directed to a judicial exception, such as an abstract idea, the second step is to determine whether additional elements in the claim "'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent- eligible application." Id. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78). This second step is described as "a search for an "'inventive concept"'-i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ' ... significantly more than ... 4 Appeal2017-004207 Application 13/764,747 the [ineligible concept] itself."' Id. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72- 73). Prima Facie Case Appellants contend the Final Office Action's "conclusory analysis fails to properly establish the reasoning for the examiner's rejection and meet the examiner's burden under 35 U.S.C. § 132 to provide notice and reasons for the rejections." App. Br. 8. In other words, Appellants argue the Examiner failed to establish a prima facie case of patent-ineligibility. We disagree with Appellants. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly explained that "the prima facie case is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production." Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The "PTO carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132, in 'notify[ing] the applicant ... [by] stating the reasons for [its] rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application."' In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 132). The PTO violates section 132 "when a rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the [ A Jpplicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection." Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990). But if the PTO "adequately explain[ s] the shortcomings it perceives .... the burden shifts to the [ A Jpplicant to rebut the prima facie case with evidence and/or argument." Hyatt, 492 F.3d at 1370. 5 Appeal2017-004207 Application 13/764,747 The Examiner's rejection under section 101 satisfies section 132 because it reflects the Alice analytical framework by identifying an abstract idea and finding the claims do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself (Final Act. 2-3; Ans. 3-9), thus apprising Appellants of the reasons for the section 101 rejection under that framework. As discussed in more detail below, Appellants recognize the Examiner's Alice analysis and present arguments regarding each step. See App. Br. 6-14; Reply Br. 2- 13. Appellants do not respond by alleging a failure to understand the rejection. See id. Alice Step One "The first step in the Alice inquiry ... asks whether the focus of the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities ... or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an 'abstract idea' for which computers are invoked merely as a tool." Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1335-36. "The abstract idea exception prevents patenting a result where 'it matters not by what process or machinery the result is accomplished."' McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853)). "We therefore look to whether the claims ... focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery." McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314. Appellants contend claim 1 is not directed to the Examiner's identified abstract idea-"receiv[ing] as revenue at least a portion of the difference in price between an offered gift and a selected alternative gift"- 6 Appeal2017-004207 Application 13/764,747 because this idea omits elements of the claim. See App. Br. 10-11; Reply Br. 3. That is, Appellants argue the Examiner simply seized onto the end result of claim 1 rather than consider the claim as a whole. See Reply Br. 4-- 6. We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument. Claim 1, in essence, is a process for generating revenue as a middleman between two parties where a mismatch between a gift selected by one party and an alternative gift desired by the other party offers an opportunity for profit-a process the Specification refers to as "gift arbitrage." Spec. ,r 25. We thus agree with the Examiner (see Final Act. 2; Ans. 3) and find the idea of receiving revenue based on a price difference between a gift offered to and selected by a gift giving party and an alternative gift offered to and selected by a gift receiving party sufficiently captures the focus of claim 1 as a whole. The fact that claim 1 recites numerous other steps besides the "receiving as revenue" step does not change the focus of the claim because many of the limitations, such as "storing user profiles," "identifying ... a life event," "receiving a selection of an offered gift," "sending ... an option," and "receiving a choice" are ancillary information handling steps in service of the main idea of gift arbitrage. The remaining "determining" and "selecting" steps in claim 1 determine the expected revenue for each candidate alternative gift and select an alternative gift based on the expected revenue. Rather than change the focus of claim 1, the "determining" and "selecting" steps are part and parcel of the idea of gift arbitrage because one must know the expected revenue from an alternative gift in order to perform the gift arbitrage and receive revenue. Notably, the "determining" step does not define a specific way of determining expected revenue, but merely states 7 Appeal2017-004207 Application 13/764,747 the criteria for expected revenue-i.e., a price difference and a matching of attributes between the candidate alternative gift and the user. Likewise, the "selecting" step does not define a specific way of selecting an alternative gift, other than that it is based in part on the expected revenue. Accordingly, the focus of claim 1 remains on the idea of receiving revenue as a result of gift arbitrage. Therefore, claim 1 utilizes computers merely as a tool to perform information processing steps in service of the result of claim I-receiving revenue from the difference in price between one gift and another alternative gift. We see no error in the Examiner's defining the abstract idea based on the result, or goal, of claim 1, without listing all the supporting information handling steps that ensure the receiving of revenue from gift arbitrage, because "[ a ]n abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction." Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240-41 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Accordingly, we find the Examiner's identified abstract idea gives due consideration to the claim as a whole. Appellants also contend the Examiner failed to properly analyze the alleged abstract idea by comparing it to similar abstract ideas previously identified by the courts. See App. Br. 8-10. Appellants further contend the Examiner has not shown the alleged abstract idea to be a fundamental economic practice. Reply Br. 10. We disagree with Appellants. The Examiner finds claim 1 can be properly categorized as a fundamental economic concept, akin to the mitigating settlement risk and hedging concepts in Alice and Bilski. Ans. 6 ( citing Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2356; Bilski v. Kappas, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010)). We agree, because the idea of capitalizing on a difference in prices of products-i.e., arbitrage-is 8 Appeal2017-004207 Application 13/764,747 indeed a fundamental concept in economics. Although not exactly like the concepts at issue in Alice and Bilski, the arbitrage concept underlying claim 1 similarly represents a building block of economic activity. The fact that claim 1 limits the concept to gift giving in a social media environment does not change the analysis. See Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2358 ("[T]he prohibition against patenting abstract ideas cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of [ the idea] to a particular technological environment.") (quoting Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3230) (quotation marks omitted). Additionally, Appellants contend claim 1 "determines and presents gifts to a target user in a way that is distinct from a common gift-giving process." Reply Br. 7-9. In other words, the claimed automated process differs from a prior human method, as in McRO, and claim 1 is therefore patent-eligible. See id. We are not persuaded by this argument. Although McRO found it important to distinguish the claims at issue from a prior human method for performing animation (see McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314), the fact that there may be no comparable prior human method does not in itself show the claim is not abstract. Indeed, even a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F .3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The issue is thus not whether the method of claim 1 had actually been performed by human agency in the same way, but whether it would be so performed except for the application of generic computer technology to automate the process. See id. ("This [human] activity, even if automated by rules, would not be within the scope of the claims."). Claim 1, unlike the claims in McRO, does not recite rules specifically defining a computerized process that is different in kind from the steps a human would use to collect and analyze information to decide 9 Appeal2017-004207 Application 13/764,747 which gifts to offer to generate revenue from gift arbitrage. That is, there is no aspect of claim 1 that defines a technological improvement, whether in a software algorithm or a hardware design. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314; Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1335-36. We are, therefore, not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Alice Step Two The second step in the Alice analysis requires a search for an "inventive concept" that "must be significantly more than the abstract idea itself, and cannot simply be an instruction to implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer." Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (2016). There must be more than "computer functions [that] are 'well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]' previously known to the industry." Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359 ( quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73). Appellants contend numerous steps of claim 1, particularly in combination, amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. App. Br. 13-14; Reply Br. 12-13. We disagree with Appellants. Claim 1 recites a "computer implemented method" that makes use of a "social networking system." These generic invocations of technology amount to merely a statement to apply the abstract idea on a computer, which the Federal Circuit admonished against in Bascom. 827 F.3d at 1349. Moreover, Appellants do not specifically explain why the combination of limitations in claim 1 amounts to significantly more than an abstract idea 10 Appeal2017-004207 Application 13/764,747 itself; rather, Appellants merely list the claimed steps. See App. Br. 12-14; Reply Br. 12-13. We are, therefore, not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding claim 1 does not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. Accordingly, we find the Examiner did not err in rejecting claim 1, and claims 3, 4, 6-12, 14, 15, and 17-22 grouped therewith, as patent-ineligible. CONCLUSION Appellants have not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 3, 4, 6-12, 14, 15, and 17-22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 6-12, 14, 15, and 17-22. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(±). AFFIRMED 11 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation