Ex Parte Ramanathan

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 22, 2018

14370184 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 22, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO.
14/370,184
154241 7590
IP Spring - AI
180 N. LaSalle St.
Suite 3700
Chicago, IL 60601
FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
07/01/2014 Ramanathan Ramanathan
08/24/2018
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
APA-US-858125-02-US-NAT 9798
EXAMINER
HOANG, HIEU T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2452
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/24/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ajay.gambhir@ipspring.com
docket@ipspring.com
paralegalteam@ipspring.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RAMANATHAN RAMANATHAN
Appeal 2018-001814
Application 14/370,184
Technology Center 2400
Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, and
KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judges.
LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-20, the only claims pending in the
application on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Empire Technology
Development LLC. Br. 3.
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Application 14/3 70,184
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant's Invention
Appellant's invention generally relates to "facilitating a migration of
data from a first computing infrastructure to a second computing
infrastructure." Spec. ,r 3. Claim 1, which is illustrative, reads as follows:
1. A method to facilitate a migration of data from a first
computing infrastructure to a second computing infrastructure,
wherein the first computing infrastructure and the second
computing infrastructure are different, the method comprising,
by a data migration unit:
identifying, in the first computing infrastructure, first
pieces of data in a first database, wherein the first pieces of data
share a first service requirement, the first service requirement
relates to an instantiation of the first pieces of data in the second
computing infrastructure, and the first service requirement
includes a first level of performance associated with the first
pieces of data when the first pieces of data are instantiated in the
second computing infrastructure;
associating the first pieces of data with each other to form
a first virtual data core, wherein the first virtual data core
represents the first pieces of data that share the first service
requirement;
identifying, in the first computing infrastructure, second
pieces of data in a second database, wherein the second pieces of
data share a second service requirement different from the first
service requirement, the second service requirement relates to an
instantiation of the second pieces of data in the second computing
infrastructure, and the second service requirement includes a
second level of performance associated with the second pieces of
data when the second pieces of data are instantiated in the second
computing infrastructure;
associating the second pieces of data with each other to
form a second virtual data core, wherein the second virtual data
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core represents the second pieces of data that share the second
service requirement;
assigning a first set of parameters to the first virtual data
core, wherein the first set of parameters includes a first model of
the first pieces of data, a first operating environment of the first
pieces of data, and first instructions that facilitate the migration
of the first pieces of data from the first computing infrastructure
to the second computing infrastructure; and
assigning a second set of parameters to the second virtual
data core, wherein the second set of parameters includes a second
model of the second pieces of data, a second operating
environment of the second pieces of data, and second instructions
that facilitate the migration of the second pieces of data from the
first computing infrastructure to the second computing
infrastructure;
wherein the first set of parameters is different from the
second set of parameters.
References
The Examiner relies on the following prior art in rejecting the claims:
Vinberg et al. US 2007 /0006218 Al Jan.4,2007
Sandorfi et al. US 2009/0177661 Al July 9, 2009
Aravamudan et al. US 2012/0054731 Al Mar. 1, 2012
Jiang et al. US 2015/0012917 Al Jan. 8,2015
Rejections
Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
judicially-excepted subject matter. Final Act. 4--5.
Claims 1, 3-7, 9, 10, 12-16, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Vinberg and Jiang.
Final Act. 6-10.
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Claims 8 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over the combination of Vinberg, Jiang, and Aravamudan.
Final Act. 10-11.
Claims 2, 11, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over the combination of Vinberg, Jiang, and Sandorfi.
Final Act. 11-13.
ANALYSIS
Appellant does not separately argue claims 1-20 but, instead, relies on
the same arguments for all the pending claims. Br. 10 ("Claims 1-20 rise
and fall together."). We select claim 1 as representative, and claims 2-20
stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
Re} ection under 3 5 US. C. § 101
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for "any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof." The Supreme Court has "long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLSBankint'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quotingAss'nfor
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
The Supreme Court in Alice reiterated the two-step framework previously
set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 82-84 (2012), "for distinguishing patents that claim laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first
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step in that analysis is to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed
to one of those patent-ineligible concepts," such as an abstract idea. Id. The
inquiry often is whether the claims are directed to "a specific means or
method" for improving technology or whether they are simply directed to an
abstract end-result. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d
1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). If the claims are not directed to a patent-
ineligible concept, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the
second step, where the elements of the claims are considered "individually
and 'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the additional
elements 'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible
application." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78-79).
We, therefore, look to whether the claims focus on a specific means or
method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a
result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic
processes and machinery. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d
1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
The Examiner finds the claims are directed to a process for the
migration of data by:
[I]dentifying first and second pieces of data that each share a
certain service requirement, associating the first and second
pieces of data with each other to from [sic] a first data core and
a second data core, assigning a first and a second set of
parameters to the data cores.
Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds the claims are directed to an abstract idea
because the claimed process "merely involves comparing information
(identifying pieces of data) and organizing information (associating pieces of
data to form data cores and assigning parameters to the data cores)." Final
Act. 4. The Examiner finds the claims do not recite significantly more than
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the abstract idea because "'a data migration unit' and 'databases' do not
amount to significant more than a general purpose processor or computer for
executing the abstract idea ( these are common computing elements for
executing instructions and storing data)." Final Act. 4.
Appellant contends the claims are not directed to an abstract idea.
Br. 11-14. Initially, Appellant argues the Examiner fails to establish that the
claims are directed to an abstract idea because the Examiner "merely
include[ s] quotes from the pending claims without setting forth how the
combination of elements in the pending claims relate to abstract ideas
defined by the courts." Br. 11.
Appellant essentially argues the Examiner's reliance upon conclusory
statements is insufficient to carry the burden of producing a prima facie case
of subject matter ineligibility. See Br. 11. The Federal Circuit has
repeatedly noted that "the prima facie case is merely a procedural device that
enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production." Hyatt v. Dudas,
492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443,
1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The court has, thus, held that the Office carries its
procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection
satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132 by notifying the applicant of
the reasons for rejection, "together with such information and references as
may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of
[the] application." See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
All that is required of the Office is that it set forth the statutory basis
of the rejection in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet
the notice requirement of§ 132. Id.; see also Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d
1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting that section 132 "is violated when a
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rejection is so uninformative that it prevents the applicant from recognizing
and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection"). We conclude that the
Examiner's statement is sufficient to place Appellant on notice as to step 1
of Alice as required under 35 U.S.C. § 132. Further, Appellant's
understanding of the Examiner's rejection is manifested by their response to
the rejection included in the Appeal Brief. Appellant does not respond by
asserting that they did not understand the Examiner's rejection. Instead,
Appellant presents arguments as to why the claims are not directed to an
abstract idea, which we address below.
Appellant further argues the Examiner fails to identify an abstract idea
defined by the courts. Br. 11. According to Appellant, "abstract ideas are
limited to fundamental economic practices, methods of organizing human
activities, an idea itself, and mathematical relationships." Br. 11 ( citing
2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg.
74,618 (December 16, 2014)). Appellant argues the 2014 Interim Guidance
on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility provides that "'a claimed concept is not
identified as an abstract idea unless it is similar to at least one concept that
the courts have identified as an abstract idea"' and the Examiner "fails to
identify an abstract idea defined by the courts, where abstract ideas are
limited to fundamental economic practices, methods of organizing human
activities, an idea itself, and mathematical relationships." Br. 11-12.
Appellant argues the claims are not directed to a fundamental economic
practice "because there are no agreements between people, contracts, legal
obligations, or business relations recited in the pending claims." Br. 12.
Appellant argues the claims are not directed to a method of organizing
human activity because "[t]he pending claims do not include elements
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relating to mental processes or thinking" and "elements such as 'associating
the first pieces of data with each other to form a first virtual data core ... ',
recited in independent claim 1, are not operations that could be performed by
a human using a pen and paper." Br. 12. Appellant argues the claims are
not directed to "a method of mathematical relationships/formulas" because
"[ t ]he pending claims do not recite any mathematical algorithms,
mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas, and calculations."
Br. 13.
Appellant's arguments are not persuasive. We agree with the
Examiner that the claims are directed to an abstract idea. Final Act. 4. All
the steps recited in Appellant's independent claims 1, 10, and 19, including,
for example: (i) "identifying ... first pieces of data in a first database"; (ii)
"associating the first pieces of data with each other to form a first virtual
data core"; (iii) identifying ... second pieces of data in a second database";
(iv) "associating the second pieces of data with each other to form a second
virtual data core"; (v) "assigning a first set of parameters to the first virtual
data core"; and (vi) "assigning a second set of parameters to the second
virtual data core" are abstract processes of collecting, storing, and analyzing
information of a specific content. Information, as such, is intangible. See
Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,451 n.12 (2007).
Information collection and analysis, including when limited to particular
content, is within the realm of abstract ideas. See, e.g., Internet Patents
Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs.for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2014); and CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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Appellant argues the claims are not directed to an abstract idea
because the claims "are directed to an improvement in data migration, which
is similar to the claims in Enfish that are directed to improvements in how a
computer stores and retrieves data." Br. 14. According to Appellant, "the
operations of associating pieces of data to form virtual data cores provide an
improvement in how to store and organize data relating to a migration of the
pieces of data" and "the operations of assigning parameters to the formed
virtual data cores provide improvements to migration of data by ensuring
that instantiations of data on a target computing infrastructure are performed
using appropriate parameters." Br. 14.
We do not find Appellant's arguments persuasive. In Enfzsh, the court
explained, "the first step in the Alice inquiry ... asks whether the focus of
the claims is on the specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities
... or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an 'abstract idea' for which
computers are invoked merely as a tool." Enfzsh, 822 F.3d at 1335-36. In
Enfzsh, the self-referential table was recited in the claims and found to be "a
specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer
stores and retrieves data in memory." 822 F.3d at 1329. There, the
specification disparaged conventional data structures and included language
describing the "present invention" as including the features that made up the
self-referential table. Id. In other words, the claims in Enfzsh were "directed
to an improvement in the functioning of a computer. Id. at 1338. By
contrast, here, as discussed above, the claims are essentially directed to
collecting, storing, and analyzing information - generalized steps to be
performed on a computer using conventional computer activity. See Enfzsh
at 1338; Electric Power Grp. LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed.
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Cir. 2016) ( explaining that claims directed to computerized collecting,
analyzing, and displaying information were different from the claims in
Enfzsh: "the focus of the claims is not on such an improvement in computers
as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as
tools.").
Turning to the second step of the analysis, we find nothing in
Appellant's claims that adds anything "significantly more" to transform the
abstract concept of collecting, storing, and analyzing information into a
patent-eligible application. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. We agree with the
Examiner (Final Act. 4) that limiting such an abstract concept to a general
purpose computer having generic components such as, for example, "a data
migration unit," "a first computing infrastructure," "a first database," "a
second computing infrastructure," and "a second database," recited in
Appellant's claim 1, does not make the abstract concept patent-eligible
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358; see also Dealertrack,
Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333-34 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
We are not persuaded by Appellant's arguments that the claims recite
significantly more than an abstract idea. That is, "an ordered combination of
the elements recited in the pending claims addresses a challenge of data
arrangement prior to performing the data migration" and "[l]ooking at the
pending claims as a whole, the pending claims are directed to an
improvement in computer-related technology of data migration by
addressing the challenge of data arrangement prior to performing the data
migration" (Br. 14 ), as discussed supra with respect to claim 1, do not
require the migration of data. Instead, the claims merely recite steps for
identifying first and second pieces of data, associating the first and second
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pieces of data to form a first virtual data core and a second virtual core,
respectively, and assigning a set of parameters to each of the first and second
virtual data cores. As the Federal Circuit has held, "the practices of
collecting, analyzing, and displaying data, with nothing more, are practices
whose implicit exclusion from § 101 undergirds the information-based
category of abstract ideas." FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839
F.3d 1089, 1097-98 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted); see also
CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1370 ("mere data-gathering steps cannot make an
otherwise nonstatutory claim statutory") ( quotation and alterations omitted).
We are also not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the claims
are similar to the claims in Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Br. 15-16. In particular,
Appellant argues in claim 1, for example:
[A] processor identifies data that shares a service requirement.
Based on that analysis, the processor assigns parameters that
include a model, an operating environment and instructions for
migration. The recitations of claim 1 identify a unique way to
facilitate migration that is not found in conventional methods.
Migration may be simplified irrespective of platforms and/or
hardware. Applicable service requirements may be met. A user
may migrate data while maintaining operational requirements
such as security, access control etc.
Br. 16 ( citing Spec. ,r 27) (internal citations omitted). Appellant further
argues:
[E]ven assuming arguendo that an abstract concept may have
been recited, the claims recite technology which adds something
significantly more so that an abstract concept itself is not
claimed. When looking at the claim recitations as an ordered
combination, the recitations as a whole amount to significantly
more than "a general purpose processor or computer for
executing the abstract idea" as suggested by the Final Office
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Action. Final Office Action, page 4. Focusing on claim 1, the
processor identifies data that shares a service requirement and
later assigns parameters that include a data model, an operating
environment and instructions for migration. This process
improves data traffic efficiency resulting in a measurable
electrical effect.
Br. 16. However, Appellant's claims do not go beyond generic functions,
and Appellant does not adequately identify technical means for performing
the claimed steps that are arguably an advance over conventional computer
technology. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2016). Features such as, for example, the data migration unit, first
and second databases, and first and second computing infrastructures, recited
in claim 1, are described and claimed generically rather than with the
specificity necessary to show how those components provide a concrete
solution to a technical problem addressed by the claims. That is, the claims
at issue do not require any nonconventional computer components, or even a
"non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional
pieces," rather, they merely call for performance of the claimed data
identifying, associating, and assigning functions "on a set of generic
computer components." Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1349--52.
The recited features, therefore, fail to cause the claims to recite
significantly more than the abstract concepts of collecting, storing, and
analyzing data. To the extent Appellant argues the claims are directed to
novel and nonobvious subject matter and, therefore, necessarily entail an
inventive concept that transforms the claims to significantly more than the
abstract idea, we disagree. Although the second step in the Alice/Mayo
framework is termed a search for an "inventive concept," the analysis is not
an evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness, but rather a search for "'an
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element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself."' Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. A novel and
nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-
ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.
Because Appellant's claims 1-20 are directed to a patent-ineligible
abstract concept, and do not recite something "significantly more" under the
second prong of the Alice analysis, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of
these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Rejections under 35 USC§ 103
Contention 1
Appellant contends the combination of Vinberg and Jiang does not
teach or suggest "identifying ... first pieces of data in a first database,
wherein the first pieces of data share a first service requirement" and
"identifying ... second pieces of data in a second database, wherein the
second pieces of data share a second service requirement different from the
first service requirement," as recited in claim 1. Br. 1 7, 19. Appellant
argues because, as acknowledged by the Examiner, "Vinberg does not show
pieces of data in a database, Vinberg cannot show 'identifying ... first
pieces of data in a first database' and 'identifying ... second pieces of data in
a second database,"' as required by claim 1. Br. 19.
We do not find Appellant's argument persuasive. Non-obviousness
cannot be established by attacking the references individually when the
rejection is predicated upon a combination of prior art disclosures. See In re
Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Here, the Examiner
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finds Vinberg teaches identifying first pieces of data sharing a first service
requirement and identifying second pieces of data sharing a second, different
service requirement. Final Act. 6-7 ( citing Vinberg ,r,r 19, 20, 21, 26, 41-
44; Figs. 2--4). The Examiner finds Jiang teaches "storing configuration data
in different databases." Final Act. 8 (citing Jiang ,r 109). Based on these
findings, the Examiner concludes the combination of Vinberg and Jiang
teaches or suggests the disputed limitations. Id. Appellant's argument does
not address the combined teachings of the references and, therefore, is
unpersuasive of error.
Contention 2
Appellant contends the combination of Vinberg and Jiang does not
teach or suggest "associating the first pieces of data with each other to form
a first virtual data core, wherein the first virtual data core represents the first
pieces of data that share the first service requirement" and "associating the
second pieces of data with each other to form a second virtual data core,
wherein the second virtual data core represents the second pieces of data that
share the second service requirement," as recited in claim 1. Br. 17, 19-20.
The Examiner finds "a type of Vinberg is a component type ( a virtual data
core, which can be a database application) which is an association of many
instances (pieces of data) whose service requirement (buffer size) are copied
from the type's service requirement" and, therefore, Vinberg teaches or
suggests the disputed limitations. Ans. 15 (citing Vinberg, Fig. 2; ,r 44); see
also Final Act. 7.
Appellant asserts, "Vinberg' s 'type' appears to include information on
constraints of a corresponding component, and appears to represent different
examples of the corresponding component." Br. 19. Appellant argues
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Vinberg' s types fail to teach or suggest the claimed first and second virtual
data cores because Vinberg does not teach that the type is formed by an
association of first pieces of data or second pieces of data, as required by
claim 1. Br. 19--20.
We do not find Appellant's arguments persuasive. Appellant's
Specification provides that virtual data cores "may be data structures stored
in memory" (Spec. ,r 12) and "may reflect an association of one or more
pieces of source data 112 with the same or similar service requirements"
(Spec. ,r 13). Thus, consistent with Appellant's Specification, the broadest
reasonable interpretation of "associating ... pieces of data with each other to
form a ... virtual data core" includes storing, in a memory, a data structure
that indicates an association of one or more pieces of data.
Vinberg discloses a system definition model ("SDM") "includes a
component corresponding to each of one or more software and/or hardware
components being managed in a virtual system." Vin berg ,r 19. Vin berg
teaches that the SDM "can be generated and stored in any of a variety of
different ways and using any of a variety of different data structures"
(Vinberg ,r 37) and "is based on a data structure format including types,
instances, and optionally configurations" (Vinberg ,r 38). Vinberg teaches
that a type corresponds to a particular component (Vinberg ,r 41) and "refers
to a general template having corresponding information pages that describe
the component generally" (Vinberg ,r 38). For example, with respect to
Figure 2, Vinberg provides:
[ A ]ssume that a particular component is a database application.
A type 202 corresponding to the database application is created,
having an associated constraint information page. The constraint
information page includes various general constraints for the
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database application. For example, one of the constraints may
be a range of values that a particular buff er size should be within
for the database application.
Vinberg ,r 42. Vinberg, therefore, teaches or suggests storing, in a memory,
a data structure (e.g., a type) that indicates an association of one or more
pieces of data with the same or similar service requirements ( e.g., the
associated constraint information page including various general constraints
for the component). As such, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in
finding Vinberg teaches or suggests the disputed limitations.
Contention 3
Appellant contends the combination of Vinberg and Jiang does not
teach or suggest "the first set of parameters includes a first model of the first
pieces of data, a first operating environment of the first pieces of data, and
first instructions that facilitate the migration of the first pieces of data from
the first computing infrastructure to the second computing infrastructure"
and "the second set of parameters includes a second model of the second
pieces of data, a second operating environment of the second pieces of data,
and second instructions that facilitate the migration of the second pieces of
data from the first computing infrastructure to the second computing
infrastructure," as recited in claim 1. Br. 17, 20-21. Appellant argues:
Vinberg appears to describe information pages including
installation and configuration instructions. Vinberg does not
appear to show first set of parameters that include "a first model
of the first pieces of data, a first operating environment of the
first pieces of data, and first instructions that facilitate the
migration of the first pieces of data from the first computing
infrastructure to the second computing infrastructure" [as]
recited in [the disputed limitations.] Similarly, Vinberg does not
appear to show second set of parameters that include "a second
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model of the second pieces of data, a second operating
environment of the second pieces of data, and second instructions
that facilitate the migration of the second pieces of data from the
first computing infrastructure to the second computing
infrastructure" [as] recited in [ the disputed limitations].
Br. 20-21.
We do not find Appellant's arguments persuasive. The Examiner
finds Vinberg teaches that an information page associated with each
component represents a model. Final Act. 8 ( citing Vinberg, Fig. 1; ,r 27).
The Examiner finds Vinberg teaches that "each model has a plurality of data
( type, config, instance), operating system and installation or migrating
instructions" and, therefore, Vinberg teaches or suggests the disputed
limitations. Id. Although Appellant argues Vinberg's teaching of
information pages including installation and configuration instructions does
not teach the disputed limitations, Appellant fails to provide explanation or
reasoning as to how or why Vinberg' s information pages fail to teach or
suggest the claimed first and second set of parameters. Appellant's
arguments, therefore, are unpersuasive of error. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) ("The arguments shall explain why the examiner erred as
to each ground of rejection contested by [ A Jppellant. "); cf In re Baxter
Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("It is not the function of
this court to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by an
[ A Jppellant, looking for nonobvious distinctions over the prior art.").
For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1, and claims 2-20, which fall with claim 1. See Br. 20.
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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 and the Examiner's rejections of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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