Ex Parte Rajkotia

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Feb 8, 2008

10028571 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 8, 2008)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte PURVA R. RAJKOTIA
____________

Appeal 2007-1660
Application 10/028,5711
Technology Center 2600
____________

Decided: February 8, 2008
____________

Before ALLEN R. MACDONALD, ROBERT E. NAPPI, and
SCOTT R. BOALICK, Administrative Patent Judges.

BOALICK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of
claims 31-60, all the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Application filed December 20, 2001. The real party in interest is
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
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Application 10/028,571

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant's invention relates to a system and method for locating a
wireless station within a wireless network.
Claim 31 is exemplary:
31. For use in wireless network communications system comprising
a plurality of base stations and a plurality of mobile stations, an apparatus
for determining a distance from a base station to a mobile station, said
apparatus comprising:

a distance unit associated with said base station wherein said distance
unit is capable of

obtaining a two way travel time, wherein said two way travel time is a
time of travel for a range signal to travel from said base station to said
mobile station and to travel from said mobile station to said base station,

adjusting a value of said two way travel time to correct for signal
conditions causing a time difference in arrival of said range signal at said
base station,

determining a one way travel time D from:

D = 1/2 [(adjusted two way travel time) - (random backoff)]

wherein said random backoff is a time value of a chip length of a
random backoff parameter of said mobile station, and

multiplying said one way travel time D by the speed of light to obtain
said distance from said base station to said mobile station.
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Innes US 6,061,565 May 9, 2000
Bevan US 6,489,923 B1 Dec. 3, 2002
Admitted Prior Art, page 17, line 15 to page 18, line 22 of the present
application (APA).

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Claims 31-60 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
obvious over Innes, the Admitted Prior Art (APA), and Bevan.

Rather than repeat the arguments of Appellant or the Examiner, we
make reference to the Briefs and the Answer for their respective details.
Only those arguments actually made by Appellant have been considered in
this decision. Arguments that Appellant did not make in the Briefs have not
been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii).2

ISSUE
The issue is whether Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in
rejecting the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). That is, given the teachings
of the prior art, has Appellant shown that the differences between the claims
and the prior art are sufficient to render the claimed subject matter
unobvious to a person skilled in the art at the time the invention was made?

2 Except as will be noted in this opinion, Appellant has not presented any
substantive arguments directed separately to the patentability of the
dependent claims or related claims in each group. In the absence of a
separate argument with respect to those claims, they stand or fall with the
representative independent claim. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

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FINDINGS OF FACT
The record supports the following findings of fact (FF) by substantial
evidence.

1. Innes describes a method for locating a mobile station of a mobile
radio system. (Col. 1, ll. 4, 32-55.) To locate the position of a mobile
station (MS), Innes teaches that "the distance of the mobile station
from a base transceiver station is determined, or the distances of the
mobile station from at least two base transceiver stations are
determined and the position is found by triangulation." (Abstract.)
Innes also teaches that "[i]n a GSM-type system, there is a
predetermined known response delay between a particular signal
received by the mobile station from the base transceiver station and a
particular response transmitted from the mobile station to the base
transceiver station." (Abstract.) Therefore, the distances can "be
determined from the response delay and a measured period between
transmission of the particular signal and reception of the particular
response." (Abstract.) In addition to GSM (Global System for
Mobile communications), the teachings of Innes are applicable to
other types of mobile cellular radio systems, such as CDMA (Code
Division Multiple Access). (Col. 5, ll. 63-66.)

2. Innes teaches that a base transceiver station (BTS) 26 registers a time
reference t0 when it begins a transmission to the mobile station (MS)
16. (Col. 3, ll. 63-65; Figs. 1, 3.) The transmission is received by MS
16 at a time t1 that is delayed from time t0. (Col. 3, ll. 65-67; Fig. 3.)
The MS 16 then communicates to the BTS 26 at a time that is
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synchronized to the reception of the transmission at t2 and delayed by
a known fixed delay period σ. (Col. 4, ll. 2-8; Fig. 3.) The
transmission from the MS 16 is received by the BTS 26 at time t3,
which is registered by the BTS 26. (Col. 4, ll. 8-11; Fig. 3.) The BTS
26 can calculate the distance to the MS 16 using the round trip time
(t3-t0) minus the known fixed delay period σ. (Col. 4, ll. 11-15.)

3. Innes teaches that a message monitoring and substitution unit
(MMSU) 36 is placed in the interface 28 between each BTS 26 in the
mobile network and its base station controller (BSC) 24. (Col. 4, ll.
43-47; Fig. 4.) The MMSUs 36 are controlled by a position location
controller (PLC) 38. (Col. 4, ll. 47-48; Fig. 4.) "The PLC 38 and
MMSU 36 may be integrated with, or separate from, the BTS 26 and
the BSC 24." (Col. 4, ll. 48-50.) The MMSUs 36 "collect the
distance information from the BTSs 26 and supply it to the PLC 38
where it is processed in order to determine the location of each mobile
station under analysis." (Col. 4, ll. 60-63.) Innes teaches how a
distance measurement may be carried out using three BTSs to
determine the location of a mobile system. (Col. 4, l. 63 to col. 5,
l. 29; Figs. 3-5.)

4. The APA states that the random backoff parameter used to calculate a
one way travel time for a signal to travel from a base station to a
mobile station in equation (1) of the Specification "is specified in the
IS-95 Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) standard for CDMA
networks (the "Standard")." (Spec. 17:4-17.) "The random backoff
parameter for mobile station MS1 represents a time duration after
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which mobile station MS1 starts a transmission." (Spec. 18:1-3.) The
"mobile station may have a random backoff parameter with a chip
length value of zero (0) up to a chip length value of five hundred
eleven (511)." (Spec. 18:5-7.) Thus, "[t]he random backoff
parameter of the mobile station represents the time offset after which
the mobile station starts a transmission." (Spec. 19:13-15.) In
addition, "[t]he mobile station continually informs the base station of
the current value of the random backoff parameter for the mobile
station." (Spec. 19:18-20.)

5. Bevan describes "a method and apparatus for locating the position of a
mobile station (MS) in a mobile telecommunications system."
(Col. 1, ll. 7-9.) Bevan teaches that a base transceiver station (BTS)
can "locate the position of a MS by measuring the round-trip delay of
a signal sent from the BTS to the MS and back (i.e. the elapsed time
between transmission of a signal from the BTS and reception of the
MS's response) to evaluate the distance from the BTS to the MS, and
by estimating the angular bearing from the BTS to the MS." (Col. 1,
ll. 24-30.) Bevan teaches that there are "several mechanisms by
which we can potentially obtain errors in attempting to estimate the
angle of arrival and range of received signal sources," (col. 1,
ll. 42-44) including "[e]rror mechanisms in measuring signal round-
trip delay (RTD) . . . Multipath (angle and delay spread) [and]
Doppler" (col. 1, ll. 45-49).

6. An object of Bevan is "to reduce errors due to Doppler frequency shift
and spread, and carrier frequency offset, in particular relating to
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potential errors due to MS motion in a cellular telecommunications
system." (Col. 1, ll. 54-58.) The invention of Bevan "may enable a
direction and range estimation system which meets the FCC E911
mandate." (Col. 3, ll. 3-5.) "In the embodiment, we combine
direction finding (DF) and round trip delay (RTD) techniques to
evaluate the direction or bearing from a BTS to a MS and the distance
from the BTS to the MS." (Col. 3, ll. 51-54.) The techniques taught
by Bevan "find particular application to direction and/or range finding
in cellular radio telecommunications systems." (Col. 2, ll. 31-33.)
The described embodiments of Bevan "relate to a code division
multiple access (CDMA) system." (Col. 3, ll. 58-59.)

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
All timely filed evidence and properly presented arguments are
considered by the Board in resolving an obviousness issue on appeal. See In
re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
In the examination of a patent application, the Examiner bears the
initial burden of showing a prima facie case of unpatentability. Id. at 1472.
When that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the applicant to rebut. Id.;
see also In re Harris, 409 F.3d 1339, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding
rebuttal evidence unpersuasive). If the applicant produces rebuttal evidence
of adequate weight, the prima facie case of unpatentability is dissipated. In
re Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1472. Thereafter, patentability is determined in
view of the entire record. Id. However, on appeal to the Board it is an
appellant's burden to establish that the Examiner did not sustain the
necessary burden and to show that the Examiner erred. See In re Kahn, 441
F.3d 977, 985-86 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("On appeal to the Board, an applicant can
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overcome a rejection [for obviousness] by showing insufficient evidence of
prima facie obviousness or by rebutting the prima facie case with evidence
of secondary indicia of nonobviousness.") (quoting In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d
1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
"Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when 'the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.'" KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727,
1734 (2007).
In KSR, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "[t]he combination of
familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when
it does no more than yield predictable results." Id. at 1739. The Court
explained that:
[o]ften, it will be necessary . . . to look to
interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the
effects of demands known to the design
community or present in the marketplace; and the
background knowledge possessed by a person
having ordinary skill in the art, all in order to
determine whether there was an apparent reason to
combine the known elements in the fashion
claimed by the patent at issue.

Id. at 1740-41. The Court noted that "[t]o facilitate review, this analysis
should be made explicit." Id. at 1741 (citing In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988
(Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[R]ejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained
by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
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obviousness")). However, "the analysis need not seek out precise teachings
directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court
can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ." Id.
The Court noted that "[i]n many fields it may be that there is little
discussion of obvious techniques or combinations, and it often may be the
case that market demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive design
trends." KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741. "Under the correct analysis, any need or
problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and
addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in
the manner claimed." Id at 1742. The Court also noted that "[c]ommon
sense teaches . . . that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their
primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able
to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle." Id..
"A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton." Id.
During examination of a patent application, a claim is given its
broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. In re
Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (CCPA 1969). "[T]he words of a claim 'are
generally given their ordinary and customary meaning.'" Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal citations
omitted). The "ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the
patent application." Id. at 1313.

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ANALYSIS
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 31-60
as being obvious over Innes, the APA, and Bevan. Reviewing the findings
of fact and documents of record, we do not agree. In particular, we find that
the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner failed to make a prima facie
showing of obviousness. Appellant failed to meet the burden of overcoming
that prima facie showing.

Independent Claim 31
Regarding claim 31, Appellant argues that the applied references do
not teach or suggest a distance unit, as claimed. (App. Br. 9-14; Reply
Br. 2-4.) In particular, Appellant argues that the applied references do not
teach or suggest either (1) a distance unit that adjusts a value of the two way
travel time to correct for signal conditions causing a time difference in
arrival of the range signal at the base station or (2) a distance unit that
determines a one way travel time by subtracting a random backoff parameter
from the adjusted two way travel time and dividing that result by two. (App.
Br. 11-14; Reply Br. 2-4.) We do not agree.
Initially, we note that the plain language of claim 31 does not require
the distance unit to actually adjust a value of the two way travel time or
determine a one way travel time by subtracting a random backoff parameter.
Instead, claim 31 merely requires that the distance unit be "capable of"
performing these acts.
The Examiner found that Innes discloses a distance unit (MMSU 36
and/or PLC 38) associated with the base station that is capable of
determining a one way travel time of a signal from the base station to the
mobile station. (Ans. 4-5; FF 1-3.) Appellant argues that, because the
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MMSUs 36 collect distance information from the BTSs 26 and supply the
information to the PLC 38, "this clearly indicates that distance estimation or
calculation is not made by either the MMSUs 36 or the PLC 38. Thus,
neither MMSU 36 or PLC 38, alone or in combination, provide the distance
unit required by Claim 31." (App. Br. 10.)
However, as the Examiner correctly points out, claim 31 has been
rejected over a combination of references, not Innes alone. (Ans. 18.) In
addition, the Examiner correctly found that the MMSU or PLC taught by
Innes would be capable of performing the distance determination recited by
claim 31. (Ans. 18.) Appellant has not presented evidence, nor do we find
any, that the MMSU or PLC would not be capable of performing the
determination of distance recited by claim 31 or that using the MMSU or
PLC to perform the distance determination would have been beyond the
level of ordinary skill in the art. Moreover, as Appellant admits (App.
Br. 10), the determination of distance is referenced generally in relation to
BTS 26. If, as Appellant appears to argue (App. Br. 10), the distance
determination is performed by a component of the base station (BTS 26), we
find nothing to prevent the distance unit, which is required to be "associated
with" the base station, from being interpreted to include such a component
of the base station.
Appellant argues that the applied references do not teach or suggest a
distance unit that adjusts a value of the two way travel time to correct for
signal conditions causing a time difference in arrival of the range signal at
the base station. (App. Br. 11-14; Reply Br. 2-4.) However, as the Examiner
correctly found, Bevan teaches adjusting a value of travel time to correct for
signal conditions. (Ans. 7, 19-20; FF 5-6.) Appellant argues that Bevan is
concerned with errors in estimating bearing to the mobile station rather than
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range and there would be no reasonable expectation of success to use the
teachings of Bevan in the system of Innes. (App. Br. 13-14; Reply Br. 2-4.)
We do not agree. Although Bevan mainly is concerned with correcting
errors in estimating bearing, Bevan also teaches sources of error in
determining range -- including error mechanisms in measuring signal round-
trip delay and techniques to compensate for those errors. (FF 5-6; Ans. 7,
19-20.)
Appellant further argues that the applied references do not teach or
suggest a distance unit that determines a one way travel time by subtracting
a random backoff parameter from the adjusted two way travel time and
dividing that result by two. (App. Br. 11-14; Reply Br. 2-4.) However, as
the Examiner correctly found, Innes teaches a delay σ for a GSM system
and, as evidenced by the APA, a person of ordinary skill in the art would
have recognized the random backoff parameter used in an IS-95 CDMA
system to be the counterpart of the delay σ used in a GSM system. (Ans. 6,
18-19; FF 4.) In addition, the APA teaches that the mobile station informs
the base station of the current value of the random backoff parameter (FF 4),
and therefore the random backoff parameter may be viewed as a fixed
quantity for a given calculation.
Although Appellant argues that the Examiner used improper hindsight
in combining the references (App. Br. 9, 12-14), we do not agree. Instead,
we find that Appellant has done no more than combine familiar elements
according to known methods to yield predictable results.
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has not shown the Examiner
erred in rejecting claim 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

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Dependent Claims 32-37
Although Appellant nominally argues the rejection of each of
dependent claims 32-37 separately (App. Br. 15-17), the arguments
presented do not point out with particularity or explain why the limitations
of the dependent claims are separately patentable. Instead, Appellant merely
asserts patentability of the claims for the same reasons advanced with
respect to independent claim 31, quotes the additional limitation(s) recited
by each dependent claim, states that Appellant traverses the Examiner's
findings, and summarily alleges patentability of the dependent claims
because "Innes, the Admitted Prior Art, and Bevan, or any combination of
them, do not appear to teach the elements as described with relation to all
other elements of this and the parent claim."3 (App. Br. 15-17.) Because
Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the Examiner's prima facie case of
obviousness for dependent claims 32-37 based on the teachings of Innes, the
APA, and Bevan, we will sustain the rejection of claims 32-37 for the
reasons discussed with respect to claim 31.

Independent Claim 38
Appellant nominally argues the rejection of independent claim 38
separately. (App. Br. 18.) However, Appellant merely asserts patentability
of claim 38 for the same reasons advanced with respect to independent
claim 31. (App. Br. 18.) Therefore, we will sustain the rejection of claim 38
for the reasons discussed with respect to claim 31.

3 We note that the quoted language in the arguments for claims 35-37 has a
typographical error because the word "appear" has been omitted. (App.
Br. 16-17.)
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Dependent Claims 39-44
Although Appellant nominally argues the rejection of each of
dependent claims 39-44 separately (App. Br. 18-21), the arguments
presented do not point out with particularity or explain why the limitations
of the dependent claims are separately patentable. Instead, Appellant merely
asserts patentability of the claims for the same reasons advanced with
respect to independent claim 38, quotes the additional limitation(s) recited
by each dependent claim, states that Appellant traverses the Examiner's
findings, and summarily alleges patentability of the dependent claims
because "Innes, the Admitted Prior Art, and Bevan, or any combination of
them, do not appear to teach the elements as described with relation to all
other elements of this and the parent claim."4 (App. Br. 18-21.) Because
Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the Examiner's prima facie case of
obviousness for dependent claims 39-44 based on the teachings of Innes, the
APA, and Bevan, we will sustain the rejection of claims 39-44 for the
reasons discussed with respect to claim 38.

Independent Claim 45
Appellant nominally argues the rejection of independent claim 45
separately. (App. Br. 21.) However, Appellant merely asserts patentability
of claim 45 for the same reasons advanced with respect to independent
claim 31. (App. Br. 21.) Therefore, we will sustain the rejection of claim 45
for the reasons discussed with respect to claim 31.

4 We note that the quoted language in the arguments for claims 42-44 has a
typographical error because the word "appear" has been omitted. (App.
Br. 20-21.)
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Dependent Claims 46-52
Although Appellant nominally argues the rejection of each of
dependent claims 46-52 separately (App. Br. 21-24), the arguments
presented do not point out with particularity or explain why the limitations
of the dependent claims are separately patentable. Instead, Appellant merely
asserts patentability of the claims for the same reasons advanced with
respect to independent claim 45, quotes the additional limitation(s) recited
by each dependent claim, states that Appellant traverses the Examiner's
findings, and summarily alleges patentability of the dependent claims
because "Innes, the Admitted Prior Art, and Bevan, or any combination of
them, do not appear to teach the elements as described with relation to all
other elements of this and the parent claim."5 (App. Br. 21-24.) Because
Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the Examiner's prima facie case of
obviousness for dependent claims 46-52 based on the teachings of Innes, the
APA, and Bevan, we will sustain the rejection of claims 46-52 for the
reasons discussed with respect to claim 45.

Independent Claim 53
With respect to independent claim 53, Appellant presents essentially
the same arguments as presented with respect to independent claim 31.
(App. Br. 25-30.) We reject those arguments for the same reasons discussed
with respect to claim 31.
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has not shown the Examiner
erred in rejecting claim 53 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

5 We note that the quoted language in the arguments for claims 49-52 has a
typographical error because the word "appear" has been omitted. (App.
Br. 23-24.)
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Dependent Claims 54-55
Although Appellant nominally argues the rejection of dependent claim
54 separately (App. Br. 30-31), the arguments presented do not point out
with particularity or explain why the limitations of the dependent claims are
separately patentable. Instead, Appellant merely asserts patentability of
claim 54 for the same reasons advanced with respect to independent claim
53, quotes the additional limitation recited by dependent claim 54, states that
Appellant traverses the Examiner's findings, and summarily alleges
patentability of dependent claim 54 because "Innes, the Admitted Prior Art,
and Bevan, or any combination of them, do not appear to teach the elements
as described with relation to all other elements of this and the parent claim."
(App. Br. 30-31.) Because Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the
Examiner's prima facie case of obviousness for dependent claim 54 based on
the teachings of Innes, the APA, and Bevan, we will sustain the rejection of
claim 54 for the reasons discussed with respect to claim 53.
With respect to dependent claim 55, the Examiner found that Innes
discloses a calculator unit (PLC 38) not located within the three base
stations. (Ans. 14-15.) Appellant argues that this finding "seems to directly
contradict the Examiner's earlier assertion that equated PLC 38 with a
distance unit associated with a base station." (App. Br. 31.) We do not
agree.
Innes teaches that the PLC 38 may be integrated with or separate from
the base station (BTS 26). (FF 3.) Either way, the PLC 38 may be
considered "associated with" the base station. The Specification does not
provide any special definition for the claim term "associated with." The
pertinent plain meaning of "associated" is "to join together; connect."
Webster's New World Dictionary Third College Edition 83 (1994). The
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PLC 38 is electrically connected to, and therefore associated with, the base
station (BTS 26) whether it is physically located within the base station or
not. Therefore, we see no contradiction in the Examiner's findings.
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has not shown the Examiner
erred in rejecting claim 55 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

Independent Claim 56
Appellant nominally argues the rejection of independent claim 56
separately. (App. Br. 31-32.) However, Appellant merely asserts
patentability of claim 56 for the same reasons advanced with respect to
independent claim 53. (App. Br. 31-32.) Therefore, we will sustain the
rejection of claim 56 for the reasons discussed with respect to claim 53.

Dependent Claims 57-60
Although Appellant nominally argues the rejection of each of
dependent claims 57-58 separately (App. Br. 32-33), the arguments
presented do not point out with particularity or explain why the limitations
of the dependent claims are separately patentable. Instead, Appellant merely
asserts patentability of the claims for the same reasons advanced with
respect to independent claim 56, quotes the additional limitation(s) recited
by each dependent claim, states that Appellant traverses the Examiner's
findings, and summarily alleges patentability of the dependent claims
because "Innes, the Admitted Prior Art, and Bevan, or any combination of
them, do not appear to teach the elements as described with relation to all
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other elements of this and the parent claim."6 (App. Br. 32-33.) Because
Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the Examiner's prima facie case of
obviousness for dependent claims 57-58 based on the teachings of Innes, the
APA, and Bevan, we will sustain the rejection of claims 57-58 for the
reasons discussed with respect to claim 56.
With respect to dependent claim 59, Appellant presents essentially the
same argument as presented with respect to claim 56. (App. Br. 33.)
However, Appellant's argument is not commensurate with the scope of claim
59. Claim 59 does not require a separate calculator unit, separate from the
three base stations, that is capable of calculating a location of the mobile
station. Instead, claim 59 merely requires the distance unit be capable of
calculating a location of the mobile station. As the Examiner correctly
found, Innes teaches this limitation. (Ans. 14; FF 3.)
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has not shown the Examiner
erred in rejecting claim 59 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
With respect to dependent claim 60, Appellant presents essentially the
same argument as presented with respect to claim 56. (App. Br. 33.) We
reject this argument for the same reasons discussed with respect to claim 56.
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant has not shown the Examiner
erred in rejecting claim 60 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

CONCLUSION OF LAW
Based on the findings of facts and analysis above, we conclude that
Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 31-60.

6 We note that the quoted language in the argument for claim 58 has a
typographical error because the word "appear" has been omitted. (App.
Br. 33.)
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DECISION
The rejection of claims 31-60 for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103
is affirmed.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

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AFFIRMED

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