Ex Parte Rainisto

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 10, 2013

11284695 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 10, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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Ex parte ROOPE RAINISTO
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Appeal 2011-003403
Application 11/284,6951
Technology Center 2600
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Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, KRISTEN L. DROESCH, and
JUSTIN BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judges.

THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 The real party in interest is Nokia Corporation.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4-9, 11-16, and 18-21, which
are all the claims remaining in the application. Claims 3, 10, and 17 are
cancelled. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
The present invention relates generally to “facilitating user input using
a touch sensitive display.” See Spec., 1:6-7.
Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A method comprising:
receiving an indication of a touch on a touch sensitive
display within an input text field,
determining, via a processor and in response to receiving
the indication of the touch within the input text field, a type of
implement having provided the sensed touch on the touch
sensitive display, said type of implement being one of at least a
blunt type or a pointed type, and
depending on the determined type of implement,
facilitating displaying of a first keyboard for text entry into the
input text field, the first keyboard having a first spatial
configuration when the determined type of implement is the
pointed type or facilitating displaying of a second keyboard for
text entry into the input text field, the second keyboard having a
second spatial configuration when the determined type of
implement is the blunt type;
wherein the first and second spatial configurations
correspond to respective first and second spatial distributions of
keys of the first and second keyboards.

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Appellant appeals the following rejections:2

R1. Claims 1, 2, 4, 6-9, 11, 13-16, and 18-21 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tanaka (US 6,611,258 B1, Aug.
26, 2003) and Ribak (US Patent Appl. Pub. No. 2002/0118176 A1, Aug. 29,
2002); and
R2. Claims 5 and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Tanaka, Ribak, and Kennedy (US Patent Appl. Pub.
2002/0080123 A1, June 27, 2002).

Claim Groupings
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief, we will decide
the appeal on the basis of claims as set forth below. See 37 C.F.R.
41.37(c)(1)(iv).

ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 2, 4-9, 11-16, and 18-21
Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combined teachings of
Tanaka and Ribak teaches and/or suggests “facilitating displaying of a first
keyboard” and “first and second spatial distribution of keys,” as set forth in
claim 1?

2 The Examiner rejects claims 7 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
Tanaka and Ribak, but does not mention Kennedy (Ans. 4); however, claims
7 and 14 are dependent on claims 5 and 12, respectively, which the
Examiner rejects over Tanaka, Ribak, and Kennedy (Ans. 10). We,
therefore, include Kennedy in the rejection of claims 7 and 14 and hold the
Examiner’s omission of Kennedy to be harmless error.
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Appellant contends:
This result arises because Ribak teaches away from the claimed
invention . . . . [O]ne of [ordinary] skill in the art would not be
inclined to utilize the stylus implemented soft keyboard indicated in
the background section of Ribak, because upon review of the entirety
of Ribak, the person of ordinary skill would be discouraged from
implementing such a slow, relatively inaccurate, and ineffective
substitute for typing.
(App. Br. 6).
The Examiner found that Ribak discloses that “it is old and well
known in the art to use a stylus with either a character recognition software
or with a ‘soft’ keyboard” (Ans. 12). The Examiner further concluded that
Ribak does not teach away from the claimed invention because Ribak is
merely being used to teach facilitating displaying of a soft keyboard when a
pointed type implement is being used and “Appellant’s claimed invention
does not claim that the first keyboard is not slow, not relatively inaccurate
and an [in]effective substitute for typing” (id.). We agree with the
Examiner.
We refer to, rely on, and adopt the Examiner’s findings and
conclusions set forth in the Answer (Ans. 11-18). Our discussions here will
be limited to the following points of emphasis.
Here, Ribak is merely being used to show that it is well known to
facilitate displaying of a soft keyboard (i.e., a first keyboard) when using a
stylus (i.e., pointed-type implement) (see ¶ [0005]). “A reference may be
said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the
reference, ...would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was
taken by the app[ellant].” In re Haruna, 249 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (quoting Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Michigan Inc., 192 F.3d 1353,
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1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). We do not find this to be the situation before this
Board. We find that a stylus configuration being noted as less effective than
typing does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the use of the
claimed invention. In fact, a stylus being noted as “relatively inaccurate”
(see Ribak ¶ [0005]) bolsters the need for the claimed “spatial distributions
of keys.” Thus, Ribak’s teaching is not a teaching away.
Appellant further contends that “[t]he cited combination provides no
clear indication that the keyboard taken from the background of Ribak
would have a different spatial configuration and distribution from the
keyboard of Figure 4B of Tanaka” (App. Br. 8)(emphasis added).
The Examiner found that “the claim is not claiming that the first
spatial configuration or distribution is different, larger, smaller[,] or the same
as the second configuration or distribution” (Ans. 17). We agree with the
Examiner.
Stated differently, the claimed invention merely requires a first and
second spatial distribution of keys without specifying how they may or may
not differ. The Examiner correctly pointed out that Tanaka’s keyboard (Fig.
4B) necessarily has a spatial configuration and distribution and that Ribak’s
soft keyboard also necessarily or inherently must have a type of spatial
configuration and distribution (see Ans. 17). We agree with the Examiner.
All that is required is that we have a first and second keyboard with first and
second spatial distribution of keys and the combination of Tanaka and Ribak
discloses this feature. There is no requirement in claim 1 that the spatial
distribution be different, as argued by Appellant. While we interpret claims
broadly but reasonably in light of the Specification, we nonetheless must not
import limitations from the Specification into the claims. See Phillips v.
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AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations
omitted). “Giving claims their broadest reasonable construction ‘serves the
public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, finally allowed, will
be given broader scope than is justified.’” In re Amer. Acad. of Sci. Tech
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). “Construing
claims broadly during prosecution is not unfair to the app[ellant] . . . because
the app[ellant] has the opportunity to amend the claims to obtain more
precise claim coverage.” Id. (citation omitted).
In view of the above discussion, since Appellant has not demonstrated
that the Examiner erred in finding the argued limitations in the combined
disclosure of Tanaka and Ribak, the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection
of representative independent claim 1, as well as claims 2, 4-9, 11-16, and
18-21 not separately argued by Appellant, is sustained.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s § 103 rejections of claims 1, 2, 4-9, 11-16,
and 18-21.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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