Ex Parte Qiu et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 2, 2017

13937956 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 2, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/937,956 07/09/2013 Tiequn Qiu H0038761-5704 4709
89953 7590
HONEYWELL/FOGG
Patent Services
115 Tabor Road
P.O. Box 377
MORRIS PLAINS, NJ 07950
11/06/2017 EXAMINER
AHMED, JAMIL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2886
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/06/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentservices-us @ honey well, com
docket@fogglaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte TIEQUN QIU, GLEN A. SANDERS, and LEE K. STRANDJORD
(Applicant: Honeywell International Inc.)
Appeal 2016-007220
Application 13/937,956
Technology Center 2800
Before KAREN M. HASTINGS, DONNA M. PRAISS, and
CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN, Administrative Patent Judges.
HASTINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
Hughes (US 2007/0242276 Al; Oct. 18, 2007) in view of Antos (US
5,361,319; Nov. 1, 1994).
We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 The real party in interest is Honeywell International Inc.
Appeal 2016-007220
Application 13/937,956
Independent claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal
(emphasis added to highlight key limitation in dispute):
1. A resonator fiber optic gyroscope (RFOG) comprising:
a resonator including:
a fiber coil; and
one or more coupling devices configured to direct a
portion of light from a first end of the fiber coil into a
second end of the fiber coil and a portion of light from the second end
of the fiber coil into the first end of the fiber coil;
one or more light sources coupled to the resonator and
configured to produce at least two light beams for input into the
fiber coil, the at least two light beams including a first light beam at a
first frequency and a second light beam at a second frequency, the first
and second frequencies locked to nearby resonance modes of the
resonator; and
resonance tracking electronics coupled to the resonator and
configured to process output light from the resonator and generate a
signal therefrom, the signal indicative of a rotation rate of the resonator;
wherein the fiber coil has approximately zero total accumulated
chromatic dispersion at the first frequency and the second frequency of
the first light beam and the second light beam.
Appellants’ arguments focus on claim 1, and do not separately argue
any other claim (Appeal Br. 11 (“the arguments set forth with respect to
Claim 1 apply to these claims [2—20] as well”)). Accordingly, we select
claim 1 as representative.
ANALYSIS
Upon consideration of the evidence on this record and each of
Appellants’ contentions, we find that the preponderance of evidence
supports the Examiner’s conclusion that the subject matter of Appellants’
claims is unpatentable over the applied prior art. We sustain the Examiner’s
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Appeal 2016-007220
Application 13/937,956
§ 103 rejection essentially for the reasons set out by the Examiner in the
Answer.
We add the following primarily for emphasis.
It has been established that “the [obviousness] analysis need not seek
out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged
claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR Int 7 Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Likewise, it is also well settled that a
reference stands for all of the specific teachings thereof as well as the
inferences one of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably been
expected to draw therefrom. See In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264—65 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
Appellants’ principal argument is that there is no apparent reason to
combine the references, because Hughes “does not discuss or imply any
reason to utilize a fiber coil that has approximately zero total accumulated
chromatic dispersion” (Appeal Br. 7—8), and Antos only discusses the
benefit of such a fiber for equalizing dispersion of signal pulses, not
continuous waves as used in the RFOG of Hughes (e.g., Appeal Br. 8—10;
Reply Br. generally). Appellants also contend that the proposed rejection is
based upon “improper hindsight” (Reply Br. 7).
Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive of reversible error. The
Examiner points out that, contrary to the Appellants’ position, Antos does
encompass use of sinusoidal waveforms which are continuous wave signals
(Ans. 8—11; Reply Br. 6 (“[Appellants agree] that a sinusoidal wave signal is
a continuous signal” but contend Antos does not discuss same.)). The
Examiner also points out that Antos discusses that chromatic dispersion is a
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Appeal 2016-007220
Application 13/937,956
problem even in systems with a very narrow wavelength range (Ans. 6;
Antos col. 1,11. 30-42). Thus, even assuming arguendo that Antos does not
explicitly discuss continuous wave signals, one of ordinary skill in the art
would have readily appreciated and inferred from Antos that an optical fiber
that has approximately zero chromatic dispersion would have been useful in
an application involving the use of an optical transmission fiber such as that
used in the RFOG of Hughes (see, e.g., Antos Abstract; Ans. generally).
Indeed, Appellants admit that in their invention, the fiber coil may be “a
dispersion shifted fiber (DSF) used in the communication industry” (Spec.
125 (“[a]n optical fiber having such properties [approximately zero total
accumulated chromatic dispersion] can be a dispersion shifted fiber”)).2
Thus, the use of this improved optical fiber as exemplified by Antos
in the optical fiber coil of Hughes would have been prima facie obvious, as
the predictable use of a prior art element for its known function is ordinarily
prima facie obvious. The rejection is not based upon a bodily incorporation
of Antos into Hughes. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)
(“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary
reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary
reference .... Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the
references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”)
(citations omitted); In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973)
2 An applicant cannot defeat an obviousness rejection by asserting that the
cited references fail to teach or suggest elements which the applicant has
acknowledged are taught by the prior art. Constant v. Advanced Micro-
Devices, Inc., 848 F. 2d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Nomiya, 509 F.2d
566, 571 n.5 (CCPA 1975) (A statement by an applicant that certain matter
is prior art is an admission that the matter is prior art for all purposes.).
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Appeal 2016-007220
Application 13/937,956
(“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to
combine their specific structures.”).
Further, Appellants have not asserted that the proposed modification
of Hughes would have been beyond the capabilities of a person of ordinary
skill in the art. Absent such an assertion, we “take account of the inferences
and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ,”
and find a person of ordinary skill in the art would have overcome those
difficulties within their level of skill. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; see also id. at
421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not
an automaton.”); Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited
Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (under the flexible inquiry
set forth by the Supreme Court, the PTO must take account of the
“inferences and creative steps, ” as well as routine steps, that an ordinary
artisan would employ).
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s prior art rejection of the
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the reasons given above and presented
by the Examiner.
DECISION
The Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims 1—20 is affirmed.
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).
AFFIRMED
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