Ex parte QIN

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Nov 30, 2000

08105899 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 30, 2000)

Concurrent with the filing of the brief, appellant filed an1
amendment canceling claim 19 (Paper No. 11, filed April 10, 1996). The
amendment has been entered by the examiner (answer, page 2). In addition, the
examiner (brief, pages 1 and 2) has withdrawn the rejection of claims 12 and
13. Accordingly, claims 1-11 and 14-18 remain before us for decision on
appeal.
The opinion in support of the decision being entered today was not written for
publication and is not binding precedent of the Board.
Paper No. 16
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________
Ex parte S. JOE QIN
____________
Appeal No. 1997-1111
Application No. 08/105,899
____________
ON BRIEF
____________
Before THOMAS, RUGGIERO, and LEVY, Administrative Patent Judges.
LEVY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from
the examiner's final rejection of claims 1-19 , which are all1
of the claims pending in this application.
Appeal No. 1997-1111
Application No. 08/105,899

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Application No. 08/105,899
BACKGROUND
The appellant's invention relates to a method and
apparatus for fuzzy logic control with automatic tuning. An
understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading
of exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced as follows:
1. A method of automatically tuning a fuzzy logic
controller used to control a process in a predetermined
manner, said process producing at least one process variable
and having at least one control action input connected to said
fuzzy logic controller, said method comprising:
determining from said process a plurality of dynamic
process
characteristics for tuning a proportional integral
derivative controller;
calculating fuzzy control parameters as functions of said
dynamic process characteristics for tuning said
fuzzy logic controller; and
tuning said fuzzy logic controller using said fuzzy
control
parameters for controlling the process.
The prior art references of record relied upon by the
examiner in rejecting the appealed claims are:
Hägglund et al. (Hägglund) 4,549,123 Oct. 22,
1985
Kraus 4,602,326 Jul. 22,
1986
Mega et al. (Mega) 5,231,335 Jul. 27,
1993
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Application No. 08/105,899
Ueda 5,241,651 Aug. 31,
1993
(§ 102(e) date Nov. 23, 1990)
Ying et al., "Fuzzy Control Theory: A Nonlinear Case",
Automatica, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1990), pp 513-520.
Claims 1, 9, 10 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as being unpatentable over Mega.
Claims 1, 9, 10 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as being unpatentable over Ueda.
Claims 2-5, 8 and 15-17 stand rejected over 35 U.S.C. §
103 as unpatentable over Mega in view of Hägglund.
Claims 2-5, 8 and 15-17 stand rejected over 35 U.S.C. §
103 as unpatentable over Ueda in view of Hägglund.
Claims 6 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Mega.
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Mega in view of Kraus.
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Ueda in view of Kraus.
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Application No. 08/105,899
Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Ueda in view of Ying.
Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Mega in view of Ying.
Rather than reiterate the conflicting viewpoints advanced
by the examiner and the appellant regarding the above-noted
rejections, we make reference to the examiner's answer (Paper
No. 13, mailed July 19, 1996) for the examiner's complete
reasoning in support of the rejections, and to the appellant's
brief (Paper No. 12, filed April 10, 1996) and reply brief
(Paper No. 14, filed September 23, 1996) for the appellant's
arguments thereagainst. Only those arguments actually made by
the appellant have been considered in this decision.
Arguments which the appellant could have made but chose not to
make in the briefs have not been considered. See 37 CFR
1.192(a).
OPINION
In reaching our decision in this appeal, we have
carefully considered the subject matter on appeal, the
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rejections advanced by the examiner, and the evidence of
anticipation and obviousness relied upon by the examiner as
support for the rejections. We have, likewise, reviewed and
taken into consideration, in reaching our decision, the
appellant’s arguments set forth in the briefs along with the
examiner's rationale in support of the rejections and
arguments in rebuttal set forth in the examiner's answer. As
a consequence of our review, we make the determinations which
follow.
We begin with the rejection of claims 1, 9, 10 and 14
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as unpatentable over Mega.
A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as
set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or
inherently described, in a single prior art reference.
Verdegaal Bros. Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2
USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
The examiner’s position (answer, pages 3 and 4) is that
As per claims 1 and 14, appellant’s determining step
is taught by Mega’s disclosure that the difference
(A-B), the integral value of the difference and the
differential value of the difference are calculated
(see column 5, lines 10-16). These are characteristic
of values normally used for tuning PID controllers.
The appellant’s calculation step and tuning step are
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Application No. 08/105,899
taught by the input of these value [sic] into the
fuzzy inference portion 51. Membership values are
obtained by calculation through fuzzy MIN and MAX
arithmetic operations.
Appellant asserts (brief, page 7), inter alia, that Mega
does not teach or suggest calculating fuzzy control parameters
for tuning the fuzzy logic controller, and that (reply brief,
page 2) “[n]owhere does Mega tune the fuzzy logic controller
using fuzzy control parameters.” We agree. We find that in
Mega (col. 4, line 40 et seq.), the inputs I , I and I to the1 2 3
fuzzy inference portion 51 are the differences between the
deviation signals (A-B), the integral value of the difference
(A-B), and the differential value of the differences (A-B),
respectively. However, we find that the input of the values
I , I and I into the fuzzy inference portion, and the1 2 3
subsequent calculation of membership values do not tune the
fuzzy inference unit as required by independent claims 1 and
14. We find that Mega discloses (col. 4, line 64 - col. 5,
line 28) that the values I , I and I are input into three1 2 3
membership value arithmetic circuits 55, which read out
membership functions stored in antecedent membership function
memory 56, and obtain membership values by calculating through
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fuzzy MIN arithmetic operations, which results in the output
of membership values to fuzzy output arithmetic circuit 57.
The fuzzy inference circuit is based on a rule format (col. 4,
lines 52 and 53). Rules R1-R10 (col. 5, lines 1-10) utilize
an IF-Then format. Fuzzy output arithmetic circuit 57 reads
out rules R1-R10 stored in rule memory 58 and membership
functions stored in a consequent membership function memory
59. Fuzzy arithmetic output circuit 57 then obtains fuzzy
output K through a fuzzy max arithmetic operation. 1
From our review of Mega, we find no tuning of the fuzzy
inference circuit, and are in agreement with appellant (reply
brief, page 2) that “careful inspection of the Mega reference
indicates that these values do not tune the fuzzy controller,
but rather are simply the inputs that determine the outputs of
the fuzzy logic controller.” We therefore find that Mega does
not anticipate claim 1. With regard to claim 14, we
additionally find that Mega does not disclose the claimed
“tuning module.” Accordingly, the rejection of claims 1 and
14 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as unpatentable over Mega is
reversed. As claims 9 and 10 depend from claim 1, the
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rejection of claims 9 and 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as
unpatentable over Mega is also reversed.
With regard to the rejection of claims 2-5, 8 and 15-17
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Mega in view of
Hägglund, we have also reviewed the Hägglund reference but
find nothing therein which makes up for the deficiencies of
Mega as discussed above. Accordingly, the examiner's
rejection of claims 2-5, 8 and 15-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Mega in view of Hägglund is reversed.
With regard to the rejection of claims 6 and 18 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Mega in view of the
admitted prior art found on page 8 of the specification, as
these claims depend from claims 1 and 14 respectively, the
rejection of claims 6 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is
reversed.
With regard to the rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Mega in view of Kraus, we have also
reviewed the Kraus reference but find nothing therein which
makes up for the deficiencies of Mega as discussed above.
Accordingly, the examiner's rejection of claim 7 under 35
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U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Mega in view of Kraus is
reversed.
With regard to the rejection of claim 11 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Mega in view of Ying, we have also
reviewed the Ying reference but find nothing therein which
makes up for the deficiencies of Mega as discussed above.
Accordingly, the rejection of claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over Mega in view of Ying is reversed.
Turning next to the rejection of claims 1, 9, 10 and 14
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as unpatentable over Ueda, the
examiner‘s position (answer, page 4) is that
As per claims 1 and 14, the appellant’s determining
step is taught by the determination of K1, K2 and
K3 disclosed in figure 8 and column 5. The appellant’s
calculation and tuning steps are taught by Ueda’s
deciding all membership functions which are set
in the inference unit 11 (see figure 7).
Appellant asserts (brief, page 9) that the values K1, K2, and
K3 do not appear to be dynamic characteristics. We agree.
However, from our review of Ueda, we find that Ueda discloses
determining from the process a plurality of dynamic process
characteristics for tuning the fuzzy logic controller. Ueda
discloses (col. 5, lines 29-32 and 51-53) that from the
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manipulated variable U and the controlled variable Y, the
process characteristics of maximum slope R, dead time L, and
steady gain K are measured. Appellant asserts (brief, page 9)
that in appellant’s invention, the determining step is
determined, for example, based on values relating to an
amplitude and period of an input waveform. According to
appellant (id.) “the determining steps of the processes
differ, and Ueda does not meet the claim limitations of the
present invention.”
As stated by the court in In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d
1362, 1369, 47 USPQ2d 1523, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1998) “[t]he name
of the game is the claim.” Claims will be given their
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the
specification, and limitations appearing in the specification
are not to be read into the claims. In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852,
858, 225 USPQ 1, 5 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Neither claim 1 nor
claim 14 recite determining dynamic process characteristics
based on the amplitude and period of an input waveform.
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We construe appellant’s statement to refer to the values R, K, and L;2
see page 9 of the brief.
Both appellant and the examiner refer to the tuning parameters K , K ,3 1 2
and K as K1, K2, and K3. For the accuracy of the record, we shall refer to3
the tuning parameters in the manner set forth by Ueda.
Appellant further asserts (brief, page 10) that the
“values of a maximum slope, R, [sic ] and dead time L . . . .2
do not appear to be dynamic process characteristics of a PID
controller.” We find that Ueda (col. 5, lines 31-33)
specifically refers to R, L, and K as “characteristics of the
process.” In addition, we find that the plurality of process
variables R, L, and K to be dynamic in view of the disclosure
of Ueda (col. 5, lines 34-44) that the tuning parameters K ,1
K , and K are determined by the following equations:2 33
K =C ·R·L; K =C ·R, and K =C ·K where C , C , and C are constants1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3
which do not change regardless of the process. In addition,
Ueda discloses (col. 5, lines 62 et seq.) that when the tuning
factors K , K , and K are decided, all of the membership1 2 3
functions which are set in the fuzzy inference unit 11 are
corrected in dependence upon the K , K , and K decided, and1 2 3
that since the parameters K , K , and K represent width along1 2 3
the horizontal axis (a fuzzy variable) the peak position and
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slope of each membership function are varied in dependence on
K , K , and K . 1 2 3
Accordingly, we find that Ueda meets the claim limitation
of calculating fuzzy control parameters of said dynamic
process characteristics for tuning said fuzzy logic
controller. In addition, as the fuzzy control parameters K ,1
K , and K are outputted from system identification unit 12 to2 3
fuzzy inference unit 11 as tuning variables for controlling
the process, we find that Ueda meets the claim limitation of
tuning said fuzzy logic controller using fuzzy control
parameters for controlling the process. Accordingly, we find
that Ueda anticipates claim 1. With respect to claim 14, we
additionally find the system identification unit 12 of Ueda to
be a tuning module as the system identification unit 12
measures the dynamic process control characteristics and
calculates the fuzzy control parameters K , K , and K which1 2 3
tune the process. We therefore find that Ueda anticipates
claim 14.
Turning now to claims 9 and 10, the examiner’s position
(answer, page 4) is that “[a]s per claims 9 and 10 the
appellant’s scaling factors and specifically error scaling
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factor, change in control scaling factor and change in control
action scaling factor are anticipated by Ueda’s error (e),
rate of change (delta e) and its rate of change (delta U).
Note how the values are scaled in figures 5a, 5b and 5c.”
Appellant asserts (brief, page 10) that Ueda’s tuning
parameters K , K , and K tune membership functions having1 2 3
values between -K , K , and K and +K , K , and K , whereas1 2 3 1 2 3
appellant’s invention uses values that are scaled to values
between -1 and +1. Appellant further asserts (brief, page 11)
that “[n]owhere does Ueda disclose use of any scaling factors,
and certainly not the specific factors of Appellant’s
invention.”
Claim 9 recites “The method of claim 1, said fuzzy
control parameters including scaling factors for said fuzzy
logic controller.” Claim 10 recites “The method of claim 9,
said scaling factors including control error scaling factor,
change in control error scaling factor, and change in control
action scaling factor.”
We find that Ueda discloses (col. 5, line 67 through col.
6, line 4) “[s]ince the parameters K , K , K represent width1 2 3
along the horizontal axis (a fuzzy variable), the peak
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position and slope of each membership function (where the peak
position of the function ZR is invariable) are varied in
dependence upon K , K , K just as if the horizontal axis were1 2 3
shortened or lengthened.” We additionally find that Figures
4a-4c of Ueda show the tuning factors K , K , and K to be1 2 3
scaled between -K to +K ; -K to +K , and -K to K1 1 2 2 3 3,
respectively. Additionally, we find that the tuning factors
K , K , and K of Ueda, which are scaled between 1 2 3
-K to +K ; -K to +K , and -K to K , respectively, include1 1 2 2 3 3
scaling factors for control error e (Fig. 4a); change in
control error ™e (Fig. 4b), and change in control action ™U
(Fig. 4c). In addition, as stated by the examiner, the values
of e, ™e, and ™U are scaled as shown in Figures 5a, 5b, and
5c. While we are in agreement with appellant that the tuning
factors K , K , and K of Ueda are not scaled to values between1 2 3
-1 and +1, we find that neither claim 9 nor claim 10 recite
the specific ranges of the scaling factors as asserted by
appellant. Accordingly, we will affirm the rejection of
claims 9 and 10 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e).
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Turning now to the rejection of claims 2-5, 8, and 15-17
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Ueda in view of
Hägglund, we will begin with claim 2.
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is
incumbent upon the examiner to establish a factual basis to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See In re Fine,
837 F.2d 1071, 1073, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In
so doing, the examiner is expected to make the factual
determinations set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 17, 148 USPQ 459, 467
(1966), and to provide a reason why one having ordinary skill
in the pertinent art would have been led to modify the prior
art or to combine prior art references to arrive at the
claimed invention. Such reason must stem from some teaching,
suggestion or implication in the prior art as a whole or
knowledge generally available to one having ordinary skill in
the art. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044,
1051, 5 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
825 (1988); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories,
Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 293, 227 USPQ 657, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v.
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Application No. 08/105,899
Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 USPQ 929, 933 (Fed.
Cir. 1984). These showings by the examiner are an essential
part of complying with the burden of presenting a prima facie
case of obviousness. Note In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445,
24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If that burden is met,
the burden then shifts to the applicant to overcome the prima
facie case with argument and/or evidence. Obviousness is then
determined on the basis of the evidence as a whole. See id.;
In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1039, 228 USPQ 685, 686 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785,
788 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1052,
189 USPQ 143, 147 (CCPA 1976).
The examiner’s position (answer, page 7) is that “Ueda
does not specifically disclose the limitations disclosed by
appellant.” To overcome this deficiency in Ueda, the examiner
relies upon Hägglund. The examiner’s position is that Hägglund
discloses, within a PID tuning system, the use of controlled
self oscillation for tuning a controller. The examiner takes
the position (answer, page 13) that the modification would
have been obvious because both Ueda and Hägglund disclose use
of the Ziegler-Nichols method of tuning. Appellant asserts
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(brief, page 17) that Hägglund does not suggest using a signal
generator with a fuzzy logic controller, and that (reply
brief, page 5) the fact that both Ueda and Hägglund mention
the Ziegler-Nichols method does not suggest the claimed steps
of appellant’s method.
We find that Hägglund discloses the use of a non-linear
circuit to provide a controlled induced oscillation for tuning
a PID. However, in Hägglund (col. 3, lines 5-11) the system
is brought into self oscillation by disconnecting the
integrating and derivative units I and D of the regulator, and
increasing the amplification of the proportional control unit
P, by manually moving adjusting means 9. Hägglund further
discloses (col. 4, lines 39-47) completely disconnecting the
PID controller. In addition, Hägglund discloses (col. 4,
lines 64 and 65) that “[a]lso the I- and D-units can be
connected individually or in combination-also with the P-
unit.” We are in general agreement with the examiner that PID
controllers and fuzzy controllers are both well known in the
art and that the Ziegler-Nichols method of tuning is used in
both PID and fuzzy controllers. However, we find no
suggestion to combine the teachings of Hägglund with Ueda for
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the reasons which follow. In Hägglund (col. 3, lines 12-19),
the amplitude and frequency of the self oscillation are
measured “by means of a measuring unit 10 the system output
variable y. The quantity values resulting from said measuring
are used for calculating the parameters k, T and T which areI D
adjusted by means of the adjusting means 9 , 9 , and 9 of thep i d
control function units P-, I- and D, respectively.” In
addition, in Hägglund (col. 3, lines 10 and 11), the adjusting
means 9 adjusts the amplitude of the proportional controlp
unit P up to a point of self-oscillation.
We find no suggestion of how the system identification
unit of Ueda would have functioned to increase the amplitude
of a
non-linear signal inputted into the fuzzy inference unit 11 up
to a point of self-oscillation, and the examiner has not
provided any convincing line of reasoning in support of such
modification. We therefore find that it would not have been
obvious for the artisan to have combined the teachings of
Hägglund with the teachings of Ueda to arrive at the claimed
invention. Accordingly, the rejection of claim 2 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Ueda in view of Hägglund is
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Application No. 08/105,899
reversed. As claims 3-5 depend from claim 2, the rejection of
claims 3-5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over is
reversed. Turning to claims 15-17, claim 15 contains similar
limitations as claim 2. Claims 16 and 17 depend from claim
15. Accordingly, the rejection of claims 15-17 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 is therefore reversed.
Turning now to claim 8, the examiner‘s position is that
Ueda does not disclose the claimed ultimate gain or ultimate
period. The examiner asserts (answer, pages 6 and 7) that
Hägglund discloses the claimed variables and that “[i]t would
have been obvious to . . . employ Hagglund’s use of the
Ziegler Nichols method as discussed above in claim 2.”
Appellant ASSERTS (brief, pages 15-17)that “Hagglund does not
calculate control parameters for tuning a fuzzy logic
controller. [Appellant’s claim 1 from which claim 8 depends].”
([]original). We note that Hägglund was not applied against
claim 1, and that claim 8 is directed to the inclusion of
ultimate gain and ultimate period in the dynamic process
characteristics. The decision of the examiner to reject claim
8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is affirmed since the appellant has
not challenged this rejection with any reasonable specificity,
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Application No. 08/105,899
thereby allowing claim 8 to fall with claim 1 from which it
depends. See In re Nielson, 816 F.2d 1567, 1572, 2 USPQ2d
1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Turning to the rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over Ueda in view of Kraus, the examiner
acknowledges (answer, page 8) that Ueda does not disclose a
pattern recognition method. To overcome this deficiency of
Ueda, the examiner relies upon Kraus. The examiner’s position
(id.)is that “Kraus, however, discloses a pattern recognizing
self tuning PID controller. Kraus also notes that pattern
recognition is a known technique for controller tuning (see
column 1, lines 30-44).” The examiner concludes (id.) that
“[i]t would have been obvious to .... combine the pattern
recognizing PID controller with Ueda’s . . . .” Appellant
asserts (brief, page 19) that “Kraus does not teach or suggest
use of dynamic process characteristics determined by a pattern
recognition method to tune a fuzzy logic controller.”
Appellant additionally asserts (id.) “[n]or does Ueda teach or
suggest use of a pattern recognition method to tune the fuzzy
logic controller of its system.”
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In the rejection, the examiner has not relied upon Ueda
for a teaching of a pattern recognition system. Nor has the
examiner relied upon Kraus for a teaching of a fuzzy logic
controller.
As to the argued deficiencies of each reference on an
individual basis, we note that nonobviousness cannot be
established by attacking the references individually when the
rejection is predicated upon a combination of prior art
disclosures. See In re Merck & Co. Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097,
231 USPQ 375, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
We find that Ueda discloses (col. 7, lines 12-17) use of
the step response method in system identification. Ueda
notes, (id.) that the identification method is not limited to
this method and that system identification can be carried out
in the same manner by using another method. We find that
Kraus teaches the use of a pattern recognizing self tuning
controller, and teaches (col. 1, lines 33-36) that pattern
recognition is a known technique for manually tuning the
operating parameters of a controller. Kraus further teaches
(col. 8, lines 45-47) that the Ziegler-Nichols ratios are
adjusted based upon the pattern shape of the signal 32. From
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these teachings of Ueda and Kraus, we conclude that one of
ordinary skill in the art would have been taught to have used
a pattern recognition method for determining the dynamic
process characteristics. Accordingly, we will affirm the
rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Ueda in view of Kraus.
Turning to the rejection of claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. §
103 as unpatentable over Ueda in view of Ying, the examiner
states (answer, page 9) that Ueda does not disclose the
claimed critical gain and integral time constant. To overcome
this deficiency in Ueda, the examiner turns to Ying. The
examiner’s position (answer, page 9) is that “Ying discloses
the appellant’s proportional gain and integral gain change
with error and rate (see equation 14)." The examiner
concludes (id.) that “[i]t would have been obvious . . . to
employ such values in the system of Ueda because this allows
for the optimal operation of the fuzzy controller due to
fuzzification and
defuzzification. . . .” Appellant asserts (brief, page 20)
that Ueda does not “teach or suggest the critical gain and
integral time constant as specific values of the dynamic
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process characteristics.” The examiner argues (answer, page
14) that “[a]s disclosed in equation 14 two gain factors are
employed for the purpose of correcting for the fuzzification
and defuzzification routines.” In response (reply brief, page
5) appellants state “[o]n further consideration of Ying,
Appellant agrees with the examiner that Ying discusses gain;
however, Ying does not teach or disclose the integral time
constant required by Appellant’s claim 11.”
We note that appellant’s specification (pages 11 and 16)
refers to dynamic process characteristic K as “proportionalc
gain” and (page 15) as “critical gain.” We agree with
appellant that although Ying discusses gain, Ying is silent as
to integral time constant, as required by claim 11. We find
that Ueda discloses (col. 7, lines 17-20) “[t]he expressions
for determining the parameters K , K also are not limited to1 2
those using R and L. It is possible to determine the
parameters based on other identified values, e.g., time
constant or steady gain.” However, Ueda’s disclosure of
determining parameters based upon time constant is not the
same as providing an integral time constant.
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We note that claims 6 and 18 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as4
unpatentable over Mega in view of appellant’s admitted prior art found on page
8 of the specification. However, in all other claims on appeal, the
(continued...)
The initial burden of establishing that Ueda and Ying
suggest the claim language of “critical gain and integral time
constant” rests with the examiner. We find that the examiner
has failed to establish that the references suggest an
integral time constant. Nor has the examiner advanced a line
of reasoning to establish that either the time constant of
Ueda or the teachings of Ying would have rendered obvious the
claimed integral time constant. The examiner’s statement
(answer, page 9) that providing Ueda with the claimed values
would allow “optimum operation of the controller” is not a
substitute for evidence. Accordingly, the rejection of claim
11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Ueda in view of
Ying is reversed.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, the decision of the examiner to reject
claims 1, 9, 10, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as
unpatentable over Mega is reversed. The decision of the
examiner to reject claims 6 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as4
Appeal No. 1997-1111 Page 26
Application No. 08/105,899
(...continued)4
rejections over Mega (alone or in view of additional prior art) included
parallel rejections over Ueda (alone or in view of additional prior art). The
examiner may wish to consider a rejection of claims 6 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. §
103 as unpatentable over Ueda in view of the admitted prior art found on page
8 of the specification. The examiner may consider Ueda’s teaching that other
methods for determining system identification may be used in a similar manner
(col. 7, lines 11-16), and the teaching of the admitted prior art
(specification, page 8) that “[t]he model matching tuning method is known to
those of skill in this technology.”
unpatentable over Mega is reversed. The decision of the
examiner to reject claims 2-5, 8, and 15-17 under 35 U.S.C. §
103 as unpatentable over Mega in view of Hägglund is reversed.
The decision of the examiner to reject claim 7 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Mega in view of Kraus is reversed.
The decision of the examiner to reject claim 11 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Mega in view of Ying is
reversed. The decision of the examiner to reject claims 1, 9,
10, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as unpatentable over Ueda
is affirmed. The decision of the examiner to reject claims 2-
5, and 15-17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Ueda
in view of Hägglund is reversed. The decision of the examiner
to reject claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Ueda in view of Kraus is affirmed. The decision of the
examiner to reject claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
Appeal No. 1997-1111 Page 27
Application No. 08/105,899
unpatentable over Ueda in view of Hägglund is affirmed. The
decision of the examiner to reject claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. §
103 as unpatentable over Ueda in view of Ying is reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in
connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 CFR
§ 1.136 (a).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
JAMES D. THOMAS )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
) BOARD OF PATENT
JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO ) APPEALS
Administrative Patent Judge ) AND
) INTERFERENCES
)
)
)
STUART S. LEVY )
Administrative Patent Judge )
SL/RWK
Appeal No. 1997-1111 Page 28
Application No. 08/105,899
DAVID D. BAHLER
ARNOLD, WHITE & DURKEE
750 BERING DRIVE
SUITE 400
HOUSTON, TX 77057