Ex Parte ProuxDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJan 26, 201813974515 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 26, 2018) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/974,515 08/23/2013 Denys Proux 20130948USNP-CNDT3039US01 1031 144578 7590 01/26/2018 FAY SHARPE LLP / CONDUENT 1228 Euclid Avenue, 5th Floor The Halle Building Cleveland, OH 44115 EXAMINER WOZNIAK, JAMES S ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2657 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/26/2018 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte DENYS PROUX1 Appeal 2017-002867 Application 13/974,515 Technology Center 2600 Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, AARON W. MOORE, and DAVID J. CUTITTAII, Administrative Patent Judges. THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—20, all the pending claims in the present application. See Claims Appendix. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. The present invention relates generally to speech to text transcription using a knowledge base containing solution descriptions. See Abstract. 1 Appellant names Xerox Corporation as the real party in interest (App. Br. 1). Appeal 2017-002867 Application 13/974,515 Claim 1 is illustrative: 1. A method for speech to text transcription comprising: providing access to a knowledge base containing solution descriptions, each solution description including a textual description of a solution to a respective problem; with a speech to text decoder, generating a preliminary transcription of at least an agent’s part of an audio recording of a dialogue between the agent and a user in which the agent had access to the knowledge base, the generating comprising: identifying a sequence of phonemes based on the agent’s part of the audio recording, and based on the identified sequence of phonemes, generating the preliminary transcription, the preliminary transcription including a sequence of words recognized as corresponding to phonemes in the sequence of phonemes and unrecognized phonemes from the phoneme sequence that are not recognized as corresponding to one of the recognized words; and revising the preliminary transcription, the revising comprising replacement of unrecognized phonemes with at least one word from one of the solution descriptions in the knowledge base, the solution description including words which match words of the sequence of recognized words, wherein at least one of the generating of the preliminary transcription and the revising of the preliminary transcription is performed with a processor. Appellant appeals the following rejections:2 Rl. Claims 1, 2, 5, 7—9, 11, 12, and 15—20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Chen (US 2013/0080177 Al, Mar. 28, 2013), Jeong (US 2007/0185713 Al, Aug. 9, 2007), and Byrd (US 2010/0274618 Al, Oct. 28, 2010) (id. at 7-13); R2. Claims 3 and 6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being 2 The Examiner withdrew the rejection of claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (see Ans. 4). 2 Appeal 2017-002867 Application 13/974,515 unpatentable over Chen, Jeong, Byrd, and Stewart (US 7,437,291 Bl, Oct. 14, 2008) (id. at 13-14); R3. Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Chen, Jeong, Byrd, Stewart, and Kuspa (US 2013/0124984 Al, May 16, 2013) (id. at 14-15); R4. Claim 10 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Chen, Jeong, Byrd, and Duke (US 2008/0082336 Al, Apr. 3, 2008) (id. at 15—16); and R5. Claims 13 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Chen, Jeong, Byrd, and Park (US 2010/0104086 Al, Apr. 29, 2010) (id. at 16). We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). ANALYSIS Rejection under § 103(a) Claims 1, 11—14, and 16—20 Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that Chen, Jeong, and Byrd collectively teaches or suggests based on the identified sequence of phonemes, generating the preliminary transcription, as set forth in claim 1? Appellant contends that “[tjhere is no suggestion in Chen of generating the text 203 from an identified sequence of phonemes” (App. Br. 12), “[tjhere is no suggestion of generating a preliminary transcription” in Jeong (id.), and Byrd “does not mention phonemes” (id.). Appellant further contends that “[ejven assuming that the preliminary transcription of 3 Appeal 2017-002867 Application 13/974,515 Chen were to be generated by phoneme recognition, as the Examiner asserts, there is no suggestion that the preliminary transcription of Chen would also include unrecognized phonemes” (App. Br. 16). In response, the Examiner finds that “Jeong was never relied upon to provide a preliminary transcription. . . . Jeong was described as ‘merely add[ing] the well-known technique ... for generating word candidates using phoneme recognition’” (Ans. 14) and that “[t]he primary reference Chen . . . already shows the generation of a preliminary or ‘initial transcription’ by the use of a speech recognition system which is to be repaired . . . [and] the argued limitation is taught by the combination” {id. at 14—15). The Examiner further finds that “Chen does teach unrecognized phonemes because Chen teaches unrecognized words” {id. at 15). We agree with the Examiner. We refer to, rely on, and adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions set forth in the Answer. Our discussions here will be limited to the following points of emphasis. As an initial matter, we note that Appellant’s arguments do not take into account what the collective teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art and are therefore ineffective to rebut the Examiner’s prima facie case of obviousness. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the stmcture of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”) (citations omitted). This reasoning is 4 Appeal 2017-002867 Application 13/974,515 applicable here because Appellant primarily argues that features are missing from one reference when the Examiner is relying on another reference for such features, e.g., Appellant argues: (1) there is no suggestion of generating a preliminary transcription in Jeong when the Examiner is relying on Chen; and (2) Byrd does not mention phonemes when the Examiner is relying on Jeong. Furthermore, regarding the Examiner’s finding that “some sequences of speech do not map to words that are recognized/knowri’'' (Final Act. 8) and “Chen does teach unrecognized phonemes because Chen teaches unrecognized words” (Ans. 15), Appellant merely contends that “Chen makes no suggestion of there being unrecognized phonemes” (see App. Br. 16) without specifically rebutting the Examiner’s aforementioned findings about “unrecognized words.” In addition, we agree with the Examiner that Appellant’s arguments fail to take into account what the collective teachings of Chen and Jeong would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art (see Ans. 16). Thus, we find Appellant’s arguments unpersuasive. Appellant further contends that “[combining Jeong with Chen would serve merely to provide the preliminary transcript, and would not aid in matching contacts in a database. Thus, there would have been no reason to combine Jeong with Chen” (App. Br. 18). In response, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that the “‘secondary reference Jeong provides the well-known technique of phoneme-based speech recognition which is easily substituted into the teachings of Chen . . . which yields a predictable result of providing the phonemes needed for repair in the speech recognition process’” (Ans. 19). “The combination of familiar elements according to known 5 Appeal 2017-002867 Application 13/974,515 methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results,” KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007), especially if the combination would not be “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art,” Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). The Examiner has found actual teachings in the prior art and has provided a rationale for the combination, i.e., in order to substitute similar elements for achieving predictable results of detecting valid words although also providing a manner in which to acquire the phonemes needed for the phonetic matching of unknown words (see Final Act. 9). Further, we agree with the Examiner that the teachings suggest that the combination involves the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. Accordingly, we find that the Examiner has provided sufficient motivation for modifying Chen with the teachings of Jeong. Finally, Appellant contends that “in Byrd, the knowledge base is not used to transcribe the customer-agent spoken interaction” (App. Br. 19) and “it would not have been obvious to use a database such as Byrd’s to repair the transcript of Chen” (id. at 19—20). In response, the Examiner finds that “Byrd teaches the same type of solution database as is claimed which provides solution descriptions for different problems in customer-agent transcriptions [and] [cjombining Byrd and Chen and Jeong only involves a database substitution and the algorithm used for repair would remain intact” (Ans. 20). We agree with the Examiner that the combined teachings of Chen, Jeong, and Byrd teaches and/or suggests the argued limitation and Appellant’s aforementioned arguments fail to consider the combined teachings. 6 Appeal 2017-002867 Application 13/974,515 Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Appellant’s arguments regarding the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 18 and 20 rely on the same arguments as for claim 1, and Appellant does not argue separate patentability for the dependent claims, except as noted below. We, therefore, also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 11-14, and 16-20. Claims 2 and 3 Appellant contends “Chen does not suggest new words comprising different phonemes . . . and [tjhere is no suggestion that the phonetic matching algorithm of Chen be a fuzzy matching algorithm” (App. Br. 20— 21) and Byrd “does not suggest identifying candidate solution descriptions” (id. at 21). In response, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that “[Ajppellant’s arguments [largely] rely on features which are not claimed” (Ans. 20). For example, claim 2 fails to recite “new words comprising different phonemes” or “fuzzy matching.” Instead, claim 2 recites, inter alia, “identify candidate solution descriptions . . . which are determined to match at least some of the identified words in the preliminary transcription” (see claim 2). For this feature, the Examiner relies upon Chen’s teaching of “matching phoneme transcriptions of an unrecognized initial transcription (e.g., ‘Marc Dick son’). . . where at least some words are in common” (Ans. 21). Appellant’s contentions fail to persuasively rebut such teachings. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2 and 3. 7 Appeal 2017-002867 Application 13/974,515 Claim 4 Appellant contends “Kuspa also does not suggest that a gap between words be limited to a threshold size. Rather, Kuspa uses the Levenshtein Word Edit Distance algorithm, which is the minimum number of single character edits” (App. Br. 21—22). In response, the Examiner finds that Kuspa teaches that “a generated transcript from speech must be within a certain number of edits of a database transcription. . . . Chen also teaches a matching based algorithm .... Thus, words would not be considered to match if too many missing additions were required or a gap is too large” (Ans. 21—22). The Examiner further finds, and we agree, that “the claims do not specify how the so called ‘threshold size’ is actually measured (e.g., in words, phonemes, etc.) [and] under the broadest reasonable interpretation” claim 4 reads on the combined teachings of Kuspa and Chen {id. at 22). Claim 4 merely recites “wherein the gap between the matching pair of words in the solution description is permitted to be no more than a threshold size” {see claim 4). We agree with the Examiner that the claimed “gap” and “threshold size” are not limited in the claim to any particular metric, so the metric could be a distance (Ans. 22). Appellant fails to demonstrate that “gap” and “threshold size” have been described in Appellant’s Specification in a way that is inconsistent with the Examiner’s interpretation. Thus, we find unpersuasive Appellant’s contention that claim 4 does not read on the combined Kuspa’s word edit distance and Chen’s matching algorithm. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 4. 8 Appeal 2017-002867 Application 13/974,515 Claim 5 Appellant contends “there is no suggestion of using a matching pair of words in a solution database to identify an unrecognized phoneme. Rather, Chen’s algorithm looks for words with matching phonemes” (App. Br. 22). In response, the Examiner directs our attention to “the specific example provided by Chen in which a database entry ‘Marc Dickinson’ is spaced by at least one unrecognized phoneme ‘in’ . . . (e.g., ‘Marc Dick son’)” (Ans. 22; see also Chen | 66). We agree with the Examiner that Chen would require some ‘threshold degree of phonetic matching/similarity’” otherwise “the entire database contents would match the phonemes of the initial transcription” (id.). Further, Chen teaches that “[ijnstead of telling the user that the assistant cannot complete the operation because it cannot find ‘Mark Dick son’ in the database, speech repair can . . . use a fuzzy-matching algorithm to generate a more plausible alternative transcription” (| 66). Thus, Chen clearly considers phonetic matching of unrecognized words. The Examiner further finds Jeong is used to teach phoneme-based speech recognition which is combinable with the teachings of Chen for generating word candidates using phoneme recognition ((Ans. 19). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 5. Claim 6 Appellant contends “Chen does not suggest relying on an inherent threshold to differentiate matches from non-matches between phonemes. . . . Chen uses fuzzy matching for text, but not for phonemes” (App. Br. 23). In response, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that “these arguments are [] focused on the teachings of Chen rather than the language actually featured 9 Appeal 2017-002867 Application 13/974,515 in [claim 6] . . . [and] Chen uses phonetic matching to determine a database match for an unrecognized word” as discussed regarding claim 5 (Ans. 23). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6. Claim 7 Appellant contends “Chen does not suggest associating text sequences of solution descriptions in a knowledge base with respective sequences of phonemes” (App. Br. 24). In response, the Examiner correctly points out that Appellant is again arguing the references separately and fails to consider the combined teachings, i.e., “piecemeal analysis” (see Ans. 23). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 7. Claims 8—10 Appellant contends “the Examiner fails to particularly point out where in Chen, Jeong, and/or Byrd there is any suggestion of retrieving an identifier . . . [and] [t]he cited paragraphs make no suggestion of retrieving phoneme sequences for a cluster of words associated in memory with the solution identifier” (App. Br. 25). In response, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that Appellant’s “argument amounts to a general allegation of patentability since it does not explain how/why the combined prior art of record fails to teach the argued limitations . . . Byrd teaches a cluster . . . [and] [t]hese stored text clusters may be identified with a number of different identifiers . . . Chen provides the remaining processing directed to phoneme matching” (Ans. 24). Here, Appellant merely argues that neither reference teaches or suggests the above-noted limitations without providing any meaningful analysis that explains why the Examiner erred (App. Br. 25), A statement 10 Appeal 2017-002867 Application 13/974,515 which merely points out what a claim recites will not he considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(vii). We note that arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. Therefore, Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 8—10. Claim 15 Appellant contends that in Byrd “[tjhere is no reference here to phonemes being drawn from a finite alphabet” (App. Br. 27). In response, the Examiner finds that “[i]t is a basic fact that human languages are known to comprise a certain finite set of sounds with some languages possessing certain sounds while other do not. ... It is noted that there is no natural language having an infinite alphabet. . . [because there is an] inherently finite set [of] sound sets” (Ans. 25). In other words, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that each language has a finite alphabet pertaining thereto, therefore, the combined teachings of Chen, Jeong, and Byrd would teach the limitations of claim 15. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 15. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejections Rl—R5. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 11 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation