Ex Parte Protopapas

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 10, 2017

14045024 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 10, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/045,024 10/03/2013 Maria Eugenia Protopapas 83395310 5084
28395 7590 03/14/2017
RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET EXAMINER
1000 TOWN CENTER CASILLASHERNANDEZ, OMAR
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/14/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MARIA EUGENIA PROTOPAP AS
Appeal 2016-007755
Application 14/045,024
Technology Center 2600
Before HUNG H. BUI, BETH Z. SHAW, and
JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judges.
SHAW, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—20, which are the only claims currently pending
in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
INVENTION
The invention is for a user authentication process for a vehicle. Spec.
117-8.
Claim 1, which is illustrative, reads as follows, with disputed
limitations emphasized:
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
authenticating a user using an extra-vehicular
authentication process;
Appeal 2016-007755
Application 14/045,024
authenticating the user using an intra-vehicular
authentication process;
if either authentication fails to authenticate the user,
providing an intra-vehicular override process;
if both initial authentications succeed or if the override
process succeeds, providing full vehicle drivability; and
if either authentication fails to authenticate the user and
if the override process fails to authenticate the user, limiting
vehicle drivability.
RELATED APPEALS
Appellant identifies the following related appeals: U.S. Patent
Application No. 13/278,270 (Appeal No. 2015-03347) and U.S. Patent
Application No. 14/045,031 (Appeal No. 2015-03714). See App. Br. 3.
REJECTIONS AT ISSUE
(1) The Examiner rejected claims 15—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b),
second paragraph, as being indefinite. Final Act. 2—3.1
(2) The Examiner rejected claims 1—3, 5—10, 12—17, 19, and 20
under35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Anzai et al. (US
6,271,745) in view of Berstis (US 6,198,996). Final Act. 4—8.
(3) The Examiner rejected claims 4, 11, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. §
103 as being unpatentable over Anzai, Berstis, and Breed (US
2002/0198632). Final Act. 8-9.
1 In an Advisory Action dated June 17, 2016, the Examiner withdrew the
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), second paragraph based on Appellants
Amendment After Final.
2
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Application 14/045,024
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejections are in error. App. Br.
6—8; Reply Br. 2-4. We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments in the Briefs,
the Examiner’s rejection, and the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s
arguments. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth in the
rejection from which this appeal is taken and in the Examiner’s Answer in
response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. See Ans. 2-4, Final Act. 2—9. We
add the following primarily for emphasis.
Claim 1 recites an authentication method including, inter alia: (1) “if
either authentication fails to authenticate the user, providing an intra-
vehicular override process,” and (2) “if either authentication fails to
authenticate the user and if the override process fails to authenticate the user,
limiting vehicle functionality.”
The Examiner maps the recited limitation (1) “if either authentication
fails to authenticate the user, providing an intra-vehicular override process”
to Berstis’s description of authenticating a user with a master user ID
number if a smart card process fails to authenticate the user. Final Act. 5
(citing Berstis, Fig. 11). The Examiner also maps the recited limitation (2)
“if either authentication fails to authenticate the user and if the override
process fails to authenticate the user, limiting vehicle functionality” to
Berstis’s disclosure of an authentication process, which if it fails to
authenticate the user, limits the driving capabilities of the user. Ans. 3^4
(citing Berstis, Fig. 11, 17:7—17, 31—40, 14:52—53). In particular, Berstis
describes prohibiting a user who has been convicted of certain conduct from
using a vehicle in that manner, for example by limiting a maximum speed.
Id. at 17:31—40. Specifically, Berstis describes:
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Application 14/045,024
Therefore, a user who has been convicted of certain conduct
involving the operation of a vehicle could be prohibited from
using a vehicle in that manner via settings of user specific
preferences that regulate that conduct. One example is a user
who has been convicted of driving at excessive speed. In order
to prohibit this user from operating the vehicle at excessive
speeds, the administrator or other user having a sufficiently
high security level limits that user's vehicle maximum speed
preference.
Id.
Appellant acknowledges that (1) “Berstis teaches input of an
authorization code if a smart-card is not present or fails” (2) “the
authorization code can identity a user as a mater user or a non-master user.”
App. Br. 6. However, Appellant argues that, in either case, there is no
“limiting” of drivability. Id.
We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Berstis teaches or suggests
the recited “limiting vehicle functionality” if the user is not authenticated
because Berstis describes examples of when the master user is not
authenticated, then limited driving capabilities, such as parameters set by the
master, can be triggered. Berstis, 18:28—36. Additionally, we agree with the
Examiner’s finding that Berstis describes a specific example of where a user
who has been convicted of certain conduct (e.g., speeding) involving the
operation of the vehicle could be prohibited from that using the vehicle in
that manner (e.g., by limiting maximum speed). Berstis, 17:31—40. As the
Examiner explains, and we agree, if the master user could get full driving
capabilities and change parameters if authenticated as a master, yet in the
case where the master user is not authenticated but instead a different user as
described is authenticated, then limiting driving capabilities are
implemented. See id.', 18:28—36. Thus, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s
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Application 14/045,024
arguments that there is no limiting of drivability based on an authorization
code. App. Br. 6—7.
Appellant also argues the input of a non master user code is not a
“failure” to authenticate a user as claimed, but is instead specifically
“identifying” a user. Id. Appellant argues that Bertsis’s identification of a
user as a master or non-master is not a “failure” to identify the user. App.
Br. 6; Reply Br. 2. In other words, Appellant argues the claims do not
require “if the override process fails to authenticate a user as a master user.”
Reply Br. 2. We are not persuaded by this argument because Appellant
provides insufficient evidence establishing that the claims limit “fails to
authenticate the user,” in a way that, under a broad but reasonable
interpretation, is not encompassed by Berstis’s teachings of failing to
authenticate a master user. “[T]he PTO gives claims their ‘broadest
reasonable interpretation.’” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324, (Fed. Cir.
2004) (quoting In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
“Moreover, limitations are not to be read into the claims from the
specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184, (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(citing In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Although Appellant
argues that no authentication of the master user was attempted, and therefore
no failure is present, we are not persuaded that the claim, as drafted, is so
narrow. Here, we agree with the Examiner’s findings, because the claim as
written discloses failing authentication of “the user,” and as the Examiner
finds, Berstis teaches that when a non master signs in, this a failure to
authenticate the master user. Ans. 3 (citing Figs. 11, steps 1102, 1103, and
1109, 17:7-17, 14:51-53). Berstis also describes that when an authentication
process fails to authenticate the user as a master user, the system provides an
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Application 14/045,024
override authentication process by authenticating the master with a master
user ID number inside the vehicle. Id. Thus, we are not persuaded by
Appellant’s argument that Berstis fails to teach failing to authenticate the
user.
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and
of claims 8 and 15, which were argued together with claim 1. See App. Br.
7.
Because Appellant has not presented separate patentability arguments,
and has only reiterated the same arguments presented against claims 1, 8,
and 15 (see App. Br. 2—8), the remaining pending claims fall for the same
reasons discussed for claims 1, 8, and 15. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1—20 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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