Ex Parte Prakah-Asante et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJan 29, 201814551668 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 2018) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/551,668 11/24/2014 Kwaku O. Prakah-Asante 83474154 1329 28395 7590 01/31/2018 RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET EXAMINER 1000 TOWN CENTER YUN, CARINA 22ND FLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2194 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/31/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing @brookskushman. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KWAKU O. PRAKAH-ASANTE, HSIN-HSIANG YANG, DORON M. ELLIOTT, and GARY STEVEN STRUMOLO Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 Technology Center 2100 Before BRUCE R. WINSOR, IRVIN E. BRANCH, and CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judges. WINSOR, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of claims 1—20, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm and designate our affirmance as new grounds of rejection within our authority under the provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) (2016). 1 Appellants identify one of the Applicants, Ford Global Technologies, LLC, as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2; Bibliographic Data Sheet. Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 STATEMENT OF THE CASE “Modem vehicles come equipped with a variety of uni- and bi directional data and communication interfaces available for interfacing with occupant brought-in devices.” Spec. 12. Appellants’ disclosed invention “generally relate[s] to . . . brought-in device communication and request handling.” Spec. 11. Claim 1, which is illustrative, reads as follows: 1. A system comprising: a processor configured to: receive an incoming message request identifying a requesting application and requested user interface; determine an incoming message priority value; determine a message type; determine a driver attention demand value; and provide access to the requested user interface when the priority value, message type, and driver attention demand value match parameters defined for the requested user interface. App. Br. 12 (Claims App’x). Claims 1—4, 11—14, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Santori et al. (US 2013/0029599 Al; publ. Jan. 31, 2013; “Santori”) in view of Beckmann (US 2013/0335401 Al; publ. Dec. 19,2013). See Final Act 3—5. Claims 5—10 and 15—19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Santori, Beckmann, and Underwood (US 2011/0289144 Al; publ. Nov. 24, 2011). See Final Act. 6—10. Rather than repeat the arguments here, we refer to the Briefs (“App. Br.” filed Dec. 5, 2016; “Reply Br.” filed Apr. 3, 2017) for the positions of Appellants; the Final Office Action (“Final Act.” mailed July 12, 2016) and Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.” mailed Mar. 1, 2017) for the reasoning, 2 Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 findings, and conclusions of the Examiner; and the Specification (“Spec.” filed Nov. 24, 2014). Only those arguments actually made by Appellants have been considered in this decision. Arguments that Appellants did not make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). ISSUES The issues presented by Appellants’ arguments are whether the Examiner errs in finding the combination of Santori and Beckmann teaches or suggests the inventions recited in claims 1,11, and 20. ANALYSIS We have reviewed Appellants’ arguments and contentions (App. Br. 6—10; Reply Br. 2-4) in light of the Examiner’s findings, explanations, and conclusions of unpatentability (Final Act. 3—10; Ans. 10-14). See Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). We agree with the Examiner’s conclusions of unpatentability and with the thrust of the Examiner’s findings and explanations. However, because we provide additional explanations, rely on passages of the cited references not cited by the Examiner, and do not rely on all of the passages cited by the Examiner, we designate our findings, explanations, and conclusions sustaining the Examiner’s rejections as new grounds of rejection. Claim 1 Appellants contend that Santori fails to teach or suggest “receiv[ing] an incoming message request identifying a requesting application and requested user interface” (App. Br. 6—7) and that Beckmann, when 3 Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 combined with Santori, fails to teach “providing] access to the requested user interface when the priority value, message type, and driver attention demand value match parameters defined for the requested user interface” (App. Br. 7—9). We disagree. Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). “[T]he [obviousness] analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for [the analysis] can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 418. “The test for obviousness is not. . . that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981) (citations omitted). Furthermore, in determining obviousness “a reference ... is prior art for all that it teaches.” Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Considering what a reference teaches “is not an ‘ipsissimis verbis’ testf In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and “it is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would 4 Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 reasonably be expected to draw therefrom,” In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968).2 It is undisputed that Santori and Beckmann are analogous art with respect to Appellants’ invention. It is also undisputed that both Santori and Beckmann teach a system comprising a configured processor (i.e., Santori’s CPU and Beckmann’s controller). See Santori Fig. 1 (items 1, 3); Beckmann Fig. 1 (items 10—19). The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Santori teaches that the processor is configured to “receive an incoming message request identifying a requesting application and requested user interface.” See Final Act. 3 (citing Santori 112). Santori teaches that “one or more applications or controls may both try to access a system resource (such as, but not limited to, a system output like a display or audio system).” Santori 1101. In other words, the CPU may receive an incoming request from one or more application to access a system resource, i.e., a “user interface.” Santori further teaches that different applications have different priority levels assigned that are used to control the interface of the applications with the vehicle in a predictable manner. Id. 1103. One of ordinary skill in the art would have inferred from Santori’s teaching that in order to control the interface of the applications based on application priority levels, the incoming message to access the interface would include an identification of the requesting application. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; Preda, 401 F.2d at 826. 2 We note that Bond and Preda were decided in an anticipation context. However, the cited principles of analysis of the references are equally applicable in an obviousness context because “anticipation is the epitome of obviousness.” Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing In re Fracalossi, 681 F.2d 792 (CCPA 1982)). 5 Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 In further explanation, Santori teaches that “the system receives a request for usage of a system resource 403.” Santori 1104. Again, one of ordinary skill in the art would have inferred that in order to access a particular system resource, the request would identity the requested resource. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; Preda, 401 F. 2d at 826. We note that the claim does not specify the manner in which the request identifies the requested user interface. In Appellants’ purported counter-example, the command type “printTexf ’ identifies the desired user interface as the vehicle display whereas the command type speakText identifies the desired user interface as the vehicle speaker (see Reply Br. 2), which falls within the language of the claim. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Santori teaches that the processor is configured to “determine an incoming message priority value.” Final Act. 2 (citing Santori | 84). We note that the claim does not recite any manner of determining the message priority value or any criteria for making such determination. Contrary to Appellants’ argument, the claim does not recite that “the incoming message has its own priority value already assigned” (App. Br. 8). Santori is replete with discussions of determining a priority value of a message (see Santori || 76, 80, 84, 93, 102—03, 105—112). For example, Santori teaches that “[bjased on the applied priority settings and the requesting application or vehicle function, the process then sets a priority for the request 405.” Santori 1105; cf Spec. 148 (“[T]he process can obtain an appropriate priority 407 based on, for example, message type, message contents, application type, application name, etc.”). The Examiner finds that Santori teaches that the processor is configured to “determine a message type.” Final Act. 3 (citing Santori 1115). During examination, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable 6 Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 interpretation consistent with the specification, and the language should be read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. ofSci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The Office must apply the broadest reasonable meaning to the claim language, taking into account any definitions presented in the specification. Id. (citations omitted). Although claims are interpreted in light of the specification, “limitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The relevant ordinary meaning of “type” is “a set of. . . things sharing a particular characteristic or set of characteristics that causes them to be regarded as a group,” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 2044 (2nd ed. unabr. 1987) (n. def. 1). Appellants’Specification does not define “message type.” The Specification describes the determining of message types as follows: The process may also consider an application type or message type 309 (since some applications may deliver messages of varied type). A number of message types can be assigned based on categorization of message types, and values provided by the application can be checked, or values can be assigned based on a providing application and/or message content. Developers can be provided with guidelines as to what to include in messages to have the messages categorized as certain types, if message-type categorization is utilized based on message content. In an alternative example, the application will identity the message type included with the request. In still another example, the message type will be assigned based on, for example, the requesting application type. Spec. 143 (emphases added). The Specification gives “advertisements” (Spec. 160) and “navigation” (Spec. 1 55) as examples of message types. 7 Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 We construe “message type” broadly, but reasonably, to encompass any characterization of a message whatsoever, including by its source or content. Santori teaches that “[different vehicle functions and applications can have different priority levels assigned thereto, so that a developer or OEM can control the interface of these functions and applications with the vehicle in a predictable manner” (Santori 1103), and “[bjased on the applied priority settings and the requesting application or vehicle function, the process then sets a priority for the request 405” (Santori 1105). We find that the requesting applications or vehicle functions of Santori’s requests fall within the broadest reasonable interpretation of “message type.” We further find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have inferred that in order to set priorities based on the requesting application or vehicle function (i.e., “message type”), Santori’s CPU (i.e., “processor”) makes a determination of the requesting application or vehicle function. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; Preda, 401 F. 2d at 826. Although the Examiner finds Santori does not teach that the processor is configured to “determine a driver attention demand value” (Final Act. 3), we note Santori teaches that “support for the scrolling of long text may also be included, where permitted by driver distraction rules” (Santori | 52 (emphasis added)). Santori’s teaching of the application of driver distraction rules at least suggests a “driver attention demand value” applied to limit the length of displayed text. Message length is a characteristic of a message. Given the broadest reasonable interpretation, discussed above, of “message type,” “message type” encompasses categorization by message length. The Examiner finds Santori (or at least Santori standing alone) does not teach that the processor is configured to “provide access to the requested 8 Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 user interface when the priority value, message type, and driver attention demand value match parameters defined for the requested user interface.” Final Act 3. We give the term “parameters” its broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. Am. Acad. ofSci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d at 1364. The Specification does not define “parameter.” The broadest relevant ordinary meaning of “parameter” includes “limit[] or boundary]; guideline[],” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1408 (n. def. 4), and “characteristic or factor; aspect; element,” id. (n. def. 5). Nothing in Appellants’ Specification is inconsistent with this meaning. Accordingly, we broadly but reasonably construe “parameters defined for the requested user interface” to encompass any limits, boundaries, guidelines, characteristics, factors, aspects, or elements defined for a user interface that can be compared to a priority value, message type, or driver attention demand value to determine a match. In other words, to “match” a “parameter” is to determine that a rule is satisfied. Although this encompasses rules that use threshold values, it is not so limited. We note that Santori teaches using “applied priority settings and the requesting application or vehicle function” (Santori 1105) in the process of determining whether to allow usage of the requested resource (i.e., “user interface”) (see id. ]Hf 101—112). We find Santori’s teaching of “applied priority settings” {id. 1105) is within the broadest reasonable interpretation of “match[ing] parameters defined for the user interface” (see id. 1103 (“These priority settings dictate the prioritization granted to various access requests.”)). Therefore, we find Santori teaches that the processor is configured to “provide access to the requested user interface when the 9 Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 priority value, [and] message type . . . match parameters defined for the requested user interface,” as recited in claim 1. See id. ]Hf 101—112. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Beckmann teaches that the processor is configured to “determine a driver attention demand value.” Final Act, 3 (citing Beckmann 19). Appellants’ Specification discloses that “driver attention demand” is a “current” value (Spec. ^fl[ 44, 46) that may be determined “utilizing known driver demand measuring techniques, which frequently involve considerations of the vehicle, driver, exterior environment and interior cabin” {id. 134). The Specification gives the following example: “[W]hen the driver is turning, in traffic, driving in weather, etc. the driver attention demand may be high, whereas when the driving is driving straight, in no traffic, in clear weather, etc., the driver attention demand may be low.” Id. | 59. We find that Beckmann’s “information regarding a degree of distraction and a driving situation of a vehicle” falls within the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the Specification of “a driver attention demand value.” The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Beckmann, when combined with Santori, teaches that the processor is configured to “provide access to the requested user interface when the priority value, message type, and driver attention demand value match parameters defined for the requested user interface.” Final Act. 3 (citing Beckmann | 80). Beckmann teaches prioritizing messages based on a driver attention demand value. Id. ^fl[ 9, 38, 75, 80. Furthermore, Beckmann teaches taking into account both the degree of distraction of an application (“message type”) and the degree of distraction of a driver (“driver attention demand value”). To the extent that Santori’s teaching of matching parameters may be deficient, Beckmann 10 Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 teaches making decisions regarding access by an application to a user interface using threshold values. Id. 175 (“[A] decision may then also be made about the display of the application on the basis of the information about the degree of distraction of the driver, and in particular, the application may not be displayed or a display of the application may be ended if the degree of distraction of the driver exceeds a predefined threshold value.”). See Beckmann | 68. The Examiner concludes, and we agree, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the teachings of Santori by adapting the teachings of Beckmann for reducing distractions of a driver in a motor vehicle. Final Act. 3 (citing Beckmann | 8 (“the risk of a driver in a motor vehicle becoming distracted is reduced.”)). We find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that incorporation of Beckmann’s “driver attention demand value” into Santori’s system would improve Santori’s system in the same way that it improves Beckmann’s similar system. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.”). Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 and designate the rejection as a new ground of rejection. Claim 11 Appellants rely on the same arguments regarding claim 11 as presented for claim 1. App. Br. 9. In addition, Appellants contend as follows: 11 Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 Applicant notes that Beckmann, in paragraph [003 8], teaches that “the number of user-interface elements or the size of the user- interface element may be compared to a threshold value . . . the threshold value may be a function of the driving situation.” Thus, while Beckmann does teach altering the size or number of displayable elements based on a driving situation, there is no compelling reason why this teaching, coupled with Santori, would relate to setting parameters relating to message priorities and/or message types required for using the interface under a particular demand level. Id. (brackets and ellipsis in original). For the reasons discussed above regarding claim 1 we agree with the Examiner that Santori teaches “[a] system comprising: a processor configured to: receive a message request identifying a vehicle interface; [and] determine a message priority and message type,” as recited in claim 11. See Final Act. 4 (citing Santori H 12, 84, 115). We note that Santori teaches that interfaces may be located in a vehicle (Santori 112; see also id. 101—104), i.e., a “vehicle interface.” For the reasons discussed above regarding claim 1, we also agree with the Examiner that Beckmann teaches a processor configured to “determine driver attention demand” as recited in claim 11. Final Act. 4 (citing Santori 19). The Examiner finds, and we agree, that Beckmann, when combined with Santori, teaches a processor configured to “set parameters, based on the driver attention demand, for the vehicle interface, defining message priorities and message types required for use permission.” Final Act. 4 (citing Beckmann 138). First of all, similar to our discussion above regarding claim 1, the broadest reasonable interpretation of “setting] parameters, based on the driver attention demand, for the vehicle interface, defining message priorities and message types required for use permission” 12 Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 is not limited to the setting of threshold values, but rather includes the establishing of rules regarding message priorities and types based on the driver attention demand. Appellants concede that Beckmann teaches establishing rules utilizing thresholds, i.e., “parameters,” for access of messages to a vehicle interface based on a driving situation, i.e., based on “driver attention demand.” App. Br. 9 (discussing Beckmann 138). Furthermore, Appellants concede that Beckmann “teach[es] altering the size or number of displayable elements based on a driving situation.” Id. Santori teaches that “support for the scrolling of long text may also be included, where permitted by driver distraction rules” (Santori | 52 (emphasis added)). Messages may be categorized by message length. Given the broadest reasonable interpretation, discussed above regarding claim 1, of “message type,” “message type” encompasses categorization by message length. Santori teaches “setting] parameters, [i.e., establishing rules,]... for the vehicle interface, defining message priorities and message types required for use permission.” See Santori || 102—112. Beckmann teaches and Santori teaches or suggests establishing rules (“setting parameters”) for vehicle interface use permission based on “driver attention demand.” One of ordinary skill in the art would have learned from Beckmann to set Santori’s message type and priority parameters (i.e., establish message type and priority rules) using Beckmann’s and Santori’s driver attention demand values. The Examiner finds that Beckmann, when combined with Santori, teaches a processor configured to “deliver a message included in the message request via the vehicle interface when the parameters set for use 13 Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 permission match the determined message priority and type.” Final Act. 4 (citing Beckmann | 80). We agree for reasons similar to those discussed above with regard to claim 1. The Examiner concludes, and we agree, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to modify the teachings of Santori by adapting the teachings of Beckmann for reducing distractions of a driver in a motor vehicle. Final Act. 4 (citing Beckmann | 8). We find that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that incorporation of Beckmann’s “driver attention demand value” into Santori’s system would improve Santori’s system in the same way that it improves Beckmann’s similar system. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 11 and designate the rejection as a new ground of rejection. Claim 20 Although directed to “[a] computer implemented method” (App. Br. (Claims App’x) 15) rather than “[a] system” (id. at 13), the limitations of claim 20 are substantially similar to those of claim 11 (compare id. at 15, with id. at 13—14). Appellants argue claim 20 relying on the arguments for claim 11. See App. Br. 20. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth supra regarding claim 11, we sustain the rejection of claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Santori and Beckmann and designate the rejection as a new ground of rejection. Dependent Claims Appellants do not present any particularized arguments in support of the patentability of claims 2—10 and 12—19, which depend from claims 1 and 14 Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 11 respectively. See App. Br. 9, 10. We adopt the Examiner’s uncontested additional findings, explanations, and conclusions regarding claims 2—10 and 12—19 (Final Act. 4, 5, 6—10), as considered in light of our findings, explanations, and conclusions supra regarding claims 1 and 11. Accordingly, we sustain the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 2— 4 and 12—14 as unpatentable over Santori and Beckmann and claims 5—10 and 15—19 as unpatentable over Santori, Beckmann, and Underwood and designate the rejections as new grounds of rejection. DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1—20 is affirmed. We designate our affirmance as new grounds of rejection. This decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides that “[a] new ground of rejection . . . shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be remanded to the examiner. . . . (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. 37 C.F.R. §41.50(b). 15 Appeal 2017-007389 Application 14/551,668 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.50(f), 41.52(b). AFFIRMED 37 C.F.R, $ 41.50(b) 16 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation