Ex Parte Porubcan et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 29, 2017

14686951 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 29, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/686,951 04/15/2015 Randolph S. Porubcan MS-QSupp 6166
93599 7590
Eric P. Mirabel, JD, LLM
3783 Darcus Street
Houston, TX 77005
EXAMINER
LEE, JENNIFER V
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/31/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
emirabel @ come ast. net
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RANDOLPH S. PORUBCAN and JEFF THURSTON
Appeal 2017-0082361
Application 14/686,9512
Technology Center 3600
Before PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and
MATTHEW S. METERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1—13. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Our decision references Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
Mar. 10, 2016) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Nov. 10, 2016), and the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Nov. 10, 2016) and Final Office Action
(“Final Act.,” mailed Dec. 30, 2015).
2 Appellants identify Master Supplements, Inc. as the real party in interest.
App. Br. 3.
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CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellants’ claimed invention relates to a “system [for] allowing
verification of the source of [a] product, its quality testing (for quantity,
activity, and purity)[,] and its date of production and/or testing.” Spec. 2.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is the sole independent claim, and is
representative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A method of verifying the authenticity and quality
of a formulation including natural supplements and other
components purchased from a producer, comprising:
encoding the formulation with a code that can be scanned
and transmitted to a website controlled by the producer;
receiving the scanned code at the website for
authentication of the code; and
providing information from the website, if the code is
authenticated, about testing the formulation for purity and
contamination, as well as concentration of active ingredients,
manufacturing process, date of manufacture and date of testing;
and if code authentication fails, alerting the website to said
authentication failure.
REJECTIONS3
Claim 11 is rejected under 35U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as
indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject
matter that Appellants regard as the invention.
Claims 1—13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-
statutory subject matter.
Claims 1, 3—5, 12, and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Grant (US 2007/0170240 Al, pub. July 26, 2007).
3 The rejection of claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, fourth paragraph, has
been withdrawn. Ans. 10.
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Claim 2 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Grant and Saloum (US 2008/0038367 Al, pub. Feb. 14, 2008).
Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Grant and Tuel (US 2010/0015184 Al, pub. Jan. 21, 2010).
Claims 7, 10, and 11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Grant and Catlett (US 2011/0184833 Al, pub. July 28,
2011).
Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Grant and Baarman (US 2012/0179665 Al, pub. July 12, 2012).
Claim 9 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Grant, Catlett, and Galuten (US 2002/0123956 Al, pub. Sept. 5, 2002).
ANALYSIS
Indefiniteness
Claim 11 depends from claim 7, which ultimately depends from
claim 1. Claim 7 recites that “the website requests] information from the
purchaser,” and claim 11 further recites that “the information requested from
the purchaser includes the source of the formulation, and contact information
for the source.”
The Examiner finds that it is unclear whether the claimed source is
“the same entity as ‘the provider,’ i.e. [,] the source of the formulation, or
some other entity.” Final Act. 11. If the claimed source “is the same entity
as ‘the provider,’” then Examiner finds that it is unclear why the source of
the formulation and contact information for the source would be why a
purchaser would request such information from a customer when
customarily such information is provided to a customer. Id. at 11—12; see
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also Ans. 7 (“it is unclear why the producer is requesting the producer’s own
contact information from the purchaser”).
In response, Appellants only assert that “[t]he claim is clear as
written: the ‘source’ of the formulation is the provider of it, and the second
occurrence of ‘the source’ refers to the provider.” App. Br. 11.
In prosecution before the PTO “[i]t is the applicants’ burden to
precisely define the invention, not the PTO’s.” In re Morris, 111 F.3d 1048,
1056 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The purpose of this requirement is to provide the
public with adequate notice of the boundaries of protection involved. The
time to do so is during prosecution where an applicant has the ability to
amend the claims to more precisely define the metes and bounds of the
claimed invention. See Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1210-12
(BPAI 2008).
We agree with the Examiner that it is unclear why a purchaser of a
formulation would be requested by a website controlled by the producer, to
provide information regarding the source of the formulation it is purchasing
from the producer, as claim 11 requires. Appellants’ argument does not
address this issue.
In the Answer, the Examiner further notes that the term “provider” is
not recited in the claims, but rather a “producer.” Ans. 7. And the Examiner
finds that if the “source” and the “producer” refer to the same entity, it is
unclear why there are two different terms for the same entity in the claims.
Appellants do not respond in the Reply Brief.
We observe that Appellants’ Specification defines the term
“producer” as “all or any” of the following entities: “the seller or the
producer or formulator or a party contacted or responsible for the website.”
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Spec. 3. Claim 1 requires two entities from the group defined in the
Specification for a “producer,” namely, that the producer is (1) a seller (“a
formulation . . . purchased from a producer”), and (2) is responsible for the
website (“a website controlled by the producer”). But claim 1 does not
expressly require the remaining entities from the Specification’s definition
of “producer,” such as a “producer” and/or “formulator.”
As such, claim 11 may intend to cover providing information to the
purchaser regarding the source of the formulation, where the source of the
formulation may or may not be the claimed producer. Presumably, this
information would otherwise be unknown to the purchaser. See Spec. 2
(“the consumer is unable to verify date of production, or any quantity or
quality testing (e.g., activity and purity) on the products offered for
purchase. Accordingly a system in allowing verification of the source of the
product. . . would offer a significant benefit.”) But the language recited in
claim 11 (i.e., “information requested from the purchaser”) does not cover
this situation. And Appellants insist that “[t]he claim is clear as written.”
App. Br. 11.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11 under
35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
Non-Statutory Subject Matter
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
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abstract ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
Banklnt’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300 (2012), “for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those
that claim patent-eligible applications of these concepts.” Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2355. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the
claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., to an abstract
idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step
where the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an
ordered combination”’ to determine whether there are additional elements
that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”
Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297).
The Court acknowledged in Mayo, that “all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena,
or abstract ideas.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. We, therefore, look to whether
the claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.
See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appellants argue that claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea,
because the concept of “verifying the authenticity and quality of a
formulation” is not one of the abstract ideas identified in Alice, such as “a
‘building block of human ingenuity,’ a ‘fundamental economic practice’ or
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an ‘algorithm.’” App. Br. 9 (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354—56). Yet,
contrary to Appellants’ suggestion, the Supreme Court in Alice did not
rigidly define or otherwise restrict the universe of abstract ideas to one or
more of: a building block of human ingenuity, a fundamental economic
practice, and an algorithm. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (“we need not labor
to delimit the precise counters of the ‘abstract ideas’ category”). Moreover,
the Examiner does not find that “verifying the authenticity and quality of a
formulation” is a building block of human ingenuity, a fundamental
economic practice, or an algorithm.
Instead, the Examiner finds that the claims, as reasonably broadly
construed, fall into a familiar class of claims involving comparing data and
organizing information that the Federal Circuit has found to be “directed to”
a patent ineligible concept. Ans. 4 (citing CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Content Extraction &
Transmission v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App’x. 950, 955
(Fed. Cir. 2014), Cyberfone Systems, LLC v. CNN Interactive Group, Inc.
558 F. App’x 988 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (non-precedential)); see also Final Act.
14—15 (collecting cases).
Applying the framework set forth in Alice, and as the first step of that
analysis, we agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed to an
abstract idea. Claim 1 is directed to a method of verifying the authenticity
and quality of a formulation, and recites the steps of (1) encoding the
formulation with a code; (2) receiving the scanned code; (3) providing
information if the code is authenticated; and (4) alerting if code
authentication fails. As such, the steps recited in claim 1 involve nothing
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more than processing data, i.e., encoding the formulation with a code;
collecting data, i.e., receiving the scanned code; and transmitting data, i.e.,
providing information if the code is authenticated and alerting if the code is
not authenticated. In this regard, Appellants’ claims are similar to claims
that the Federal Circuit determined were patent ineligible. See, e.g., Content
Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347 (collecting data, recognizing certain data within
the collected data set, and storing the recognized data in memory is
“undisputedly well-known”), Cyberfone, 558 F. App’x at 992 (“using
categories to organize, store, and transmit information is well-established”),
and, more recently, in Elec. Power Grp. LLC v. Alstom, 830 F.3d 1350, 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[t]he advance they purport to make is a process of
gathering and analyzing information of a specified content, then displaying
the results, and not any particular assertedly inventive technology for
performing those functions”), and In re TLI Comm. LLC Patent Litig., 823
F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“attaching classification data ... to images
for the purpose of storing those images in an organized manner is a well-
established ‘basic concept’ sufficient to fall under Alice step 1”).
Appellants’ argument regarding preemption is likewise unpersuasive
of Examiner error. See App. Br. 9 (“There is no danger of ‘monopolization’
or ‘pre-emption’ of all verification in all fields”). Although preemption
“might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,
thereby thwarting the primary object of the patent laws” {Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2354 (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293)), “the absence of complete
preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). See also OIP
Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362—63 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
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(“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited
to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less
abstract.”).
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, Appellants argue that
the step of “testing the formulation for purity and contamination, as well as
concentration of active ingredients, manufacturing process, date of
manufacture, and date of testing” are not in the prior art raised by the
Examiner. App. Br. 10. As an initial matter, claim 1 does not recite a
testing step, much less any new technique for testing that amounts to an
“inventive concept” under step 2 of the Alice analysis. Instead, claim 1
recites “providing information” about testing.
Moreover, to the extent that Appellants argue that claim 1 contains an
“inventive concept” by having novel claim limitations, Appellants
misapprehend the controlling precedent. Although the second step in the
Alice/Mayo framework is termed a search for an “inventive concept,” the
analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a
search for “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”’ Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. A novel and
nonobvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-
ineligible. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304. Here, the step of providing
information is directed to the abstract idea identified by the Examiner, and
remains “abstract” regardless of novelty and obviousness.
We also are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the claimed
“testing the formulation” requires both machines and transformations of
matter, or that the claims are analogous to those in SiRF. App. Br. 10; see
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also Reply Br. 2 (“scanning a code and authenticating it at a website
can[not] be performed ‘entirely in the human mind’”) (citing SiRF Tech. Inc.
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). As an initial
matter, testing is not positively recited in the claims, let alone, for example,
the alleged machines required for such testing. But even if testing were
positively recited, an abstract idea is not rendered patentable by mere
connections to the physical world. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (“The fact that a
computer ‘necessarily existfs] in the physical, rather than purely conceptual
realm’ ... is beside the point”). For example, in Content Extraction, the
Federal Circuit rejected the patent owner’s argument that using a scanner
and computer to extract and store data from a check was an inventive
concept. Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1348-49.
In order for the use of a machine to render a process patent-eligible,
the machine must impose a meaningful limit on the scope of the claim, and
play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed.
See, e.g., SiRF Tech., 601 F.3d at 1333. In SiRF the Federal Circuit found
that the claims were “directed to various improvements over conventional
A-GPS technology.” Id. at 1323. Stated another way, the claims were not
directed to abstract-idea processes, but rather to an improvement over
conventional GPS technology itself. See id. (finding the ’801 patent
“allow[s the GPS] receiver to calculate its position more quickly and even in
weak-signal environments,” and the ’ 187 patent “extends the solution of the
‘801 patent. . . [to] allow[] the improved, repeated calculation of a GPS
receiver’s position as it changes over time”).
Appellants’ claimed invention, in contrast, does not improve scanning
technology or any other relevant technology. See, e.g., Spec. 5—8
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(describing various known techniques for encoding); id. at 9-10 (describing
known technology for scanning a code). Instead, it is directed to abstract-
idea processes that provide a solution to a commercial problem, i.e.,
allowing a consumer to verify information about a formulation. See id. at 2
(“the consumer is unable to verify [information] on the products offered for
purchase. Accordingly, a system in allowing verification . . . would offer a
significant benefit.”).
Moreover, any alleged “transformation” due to “testing” (see App.
Br. 10), is, at best, merely a manipulation of data, which is not sufficient to
meet the transformation prong under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71—72 (1972) (a computer based algorithm that merely
transforms data from one form to another is not patent-eligible).
In the Reply Brief, Appellants also argue, for the first time, that the
Examiner erred by not considering all of the elements, both individually, and
in combination. Reply Br. 2. Even if Appellants’ argument were timely
presented for our consideration, it is not persuasive. See Final Act. 15
(“When considering the elements and combinations of elements.”)
Appellants do not identify, and we do not find, anything about the particular
arrangement of claim elements that is significantly more than the abstract
idea.
For the above reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred
in rejecting claims 1—13 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection.
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Obviousness
Independent Claim 1 and Dependent Claims 3—5, 12, and 13
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because the
Examiner did not find prior art “disclosing or suggesting that a code is or
can be scanned and transmitted to a website controlled by a producer,” and
did not consider the claim as a whole. App. Br. 11. Instead, we agree with
the Examiner’s finding that Grant discloses encoding the formulation with a
code that can be scanned and transmitted to a website controlled by the
producer. See Ans. 8 (citing Grant H 21, 36, 47).
Grant relates to a method and system for authenticating products, and
deterring diversion and/or piracy. Grant 12. A security code is printed on a
product to be authenticated. See id. 146. The security code may be
alphanumeric text that has been encoded as a graphic symbol, such as a
datamatrix or other code. Id. 147. A barcode reader may capture the
security code and send the security code to the host. Id. 121. The host
validates the authenticity of the security code for product authentication. Id.
136. In other words, Grant describes encoding a product with a security
code that can be scanned and transmitted to a website controlled by the
producer under a broad, but reasonable, interpretation.
Appellants argue that Grant provides “absolutely no notion of quality
or product testing,” rendering claim 1 patentable over the cited prior art.
App. Br. 12. Appellants acknowledge that Grant describes providing
information about the product, such as a use-by date or a sell-by date, but
Appellants argue that Grant does not describe quality testing and, thus, does
not teach or suggest providing the claimed testing information. Id. at 11—12.
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Yet, claim 1 does not positively recite a quality or product testing
step. Instead, claim 1 recites “providing information from the website, if the
code is authenticated, about testing.” In other words, claim 1 recites
informational content in the claimed providing step, and as such, is directed
to printed matter.
The Federal Circuit has long held that where a limitation claims
printed matter that is not functionally or structurally related to its physical
substrate, the printed matter may not be relied on to distinguish over the
prior art for purposes of patentability. In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (when descriptive material is not functionally related to the
substrate, the descriptive material will not distinguish the invention from the
prior art in terms of patentability). In applying the printed matter doctrine,
the first step is to determine whether the limitation is, in fact, directed to
printed matter, i.e., whether the limitation claims the content of information.
See In re Distefano, 808 F.3d 845, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2015). If so, “one must
then determine if the matter is functionally or structurally related to the
associated physical substrate, and only if the answer is ‘no’ is the printed
matter owed no patentable weight.” Id. at 851. See also King Pharms. Inc.
v. Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1278—79 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (applying the
“printed matter” reasoning to method claims containing an “informing” step
that could be either printed or verbal instructions).
Here, the relevant inquiry is whether the recitation in claim 1 that the
information provided “about testing the formulation for purity and
contamination, as well as concentration of active ingredients, manufacturing
process, date of manufacture^] and date of testing,” i.e., the claimed
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informational content, has a “new and unobvious functional relationship”
with the method. King Pharms. Inc., 616 F.3d at 1279.
Appellants argue that the provided informational content recites
“features [that] are functionally related to and critical to the invention,” and
“mandates reversal.” Reply Br. 3. Yet, there is no objective evidence of
record that there is a functional difference in providing the claimed
information about testing versus information containing other content.
Regardless of the particular information provided, the underlying method is
the same. The specific nature of the information provided does not depend
on the method, and the method does not depend on the nature of the
information provided. See Ans. 8. As such, it constitutes non-functional
descriptive material that may not be relied on for patentability. See In re
Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Indeed to hold otherwise, i.e.,
to allow Appellants to distinguish over the prior art based solely on the
specific information provided would lead to repeated patenting of a known
method by the mere inclusion of novel, non-functional descriptive material.
See King Pharms., 616 F. 3d at 1279 (“The rationale behind this line of
cases is preventing the indefinite patenting of known products by the simple
inclusion of novel, yet functionally unrelated limitations.”).
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 1, and dependent claims 3—5, 12, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Dependent Claims 2, 6, and 8
Claims 2, 6, and 8 depend from independent claim 1, and are not
separately argued. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of
dependent claims 2, 6, and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the same reasons
set forth above with respect to claim 1.
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Dependent Claims 7, 10, and 11
Dependent claims 7, 10, and 11 depend from claim 1, and further
recite requesting information from the purchaser. The Examiner relies on
Catlett for describing the known technique of a website requesting
information from the purchaser. Final Act. 29.
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 7, 10,
and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because Catlett is not analogous art. App.
Br. 12—13. Specifically, Appellants assert that Catlett is not in the same
field of endeavor or reasonably pertinent to the problems faced by the
inventor, and should be withdrawn as a reference.
Catlett is directed to a system for providing assistance to a consumer
to select nutritious meals having available ingredients and purchase
groceries for the meals. Catlett 127. Catlett describes, with reference to
Figure 3, providing a web interface that allows registration of new users and
authentication of returning customers. Id. at Fig. 3,140. For new
customers, the website interface requests contact information from the
customer, such as name address phone number, and email address. Id. at
Fig. 3. We agree with the Examiner that Catlett is within Appellants’ field
of endeavor, namely providing product information to a purchaser. Final
Act. 29. Therefore, Catlett is analogous art that properly can be considered
in an obvious rejection.
Regarding claim 11, Appellants additionally argue that Catlett does
not disclose the information further requested from the purchaser. Because
we determine that this language in claim 11 renders it indefinite, we pro
forma reverse the rejection of claim 11 as an analysis would be based on a
speculative interpretation of claim 11. See In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382,
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1385 (CCPA 1970); In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862-63 (CCPA 1962)
(determinations as to obviousness cannot be made for indefinite claims).
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7 and 10,
and reverse, pro forma, the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Dependent Claim 9
Claim 9 depends from dependent claim 7, and further recites
requesting from the purchaser whether it intends to sell the formulation to a
third party or consume the formulation itself. The Examiner relies on
Galuten for determining relationship data. Final Act. 32—33 (citing Galuten,
claim 1, || 3—14). Appellants argue that Galuten is non-analogous art
because it is “not related to the field of verifying quality of nutritional
supplements, or to the problems faced in the instant application.” App
Br. 13.
Galuten relates generally to the field of electronic commerce. Galuten
12. Galuten describes determining relationships between different value
chain participants. Id. 112. We agree with the Examiner that Galuten is
within Appellants’ field of endeavor, namely receiving purchaser input.
Final Act. 32. Therefore, Galuten is analogous art that properly can be
considered in an obvious rejection.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 9 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
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DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—13 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—10, 12, and 13 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) are affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claim 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is
reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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