Ex Parte PONGRATZ et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 30, 201713937250 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 30, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/937,250 07/09/2013 Christian PONGRATZ 0547-956 5487 65363 7590 12/04/2017 TnHH A VAUGHN EXAMINER Jordan IP Law, LLC GREENE, DANIEL LAWSON 12501 Prosperity Drive, Suite 401 Silver Spring, MD 20904 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3667 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/04/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): tvaughn@jordaniplaw.com admin2 @ j ordaniplaw .com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte CHRISTIAN PONGRATZ, MARKUS PASSATH, and MANFRED POSCH Appeal 2016-007122 Application 13/937,250 Technology Center 3600 Before: CHARLES N. GREENHUT, MICHAEL L. HOELTER, and ANNETTE R. REIMERS, Administrative Patent Judges. HOELTER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2016-007122 Application 13/937,250 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a rejection of claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. THE INVENTION The claims are directed to a method for operating a hybrid vehicle. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for operating a hybrid vehicle having an internal combustion engine and an electrical machine having an energy storage device,[1] the method comprising: determining, during a driving sequence of the hybrid vehicle via the electrical machine, a power currently available of the electrical storage device of the hybrid vehicle on fulfillment of a first activation condition of the internal combustion engine of the hybrid vehicle; charging the energy storage device, when the determined power currently available from the electrical storage device exceeds a first power threshold, by activating the internal combustion engine; and determining, when the determined power currently available from the electrical storage device is less than the first power threshold, the power currently available from the electrical storage device. 1 The terms “energy storage device” and “electrical storage device” appear to be used interchangeably in claim 1. 2 Appeal 2016-007122 Application 13/937,250 REFERENCES Klauer Okubo Zhang US 5,831,411 US 2008/0215201 A1 US 2009/0045815 A1 Nov. 3, 1998 Sept. 4, 2008 Feb. 19, 2009 REJECTIONS Claims 1—11 and 14—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Zhang and Okubo.2 Final Act. 3—13. Claims 12 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Zhang, Okubo, Klauer, and “in view of MPEP 2144.05 Obviousness of Ranges.” Final Act. 13—14. ANALYSIS Claims 1—11 and 14—20—Unpatentable over Zhang and Okubo Based on Appellants’ arguments, we will decide the appeal of claims 1—11 based on claim 1, and the appeal of claims 14—20 based on claim 14. 37C.F.R. §41.37(c)(l)(iv). Claim 1 The Examiner finds that Zhang teaches determining a battery’s initial state of charge (SOC) at an engine crank event, which corresponds to the recited step of determining a power currently available of the electrical storage device on fulfillment of a first activation condition of a vehicle’s internal combustion engine. Final Act. 3 (citing Zhang, Fig. 3 and associated text). The Examiner further finds that Zhang teaches activating the internal combustion engine to charge the battery, which corresponds to the recited step of charging the energy storage device when the determined 2 Claim 8 was rejected under Zhang, Okubo, and “in view of MPEP 2144.05 Obviousness of Ranges.” Final Act. 11. 3 Appeal 2016-007122 Application 13/937,250 power currently available from the energy storage device exceeds a first power threshold. Final Act. 3^4 (citing Zhang, Fig. 3). The Examiner additionally finds that Zhang’s teaching regarding determining if there is sufficient cranking power for a subsequent cranking event corresponds to the recited step of determining, when the determined power currently available from the electrical storage device is less than the first power threshold, the power currently available from the electrical storage device. Final Act. 4 (citing Zhang, Fig. 3 and associated text). The Examiner explains that “Zhang clearly shows continuously determining the SOC by measuring battery current (Fig. 2 ‘Battery current during normal operations’).” Ans. 10 (citing Zhang, Fig. 2). Thus, according to the Examiner, Zhang’s system continuously monitors battery current when the estimated cranking power available (“Pmax_est”) is less than the power needed to crank the engine at the next cranking event (“Pmax”)? in order to know whether additional battery charging continues to be required. Ans. 9-10. The Examiner acknowledges that, while Zhang teaches a hybrid electro-mechanical device, Zhang does not teach that the first determining step occurs during a driving sequence of the hybrid vehicle via the electrical machine as recited. Final Act. 4. The Examiner therefore relies on Okubo to teach that “it was known to those of ordinary skill in the art to determine, during a driving sequence of the hybrid vehicle via the electrical machine a power currently available of the electrical storage device of the hybrid vehicle.” Final Act. 4 (citing Okubo 1 57, Fig. 6). According to the Examiner, [I\t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to provide Zhang with the capability to operate in hybrid electric mode as taught by Okubo as merely performing the same 4 Appeal 2016-007122 Application 13/937,250 function as it does separately and being no more than the predictable use of prior-art elements according to their established functions. Final Act. 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellants first argue that the Zhang-Okubo combination does not determine a power currently available “on fulfillment of a first activation condition” of an internal combustion engine, but rather determines the state of the battery “at the engine crank event.” Br. 6—7 (citing Zhang 118). We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that an engine cranking event constitutes the “fulfillment of a first activation condition” of an internal combustion engine. As depicted in Zhang Figure 3, and as the Examiner explains (Ans. 8), the step of recording open-circuit voltage— which is used to determine the battery’s initial SOC—is not reached until the internal combustion engine is being cranked. Zhang || 16—18, Fig. 3. Thus, engine cranking is a condition that must be fulfilled before Zhang’s system measures open-circuit voltage. Appellants next argue that the Zhang-Okubo combination lacks the “second determining” limitation, i.e., the limitation requiring “determining, when the determined power currently available from the electrical storage device is less than the first power threshold, the power currently available from the electrical storage device.” Br. 8—9. Appellants assert that Zhang teaches performing an “estimation” of maximum cranking power available, not a “determination” of power currently available. Br. 9. According to Appellants: The rejection would be proper to the extent claim 1 calls for an estimation of the power currently available from the electrical storage device. But claim 1 clearly does not. In contrast to 5 Appeal 2016-007122 Application 13/937,250 Zhang, the method in accordance with claim 1 sets forth a determination (not an estimation) of the power currently available from the electrical storage device when the determined power currently available from the electrical storage device is less than the first power threshold. Br. 9. The Examiner responds, inter alia, that “an ‘estimation’ is still a ‘determination’ which is not limited by the claim.” Ans. 10. We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that Zhang teaches the “second determination” limitation. As the Examiner states, the Specification does not expressly define what “determining” requires, much less define it in a way that excludes any sort of estimation of the power available. Further, Appellants have not provided evidence or persuasive argument that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that “determining” excludes “estimating.” See Ans. 10. Appellants further argue that because Zhang is directed to a “non hybrid” vehicle having only an internal combustion engine, Zhang is “not germane to the claimed invention” and “is not concerned with the problem recognized by Appellant.” Br. 13. According to Appellants, “any attempt to modify Zhang by incorporating the teachings of Okubo rings hollow,” and the Examiner has “not provided any motivation” for the combination. Br. 13—14. The Examiner responds, inter alia, that Zhang expressly teaches hybrid vehicles, and that Okubo suggests to one of ordinary skill in the art to “monitor the SOC of the battery in both engine on and engine off states of operation (Fig. 6) and to determine in step 98 if the SOC of the battery can meet the power need.” Ans. 13. Appellants have not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in determining that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Zhang and Okubo. See Br. 13—14. First, it does not matter that 6 Appeal 2016-007122 Application 13/937,250 the references do not address the same problem addressed by Appellants, because “any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed.” KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007). Second, to the extent that Zhang is directed to a conventional rather than a hybrid vehicle, the rejection is based on a combination of references rather than Zhang alone. “Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking the references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references.” In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also Ans. 12. Moreover, Zhang does suggest the applicability of its system to hybrid vehicles. Zhang describes a system having an internal combustion engine that transmits power to a transmission that “may comprise a conventional fixed gear transmission or, alternatively, some form of electro-mechanical hybrid device which combines electric power and mechanical power to generate a torque output.” Zhang 114; see also id. 117 (engine cranking starts by actuating switch 16, which may be done by the vehicle operator “or based upon an engine stop/start routine”). Thus, Zhang teaches a system that ensures that the battery has sufficient power to start the internal combustion engine, which occurs in both conventional and hybrid vehicles. Because we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as unpatentable over Zhang and Okubo, we sustain the rejection of claims 1—11. Claim 14 Independent claim 14, otherwise similar to claim 1, recites “determining, during a driving sequence of the hybrid vehicle via the 7 Appeal 2016-007122 Application 13/937,250 electrical machine, a power currently available of the electrical storage device of the hybrid vehicle when a current state of charge of the electrical storage device is less than a charge threshold value.” Br. 18 (claims appx.). The Examiner finds that Zhang teaches this limitation. Final Act. 8—11. According to the Examiner, Zhang teaches monitoring battery current when P max_est is less Pmax, in order to know when additional battery charging continues to be required. Ans. 11. In addition to the arguments previously made with respect to claim 1, which we found unpersuasive, Appellants argue that Zhang does not teach this determining step. Br. 10—12. But Appellants have not shown or alleged that the Examiner erred in finding that Zhang monitors battery current when Pmax est < Pmax- Nor have Appellants shown that the Examiner erred in finding that the disclosed current monitoring corresponds to claim 14’s determining step. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 14—20. Claims 12 and 13—Unpatentable over Zhang, Okubo, and Klauer Claims 12 and 13 depend from claim 1. Br. 17—18 (claims appx). Appellants do not separately argue claims 12 and 13. Therefore, for the reasons stated above with respect to claim 1, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 12 and 13 as unpatentable over Zhang, Okubo, and Klauer. 8 Appeal 2016-007122 Application 13/937,250 DECISION For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—20 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation