Ex Parte Pitz et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jun 4, 2008

10813937 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 4, 2008)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte HEINER PITZ, AXEL HAUCK,
WERNER ANWEILER, and PETER HACHMANN
____________

Appeal 2008-0210
Application 10/813,937
Technology Center 2800
____________

Decided: June 4, 2008
____________

Before JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, JOHN A. JEFFERY, and KARL
EASTHOM, Administrative Patent Judges.

JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1, 4, 5, 9, 10, and 12-16. Claims 2, 3, and 6-8 have been
indicated as containing allowable subject matter (Br. 4). We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants invented a method for drying printing ink on a substrate
that is moved through a printing press. A treatment agent is applied to the
substrate prior to applying the ink to accelerate drying the ink.1 Claim 1 is
illustrative:
1. A method for drying a printing ink on a printing substrate in a
printing press comprising the steps of:

using at least one printing ink to print on the printing substrate at a
first position of a path, the printing substrate being moved along the path
through the printing press; and

applying a treatment agent at a second position of the path the printing
substrate to accelerate drying of the printing ink on the printing substrate;
[sic]

the applying of the treatment agent at the second position occuring
before the printing at the first position.

The Examiner relies on the following prior art references to show
unpatentability:
Rodi US 5,115,741 May 26, 1992
Broder US 5,668,584 Sep. 16, 1997
Bär US 6,401,358 B1 Jun. 11, 2002
Jung US 2003/0066452 A1 Apr. 10, 2003
Doberenz US 2003/0071863 A1 Apr. 17, 2003
Wilbur US 2004/0189769 A1 Sep. 30, 2004
(filed Mar. 31, 2003)

1 See generally Spec. ¶¶ 0013-0027.
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1. Claims 1 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Wilbur and Jung.
2. Claims 1 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Jung and Broder.
3. Claims 9 and 10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Jung and Bär.
4. Claims 1 and 5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Doberenz and Jung.
5. Claims 12-16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Jung, Bär, and Rodi.
Rather than repeat the arguments of Appellants or the Examiner, we
refer to the Brief2 and the Answer for their respective details. In this
decision, we have considered only those arguments actually made by
Appellants. Arguments which Appellants could have made but did not make
in the Brief have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

OPINION
The Rejection of Claims 1 and 4 Over Wilbur and Jung
We first consider the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 1
and 4 over Wilbur and Jung. In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is
incumbent upon the Examiner to establish a factual basis to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073 (Fed. Cir.

2 We refer to the most recent Brief filed November 9, 2006 throughout this
opinion.
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1988). In so doing, the Examiner must make the factual determinations set
forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
Discussing the question of obviousness of a patent that claims a
combination of known elements, the Court in KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc., 127
S. Ct. 1727 (2007) explains:
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of
ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, §103
likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless
its actual application is beyond his or her skill. Sakraida [v. AG
Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976)] and Anderson's-Black Rock[,
Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)] are
illustrative—a court must ask whether the improvement is more
than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions.
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740. If the claimed subject matter cannot be fairly
characterized as involving the simple substitution of one known element for
another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art
ready for the improvement, a holding of obviousness can be based on a
showing that “there was an apparent reason to combine the known elements
in the fashion claimed.” Id. at 1740-41. Such a showing requires “some
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness. . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out
precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged
claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 1741 (quoting In re
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
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If the Examiner’s burden is met, the burden then shifts to the
Appellants to overcome the prima facie case with argument and/or evidence.
Obviousness is then determined on the basis of the evidence as a whole and
the relative persuasiveness of the arguments. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d
1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

Claim 1
Regarding independent claim 1, the Examiner's rejection essentially
finds that Wilbur teaches every claimed feature except for printing in a
printing press. The Examiner cites Jung as teaching this feature and
concludes that the claimed invention would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention in view of the collective
teachings of the references (Ans. 3-4).
Appellants argue that the Examiner’s interpretation of the term
“treatment agent” as including energy itself contradicts the Specification
which identifies the treatment agent as separate from energy. According to
Appellants, heat and radiation are not “treatment agents” as the term is
interpreted in light of the Specification. Appellants note that the
Specification describes “treatment agents” as physical substances deposited
on a printing substrate (Br. 9-10).
Appellants also argue that there is no motivation to combine Wilbur
with Jung since the devices are different and there is no teaching in either
reference that Jung would increase the speed of drying as asserted (Br. 10).
The Examiner contends that the term “treatment agent” is not limited
to physical substances, and can include radiant heat under the term’s
broadest reasonable interpretation. To support this assertion, the Examiner
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cites a dictionary definition of “agent” which defines the term as “a force or
substance that causes change.” The Examiner then relies on another
definition of “force” as “the capacity to do work or cause physical change.”
With these definitions, the Examiner concludes that heat is a “treatment
agent” since “heat is a force that causes change” (Ans. 8-9).
The issues before us, then, are (1) whether heat is a “treatment agent”
under the term’s broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the
Specification; (2) whether there is a reason to combine Jung and Wilbur to
arrive at the claimed invention; and (3) whether the cited prior art teaches or
suggests all limitations of independent claim 1.
For the following reasons, we answer the first question “no.”
However, because we answer the third question “yes” based on the teachings
of the Jung reference, it is dispositive to our decision regarding the
patentability of claim 1. Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, we also
answer “yes” to the second question.
In interpreting the term “treatment agent,” we first turn to Appellants’
Specification as it “is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed
term.”3 According to the Specification:
At a second position, a treatment agent is applied
to the printing substrate to accelerate the drying of
the printing ink on the printing substrate. In other
words, the treatment agent is used as a catalyst to
accelerate the drying of the printing ink on the
printing substrate or to accelerate the absorption of

3 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(“[T]he specification is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed
term, and…acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms in the claims
or when it defines them by implication.”) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
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energy, in particular as a direct catalyst, which
reduces the energy absorption required for drying
the printing ink.

(Spec. ¶ 0014; emphasis added)
In the next paragraph, the Specification indicates that “[t]he dosage
and composition of the treatment agent is to be selected as a function of the
printing substrate material, of the printing ink to be used in printing, and of
the processing parameters, application parameters, or process parameters”
(Spec. ¶ 0015; emphasis added). Additionally, the Specification notes the
following:
The treatment agent may also be a catalyst, in
particular a catalyst that is directly effective for the
energy absorption, or a reaction initiator….The
treatment agent may have a switching or triggering
function: Its action may be such that the effect on
the drying is first triggered in response to the
treatment agent interacting with the introduced
energy.

(Spec. ¶ 0018; emphasis added)
The clear import of this discussion is that the “treatment agent” is a
physical substance that is applied to the printing substrate and interacts with
introduced energy to accelerate the drying process, the dosage and
composition of which is selected based on the particular printing materials
and process parameters employed. That the Specification specifically refers
to the dosage and composition of the treatment agent only reinforces our
conclusion that it is a physical substance. Significantly, the Specification
clearly distinguishes the treatment agent from the introduced energy --
energy to which the treatment agent interacts to accelerate drying.
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In concluding that the recited “treatment agent” is a physical
substance, we acknowledge that we must give the term its broadest
reasonable interpretation in light of the Specification, and yet not
unnecessarily import limitations from the Specification into the claims.4
Nevertheless, we find the Specification’s clear description of the “treatment
agent” as a physical substance tantamount to an implicit definition of the
term.5 Therefore, our interpretation of the term “treatment agent” most
naturally aligns with the Specification and is therefore the appropriate
construction.6
With this interpretation, we turn to the prior art. Wilbur discloses a
printing system for drying ink on a printable medium with a movable print
head and at least one halogen lamp for irradiating the printable medium 22
and/or the platen 24 (Wilbur, Abstract). Heat is applied to the printable
medium before ink is deposited thereon (Wilbur, ¶¶ 0039-40; Figs. 2-3, 6).
It is undisputed that Wilbur does not apply a treatment agent in the
form of a physical substance. Rather, the Examiner takes the position that
the heat applied in Wilbur before printing is the “treatment agent.”

4 “[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of
the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to
those embodiments...[C]laims may embrace different subject matter than is
illustrated in the specific embodiments in the specification.” Phillips, 415
F.3d at 1323 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
5 See id. at 1321 (noting that the specification “acts as a dictionary when it
expressly defines terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by
implication.”).
6 See id. at 1316 (“The construction that stays true to the claim language and
most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will be, in
the end, the correct construction.”) (citations omitted).
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But as we noted above, we do not agree that this interpretation of
“treatment agent” reasonably comports with the Specification’s implicit
definition of the term which requires a physical substance. Consequently,
we find the Examiner’s reliance on Wilbur problematic. Nevertheless, Jung
not only teaches applying a treatment agent in the form of a physical
substance in the manner claimed, but also teaches or suggests all other
limitations of claim 1.
Jung discloses a rotary printing machine with plural printing units. In
one embodiment, two identical printing units I are disposed adjacent to each
other. In this arrangement, the substrate to be printed first passes through
the rightmost printing unit (“the upstream printing unit”), and then passes
through the leftmost printing unit (“the downstream printing unit”). As
shown in Figure 2, each printing unit I comprises (1) inked cylinders 1, 2;
(2) applicator device 7 for applying a catalyst mixture to the printing
material; and (3) a dryer device 8 located downstream from the applicator
device (Jung, ¶¶ 0018, 0023-28; Fig. 2). With this arrangement, the printing
ink is applied before the catalyst mixture in each printing unit I. However,
the catalyst mixture may also be applied together with the ink (Jung, ¶¶
0031-36).
Turning to the language of claim 1, we first note that the catalyst
mixture applied to the substrate in Jung fully meets a “treatment agent” as
claimed. As Jung indicates, the catalyst mixture accelerates the breakdown
of inhibitors in the ink which ultimately accelerates the drying time (Jung, ¶¶
0007, 0026). While this treatment agent is applied after applying the
printing ink (or together with the ink) in each printing unit I, the scope of
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claim 1 nonetheless does not preclude the overall functionality of both
printing units operating together as shown in Figure 2.
That is, nothing in claim 1 precludes the recited “first position” in
Jung as corresponding to the ink applied via cylinders 1, 2 in the
downstream printing unit I. Nor does the scope and breadth of claim 1
preclude the recited “second position” in Jung as corresponding to the
application of the catalyst mixture in the upstream printing unit I. With this
interpretation, the treatment agent in Jung would therefore be applied before
printing at the “first position.”
Since we find that Jung fully meets the limitations of claim 1, we will
sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of that claim based on the
collective teachings of the cited prior art.7

Claim 4
We also are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the collective
teachings of the cited prior art do not disclose or suggest drying at a
“chronologically later point in time” as set forth in claim 4 (Br. 10). We first
note that the substrate in Jung is dried by a dryer device 8 located in the
downstream printing unit I. Since this drying unit is located downstream
from the inked cylinders and the applicator device (i.e., at a third
downstream position), drying would therefore occur at a later point in time
with respect to the printing and catalyst application steps.

7 See In re Meyer, 599 F.2d 1026, 1031 (CCPA 1979) (noting that
obviousness rejections can be based on references that happen to anticipate
the claimed subject matter).
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While Jung is short on specifics regarding the dryer device 8, it is
nonetheless described as a “thermally active” dryer device that is adjacent to
-- and at a distance from -- the cylinder 2 (Jung, ¶ 0022). In our view,
utilizing radiant energy sources in connection with such a dryer device
would have been well within the level of ordinarily skilled artisans,
particularly in view of Wilbur’s stated preference for such sources to dry
ink. See, e.g., Wilbur, ¶¶ 0036-0040, 0053-54. Moreover, as the Examiner
indicates (Ans. 10), Wilbur teaches using radiant energy sources both before
and after printing, and we find this teaching would have been reasonably
applicable to the ink dryer device of Jung.
In light of these teachings, we find that using radiant energy sources
for the subsequent drying step at the recited “third position” in Jung would
have been well within the level of ordinary skill in the art and tantamount to
the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions -- an obvious improvement. See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740.
For the foregoing reasons, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 4.

The Rejection of Claims 1 and 4 Over Jung and Broder
We will also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 based on the
disclosure of Jung for the reasons previously discussed. While we consider
the Examiner’s perceived difference between Jung and the claimed invention
(Ans. 4) problematic, we nonetheless find that Jung discloses all limitations
of claim 1. Our previous discussion regarding the disclosure of Jung applies
equally here and we therefore incorporate that discussion by reference. We
therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 on that basis.
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Regarding claim 4, while Appellants nominally indicate that the claim
is argued separately (Br. 11), Appellants present no substantive arguments or
explanation why this claim is separately patentable apart from its
dependence from claim 1. Nevertheless, we agree with the Examiner (Ans.
11) that radiant energy sources in Broder are used to heat the substrate after
printing (Broder, Abstract; col. 6, ll. 14-16; col. 6, l. 50 - col. 7, l. 6; Figs. 1
and 2).
We also find that this teaching is reasonably applicable to the ink
dryer device of Jung. As we noted previously, using radiant energy sources
for the subsequent drying step at the recited “third position” in Jung would
have been well within the level of ordinary skill in the art and tantamount to
the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions -- an obvious improvement. See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740.
For the foregoing reasons, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1 and 4 over the collective teachings of the cited prior art.

The Rejection of Claims 9 and 10 Over Jung and Bär
Regarding representative claim 9,8 the Examiner finds that Jung
discloses all of the claimed subject matter including a conditioning apparatus
that applies a treatment agent accelerating drying. The Examiner, however,
notes that Jung does not disclose the drying device including at least one
narrow-band radiant energy source emitting light of one wavelength in the
near-infrared (near-IR) region as claimed. The Examiner cites Bär as

8 Appellants argue claims 9 and 10 together as a group. See Br. 11-12.
Accordingly, we select claim 9 as representative. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

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teaching such a feature and concludes the claimed invention would have
been obvious to ordinarily skilled artisans in view of these collective
teachings (Ans. 5-6).
Appellants first argue that Jung does not disclose a conditioning
apparatus including a narrow-band radiant energy source emitting light of
one wavelength. Appellants also argue that Bär also does not disclose a
narrow-band radiant energy source, but rather a halogen light source.
Appellants further note that the specified wavelength range in Bär has
several absorption bands and is not light of one wavelength as claimed (Br.
12).
The Examiner maintains that Bär discloses a narrow-band radiant
energy source that is said to have a wavelength emission maximum of 0.8 to
2.0 µm. Although the Examiner acknowledges that Bär does not specifically
state the bandwidth of such emissions, the Examiner nonetheless takes the
position that even a 2.0 µm bandwidth is “narrow-band” given the current
state of the art (Ans. 11-12).
The issue before us, then, is whether the collective teachings of Jung
and Bär reasonably teach or suggest a narrow-band radiant energy source
emitting light of one wavelength in the near-IR region as claimed. For the
following reasons, we answer this question “yes.”
At the outset, our previous discussion pertaining to the disclosure of
Jung applies equally here and we therefore incorporate that discussion by
reference. We further note that, unlike the previous rejections relying on
Jung, we are in substantial agreement with the Examiner’s interpretation of
Jung as articulated in this rejection, as well as the perceived differences
between Jung and the claimed invention (Ans. 5).
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Turning to the language of claim 9, we note that the scope and breadth
of the last clause of the claim is not limited to the energy source emitting
only one wavelength of light in the near-IR region. Rather, the claim merely
calls for the energy source to emit light of one wavelength in the near-IR
region: a limitation that does not preclude additional wavelengths so long as
one wavelength falls within the near-IR region.
Indeed, Appellants’ Specification all but confirms this point.
According to the Specification, “[t]he radiant energy source should emit one
wavelength that corresponds to the absorption of the infrared absorber, or a
plurality of wavelengths that correspond to the absorption of the infrared
absorber, in particular only this one or this plurality of wavelengths” (Spec.
¶ 0027; emphasis added).
The clear import of this discussion is that emitting light of one
wavelength in the desired region is a distinct embodiment from emitting
light at multiple wavelengths in that region. Further, the Specification
implies that emitting only one wavelength in the desired region is a preferred
implementation of the first embodiment (emitting one wavelength of light in
the desired region). See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 0029 (describing embodiment of
energy source where emissions can occur at four wavelengths in a desired
region (870 nm, 1050 nm, 1250 nm, and 1600 nm respectively)). Thus, the
fact that claim 9 did not specifically recite emitting only one wavelength in
the near-IR region therefore evidences an apparent intent to not be limited to
such a preferred embodiment.
With this interpretation, we turn to the disclosure of Bär. It is
undisputed that Bär discloses a drying device that emits radiation in the
near-IR region, in particular radiation with wavelength emission maximum
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of 0.8 to 2.0 µm (Bär, col. 2, ll. 53-63; col. 5, ll. 10-21; col. 6, ll. 28-34; Fig.
2). Since at least one emitted wavelength falls within the near-IR region, the
energy source therefore emits radiation of one wavelength in this region.
Bär is silent regarding the bandwidth of these emissions, however. To
interpret the term “narrow-band radiant energy source,” we once again turn
to Appellants’ Specification for guidance. According to the Specification,
“[i]n one advantageous embodiment, the radiant energy source is a narrow-
band source: In this case, the radiant energy source may emit, for example,
up to + 50 nm width, preferably less than + 50 nm width about a
wavelength….” (Spec. ¶ 0029; emphasis added).
Although the specific bandwidth of + 50 nm is discussed in
connection with a narrow-band radiant energy source, based on the passage
taken as a whole, such a range is merely an exemplary embodiment of such
an energy source. Such a preferred embodiment by no means imparts a
limitation on the broadest reasonable interpretation of a “narrow-band
radiant energy source.”
Notwithstanding Bär’s silence regarding the bandwidth of the radiant
energy emissions, Bär does indicate that a spectral filter can be disposed
between the halogen line-sources 10 and the substance to be dried (Bär, col.
6, ll. 32-34). As is well known in the art, spectral filters can narrow the
emissions of radiant energy to particular narrow bands of wavelengths.
Indeed, Appellants’ own Specification evidences this point. See Spec.
¶ 0034 (noting that broadband light sources with suitable filter systems can
be used in lieu of lasers to provide a narrow-band radiant energy source). In
our view, using such a filter in Bär to provide a narrow-band energy source
would have been well within the level of ordinary skill in the art and
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tantamount to the predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions -- an obvious improvement. See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at
1740.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants have not persuaded us of error
in the Examiner’s rejection of representative claim 9. Therefore, we will
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of that claim, and claim 10 which falls with
claim 9.

The Rejection of Claims 1 and 5 Over Doberenz and Jung
We will also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 5 over
the collective teachings of Doberenz and Jung. While we find the
Examiner’s reliance on the printer peripheral of Doberenz as well as curing
the deficiencies of Doberenz via the disclosure of Jung (Ans. 6-7)
problematic, we nevertheless find that the disclosure of Jung discloses all
limitations of claim 1 as we indicated previously. Our previous discussion
pertaining to the disclosure of Jung applies equally here and we therefore
incorporate that discussion by reference.
Regarding claim 5, the Examiner is correct (Ans. 13) that Jung’s
treatment agent is a mixture. See, e.g., Jung ¶ 0026 (referring to a catalyst
mixture). Although the Examiner has not clearly shown that such a mixture
inherently includes a binding agent to bind the mixture as the Examiner
asserts, Appellants nonetheless have not rebutted this assertion apart from
merely asserting that Jung does not disclose the limitations of claim 5 (Br.
14). Such summary assertions fall well short of persuasively rebutting the
Examiner’s prima facie case of obviousness or showing error in the
Examiner’s position.
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In any event, we note that the purpose of the catalyst mixture is to
accelerate the breakdown of the inhibitors in the ink which accelerates the
crosslinking process. This reaction ultimately accelerates the drying process
(Jung, ¶¶ 0002; 0026; 0031). In our view, the fact that a chemical reaction
occurs between the catalyst mixture and the ink to break down the ink’s
inhibitors in Jung suggests that some sort of chemical binding occurs
between the respective compounds in the ink and the catalyst. Therefore,
ordinarily skilled artisans would recognize that the catalyst mixture would
reasonably include a binding agent to facilitate this reaction.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants have not persuaded us of error
in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 5 based on the collective
teachings of the cited prior art. Therefore, we will sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of those claims.

The Rejection of Claims 12-16 Over Jung, Bär, and Rodi
Regarding claims 12-16, the Examiner adds the disclosure of Rodi for
teaching a laser light source and multiple radiant energy sources arranged as
claimed (Ans. 7-8). With respect to representative claim 12, Appellants
argue that the lasers in Rodi are in the ultraviolet (UV) range -- not the IR
range -- and therefore teach away from the near-IR region as claimed (Br.
14). Appellants add that there is no motivation or teaching to use Rodi’s
lasers to modify Jung or Bär. According to Appellants, the Examiner’s
proffered motivation of providing sufficient heat via a new heat source is
based on hindsight since Jung already provides sufficient heat (Id.).
The Examiner notes that Rodi was not relied upon for the particular
wavelength range emitted by the laser sources in the reference, but rather the
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general teaching of using lasers which provide, among other things, a very
confined beam (Ans. 14).
We will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 12 essentially for
the reasons indicated by the Examiner. As the Examiner indicates, skilled
artisans would understand that lasers have a very confined beam of radiation
as compared to other radiation sources. As such, skilled artisans would
recognize that lasers would therefore facilitate irradiation of only those areas
of the substrate that need to be irradiated (i.e., for drying ink), while
avoiding irradiating other parts of the substrate. See Rodi, col. 3, ll. 15-22.
Such a technique would, among other things, minimize collateral radiation
(and possible damage) to areas that were not intended to be irradiated.
This teaching, in our view, would have been readily applicable to the
ink drying apparatus of Jung and Bär. While Rodi does teach that the lasers
are in the UV range, they are so employed due to the particular type of ink
used (UV ink) that dries without unnecessary heating (Rodi, col. 2, ll. 54-
62). However, Rodi also teaches that the radiation source is selected in
accordance with at least one characteristic of an ink to be dried (Rodi, col. 3,
ll. 44-48). In our view, selecting a radiation source in the near-IR region that
is commensurate with ink whose drying characteristics (i.e., radiant energy
absorption, etc.) were likewise optimized for near-IR wavelengths would
have been well within the level of ordinary skill in the art and tantamount to
the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions -- an obvious improvement. See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740.
Regarding claims 14-16, Appellants reiterate that there is no
motivation to use Rodi’s lasers to modify the cited prior art (Br. 15).
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However, we are not persuaded by this argument for the reasons noted above
and find ample reason to combine the references’ teachings.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants have not persuaded us of error
in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 12-16. Therefore, we will sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of those claims.

DECISION
We have sustained the Examiner's rejections with respect to all claims
on appeal. Therefore, the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 4, 5, 9, 10,
and 12-16 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

tdl

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