Ex Parte Pisau

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 20, 2018

14132970 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 20, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/132,970 12/18/2013
117548 7590 04/24/2018
Murphy, Bilak & Homiller/Omron
1255 Crescent Green
Suite 200
Cary, NC 27518
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Lucretiu Pisau
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
1038-0003 7784
EXAMINER
ALMO, KHAREEM E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2842
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/24/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
official@mbhiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte LUCRETIU PISAU
Appeal2017-007042
Application 14/132,970
Technology Center 2800
Before ROMULO H. DELMENDO, CHRISTOPHER C. KENNEDY, and
SHELDON M. McGEE, Administrative Patent Judges.
DELMENDO, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
The Applicant (hereinafter "Appellant") 1 appeals under 35 U.S.C.
§ 134(a) from the Primary Examiner's final decision to reject claims 1-8 and
13-19. 2, 3 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
1 The Appellant is the Applicant, "Omron Automotive Electronics, Inc.,"
which, according to the Brief, is the real party in interest (Appeal Brief filed
June 6, 2016, hereinafter "Appeal Br.," 2).
2 Appeal Br. 2, 5-19; Reply Brief filed March 31, 2017, hereinafter "Reply
Br.," 2-9; Final Office Action entered December 3, 2015, hereinafter "Final
Act.," 2-8; Examiner's Answer entered January 31, 2017, hereinafter
"Ans.," 2-13.
3 The remaining pending claims (i.e., claims 9-12, 20, and 21) are objected
to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim but are indicated as
allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of
the base claim and any intervening claims (Final Act. 8-9).
Appeal2017-007042
Application 14/132,970
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The subject matter on appeal relates to a switching circuit for
switching a power transistor configured to switch a current through an
external resistive load (Specification filed December 18, 2013, hereinafter
"Spec.," i-f 6). Figure 1, which is reproduced from the application below, is
illustrative:
CONTROL
CIRCUIT
l!l
FIG.1
c
Figure 1 above depicts a switching circuit 10 including: a transistor 12 for
switching a current through a load 14; a compensation capacitor 16 with a
first time constant for turning on the transistor 12 when a first source
resistance 30-1 is selected and a second time constant for turning off the
transistor 12 when a second source resistance 30-2 is selected; and a control
circuit 26 configured to control a slew rate of the current through the load by
selecting either the first source resistance 30-1 or the second source
resistance 30-2 (id. i-f 14 ).
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Application 14/132,970
Representative claim 1 is reproduced from the Corrected Claims
Appendix to the Appeal Brief filed January 19, 2017, with key limitations
emphasized, as follows:
1. A switching circuit comprising:
a transistor for switching a current through an external resistive
load;
a compensation capacitor external to the transistor and coupled
between a first terminal and a second terminal of the
transistor, wherein the first terminal is a gate or a base
terminal of the transistor and the second terminal is a drain
or a collector terminal of the transistor; and
a control circuit coupled to the first terminal of the transistor
through a selectable source resistance, said control
circuit configured to control a slew rate of the current
through the load by selecting a first source resistance that
in combination with the compensation capacitor yields a
first time constant for turning the transistor on, and
selecting a second source resistance that in combination
with the compensation capacitor yields a second time
constant for turning the transistor off.
II. REJECTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, the Examiner maintains several rejections, as follows:
A. Claims 7 and 8 under AIA 35 U.S.C. § l 12(b) as indefinite;
B. Claims 1-5, 7, 8, and 13-18 under AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(l)
as anticipated by Rodgers et al. 4 (hereinafter "Rodgers"); and
C. Claims 6 and 19 under AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Rodgers in view of Lou. 5
(Ans. 2-13; Final Act. 2-8.)
4 US 2007/0285854 Al, published December 13, 2007.
5 US 2006/0044007 Al, published March 2, 2006.
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Application 14/132,970
III. DISCUSSION
Rejection A (Indefiniteness). Claim 7 recites (Corrected Claims
Appendix; emphasis added):
The switching circuit of claim 1, wherein a threshold
voltage of the transistor is positioned asymmetrically with
respect to first and second control voltages output by the
control circuit for transistor tum on and tum off, respectively,
and wherein the first and second source resistances are sized to
yield different first and second time constants that compensate
for said asymmetrical positioning.
Claim 8 depends from claim 7 (id.).
The Examiner determines that claim 7 and 8 are indefinite because "it
is unclear as to the meaning of 'a threshold voltage of the transistor is
positioned asymmetrically with respect to first and second control voltages
output"' (Ans. 2). Specifically, the Examiner states that "[a]lthough
symmetry implies congruence, it may also imply equivalence thus giving
asymmetry the two definitions of non-congruence and non-equivalence" (id.
at 8-9).
The Appellant contends that, when read in light of the Specification,
"[ c ]laim 7 has only one plausible construction for what it means for the
threshold voltage of the (switching) transistor to be positioned
asymmetrically with respect to the first and second control voltages output
by the control circuit for transistor tum on and tum off, respectively"-i.e.,
"[ n ]amely, that the threshold voltage is not equidistant to the two control
voltages" (Appeal Br. 5---6).
We agree with the Appellant. "[C]laims are required to be cast in
clear-as opposed to ambiguous, vague, indefinite-terms" as "[i]t is the
claims that notify the public of what is within the protections of the patent,
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Appeal2017-007042
Application 14/132,970
and what is not." In re Packard, 751F.3d1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014). "At
the same time, this requirement is not a demand for unreasonable precision."
Id. "'If the claims, read in the light of the specifications, reasonably apprise
those skilled in the art both of the utilization and scope of the invention, and
if the language is as precise as the subject matter permits, the courts can
demand no more."' Id. (quoting Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. US. Plywood
Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 136 (2d Cir.1958)). See also In re Moore, 439 F.2d
1232, 1047 (CCPA 1971) ("[T]he definiteness of the language employed
must be analyzed-not in a vacuum, but always in light of the teachings of
the prior art and of the particular application disclosure as it would be
interpreted by one possessing the ordinary level of skill in the pertinent
art.").
Applying these principles, we find that, when read in light of the
Specification, the disputed language does not render the claim indefinite. As
the Appellant points out (Appeal Br. 5), the Specification reasonably
informs one skilled in the relevant art that the term "threshold voltage" is the
minimum voltage at which the transistor turns on or begins conducting
(Spec. i-f 40). To illustrate, the Specification exemplifies a transistor
threshold voltage of 1.5 VDC in the situation where the control circuit
operates with supply rails of +5VDC and OVDC (id.). The Specification
explains that "[t]his asymmetrical positioning means that the compensation
capacitor 16 has to discharge further for turning off the transistor 12 than it
has to charge for turning on the transistor 12" (id.; bolding added). The
Examiner does not direct us to any description that would indicate that a
person skilled in the art would have given the disputed language a broader
meaning or an interpretation different from that provided in paragraph 40.
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Application 14/132,970
Therefore, we agree with the Appellant that the disputed claim language has
only one plausible interpretation-"[ n ]amely, that the threshold voltage is
not equidistant to the two control voltages" (Appeal Br. 6).
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection.
Rejection B (Anticipation). The Appellant provides arguments under
various subheadings identified by claim(s) (Appeal Br. 7-19). Unless
argued separately pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv), all claims stand or
fall with claim 1, which we select as representative pursuant to the rule.
The Examiner finds that Rodgers describes every limitation recited in
clam 1 (Ans. 3--4; Final Act. 2--4). In support, the Examiner relies on
Rodgers's Figure 7 (Ans. 3).
The Appellant alleges three errors in the Examiner's rejection. First,
the Appellant contends that Rodgers describes a trigger circuit, but that it is
not a switching circuit for switching current through an external resistive
load by turning a transistor on and off (Appeal Br. 9). Specifically, the
Appellant argues that, contrary to the Examiner's finding, load resistor RL in
Rodgers' s Figure 7 is not an "external resistive load" as required by claim 1
(id.). Second, the Appellant argues that "Rodgers does not control any slew
rate (voltage or current) but rather focuses on setting the sensitivity of a
detection circuit to voltage slew rates, so that the circuit only responds to
voltage slew rates at or above a certain level" (id. at 10). Third, the
Appellant argues that Rodgers's fuses Fl-F4 are not a "control circuit" as
recited in claim 1 (id.). According to the Appellant, "Rodgers does not
suggest that the fuse settings change dynamically during operation of the
trigger circuit" (id.).
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Appeal2017-007042
Application 14/132,970
The Appellant's arguments fail to identify any reversible error in the
Examiner's rejection. In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Rodgers describes a circuit for protecting integrated circuit
components from damage caused by high slew rate, overvoltage, and/or
overcurrent conditions, such as those caused by electrostatic discharge
(ESD) (Rodgers i-fi-12, 5). According to Rodgers, "a control circuit is used
to activate the tum on of certain devices (e.g., ESD clamps), which conduct
the ESD current through an actively switched network" (id. i-f 13; emphases
added). Rodgers teaches that the control circuit is commonly called an
"ESD trigger circuit" and "is capable of differentiating between normal
operation of the integrated circuit and an ESD event" (id.). Rodgers teaches
that, for example, the ESD protection device may include a shunting device
and the ESD trigger circuit to redirect current away from the sensitive circuit
components during an ESD event (id. i120).
Rodgers' s Figure 7 is reproduced below:
FIG. 7
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Application 14/132,970
Rodgers' s Figure 7 above, which is a modification of the circuit
described in Figure 3, depicts a simplified diagram for an improved ESD
trigger circuit that may be included in an ESD protection device as shown in
Figure 2, which is labeled as prior art (id. i-fi-137, 59). Rodgers teaches that
the improved ESD trigger circuit 700 includes a slew rate detector 710, a
pulse generator 720 including transistor Ml, and an output driver 730
including transistor M2, wherein the slew rate detector 710 has a plurality of
resistors Rl-R4, a plurality of capacitors Cl---C3, and "a plurality of fuses
[Fl-F4] for programmably altering the RC time constant associated
therewith" (id. i-fi-1 59---62; emphasis added).
Rodgers discloses that "the trigger circuit operates by comparing a
first voltage signal V(SRour) to a first threshold voltage (Vth(Ml)), and a
second voltage signal V(VCC, PGour) to a second threshold voltage
(Vth(M2))" and that "[i]fV(VCC, PGour)>=Vth(M2), PFET [transistor] M2
is activated and a pulse of current is generated at the drain of PFET M2,"
which "generates a voltage pulse across the load resistance (RL) arranged at
the output pin (TRIG_ OUT) of the ESD trigger circuit" (id. i-fi-153-54).
Rodgers further teaches that depending on the fuses used and resistance
values, "one or more of the fuses may be activated (in the case of a
normally-open fuse) or deactivated (in the case of a normally-closed fuse) to
reduce the RC time constant by effectively removing one or more resistors
from the resistor string" (id. i162). According to Rodgers, the fuses may be
one-time programmable or reprogrammable (e.g., FRAM, MRAM, phase
change memory cells, or SONOS and flash memory cells) (id. i1 66).
Rodgers explains that the trigger circuit 700 is an improvement that provides
"programmable means for altering the RC time constant of the Slew Rate
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Appeal2017-007042
Application 14/132,970
Detector, and therefore, modifying the sensitivity of the ESD protection
device to ESD events" (id. i-f 67).
Given Rodgers's explanations regarding Figure 7, which the
Examiner relies on, we discern no reversible error in the Examiner's
rejection based on the Appellant's arguments. Regarding the first alleged
error (i.e., that Rodgers's trigger circuit is not a switching circuit because
load resistance RL is not an "external resistive load" as recited in claim 1 ),
we agree with the Examiner's analysis as set forth in the Answer at page 9.
As the Examiner explains (Ans. 9), Rodgers's trigger circuit is a switching
circuit because transistors Ml and M2 switch on and off depending on the
input at the gate (Rodgers i-fi-153-54). Furthermore, Rodgers's external load
RL as shown in Figure 7 is external to other components of the trigger circuit
in a manner that is consistent with the circuit layout as claimed and disclosed
in the current application (Fig. 1 ). Alternatively, we find no error in the
Examiner's determination (Ans. 9) that the "external resistive load" as
specified in claim 1 also reads on the load "downstream" of "TRIG_ OUT"
as shown in Rodgers's Figure 7.
Regarding the alleged second error (that "Rodgers does not control
any slew rate (voltage or current) but rather focuses on setting the sensitivity
of a detection circuit to voltage slew rates, so that the circuit only responds
to voltage slew rates at or above a certain level" (Appeal Br. 10)), Rodgers
plainly teaches controlling slew rate by protecting sensitive circuit
components from high slew rate, overvoltage, and/or overcurrent conditions
(Rodgers i-fi-12, 20, 44, 62).
Regarding the alleged third error (that Rodgers's fuses Fl-F4 are not
a control circuit), "we look to the [S]pecification to see if it provides a
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Application 14/132,970
definition for claim terms, but otherwise apply a broad interpretation." In re
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Here, the Appellant does not direct us to any description in the
Specification to indicate that the term "control circuit" must be narrowly
construed to exclude the control circuit as disclosed in Rodgers (id. i-fi-f 13,
62). Indeed, contrary to the Appellant's position, the Specification places no
limits on the devices that constitute a "control circuit" (Spec. i127; bolding
added) ("control circuit 26 is based on non-computer circuitry in some
embodiments, e.g., simple programmable logic devices or even discrete
transistor circuits"). Therefore, nothing in the appeal record supports the
Appellant's bare assertion that Rodgers does not describe a "control circuit"
as required by claim 1.
Regarding the Appellant's argument that Rodgers does not suggest
changing the fuse settings dynamically during operation (Appeal Br. 10), we
agree with the Examiner (Ans. 10) that claim 1 does not require dynamic
control. To the contrary, the current Specification describes dynamic control
for "some embodiments"-not all embodiments within the broad scope of
claim 1. In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (The
"name of the game is the claim" and unclaimed features cannot impart
patentability to claims).
For these reasons, we uphold Rejection Bas entered against claim 1.
The Appellant's arguments for certain other claims (Appeal Br. 12-
19) are based on the same or similar arguments already found unpersuasive
for claim 1. Therefore, we do not address them separately.
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Application 14/132,970
Rejection C (Obviousness). The Appellant does not appear to contest
Rejection C (Appeal Br. 5, 7-19). Therefore, we sustain Rejection C for the
reasons of record.
IV. SUMMARY
Rejection A is not sustained. Rejections Band Care sustained.
Therefore, the Examiner's final decision to reject claims 1-8 and 13-19 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED
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