Ex Parte Phillips

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 28, 2017

13004386 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 28, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/004,386 01/11/2011 Anthony Mark Phillips 83161389 1417
28395 7590 10/02/2017
RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET EXAMINER
1000 TOWN CENTER ZALESKAS, JOHNM
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3747
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/02/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ANTHONY MARK PHILLIPS
Appeal 2016-002138
Application 13/004,386
Technology Center 3700
Before CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, and
AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges.
MURPHY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
The Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s
rejections of claims 1—7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, and 17—20. We have jurisdiction
over this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 “The real party in interest is Ford Global Technologies, LLC.” (Appeal
Br. 2.)
Appeal 2016-002138
Application 13/004,386
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant’s invention “relates to an engine start/stop system.”
(Spec. 1,1.7.)
Illustrative Claim
1. A method of controlling a vehicle including an
internal combustion engine, a starter that engages with the
engine to start the engine, and at least one sensor for detecting
roadway information, the method comprising:
detecting roadway information with the at least one
sensor while the vehicle is moving and the engine is running;
determining an engine shutdown condition including an
adaptive vehicle speed threshold, while the vehicle is moving,
based on the roadway information, vehicle speed and
driver behavior, wherein the adaptive vehicle speed threshold
increases or decreases as the driver behavior changes; and
stopping the engine while the vehicle is moving in the
presence of the engine shutdown condition including the
vehicle speed being less than the adaptive vehicle speed
threshold.
References
Scholt US 2005/0143901 A1
Tanaka US 2007/0035416 A1
De Mersseman US 7,404,784 B2
Jasem US 7,469,767 B2
June 30, 2005
Feb. 15,2007
July 29, 2008
Dec. 30, 2008
Rejections
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 14, 15, and 17—20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over De Mersseman and Scholt. (Final
Action 4.)
The Examiner rejects claims 3, 6, 7, and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over De Mersseman, Scholt, and Tanaka. (Final Action 9.)
The Examiner rejects claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over De Mersseman, Scholt, and Jasem. (Final Action 13.)
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Application 13/004,386
ANALYSIS
Claims 1,18, and 19 are the independent claims on appeal, with the
rest of the claims on appeal (i.e., claims 2—7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, and 20)
depending therefrom. (Appeal Br., Claims App.) Independent claim 1
recites a method of “controlling a vehicle” including an “engine,”
independent claim 18 recites a method of “controlling an engine” of a
“vehicle,” and independent claim 19 recites a “vehicle” including an
“engine.” (Id.)
Independent claims 1,18, and 19 also recite limitations involving an
engine “shutdown condition,” an “adaptive vehicle speed threshold,” and
“driver behavior.” (Appeal Br., Claims App.) More particularly, these
independent claims specify that the engine shutdown condition includes
“vehicle speed being less than [the] adaptive vehicle speed threshold,” and
they specify that the adaptive vehicle speed threshold “increases or
decreases as the driver behavior changes.” (Id.)
The Examiner finds that De Mersseman discloses “controlling an
engine shutdown on the basis of a determination that the vehicle speed is
less than a vehicle speed threshold.” (Final Action 5, emphasis omitted.)
Thus, according to the Examiner’s findings, the engine-shutdown
determination in De Mersseman is based on the comparison of an actual
operating parameter (e.g., vehicle speed) to a corresponding predetermined
threshold (e.g., the vehicle speed threshold).
The Examiner also finds that Scholt discloses “controlling the engine
to automatically stop” upon “elapse” of a delay time. (Final Action 5,
emphasis omitted.) Scholt discloses automatically stopping the engine “after
a predetermined stopping delay,” if certain “stopping conditions] are
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Application 13/004,386
present.” (Scholt | 5.) These stopping conditions relate to actual operating
conditions of the vehicle and include, for example, the brake pressure being
applied. (See id. 15, 29, Fig. 3.) Thus, the engine-shutdown determination
in Scholt is based on the comparison of an actual operating parameter (e.g.,
time elapsed since brake pressure was applied) and a corresponding
predetermined threshold (stopping delay).
As indicated above, the recited threshold is an “adaptive” threshold.
(Appeal Br., Claims App.) The Examiner finds that Scholt teaches “an
adaptive delay time.” (Final Action 5, emphasis omitted.) Scholt teaches
that advantages can be achieved by “adapting the stopping delay to the
actual driver of the motor vehicle.” (Scholt 113.) Thus, Scholt teaches that,
when engine shutdown is based on the comparison of an actual operating
parameter to a corresponding predetermined threshold, this threshold can be
advantageously adapted to the driver of the motor vehicle.
As also indicated above, the recited adaptive threshold “increases or
decreases as the driver behavior changes.” (Appeal Br., Claims App.) The
Examiner finds that Scholt teaches an adaptive threshold (i.e., a variable
stopping delay time) based on a “driver-type classification system” that
corresponds to “driver behaviors.” (Final Action 2, 5.) Scholt discloses that
its adaptive threshold (i.e., the predetermined stopping delay) increases or
decreases depending on whether a driver is categorized as a “vigorous”
driver or a “cautious” driver. (Scholt 126.)
The Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art to modify “De Mersseman with the teachings of
Scholt to enable increasing or decreasing the vehicle speed threshold of the
engine shutdown condition as the driver behavior changes.” (Final
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Application 13/004,386
Action 6.) The Examiner explains that applying Scholt’s adaptive
“technique” would result in a vehicle being “more adaptive to the different
driving behaviors of different drivers when determining whether to
automatically stop an internal combustion engine while the vehicle is
moving.” {Id. at 3.)
The Appellant argues that the Examiner has not sufficiently
established that the methods and vehicle recited in the independent claims
would have been obvious over De Mersseman and Scholt. (See Appeal
Br. 3^4; see also Reply Br. 2.)
The Appellant does not appear to challenge the Examiner’s position
that one of ordinary skill in the art, when seeking to improve engine-
shutdown determinations, would have considered and combined the
teachings of De Mersseman and Scholt. (See Appeal Br. 3 4.) Rather, the
Appellant’s arguments are premised primarily on the combined teachings of
the prior art producing an engine-shutdown condition involving an adaptive
“time delay” threshold, not an adaptive “vehicle speed” threshold. (See id.)
For example, the Appellant asserts that “Scholt changes the time period
associated with its stopping delays, which has nothing to do with increasing
or decreasing a vehicle speed threshold.” {Id. at 4.) The Appellant also
contends that providing De Mersseman with Scholt’s variable stopping delay
would not be equivalent to providing it with an adaptive vehicle speed
threshold. {See Reply Br. 2.)
We are unpersuaded by the Appellant’s arguments because, as noted
by the Examiner, the rejection is based on “the combined teachings of the
references.” (Answer 13—14.) The Appellant’s position that neither
reference individually discloses, precisely, an adaptive vehicle speed
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threshold is not disputed in the record. (See, e.g., Answer 13, 16.) But the
Examiner “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific
subject matter of the challenged claim” as “the inferences and creative steps
that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ” can be taken into
account. KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
As discussed above, De Mersseman discloses that a vehicle speed
threshold can be used in an engine-shutoff determination; and Scholt teaches
that an adaptive threshold (based on driver behavior) can be advantageously
used in an engine shut-off determination. We agree with the Examiner’s
implication that one of ordinary skill in the art, when seeking to improve an
engine-shutdown determination, would infer from these combined teachings
that advantages could be achieved by adapting a vehicle speed threshold to
the actual driver of the motor vehicle. Insofar as a “time delay” threshold is
not precisely equivalent to a “vehicle speed” threshold, we agree with the
Examiner that both these parameters correspond to driver-applied braking,
and that one of ordinary skill would appreciate this correspondence when
seeking to improve an engine-shutoff determination. (See, e.g., Answer 18.)
We therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1, 18, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
De Mersseman and Scholt. As the Appellant does not argue the dependent
claims separately (see Appeal Br. 5), we likewise sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of dependent claims 2, 5, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over De Mersseman and Scholt; the Examiner’s
rejection of dependent claims 3, 6, 7, and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over De Mersseman, Scholt, and Tanaka; and the Examiner’s
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rejection of dependent claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over De Mersseman, Scholt, and Jasem.
DECISION
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15,
and 17—20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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