Ex Parte PetronelliDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesJul 18, 201211182895 (B.P.A.I. Jul. 18, 2012) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/182,895 07/15/2005 Anthony Paul Petronelli 130332.00332 2728 82744 7590 07/19/2012 AT&T Legal Department - JW Attn: Patent Docketing Room 2A-207 One AT&T Way Bedminster, NJ 07921 EXAMINER D AGOSTA, STEPHEN M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2617 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/19/2012 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES ____________ Ex parte ANTHONY PAUL PETRONELLI ____________ Appeal 2010-000955 Application 11/182,895 Technology Center 2600 ____________ Before JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO, BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, and BRUCE R. WINSOR, Administrative Patent Judges. RUGGIERO, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final Rejection of claims 1-15, 17-19, 21, and 22, which are all of the pending claims. Claims 16 and 20 have been canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Appeal 2010-000955 Application 11/182,895 2 We reverse and enter a new rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Rather than reiterate the arguments of Appellant and the Examiner, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed Apr. 24, 2009), the Answer (mailed July 23, 2009), and the Reply Brief (filed Sep. 29, 2009). Appellant’s Invention Appellant’s invention relates to the providing of service provider information to a communication device. A determination is made as to a telecommunications service provider that corresponds to a called party telephone. Upon a further determination of an indicator that corresponds to the telecommunications service provider, the indicator is provided to a user of the communication device. (See generally Spec. ¶ [0003]). Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention and reads as follows: 1. A method of providing information to a communication device comprising: (a) determining a telecommunications service provider corresponding to a called party telephone number; (b) determining an indicator of the telecommunications service provider; and (c) providing the indicator to the user communication device. Appeal 2010-000955 Application 11/182,895 3 The Examiner’s Rejections The Examiner’s Answer cites the following prior art references: Smith US 5,742,667 Apr. 21, 1998 Kaplan US 5,884,193 Mar. 16, 1999 Cannon US 6,353,664 B1 Mar. 5, 2002 Glenn US 6,954,526 B1 Oct. 11, 2005 (filed Mar. 24, 2000) Fiedler US 2005/0261003 A1 Nov. 24, 2005 (May 20, 2004) Claims 1-6, 9-15, 19, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Smith in view of Fiedler and Glenn or Cannon. Claims 7, 8, 17, 18, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Smith in view of Fiedler and Glenn or Cannon and further in view of Kaplan. ANALYSIS Claims 1-6, 9-15, 19, and 21 Appellant contends, with respect to the obviousness rejection of independent claims 1, 11, and 21, that the applied Fiedler, Glenn, and Cannon references do not overcome what the Examiner has identified as the deficiency of Smith. This deficiency is the lack of disclosure of the determination of a telecommunications service provider that corresponds to a called party telephone number as claimed. According to Appellant (App. Br. 5), Fiedler discloses a billing statement feature which summarizes a user’s calls according to various parameters, none of which include the claimed service provider information Appeal 2010-000955 Application 11/182,895 4 that corresponds to a called party telephone number. Appellant further contends (App. Br. 6) that, although Fiedler’s claim 7 includes the terminology “service provider,” this terminology is merely used in the context of providing geographical boundaries such as zip code, phone area code, city, county, etc. that define a user’s home area for billing purposes. Appellant also contends (App. Br. 6-7) that Glenn and Cannon are similarly deficient since, although they both disclose the providing of calling party information such as phone number and location/area code to a called party, there is no disclosure of providing service provider information. We agree with Appellant that none of the applied secondary references to Fiedler, Glenn, or Cannon teaches or suggests the claimed feature of determining and providing to a user communication device an indicator of the service provider of a called party. The Examiner has not pointed to any specific disclosure of such a feature in any of the references but, instead, has posited, without evidentiary support, that the references suggest that any and all information about a telephone call can be provided (Ans. 13). From this faulty premise, the Examiner concludes that the particular information provided to user is a matter of “design choice.” Ans. 12. In a similar vein, the Examiner suggests that, since there is a correlation between location information such as area codes and service providers, only the area code associated with a telephone number is necessary to determine the service provider associated with that number (Ans. 4). As argued by Appellant, however, there is no evidentiary support Appeal 2010-000955 Application 11/182,895 5 for the conclusion that there is a corresponding relationship between area codes and service providers (App. Br. 7). In view of the above discussion, we find that the Examiner’s line of reasoning does not rise to a level of a rational underpinning to support a conclusion of obviousness that relies on the teachings of any or all of Fiedler, Glenn, and Cannon in the proposed combination with Smith. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418. Accordingly, the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 1-6, 9-15, 19, and 21 is not sustained. Claims 7, 8, 17, 18, and 22 We also do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 7, 8, 17, 18, and 22 in which the Kaplan reference has been added to Smith, Fiedler, Glenn, and Cannon to address the call restriction features of the rejected claims. We find nothing in Kaplan that overcomes the deficiencies of the Examiner’s reliance on Fiedler, Glenn, and Cannon to support the obviousness rejection. REJECTION UNDER 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) We make the following new ground of rejection using our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Independent claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Smith. Smith discloses an 800 service telecommunication system in which an indication is provided to a caller that the 800 service call is a “free” call (Fig. 2, step 204; col. 4, ll. 2-5). In addition to the “free” call indication to the caller, Smith also discloses that the indication includes a service carrier identifier, which identifies the carrier Appeal 2010-000955 Application 11/182,895 6 of the 800 service to the caller (col. 4, ll. 5-8). Appellant’s disclosure imparts no special definition of the terminology “service provider,” nor includes any indication that such terminology should be interpreted in any specific manner that would distinguish over the “service carrier” of Smith. We note that, although the Smith reference has been applied only against independent claim 1, this is not to be taken as an indication of the patentability of the other claims on appeal. In any resumption of the prosecution of this application before the Examiner, the Examiner should consider the applicability of the applied prior art as well as the other prior art of record and any other discovered prior art, to all of the appealed claims 1- 15, 17-19, 21, and 22. CONCLUSION In view of the foregoing, we reverse the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims of all of the appealed claims 1-15, 17-19, 21, and 22. A new rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is entered pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Rule 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides [a] new ground of rejection pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review. Rule 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that the Appellant, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, Appeal 2010-000955 Application 11/182,895 7 or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner.... (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record.... No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). REVERSED 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) kis Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation