Ex parte Peterson

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Feb 26, 1998

08032758 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 26, 1998)

Application for patent filed March 17, 1993. According1
to the appellant, this application is a continuation of
Application 07/785,895, filed October 30, 1991, now abandoned,
which is a continuation of Application 07/504,776, filed April
4, 1990, now abandoned.
1
THIS OPINION WAS NOT WRITTEN FOR PUBLICATION
The opinion in support of the decision being entered today (1)
was not written for publication in a law journal and (2) is
not binding precedent of the Board.
Paper No. 47
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____________
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
_____________
Ex parte LUVERNE R. PETERSON

_____________
Appeal No. 94-3790
Application 08/032,7581
______________
ON BRIEF
_______________
Before THOMAS, HAIRSTON and KRASS, Administrative Patent
Judges.
THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge.
Appeal No. 94-3790
Application 08/032,758
2
ON REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
Appellant requests that we reconsider our decision
of June 16, 1997, wherein we affirmed the examiner’s decision
rejecting claims 21 to 25 and 27 to 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
At the outset, we address the two declarations attached
to the request for reconsideration. Both declarations are
identical from two different individuals and essentially set
forth that which has been argued by appellant in the request
for reconsideration. Moreover, the basic argument presented
in each of these three documents is apparently the same as
basically presented in the principal brief and reply brief
filed before our original opinion. Even though there does not
appear to be any substantive showing of good and sufficient
reasons why these declarations were not earlier presented
within the requirements of 37 CFR § 1.195, we have still
considered them because of this consistency. Appellant’s
arguments in the request for reconsideration as well as those
more particular arguments set forth in both declarations
reflect an understanding of Lofgren which is consistent with
our understanding when we rendered our original opinion.
Appeal No. 94-3790
Application 08/032,758
3
Appellant’s brief, reply brief and this reconsideration
request as well as its attached two declarations essentially
in some manner appear to assert that the delay means in
Lofgren’s patent operates in such a manner that the rising
signal edges are not delayed independent of the falling signal
edges and that the falling signal edges are not delayed
independent of the rising signal edges. Appellant’s position
continues to explain that if the delay of Lofgren’s rising
signal edges is increased then the delay of the falling signal
edges is also increased and vice versa. Request at top of
page 2.
This language the examiner did not agree with in the
answer nor did we in our original opinion. We went through
great effort in our original opinion to explain how the
presently claimed invention was not consistent with
appellant’s disclosure and the arguments of the brief
associated with the claim were not consistent with what the
claim said. Appellant’s request for reconsideration and the
declarations appear to ignore the understanding which we and
the examiner went through great length to convey to appellant.
In fact, the declarations completely ignore and make no
Appeal No. 94-3790
Application 08/032,758
4
reference to the subject matter of independent claim 21 on
appeal. The examiner repeatedly indicated in the answer that
appellant read too much into the language of independent claim
21 and we repeated as much at page 7 of our original opinion.
Furthermore, appellant has not given any recognition of the
paragraph bridging pages 10 and 11 of our original opinion
which indicates in another form the breadth of the claim
language recited in independent claim 21.
The questioned language is reproduced at the bottom of
page 3 and the top of page 4 of our original opinion. It
states (emphasis added):
and a delay means which propagates said
input clock signal from said input terminal
to an output terminal such that said first
type signal edges are delayed independent
of said second type edges between said
input and output terminals for a time
interval which is varied in continuous
fashion by the magnitude of said control
signal.
We stated at page 8 of our original opinion the
following (emphasis added):
The above quoted delay means clause
says nothing about the first type signal
edges being delayed independently of any
Appeal No. 94-3790
Application 08/032,758
5
delay for or associated with the second
type or falling edges. Different or
separate circuit elements are not
necessarily recited in the claim for the
disclosed two different delays as asserted
at page 3 of the brief in the Summary of
the Invention thereof. Essentially, only
one delay is recited in claim 21. That is,
the first type signal edges are delayed for
“a time interval” at the end of the above
quoted delay means clause. There is no
corresponding delay recited for the second
or falling type signal edges.
The claimed
first type and second type signal edges
(that is, for example, rising and falling
edges, respectively) are not recited in
claim 21 to be separately controlled.
This language built upon the views expressed by the
examiner in the answer as to what the examiner considers the
claim 21 to say and not to say. More specifically, the
assertion made at the top of page 2 of the request for
reconsideration,
being the same as originally asserted in the brief and reply
brief, is that in Lofgren’s delay the rising signal edges are
not delayed independent of the falling signal edges and the
falling signal edges are not delayed independent of the rising
signal edges. We endeavored to explain in our original
opinion that such a requirement must be set forth with claims
Appeal No. 94-3790
Application 08/032,758
6
that require two control terminals and two control signals to
be based on the disclosed invention. However, our original
analysis in our original opinion makes clear that only one
control terminal and one control signal are recited and that
only one delay is recited in claim 21. For these arguments of
appellant to have merit, they must have corresponding language
in claim 21 on appeal.
The additional assertion, made at the top of page 2 that
if the delay of the rising signal edges in Lofgren is
increased, then the delay of the falling signal edges is also
increased, and vice versa, is a restatement of the above
asserted position, which again, is not consistent with that
which is recited in claim 21 on appeal. Claim 21 says nothing
of the delay of the second type signal edges as we explained
in our original opinion and the examiner explained in the
answer.
One view of the operation of Lofgren’s teachings is that
the OSC clocking signal is delayed one clock cycle or one
clock
Appeal No. 94-3790
Application 08/032,758
7
period to yield DOSC. Thus, Lofgren’s circuits operate in
such a manner that the rising clock edge of OSC is delayed one
clock cycle to yield DOSC. In one sense, the circuits in
Lofgren may be viewed as keying-in-on or operating only with
respect to the rising signal edges of OSC and DOSC and
essentially ignore or operate irrespective to the falling
signal edges of those OSC and DOSC signals. Therefore, they
may be said to operate in an independent manner as claimed.
The delay is a function of whether the DOSC signal leads or
lags the OSC signal and in accordance with the control signals
VCN and VCP. Claim 21 requires only one delay by means of one
control signal by means of one control terminal.
In accordance with the view we expressed in our original
opinion, the delay of the rising edges of succeeding OSC and
DOSC signals meets the single delay required of the claim. No
separate control terminal and no separate control signal and
no separate amount of delay is required for the claimed second
type control signal edges of claim 21 on appeal.
The claimed first type edges and second type edges are
not stated in the claim to be rising and falling edges
Appeal No. 94-3790
Application 08/032,758
8
respectively and vice versa. The rising signal edges of OSC
of Lofgren
(perhaps the claimed first type edges or second type edges)
and the delayed rising signal edges of DOSC (perhaps the
claimed second type edges or first type edges) are compared in
Lofgren. Phase changes then occur based upon this comparison.
Furthermore, in the alternative, as urged by the
examiner, separate or different or independent circuit
elements (pump up and pump down, as well as VCR and VCN
signals in the figures) in Lofgren control the rising and
falling edges of clock OSC and of delayed clock DOSC. Again,
claim 21 does not recite that the first type signal edges are
delayed independently of the delay associated with the second
type edges only that “said first type signal edges are delayed
independent of said second type edges.”
We have reconsidered our decision of June 16, 1997, in
light of appellant’s arguments and appellant’s request for
Appeal No. 94-3790
Application 08/032,758
9
reconsideration and its two attached declarations, but we
decline to change our position set forth therein.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in
connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 CFR
§ 1.136(a).
DENIED
)
JAMES D. THOMAS )
Administrative Patent Judge )
Appeal No. 94-3790
Application 08/032,758
10
)
)
) BOARD OF PATENT
KENNETH W. HAIRSTON )
Administrative Patent Judge ) APPEALS AND
)
) INTERFERENCES
)
ERROL A. KRASS )
Administrative Patent Judge )
Charles J. Fassbender
UNISYS CORPORATION
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