Ex Parte Pekny et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 2, 2015

12112831 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 2, 2015)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/112,831 04/30/2008 Ted Pekny MICS:0270 /
2008-0132.US
9890
52142 7590 09/03/2015
FLETCHER YODER (MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.)
P.O. BOX 692289
HOUSTON, TX 77269-2289
EXAMINER
YANG, HAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2824
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/03/2015 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
——————
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
——————
Ex parte TED PEKNY and JEFF YU
——————
Appeal 2013-003041
Application 12/112,831
Technology Center 2800
——————
Before DONNA M. PRAISS, JEFFREY W. ABRAHAM, and
CHRISTOPHER L. OGDEN, Administrative Patent Judges.
OGDEN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) (2006) from the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–4, 7–10, and 16–20 in the above-
identified application. Appeal Br. 4–5. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2006).
We AFFIRM.

1 According to Appellants, the Real Party in Interest is Micron Technology,
Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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Application 12/112,831
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BACKGROUND
The subject matter on appeal is directed to powering up memory
devices on command or in a current-controlled manner. Spec. ¶ 1.
Independent claims 1 and 16 are representative:
1. A memory device comprising:
power up circuitry configured to receive an external
power supply and to provide an internal power supply to the
memory device upon receipt of a command from a memory
device controller associated with the memory device.

16. A system comprising:
a processor; and
a memory device operably coupled to the processor, the
memory device comprising power-up circuitry configured to
receive an external power supply and to provide an internal
power supply to the memory device upon receipt of a
command; and
a controller operably coupled to the memory device,
wherein the controller is configured to provide the command to
the memory device.
Appeal Br. 15–16 (emphasis added).
THE REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1, 16, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006) as
anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 7,715,268 B2 [hereinafter “Hsieh”] (issued
May 11, 2010). Final Act. 2; Appeal Br. 4.
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II. Claims 2–4, 7–10, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) as
unpatentable over Hsieh in view of U.S. Patent No. 4,780,854 [hereinafter
“Watanabe”] (issued Oct. 25, 1988). Final Act. 4; Appeal Br. 4–5.2
DISCUSSION
I. Rejection of claims 1, 16, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102
Claims 1 and 16 recite a “memory device” that comprises “power up
circuitry” which is configured “to provide an internal power supply to the
memory device upon receipt of a command.” Appeal Br. 15–16. In addition
to the memory device, claim 16 further requires “a processor” and “a
controller operably coupled to the memory device,” and requires that the
memory device is “operably coupled to the processor.” Id.
The Examiner finds that each element of claims 1 and 16 is found in
Figure 2 of Hsieh, which is reproduced below:

2 The Final Rejection and Appeal Brief incorrectly cite the Watanabe
reference as U.S. Pub. No. 2009/0024856 A1, but the Examiner later
corrected this error. See Answer 4.
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Application 12/112,831
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Figure 2 is a block diagram representing a memory device. Hsieh col. 2, l.
23–col. 3, l. 3. An outer box represents non-volatile storage apparatus 20,
which includes storage controller 21 and memory unit 22. Storage controller
21 contains a power management unit 210 and a control unit 220, the latter
containing a processing device 222. Figure 2 depicts an arrow, labeled VC,
from control unit 220 to power management unit 210, which the
Specification describes as a “control signal.” Hsieh col. 2, l. 42.
Appellants contend (1) that the Examiner’s construction of claims 1
and 16 is erroneous, because the “controller” and “processor” of the claims
may not be internal to the “memory device,” Appeal Br. 10–12; Reply Br.
4–7, and (2) that Hsieh does not disclose the “receipt of a command,” Reply
Br. 7–9.3 We discuss each of these issues below, beginning with claim 16:

3 In the Final Office Action, the Examiner identified the “memory device” of
claims 1 and 16 as memory unit 22, and the “power up circuitry” as power
management unit 210. Final Act. 2–3. In the Answer, the Examiner
“clarified the rejection and emphasized that the memory device is #20 in Fig.
2 (Non-volatile storage apparatus) . . . and #22 (Memory unit) is being part

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Application 12/112,831
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Claim 16
In addition to identifying Hsieh’s storage apparatus 20 as the
“memory device” of claim 16, the Examiner identifies power management
unit 210 as the “power up circuitry,” control unit 220 as the “controller,”
processing device 222 as the “processor,” and control signal VC as the
“command from a memory device controller.” Answer 5. Addressing the
“coupled to” language, the Examiner construes the terms broadly, and finds
that “as long as the prior art has a controller, a processor and a memory
device included in the system, and they are operably coupled to each other,
the claimed structure fully reads on the prior art,” because “there is no
further limitation about the system structure[-]wise in the claim.” Id. at 9–
10.
Appellants argue that the structure of the claim implies that the
processor, memory device, and controller are three separate components.
Appeal Br. 10–12. Appellants contend that the Examiner’s construction of
claim 16 is erroneous, because the claims require that the “memory device”
is physically separate from the “controller,” Reply Br. 4–7, and that the
processor, memory device, and controller are all discrete components.
Appeal Br. 10–12.
In support of this position, Appellants argue that “the claim term
coupled to would be meaningless without linking or joining two separate
elements.” Reply Br. 5. Appellants provide a dictionary definition for

of #20.” Answer 9. Appellants responded to the clarified findings, Reply
Br. 2–4, and did not petition to have them designated as a new grounds of
rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.40. Because we affirm the Examiner’s
clarified findings, we need not address Appellants’ arguments, Appeal Br.
6–10, that respond to the Examiner’s original findings.
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couple as meaning, for example, “to fasten together : JOIN, LINK.” Id. at 5–
6 (quoting “Couple,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,
Unabridged). Based on this understanding of the term, Appellants argue that
“it would be wholly unreasonable to suggest that a claim element, such as
the claimed memory device, could be coupled to itself”—which is what
Appellants argue the Examiner is doing for claim 16 because controller 220
is part of the memory device 20. Id. at 6.
Likewise, Appellants argue that claim 16 requires the “processor” to
be separate from, and not internal to, the controller and the memory device.
Appeal Br. 10–12. They note that Hsieh discloses a processor 222 that is
internal to the controller 220 and memory device 20, and they argue that
processing device 222 performs the same function as control unit 220, thus
they are indistinct. Id. at 11.
We must give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation in light
of the Specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054–55 (Fed. Cir.
1997). Regarding claim 16, we accept Appellants’ dictionary definition of
the word “couple” as meaning “join.” However, we disagree with
Appellants’ argument that the Examiner’s construction would require the
claimed memory device of Hsieh to be “coupled to itself.” Id. at 6. The
Examiner identifies control unit 220 as a distinct entity from memory device
20, of which it is a component. See Answer 9–10. A component such as
control unit 220 does not lose its distinct identity by joining with and
becoming part of a larger structure such as storage apparatus 20, and
Appellants have not directed our attention to anything in the Specification
that would suggest otherwise.
Moreover, Appellants’ definition of “couple” as meaning “join” does
not limit the manner in which the two components are joined. It is
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reasonable to interpret a larger structure, such as storage apparatus 20, to be
“joined to” one of its component parts, such as control unit 220 or
processing device 222, even though by being joined, the component
becomes part of the larger structure.
Regarding Appellants’ argument that the processing device 222 and
the control unit 220 perform the same control function, and thus are
indistinct, Appeal Br. 11, claim 16 does not limit the “processor” to any
particular structure or function, only specifying that it is “operably coupled
to” the memory device. See id. at 16. Therefore, we conclude that the
broadest reasonable construction of claim 16 encompasses a system in which
the processor is part of the control unit and performs processing for the
control unit.
As claim 16 is construed above, a preponderance of the evidence on
this record supports the Examiner’s finding that the limitations of claim 16
are disclosed by Hsieh, wherein the “controller” is control unit 220, the
“processor” is processing device 222, and the “memory device” is storage
apparatus 20, and where the controller and processor are both components of
the memory device.
Claim 16 also requires that the memory device receives a command
provided by a controller. The Examiner identifies control signal VC in Hsieh
as being the “command from a memory device controller” 220 in claims 1
and 16. Answer 4–5. Appellants argue that Hsieh does not disclose a
memory device that “receives a command” from a controller because the
controller is internal to the memory device. Reply Br. 7–9. Appellants
contend that “for a memory device to receive a signal, the signal must derive
from another element.” Id. at 8. Thus, they argue that it is unreasonable to
construe the claim such that “a signal generated entirely within a particular
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component could somehow be said to be received by that component.” Id. at
9.
Appellants’ argument rests on the assumption that the “command” in
claim 16 is received by the memory device. The text of claim 16 clearly
states that it is the power up circuitry, not the memory device, that is
configured to receive the command from the memory device controller,
upon which the power up circuitry is configured “to provide an internal
power supply to the memory device.” Appeal Br. 15–16. This interpretation
is consistent with embodiments described throughout the Specification. See,
e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 15 (“a memory device 10 having command based . . . power
up circuitry”; 16 (“controller 16 may send a command 18 to the power up
circuitry 12 to begin powering up the remaining circuitry of the memory
device 10”).
Therefore, the preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner’s
finding that Hsieh discloses the limitation wherein the power up circuitry is
configured “to provide an internal power supply to the memory device upon
receipt of a command from a memory device controller” in claim 16.
Claim 1
In rejecting claim 1, as with claim 16, the Examiner identifies Hsieh’s
storage apparatus 20 as the “memory device,” power management unit 210
as the “power up circuitry,” and control unit 220 as the “controller.” Answer
4–5. Although claim 1 does not include the “coupled to” language of claim
16, Appellants rely on similar arguments presented with regard to claim 16
which does include that language, namely that the memory device and
controller must be separate components. According to Appellants, “based
on Appellants’ usage of the terms, it is . . . clear that the controller from
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which the memory device of independent claim 1 receives the command
must also be separate from the memory device of independent claim 1.”
Reply Br. 5.
We have fully considered Appellants’ arguments, but do not find them
persuasive. The word “receives” does not indicate that the controller must
be physically separate from the memory device, because as discussed above,
it is the power up circuitry, not the memory device, that receives the
command in claim 1. Nor have Appellants directed us to any evidence that
the phrase “memory device controller associated with the memory device”
requires that the two elements are physically separate, i.e., one cannot be
part of the other.
For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims
1 and 16. Because Appellants do not separately challenge the Examiner’s
specific findings, Final Act. 3, regarding dependent claims 19 and 20, we
also affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 19 and 20.
II. Rejection of claims 2–4, 7–10, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
Claims 7, 8, and 18
Dependent claims 7, 8, and 18 require that “the power up command
logic is configured to receive another command.” Appeal Br. 16–17
(emphasis added). Finding this limitation to be disclosed by Hsieh, the
Examiner identifies power management unit 210 to be the “power up
command logic,” and identifies control signal VC to be both the “command”
of claims 1 and 16 and “another command” of claims 7, 8, and 18. See Final
Act. 5–6; Answer 5 (citing Figs. 2 and 4 of Hsieh) and 7–8. Figure 4 of
Hsieh is reproduced below:
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Figure 4 depicts a flowchart in which box S330 states, “The control unit
outputs VC to the power management unit to produce the minimum of VOP2,”
and subsequent box S354 states, “The control unit produces a new VC to
control the power management to increase VOP2.” Hsieh, Fig. 4.
Appellants argue that the power up command logic does not receive
any command, because “the signal VC of Hsieh is entirely internal to—and
generated by—the non-volatile storage apparatus 20 of Hsieh.” Reply Br. 9.
Appellants also argue that if VC is identified as the “command” specified in
claims 1 and 16, then VC could not also be identified as “another command”
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in dependent claims 7, 8, and 18. Id. at 9–10. Also, according to
Appellants, the function of signal VC “does not appear to change throughout
the operation of the non-volatile storage apparatus 20. That is, the signal VC
of Hsieh appears to perform substantially the same function and could not
represent more than one command.” Id. at 10.
Appellants’ argument that a device cannot receive an internally-
generated command is unpersuasive for the reasons discussed above in the
context of claims 1 and 16. Claims 7, 8, and 18 require that it is the “power
up command logic” (power management unit 210) that receives “another
command,” not the memory device (storage apparatus 20). Appeal Br. 16–
17.
As to Appellants’ argument that the signal VC in Hsieh does not
functionally change throughout the operation of storage apparatus 20, Reply
Br. 10, Appellants offer no evidence in support of their argument that claims
7, 8, or 18 require “another command” to be functionally different from the
“command” of claims 1 and 16. Moreover, even if “another command”
were required to be functionally different, Hsieh states that the control unit
outputs a VC signal “to produce the minimum of VOP2,” Fig. 4 box S330, and
then later “to increase VOP2,” id. at box S354. Because Hsieh discloses two
functionally distinct VC signals, the preponderance of the evidence on this
record does not support Appellants’ contention that the VC signal in Hsieh
remains unchanged during the operation of storage apparatus 20.
Consequently, Appellants’ arguments do not persuade us of any
reversible error in the Examiner’s finding that Hsieh discloses “another
command” as required by claims 7, 8, and 18. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d
1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We therefore affirm the rejection of claims 7,
8, and 18 over Hsieh in view of Watanabe.
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Claims 2–4, 9, 10, and 17
Claims 2–4, 9, and 10 depend on independent claim 1, and claim 17
depends on independent claim 16. Appeal Br. 15–17. The Examiner finds
that Watanabe teaches each of the specific limitations added by each of the
dependent claims. Final Act. 4–6; Answer 6–10. For claims 2, 4, 9, and 17,
the Examiner finds that it would be obvious to combine Hsieh and Watanabe
“such that it suffices to increase current for only limited time in order to
raise the slew rate.” Final Act. 4–6; Answer 6–10.
Appellants argue that because claims 1 and 16 are not anticipated by
Hsieh, the Examiner has not made out a prima facie case of obviousness
with respect to all of the above dependent claims. Appeal Br. 13. Because
we find no reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 16 as
being anticipated over Hsieh, we also affirm the rejections of claims 2–4, 9,
10, and 17.
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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