Ex Parte PedersonDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 23, 201612057729 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 23, 2016) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/057,729 03/28/2008 Brian Pederson P39757.01 1874 28390 7590 12/28/2016 MEDTRONIC VASCULAR, INC. IP LEGAL DEPARTMENT 3576 UNOCAL PLACE SANTA ROSA, CA 95403 EXAMINER DINGA, ROLAND ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3766 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/28/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): rs. vasciplegal @ medtronic .com medtronic_c v_docketing @ cardinal-ip. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte BRIAN PEDERSON Appeal 2015-001398 Application 12/057,729 Technology Center 3700 Before BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD, GEORGE R. HOSKINS, and LEE L. STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judges. HOSKINS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Brian Pederson (“Appellant”)1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4—8, 10-14, 17—19, 21, and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Opie (US 2005/0021134 Al, pub. Jan. 27, 2005) and Sawyer (US 4,038,702, iss. Aug. 2, 1977). See Final Act. (mailed Oct. 25, 2013), at 2-4. The Board has jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. 1 The Appeal Brief identifies Medtronic ATS Medical, Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2015-001398 Application 12/057,729 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claims 1, 4, 8, 11, 13, 17, and 24 are independent. Claim 1 illustrates the subject matter on appeal, and it recites: 1. A method for passivating a biomaterial surface, said method comprising: exposing said biomaterial surface to therapeutic electrical energy in the presence of blood or plasma prior to implantation within a human body of an object on which said biomaterial surface is located; and causing proteinaceous material in the blood or plasma to adhere to said biomaterial surface. Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.). ANALYSIS Claims 1, 2, and 7 In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner finds Opie substantially discloses the recited method, but Opie’s method exposes the implanted object surface to electrical energy after implantation, rather than prior to implantation as claimed. Final Act. 2—3. The Examiner finds Sawyer discloses treating a surface prior to implantation. Id. at 3 (citing Sawyer, Figs. 1—5, 5:3—10, 6:49—55, 9:15—16). The Examiner determines it would have been obvious to modify Opie to treat the surface prior to implantation because “Sawyer states at [Col.5, lines 3-7] that such modification would prepare a prosthetic device so that the same will be particularly suitable for use in a blood containing environment wherein the implantation of the prosthetic device will not result in thrombus.” Ans. 3—4, 5, 6. Appellant argues Sawyer’s pre-implantation treatment process does not teach or suggest “passivating in the presence of blood or plasma to cause proteinaceous material in the blood or plasma to adhere to the biomaterial 2 Appeal 2015-001398 Application 12/057,729 surface.” Appeal Br. 9. In support, Appellant contends Sawyer’s polishing and cleaning processes “would cause any proteinaceous material in the ‘dirty valve’ to be removed from the surface of the implant.” Id. at 8—9; Reply Br. 2. Appellant therefore further asserts “it cannot be said that the cited references, alone or in combination, disclose a process that includes ah of the claimed elements.” Appeal Br. 9. Appellant also contends the Examiner has not provided any valid reason for combining Opie and Sawyer to reach the invention of claim 1. Id. We are persuaded of Examiner error, for two reasons. First, the Examiner fails to address the claim limitation requiring “causing proteinaceous material in the blood or plasma to adhere to” the surface (emphasis added), before or after implantation.2 See Final Act. 2—\\ Ans. 2— 6. In particular, there is no finding that either Opie or Sawyer expressly or inherently discloses that claim limitation. The only findings concerning proteinaceous material are that Opie’s paragraph 4 discloses two such materials: fibrinogen and albumin. Final Act. 4. That disclosure, however, discusses “the coagulation process” that Opie’s electrification is designed to suppress. Opie Tflf 4, 14. The Examiner has not established that proteinaceous material would still adhere to the implanted device surface during application of Opie’s anti-coagulation electrification. Second, the Examiner has not provided an articulated reasoning with rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See In 2 Appellant appears to suggest claim 1 requires this adherence to occur during application of the electrical energy, prior to implantation. Appeal Br. 9; Reply Br. 2. We disagree with that claim construction. Claim 1 is open to the adherence occurring before or after implantation. 3 Appeal 2015-001398 Application 12/057,729 re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)). Claim 1 recites that the implanted device is exposed “to therapeutic electrical energy in the presence of blood or plasma prior to implantation.” Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.). The Examiner has not provided any rational underpinnings to support the notion that performing Opie’s electrification prior to implantation would provide any anti-thrombogenic properties that would continue to be present after implantation. See, e.g., Opie 16—17, 23 (“substantially constant” electrification after implantation achieves anti-coagulation benefits). The Examiner further has not provided any reason why Sawyer’s pre implantation process would be modified to be performed in the presence of blood or plasma. For the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1. The Examiner’s additional consideration of claims 2 and 7, each of which depends from claim 1, does not cure the deficiencies as to claim 1. See Final Act. 2-4. Thus, we likewise do not sustain the rejection of claims 2 and 7. Claims 4—6, 8, and 10 Appellant submitted, contemporaneously with the Appeal Brief, an Amendment seeking to cancel claims 4, 8, and 10, and to amend claim 5 to depend from claim 1 instead of claim 4. See Appeal Br. 3^4 & Claims App.; Amendment filed Apr. 18, 2014 (hereafter “Amendment on Appeal”). Appellant requested entry of the Amendment on Appeal “under MPEP 1206 because this Amendment presents the claims in better form for consideration on appeal.” Appeal Br. 4; Amendment on Appeal 5. The MPEP provides “Examiners must respond to all amendments filed after an appeal has been taken and prior to transfer of jurisdiction to the 4 Appeal 2015-001398 Application 12/057,729 Board under 37 CFR 41.35(a),” such as the Amendment on Appeal at issue in this case. MPEP § 1206. The MPEP further provides any denial of entry “should use form PTOL-304, ‘Advisory Action After the Filing of an Appeal Brief, ’ to notify the applicant of the non-entry and the reason for non-entry.” Id. In this case, the Examiner’s only response to the Amendment on Appeal is that the Answer maintains the rejection of claims 4, 8, and 10, thus suggesting by implication that the Amendment was not entered. Ans. 2-4. Appellant does not address the Amendment on Appeal in the Reply Brief. From this record, we understand the Amendment on Appeal not to have been entered by the Examiner.3 As a result, the claims on appeal are as presented in the Amendment dated July 2, 2013. These claims differ from Appellant’s Claim Appendix in that they include independent claim 4 and claims 5 and 6 depending therefrom, and independent claim 8 and claim 10 depending therefrom. Appellant does not address the merits of the Examiner’s rejection as to those claims, so we summarily sustain the rejection of claims 4—6, 8, and 10. 3 We additionally note this is consistent with the standard for admitting entry of amendments on appeal. Such amendments “may be admitted: (1) To cancel claims, where such cancellation does not affect the scope of any other pending claim in the proceeding, or (2) To rewrite dependent claims into independent form.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.33(b) (emphasis added). Absent one of those conditions applying, an amendment filed on the same day as an Appeal Brief “will not be admitted except as permitted by” certain provisions which do not apply here. Id. § 41.33(c). The proposed cancellation of claim 4 would affect the scope of claim 5, which depends from claim 4. This can be seen, for example, by Appellant’s need to amend claim 5 to depend from claim 1, leading to inconsistent preambles in those claims. See Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.) (claim 1 recites “A method,” whereas Appellant’s proposed amendment to claim 5 would recite “A passivated biomaterial surface as in Claim 1”). 5 Appeal 2015-001398 Application 12/057,729 Claims 11 and 12 Claim 11 recites: “A method for passivating a biomaterial surface, said method comprising depositing modified proteinaceous material at said biomaterial surface prior to implantation with a human body of an object on which said biomaterial surface is located.” Appeal Br. 15 (Claims App.). The Examiner’s rejection of claim 11 is identical to the rejection of claim 1. Final Act. 2—3. For the reasons provided in relation to claim 1, that analysis is in error, and we do not sustain the rejection of claim 11. The Examiner’s additional consideration of claim 12, which depends from claim 11, does not cure the error, so we likewise do not sustain the rejection of claim 12. Claims 13 and 14 Claim 13 recites, in part, “(a) exposing a quantity of blood or plasma to therapeutic electrical energy; (b) subsequent to step (a), depositing proteinaceous material from said quantity of blood or plasma on said biomaterial surface; [and] (c) subsequent to step (b), implanting in a human body an object on which said biomaterial surface is located.” Appeal Br. 15 (Claims App.). The Examiner’s rejection of claim 13 is identical to the rejection of claim 1. Final Act. 2—3. For the reasons provided in relation to claim 1, that analysis is in error, and we do not sustain the rejection of claim 13. The Examiner’s additional consideration of claim 14, which depends from claim 13, does not cure the error, so we likewise do not sustain the rejection of claim 14. Claims 17—19 and 21 Claim 17 recites, in part, “exposing [a] biomaterial surface to therapeutic electrical energy in the presence of blood or plasma prior to 6 Appeal 2015-001398 Application 12/057,729 implantation” and “causing proteinaceous material in the blood or plasma to adhere to said biomaterial surface.” Appeal Br. 16 (Claims App.). The Examiner’s rejection of claim 17 is identical to the rejection of claim 1. Final Act. 2—3. For the reasons provided in relation to claim 1, that analysis is in error, and we do not sustain the rejection of claim 17. The Examiner’s additional consideration of claims 18, 19, and 21, which depend directly or indirectly from claim 17, does not cure the error, so we likewise do not sustain the rejection of those claims. Claim 24 Claim 24 recites: “A method for passivating a biomaterial surface, said method comprising modulating the preferential adsorption of blood proteins to said biomaterial surface by exposing said blood proteins to therapeutic electrical energy prior [to] implantation within a human body of an object on which said biomaterial surface is located.” Appeal Br. 16 (Claims App.). The Examiner’s rejection of claim 24 is identical to the rejection of claim 1. Final Act. 2—3. For the reasons provided in relation to claim 1, that analysis is in error, and we do not sustain the rejection of claim 24. DECISION The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 4—8, 10-14, 17—19, 21, and 24 is affirmed as to claims 4—6, 8, and 10, and reversed as to claims 1, 2, 7, 11-14, 17-19, 21, and 24. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal maybe extended, under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation