Ex Parte PattersonDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMay 27, 201612945946 (P.T.A.B. May. 27, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 12/945,946 11/15/2010 92668 7590 05/31/2016 The Law Office of Robert E. Purcell, PLLC 211 West Jefferson Street Suite 24 Syracuse, NY 13202 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Thompson B. Patterson JR. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 8927 EXAMINER GARNER, WERNER G ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3714 MAILDATE DELIVERY MODE 05/31/2016 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte THOMPSON B. PATTERSON, JR. Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 Technology Center 3700 Before JOHN C. KERINS, STEFAN STAICOVICI, and LEE L. STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judges. STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Thompson B. Patterson, Jr. (Appellant) appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 22--47. 1 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. 1 Claims 1-21 have been cancelled. Appeal Br. 5 (filed on December 18, 2013). Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Appellant's invention relates "to a system for and method of handling an electronic marker for use at a gaming establishment, such as a casino." Spec. if 2. Claims 22-25, 35, and 42 are independent. Claims 22-24 and 35 are illustrative of the claimed invention and read as follows: 22. A method of redeeming a marker issued by a gaming establishment to a patron comprising: (a) receiving first identifying information about the patron that essentially uniquely identifies the patron and distinguishes the patron from other patrons; (b) electronically storing said first identifying information in an electronic database; ( c) electronically storing marker information about the patron in said electronic database, said marker information comprising the time when markers were issued to the patron and the amount of the markers; (d) after steps (a)-(c) receiving a request from the patron to redeem said marker; (e) after steps (a)-(d), at least partially electronically obtaining and storing second identifying information from the patron; ( f) after steps (a) - ( e ), at least partially electronically comparing said stored first identifying information with said second identifying information obtained in step ( e ); (g) determining whether to redeem said marker based on said comparison; (h) electronically displaying said stored marker information; (i) if a determination has been made to redeem said marker in step (g), obtaining something of value from the patron; and j) electronically storing the time when said something of value was obtained from the patron and the value of said something of value. 2 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 23. A method of redeeming a particular marker issued by a gaming establishment to a patron comprising: (a) receiving first identifying information about the patron that essentially uniquely identifies the patron and distinguishes the patron from other patrons; (b) electronically storing said first identifying information in an electronic database; ( c) electronically storing marker information about the patron in said electronic database, said marker information comprising the time when one or more markers including said particular marker were issued to the patron and the amount of each of said one or more markers; (d) after steps (a)-(c) receiving a request from the patron to redeem said particular marker; and ( e) after steps (a) - ( d) step for redeeming said particular marker. 24. A system for redeeming a particular marker issued by a gaming establishment comprising: (a) an electronic database storing first identifying information about a patron that essentially uniquely identifies the patron and distinguishes the patron from other patrons and storing marker information comprising the time when one or more markers including said particular marker were issued to the patron and the amount of each of said one or more markers; (b) an electronic display screen; ( c) a processor operably, electronically connected to said database and to said display screen; and (d) an electronic player-initiated input configured for providing second identifying information about the patron in connection with the patron's request to redeem said particular marker and as a prerequisite to redeeming a said particular marker, said input adapted to provide second identifying information selected from the group consisting of the patron's signature, fingerprint, eye scan, and facial scan, said patron- initiated input operably, electronically connected to said processor, said patron-initiated input selected from the group consisting of a touch screen, a key pad, and a camera. 3 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 3 5. A method of processing a marker request by a patron of a table game played by utilizing chips at a gaming establishment having a group of hired personnel members at least one of whom oversees the operation of said table game, said method compnsmg: (a) receiving by a first member of said group first identifying information about the patron that essentially uniquely identifies the patron and distinguishes the patron from other patrons; (b) electronically storing said first identifying information in an electronic database; ( c) electronically storing financial information about the patron in said electronic database, said financial information selected from the group consisting of credit available to the patron and funds the patron has on deposit with the gaming establishment; (d) after steps (a)-(c), receiving by a second member of said group who oversees the operation of the table game said marker request orally from the patron; ( e) step for approving the marker request; and ( f) if the marker request has been approved in step ( e ), then, in response to the approval, distributing to the patron for the patron's use chips that will enable the patron to play the table game. REFERENCES RELIED ON BY THE EXAMINER Tsukui Bramson Huizinga US Re. 33,688 US 2006/0047725 Al US 2007 /0243935 Al Sept. 10, 1991 Mar. 2, 2006 Oct. 18, 2007 E. Malcom Greenlees, Casino Accounting and Financial Management, University of Nevada Press (1988), hereinafter "Greenlees" Kirrio 5-in-l Charger for Palm PDAs Review, The Gadgeteer, Oct. 17, 2002, hereinafter "Kirrio," http://the- gadgeteer.com/2002/10/17 /kirrio_5_in_l_charger_for_palm_pdas_rev iew/ 4 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 REJECTIONS ON APPEAL2 I. Claims 22, 23, and 35-38 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Huizinga and Greenlees. II. Claims 24 and 39 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Huizinga, Greenlees, and Bramson. III. Claims 25-29 and 32-34 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Greenlees and Bramson. IV. Claims 30 and 31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Greenlees, Bramson, and Tsukui. V. Claims 40 and 41 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Huizinga, Greenlees, and Tsukui. VI. Claims 42 and 44 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Huizinga and Bramson. VII. Claim 43 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Huizinga, Bramson, and Greenlees. VIII. Claims 45--47 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Huizinga, Bramson, and Kirrio. 2 Should there be further prosecution of this application (including any review for allowance), the Examiner may wish to review the claims for compliance under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in light of the USPTO's guidance on patent eligible subject matter. See 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,618 (Dec. 16, 2014); "Preliminary Examination Instructions in view of the Supreme Court Decision in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, et al." Memorandum to the Patent Examining Corps, June 25, 2014; see also July 2015 Update on Subject Matter Eligibility, 80 Fed. Reg. 45,429 (July 30, 2015), and May 2016 Subject Matter Eligibility Update, 81 Fed. Reg. 27 ,381 (May 6, 2016). 5 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 Claim 22 ANALYSIS Rejection I Claim 22 recites, in part, "(e) after steps (a)-(d), at least partially electronically obtaining and storing second identifying information from the patron." The Examiner finds that Huizinga discloses this limitation because Huizinga discloses entering "player data (e.g., player first and/or last name, etc.)." Final Act. 5 (citing Huizinga i-f 108). In the Answer, the Examiner expands upon the finding and states that a worker (user) may also view a player's photo screen to see a photograph of a player that is associated with the player based on the entered player data. Ans. 5 (citing Huizinga i-f 108, Fig. 17). Appellant asserts that in Huizinga, "the information is not electronically obtainedfrom the patron." Reply Br. 5 (emphasis added). Appellant points out that by contrast, in a preferred embodiment of (Appellant's) invention, "the patron uses a plastic pen or similar implement to provide a signature on a touch screen of the display screen." Id. (citing Spec. ,-r 72)." Although the information in Huizinga is in an electronic format, a player's name and photograph, as depicted in Huizinga's Figure 17, are obtained from the player and then stored in a PDA ahead of time so that a worker can compare a photograph of a player, with entered player data (e.g., player first and/or last name, etc.). See Huizinga i-f 108. Thus, the worker inputs a name in order to compare a stored photograph corresponding to that name with a person (player) making the request, but neither the worker nor the PDA obtains input from the player after the player makes the marker 6 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 request. The Examiner does not adequately explain how the Huizenga disclosure can reasonably be interpreted as disclosing how information stored in a PDA can be considered as being electronically obtained from the patron after a request to redeem a marker is made. As such, a preponderance of the evidence does not support the Examiner's position that Huizinga discloses electronically obtaining and storing second identifying information from the patron after steps (a)-(d), as recited in claim 22. The Examiner's use of the teachings of Greenlees does not remedy the deficiencies in the teachings of Huizinga as described supra. For these reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 22 as unpatentable over Huizinga and Greenlees. Claim 23 Claim 23 recites, in part, "( e) after steps (a) - ( d) step for redeeming said particular marker.'' The Examiner finds that "Huizinga discloses a system using a wireless communication device to perform a variety of tasks including managing markers." Ans. 9 (citing Huizinga i-fi-f l 06, 107, Abstract, Fig. 16). The Examiner notes that although Huizinga manages markers, "Huizinga fails to describe the step of receiving money and cancelling the marker." Id. The Examiner relies on Greenlees as teaching that "if paid in full, the marker is usually canceled by the bookkeeper." Id. at 10 (citing Greenlees, 269). The Examiner states that in Greenlees' "repayment transactions, the dealer and the floor person both sign the repayment copy of the marker indicating that the amount of money, either in currency or in chips, has been added back to the table." Id. (citing Greenlees, 269). In view of this, the Examiner takes 7 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 the position that "when combining Huizinga which deals with automated, electronic management of marker transactions with Greenlees which discusses the manual process of managing markers, the result is an automated marker management system that cancels a marker once the marker has been paid." Id. Appellant asserts that "neither Huizinga nor Greenlees, whether alone or in combination, discloses the corresponding acts or equivalents thereof for performing the recited function." Appeal Br. 14. Appellant argues that "Huizinga does not disclose any method of redeeming a particular marker, nor a 'step for redeeming said particular marker.'" Reply Br. 7. Appellant thus argues that because Huizinga discloses a single sum of money, Huizinga does not have a choice of which of more than one marker to pay and therefore, "Huizinga does not disclose a method or acts for redeeming a particular marker." Id. Appellant; s argument is not commensurate with the scope of the claim. Claim 23 recites "one or more markers" and if only one marker is outstanding, that marker would be the particular marker. For a case in which Huizinga has only a single marker, Appellant does not explain adequately why that marker does not meet the requirements of the particular marker recited in claim 23. Further, Appellant does not explain persuasively why a single marker is precluded by claim 23. With respect to whether Huizinga redeems a particular marker, Huizinga' s Figure 16 includes a marker log field 418 that displays a list of outstanding markers for the player, and Appellant does not adequately explain why payment must be applied against the oldest outstanding marker and could not be on any particular marker 8 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 listed in the log. See Reply Br. 7. In view of this, we sustain the rejection of claim 23 as unpatentable over Huizinga and Greenlees. Claims 35, 36, and 38 Claim 3 5 recites, in part, "( e) step for approving the marker request." Appellant asserts that this limitation of claim 35 must be analyzed under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph, "step-plus-function" based on the steps described in paragraphs 29-34 of the Specification and shown in Figure 1. Appeal Br. 10. The Examiner relies on pages 264 and 265 of Greenlees as teaching these limitations in a manual transaction and asserts that these limitations could be performed electronically based on the general teachings of Huizinga. See Final Act. 13-14. Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in interpreting claim 3 5 (Appeal Br. 15), in that, "the Examiner has not carried his burden of making a prim a facie showing of the unpatentability of claim 3 5 over Huizinga in view of Greenlees," and that the Examiner's "conclusory statement of alleged obviousness is insufficient." Reply Br. 7. Appellant's step for approving a marker request requires retrieving marker data (step 106), verifying requester identity (step 108), and approving or declining the request (step 112). Spec. i-f 33. Greenlees teaches that the propriety of the request is verified by determining whether a line of credit is authorized. Greenlees 264. Here, Greenlees' line of credit is the marker data and thus, Greenlees is manually retrieving the marker data. Because Huizinga discloses electronically storing and viewing marker data in a database (Huizinga i-f 106), the combined teachings of Greenlees and 9 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 Huizinga include retrieving marker data as disclosed in paragraph 30 of Appellant's Specification. Greenlees also teaches that the identity of the requester is known or identified to the pit boss. Greenlees 264. Huizinga discloses that the identity of a player can include a stored photograph. Huizinga i-f 107. Based on these disclosures, the combined teachings of Greenlees and Huizinga suggest verifying requester identity as disclosed in paragraph 31 of Appellant's Specification. Greenlees further teaches that "the amount of the total credit is indicated, and the credit previously extended is recorded," so that "the pit boss can make the credit-granting decision very quickly." Greenlees 264--265. As such, Greenlees also teaches an approval decision consistent with paragraph 33 of Appellant's Specification. Thus, the Examiner has established a prima facie showing of the unpatentability of claim 35 over Huizinga in view of Greenlees. We are not persuaded by Appellant's arguments, because Appellant does not point to any particular step as depicted in Appellant; s Figure 1, for example, that is absent from the combined teachings of Huizinga and Greenlees, nor does Appellant persuasively argue why the portions of Huizinga and Greenlees relied on by the Examiner do not teach each of the steps required for approving a marker request. For these reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 35, 36, and 38 as unpatentable over Huizinga and Greenlees. 10 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 Claim 37 Claim 3 7 recites, in part, "wherein step ( e) includes assessing a location where the patron is making the marker request." The Examiner's position is that because Greenlees teaches that "when a customer requests credit at the table, the request is transmitted by the dealer or boxman in charge of the game to a pit boss or floor supervisor," and because "the pit boss or floor supervisor has limited authority to grant credit within his area of control (i.e., a particular pit or a particular floor)," this limitation is met. Final Act. 15 (citing Greenlees, 264--265). In the Answer, the Examiner states that "the location of the player requesting a marker may be assessed merely to confirm the proper individuals are involved in deciding marker requests." Ans. 13. Appellant asserts that "the limitation of claim 3 7 is useful for (approving or declining) a marker request where, for example [a] patron has previously set restrictions on obtaining credit in specified areas of the casino," " as a measure of self-restraint," or "as a measure of defeating fraud." Appeal Br. 15-16 (citing i-fi-133, 77). Appellant asserts that "the process of making a marker request via the table game hierarchy is not an act supporting the function of approving the marker request in part by assessing the location where the patron is making the request." Id. at 16. Appellant argues that Greenlees' "request will be approved or declined based on criteria independent of, and regardless of, the location where the patron is making the marker request." Id. Although a pit boss or floor supervisor might be present in a particular location, he or she is not making a decision based on that location. The floor supervisor would always make the decision whether to approve or deny a 11 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 marker request and would make the decision regardless of location. Specifically, the floor supervisor is not evaluating where the patron is standing on that floor, and as such, he or she is not assessing a location as part of the step of approving the marker request. Because physical presence alone in a location is not an act of assessing, the Examiner has not established that Greenlees is assessing the location where the patron is making the request. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 37 as unpatentable over Huizinga and Greenlees. Rejection II Independent claim 24 recites, in part, (d) an electronic player-initiated input configured for providing second identifying information about the patron in connection with the patron's request to redeem said particular marker and as a prerequisite to redeeming said particular marker, said input adapted to provide second identifying information selected from the group consisting of the patron's signature, fingerprint, eye scan, and facial scan, said patron-initiated input operably, electronically connected to said processor, said patron-initiated input selected from the group consisting of a touch screen, a key pad, and a camera. The Examiner finds that Huizinga discloses an electronic player- initiated input, but that the input is not adapted to provide second identifying information selected from the group consisting of the patron's signature, fingerprint, eye scan, and facial scan, and that Huizinga's patron-initiated input is not operably, electronically connected to the processor. Final Act. 17-18 (citing Huizinga i-f 69). The Examiner relies on Bramson as teaching input adapted to provide second identifying information selected from the 12 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 group consisting of the patron's signature, fingerprint, eye scan, and facial scan, said patron-initiated input operably, and electronically connected to the processor. Id. at 19 (citing Bramson i-f 78). The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to substitute Huizinga's identity verification information with biometric information such as measurements relating to the individual's face, fingerprints, hand geometry, handwriting, iris, or retina as taught by Bramson, as a substitution that achieves predictable results in verifying an individual's identity. Id. at 19-20. Appellant argues that Bramson is non-analogous art because "Bramson deals with a system for minimizing the creation and presentation of a phony personal profile accessible via the Internet," and "has nothing to do with casinos or with processing or redeeming markers." Appeal Br. 16- 18. Appellant also argues that, moreover, none of the references discloses "providing an electronic customer-initiated input configured for providing a second identifying information." Reply Br. 9. As to whether Bramson is non-analogous art, we do not agree with Appellant's argument. Appellant does not explain persuasively why verifying a user's identity using biometric data as taught by Bramson is so different from providing second identifying information about the patron in order to establish a user's identity as required by claim 24 that Bramson is non-analogous art. Indeed, both Bramson and claim 24 are directed to uniquely identifying an individual and as such, Bramson is reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by Appellant. See Bramson i-f 78. With respect to whether the references disclose customer-initiated input, the Examiner relies on Huizinga's paragraph 69 for this feature (see 13 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 Final Act. 17), and Appellant does not adequately explain why an input device such as Huizinga' s touch screen that reads identifying information is not an electronic customer-initiated input configured for providing a second identifying information, as claimed. In view of this, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 24 as unpatentable over Huizinga, Greenlees, and Bramson. Claim 39 Claim 39 recites, in part, "step (e) includes, after steps (a)-(d), at least partially electronically obtaining and storing second identifying information about the patron." The Examiner relies on Bramson as teaching this limitation and states that in Bramson, "the agent obtains biometric information that may include measurements relating to the individual's face or handwriting." Final Act. 20 (citing Bramson i-f 78). Appellant asserts that "the Examiner has failed to show how the alleged combination of the three references would obviously arrive at 'electronically obtaining and storing second identifying information about the patron' after the patron makes a marker request." Appeal Br. 19. Similar to Huizinga, Bramson is based on stored data and as discussed above with respect to claim 22, the Examiner does not adequately explain how this stored information is electronically obtained from the patron after a request to redeem a marker is made. As such, a preponderance of the evidence does not support the Examiner's position that Huizinga modified based on the teachings of Bramson discloses at least partially electronically obtaining and storing second identifying information from the patron after steps (a)-(d), as required by claim 39. The Examiner's use of the teachings 14 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 of Greenlees does not remedy the deficiencies in the rejection based on Huizinga and Bramson as described supra. For these reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 39 as unpatentable over Huizinga, Greenlees, and Bramson. Rejection III Similar to claim 39, independent claim 25 recites, in part, "( e) after steps (a)- ( d), at least partially electronically obtaining and storing second identifying information from the patron." As with claim 39, the Examiner relies on paragraph 78 of Bramson for this feature. See Final Act. 24. As discussed supra, the Examiner does not provide a cogent technical reason how the stored information of Bramson is obtained from the patron after a request to redeem a marker is made. As such, a preponderance of the evidence does not support the Examiner's position that Greenlees, as modified based on the teachings of Bramson, discloses at least partially electronically obtaining and storing second identifying information from the patron after steps (a) - ( d), as required by claim 25. For these reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 25, and the rejection of claims 26-29 and 32-34 depending from claim 25, as unpatentable over Greenlees and Bramson. Rejection IV The Examiner's use of the teachings of Tsukui does not remedy the deficiencies in the rejection of claim 25 based on Huizinga and Bramson as described supra. For these reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 30 and 31 as unpatentable over Greenlees, Bramson, and Tsukui. 15 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 Rejection V Appellant makes no separate arguments for claims 40 and 41, but instead relies on the arguments made against the rejection of independent claim 35. Appeal Br. 21. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 40 and 41 as unpatentable over Huizinga, Greenlees, and Tsukui for the reasons discussed above regarding the rejection of claim 3 5. Rejection VI Appellant argues that as "set forth above with respect to claim 24, Bramson is non-analogous prior art" and as also "set forth above in connection with the claim 24, neither Huizinga nor Bramson teach element (d) of claim 42," and further, "one of ordinary skill in the art would not find it obvious to select bits and pieces of the disclosure of Bramson in such way as proposed by the Examiner and apply such selected disclosure to Huizinga to arrive at Applicanf s invention recited in claim 42.'' Appeal Br. 22. As to whether Bramson is non-analogous art, for the same reasons discussed above with respect to claim 24, we do not agree with Appellant on this issue. As also discussed above with respect to claim 24, we are not pursuaded that the combination of Huizinga and Bramson fails to teach an input device using identifying information as recited in claim 24. Likewise, for the same reasons, we are not persuaded that the combination of Huizinga and Bramson fails to disclose an input device as recited in claim 42. With respect to whether it would have been obvious to modify Huizinga based on the teachings of Bramson, we are not persuaded by Appellant's arguments. The Examiner's stated rationale for making the modification is "to substitute the user name and password to verify an individual's identity as disclosed by 16 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 Huizinga with biometric information" as taught by Bramson, because "one of ordinary skill in the art could have substituted these steps and achieved predictable results of verifying an individual's identity." Final Act. 37. Given that Huizinga and Bramson are both using known methods of verifying identity, the Examiner has a sound basis for finding that verification using biometric information as taught by Bramson would have been a suitable substitute for the password verification taught by Huizinga. Appellant provides no persuasive reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art could not have implemented such a substitution. Neither does Appellant provide any persuasive reason why the results of the substitution would have been unpredictable. Thus, the Examiner is correct in concluding that such a substitution would have been obvious. For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 42 and 44 as being unpatentable over Huizinga and Bramson. Re} ections VII and VIII Appellant makes no separate arguments for claims 43 and 45--47, but instead relies on the arguments made against the rejection of independent claim 42. Appeal Br. 22-23. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 43 as unpatentable over Huizinga, Bramson, and Greenlees, and we sustain the rejection of claims 45--47 as unpatentable over Huizinga, Bramson, and Kirrio, for the reasons discussed above regarding the rejection of claim 42. DECISION I. The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 22 and 3 7 as unpatentable over Huizinga and Greenlees is reversed. The decision of the 17 Appeal2014-004786 Application 12/945,946 Examiner to reject claims 23, 35, 36, and 38 as unpatentable over Huizinga and Greenlees is affirmed. II. The decision of the Examiner to reject claim 24 as unpatentable over Huizinga, Greenlees, and Bramson is affirmed. The decision of the Examiner to reject claim 39 as unpatentable over Huizinga, Greenlees, and Bramson is reversed. III. The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 25-29 and 32-34 as unpatentable over Greenlees and Bramson is reversed. IV. The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 30 and 31 as unpatentable over Greenlees, Bramson, and Tsukui is reversed. V. The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 40 and 41 as unpatentable over Huizinga, Greenlees, and Tsukui is affirmed. VI. The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 42 and 44 as unpatentable over Huizinga and Bramson is affirmed. VII. The decision of the Examiner to reject claim 43 as unpatentable over Huizinga, Bramson, and Greenlees is affirmed. VIII. The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 45--47 as unpatentable over Huizinga, Bramson, and Kirrio is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 18 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation