Ex Parte Patel et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 25, 2013

11256377 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/256,377 10/21/2005 C. Kumar Patel 05-15905 8966
25189 7590 03/25/2013
Cislo & Thomas LLP
1333 2nd Street
Suite #500
Santa Monica, CA 90401-4110
EXAMINER
BRYANT, REBECCA CAROLE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2877
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/25/2013 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte C. KUMAR PATEL, MICHAEL E. PUSHKARSKY,
MICHAEL C. WEBBER, and TYSON MACDONALD
____________________

Appeal 2010-001087
Application 11/256,377
Technology Center 2800
____________________

Before DAVID M. KOHUT, TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, and
LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the second,
Non-Final rejection of claims 12-29, 36, and 37. Appellants have previously
canceled claims 1-11 and 30-35. App. Br. 3. We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
The Invention
Appellants’ invention relates to the detection of hazardous and/or
toxic gases, including warfare gases, and more particularly to a method and
apparatus for detecting such gases using optical systems such as laser
photoacoustic spectroscopy (LPAS). Spec. p. 2, ll. 22-24 (“Field of the
Invention”).
Exemplary Claims
Claim 12 is an exemplary claim representing an aspect of the
invention which is reproduced below (emphasis added):
12. A high sensitivity gas detector for detection of
hazardous gases with reduced probability of false positive and
false negative signals, comprising:
a light source transmitting modulated tunable radiation;
a photoacoustic test cell illuminated by said radiation,
said photoacoustic test cell having a microphone system
transmitting a photoacoustic signal;
a signal receiver receiving said microphone signal and
transmitting a normalized signal; and
a signal processor receiving said normalized signal,
analyzing said normalized signal using pattern recognition in
conjunction with at least one entry in a library for signal

1 Our Decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
Apr. 13, 2009); Suppl. App. Brief (“Claim Status,” filed June 1, 2009);
Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Sep. 25, 2009); Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,”
mailed Jul. 21, 2009); Non-Final Office Action (“NFOA,” mailed Nov. 18,
2008); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed Oct. 21, 2005).
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signatures for gases detectable by said radiation, said signal
processor transmitting a resulting signal indicating a quantity of
the hazardous gases in said test cell; whereby
detection of known hazardous gases can be made by
illuminating sample air or other gas in said photoacoustic test
cell.
Claim 28 is an exemplary claim representing an aspect of the
invention which is reproduced below (emphasis added):
28. A high sensitivity gas detector for detection of
hazardous gases with reduced probability of false positive and
false negative signals, comprising:
a light source transmitting modulated tunable radiation,
said light source selected from the group consisting of:
a tunable CO2 laser;
a tunable C02 laser tunable to wavelengths
inclusively between 9.0 µm and 11.5 µm;
one or more tunable quantum cascade lasers;
a tunable quantum cascade laser tunable to
wavelengths inclusively
between 3.0 µm and 15 µm;
a tunable parametric oscillator;
a tunable parametric oscillator tunable to
wavelengths inclusively between 2.0 µm and 15 µm;
one or more tunable direct bandgap recombination
type semiconductor lasers;
a tunable direct bandgap recombination type
semiconductor laser tunable between wavelengths inclusively
between 1.0 µm and 15 µm;
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any combination of CO2 lasers, quantum cascade
lasers, parametric oscillators, and direct bandgap recombination
type semiconductor lasers;
any tunable combination of CO2 lasers, quantum
cascade lasers, parametric oscillators, and direct bandgap
recombination type semiconductor lasers, such tunable
combination tunable between wavelengths inclusively between
1.0 µm and 15 µm; and
any combinations thereof;
a photoacoustic test cell illuminated by said radiation,
said photoacoustic test cell having a microphone system
transmitting a photoacoustic signal;
a detector detecting said radiation and a characteristic
thereof, said detector transmitting a reference signal;
a beam splitter splitting said radiation to illuminate both
said test cell and said detector;
a signal receiver receiving said microphone signal and
transmitting a normalized signal;
said signal receiver receiving said reference signal and
said photo acoustic signal;
said signal receiver communicating bi-directionally with
said light source;
a signal processor receiving said normalized signal,
analyzing said normalized signal using pattern recognition in
conjunction with at least one entry in a library for signal
signatures for gases detectable by said radiation, said signal
processor transmitting a resulting signal indicating a quantity of
the hazardous gases in said test cell;
said library having entries for analysis with said
normalized signal, said entries including signal signatures for
chemical warfare agents (CWAs): Lewisite, Nitrogen Mustard
(H-N3), Sulfur mustard (HD), 4-dithiane, diisopropyl
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methylphosphonate (DIMP), dimethyl methylphosphonate
(DMMP), isoamyl alcohol, methylphosphonic difluoride
(DIFLUOR), Cyclosarin (GF), Sarin (GB), Soman (GD), Tabun
(GA), VX, triethyl phosphate, and 2-diisopropylaminoethanol
(DIPAE);
said library having entries for analysis with said
normalized signal, said entries including signal signatures for
toxic industrial chemicals (TICs): ammonia, arsine, boron
trichloride, ethylene oxide, nitric acid, borontrifluoride, carbon
disulfide, diborane, formaldehyde, hydrogen cyanide, hydrogen
sulfide, nitric acid, phosgene, sulfur dioxide, tungsten
hexafluoride, HBr, HCI, and HF; and
said library having entries for analysis with said
normalized signal, said entries including signal signatures for
explosives: TNT and PETN; whereby
detection of known hazardous gases can be made by
illuminating sample air or other gas in said photoacoustic test
cell.
Prior Art
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art in rejecting the
claims on appeal:
Bibbero US 4,084,906 Apr. 18, 1978
Schüth US 6,873,414 B2 Mar. 29, 2005
Patel US 7,004,909 B1 Feb. 28, 2006
L.B. Kreuzer & C.K.N. Patel, Nitric Oxide Air Pollution: Detection
by Optoacoustic Spectroscopy, 173 SCIENCE 45-47 (1971)
(hereinafter “Kreuzer”).
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Rejections on Appeal
1. Claims 12-16, 18-27, and 36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Kreuzer and
Bibbero. Ans. 5.
2. Claims 17, 18, 28, 29, and 37 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Kreuzer, Bibbero,
and Schüth. Ans. 8.
3. Claim 12 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Patel. Id.
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellants’
conclusions with respect to claim 12, and we adopt as our own (1) the
findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this
appeal is taken and (2) the reasons and rebuttals set forth by the Examiner in
the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ Arguments. However,
we highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claims
12 and 28 for emphasis as follows.
1. Rejection of Claims 12-16, 18-27, and 36 over Kreuzer and Bibbero
Issue 1
Appellants argue (App. Br. 10-15; Reply Br. 3-7) that the Examiner’s
unpatentability rejection of claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the
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combination of Kreuzer and Bibbero is in error. These contentions present
us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Kreuzer
and Bibbero teaches or suggests Appellants’ claimed gas
detector including, inter alia, “a signal processor . . . analyzing
said normalized signal using pattern recognition in conjunction
with at least one entry in a library for signal signatures for gases
detectable by said radiation,” as recited in claim 12?
Analysis
Appellants argue that the cited art does not teach or suggest the
claimed “pattern recognition” (App. Br. 10-11; Reply Br. 3-4), the claimed
use of a “library” (App. Br. 11-12; Reply Br. 5-6), and that “the cited
references were not considered as a whole, and do not contain any
suggestion or motivation to combine the reference teachings.” App. Br. 13-
15; Reply Br. 6-7.
In response, the Examiner finds that, with respect to the “pattern
recognition” limitation:
[P]attern recognition, without being defined by the applicant to
be limited to “using absorbency signals and determined
absorptions to provide mole fraction quantities for each of the
expected gases and each of the target gases” and through using
“least squares fitting, linear techniques, and possibly nonlinear
techniques”, is broadly defined as classifying data based on
observed or statistical information.
Ans. 10. During prosecution, “the PTO applies to the verbiage of the
proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their
ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the
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art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or
otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the
applicant's specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir.
1997). Since USPTO gives claims their broadest reasonable interpretation,
our reviewing court reviews the “reasonableness” of the USPTO’s
interpretation. Id. at 1055.
In this case, Appellants’ Specification does not expressly define the
phrase “pattern recognition” or otherwise indicate that this phrase is used
exclusively in a manner other than its ordinary and customary meaning.2
Therefore, in determining the ordinary and customary meaning of “pattern
recognition” as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the art, it is
appropriate to consult a general dictionary definition for guidance. Comaper
Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010).3
The Examiner finds that “pattern recognition . . . is broadly defined as
classifying data based on observed or statistical information.” Ans. 10. We
find the Examiner’s interpretation to be reasonable, particularly in light of
Appellants’ above-cited disclosure of an embodiment which uses “pattern

2 “In one embodiment . . . a processor receives the absorbancy signals from
the optical analyzer and applies pattern recognition (such as least squares
fitting) using the absorbancy signals and the determined absorptions to
provide mole fraction quantities for each of the expected gases and each of
the target gases. In this way, the sample of gas may be analyzed for
presence and quantity of expected gases and target gases.” Spec. 10, ll. 6-15
(emphasis added).
3 “Pattern recognition aims to classify data (patterns) based on either a
priori knowledge or on statistical information extracted from the patterns.
The patterns to be classified are usually groups of measurements or
observations, defining points in an appropriate multidimensional space.”
See, e.g., http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pattern+recognition.
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recognition” in the manner argued by Appellants, and the dictionary
definition cited above.
With respect to the “library” argument,4 the Examiner finds that:
It would be necessary for Kreuzer to have background
knowledge of the absorption lines of the gases, specifically
knowing the absorption lines of NO since otherwise the spectra
would be meaningless. Kreuzer not only has “a library” of the
NO absorption lines as shown in Figure 1 but also of water
vapor. (Page 46, Col. 3) Additionally, “at least one entry” only
requires one entry, there is no implication that there are
multiple records. Even if Kreuzer only disclosed NO
absorption lines in the library, a single entry of a single target
gas is sufficient to satisfy the claim limitation. Simply saying
the library is “for signal signatures for gases detectable by said
radiation” is not claiming multiple signal signatures, but rather
only the intended use of the library. Kreuzer therefore discloses
a library as claimed.
Ans. 12. The Examiner further finds that the Specification does not clearly
define a library as requiring all of the characteristics described in
Appellants’ Specification. Ans. 11 (citing Spec. 11). Appellants respond by
contending that “by reference to the specification, the library is a collection
of the ‘determined absorptions for expected gases and target gases’ and the
‘signal signatures for gases detectable by the radiation’[,] [m]oreover, the
library is electronically stored, and ‘at least one entry in a library’ implies
that there are multiple records in the library.” Reply Br. 5 (citations omitted)
(citing Spec. 10:9-11 and 20-22; 11:6-8 and 16-17).

4 I.e,. “analyzing said normalized signal using pattern recognition in
conjunction with at least one entry in a library for signal signatures . . . .”
Claim 12.
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We find that Appellants’ Specification merely describes an exemplary
embodiment of the invention which include a library, i.e., “[i]n a further
embodiment . . . [t]he absorbancy signal for the gas sample as a whole is
then analyzed in conjunction with a spectral library of determined
absorptions for expected gases and target gases.” Spec. 11, ll. 3-8. As a
result of the exemplary nature of the disclosure, and the lack of claim
language further limiting the definition of “library,” we find that Appellants’
arguments are not commensurate with the scope of claim 12. Accordingly,
we agree with the Examiner’s finding, and disagree with Appellants’
contentions in this regard.
Finally, Appellants’ contend that the cited references were not
considered as a whole and do not contain any motivation to combine the
reference teachings (App. Br. 6; Reply Br. 6-7).
[T]he Examiner has not shown that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would have thought to combine a photoacoustic test cell
with a signal processor receiving the normalized signal,
analyzing the normalized signal using pattern recognition in
conjunction with at least one entry in a library for signal
signatures for gases detectable by the radiation, the signal
processor transmitting a resulting signal indicating a quantity of
the hazardous gases in the test cell.
App. Br. 14. Appellants further contend “the Office Action did not show
any genuine teaching, motivation, or suggestion to combine the cited
references . . . Applicant respectfully submits that the Applicant's teachings
themselves have been used to piece together the cited references through
impermissible hindsight reconstruction.” App. Br. 15. Appellants go on to
describe advantages of the intended use of the claimed invention relating to
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reducing the probability of false positive and false negative signals, and the
importance of low probability of false positives (PFA) or low probability of
false negatives (PFN), and that “[t]hese critical quantities, PFA and PFN, are
not even mentioned in the cited references.” App. Br. 14. We find that
these intended uses and results are not recited in the claims, such that
Appellants’ arguments are not commensurate with the scope of the claims.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “[t]he obviousness analysis
cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching,
suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of
published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.” KSR Int’l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). Instead, the relevant inquiry is
whether the Examiner has set forth “some articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR, 550
U.S. at 418).
Our review of the record establishes that the Examiner’s case for
obviousness is only based on knowledge which was within the level of
ordinary skill at the time of the Appellants’ invention and does not include
knowledge gleaned only from the Appellants’ disclosure.
Second, the Examiner identifies the relevant portions of each of the
references relied on throughout the Examiner’s Answer. See Ans. 5-6. To
the extent that the Examiner relies on the knowledge of one of ordinary skill
in the art to combine the teachings of the references, this practice is
consistent with current case law. For example, the Supreme Court explains:
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Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated
teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to
the design community or present in the marketplace; and the
background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary
skill in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an
apparent reason to combine the known elements in the fashion
claimed by the patent at issue. To facilitate review, this
analysis should be made explicit. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d
977, 988 (C.A.Fed.2006) (“[R]ejections on obviousness
grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements;
instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness”). As our precedents make clear, however, the
analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the
specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can
take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person
of ordinary skill in the art would employ.
KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. We find that the Examiner has made his analysis
explicit in the Answer. See, Ans. 13.
In addition, the reason or motivation to modify the reference may
often suggest what the inventor has done, but for a different purpose or to
solve a different problem. It is not necessary that the prior art suggest the
combination to achieve the same advantage or result discovered by
Appellant. See, e.g., In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 987 (motivation question arises
in the context of the general problem confronting the inventor rather than the
specific problem solved by the invention); Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v.
Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“One of ordinary skill in the art need not see the identical problem
addressed in a prior art reference to be motivated to apply its teachings.”); In
re Linter, 458 F.2d 1013 (CCPA 1972); In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, (Fed.
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 904 (1991).
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Appellants also contend that “[m]oreover, the Appeal Brief recites the
advantages of the present invention to point out the unexpected results of the
invention as claimed.” Reply Br. 7. Appellants have not explained why, nor
is it apparent that this argument regarding secondary considerations (i.e.,
“unexpected results”) was necessitated by a new point in the Answer or any
other circumstance constituting “good cause” for its belated presentation.
See Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1473-74 (BPAI 2010)
(“informative”) (absent a showing of good cause, the Board is not required
to address argument in Reply Brief that could have been presented in the
principal Brief).
Finally, we agree with the Examiner’s findings that “[t]he intended
result as described in the specification of the current application is not a
positive limitation on the claims[,] and since Kreuzer and Bibbero satisfy the
structural limitations, the advantages provided would be the same, even if
not expressly stated.” Ans. 13.
Therefore, we disagree with Appellants’ contentions, and agree with
the Examiner’s findings with respect to the rejection of claim 12 over the
combination of Kreuzer and Bibbero.
Accordingly, Appellants have not convinced us of any error in the
Examiner’s characterization of the cited art and related claim construction.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s unpatentability rejection of
independent claim 12. As Appellants have not provided separate arguments
with respect to dependent claims 13-16, 19-27, and 36, we similarly sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
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2. Rejection of Claims 17, 18, 28, 29, and 37 over Kreuzer, Bibbero, and
Schüth
Issue 2
Appellants argue (App. Br. 15; Reply Br. 9) that the Examiner’s
unpatentability rejection of claim 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the
combination of Kreuzer, Bibbero, and Schüth is in error. These contentions
present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of
Kreuzer, Bibbero, and Schüth teaches or suggests Appellants’
claimed gas detector because the combination does not teach or
suggest pattern recognition or a library, as recited in
independent claim 28?
Analysis
For substantially the same reasons as discussed with respect to
independent claim 12, supra, we find that Appellants have not provided
sufficient evidence or arguments to convince us that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 28. In addition, Appellants contend that the cited
combination does not “recognize or address the importance of reducing the
probability of false positives and reducing the probability of false
negatives.” App. Br. 15. Again, we find that Appellants’ arguments are not
commensurate with the scope of independent claim 28, which contains no
such limitations.
Accordingly, Appellants have not convinced us of any error in the
Examiner’s characterization of the cited art and related claim construction.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s unpatentability rejection of
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independent claim 28. As Appellants have not provided separate arguments
with respect to dependent claims 17-18, 29, and 37, we similarly sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
3. Rejection of Claim 12 over Patel
Issue 3
Appellants argue (App. Br. 16; Reply Br. 7-9) that the Examiner’s
unpatentability rejection of claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the
single reference to Patel is in error. These contentions present us with the
following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding that Patel is not disqualified as
prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) in the rejection of claim 12
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because the Application and the Patel
reference were, at the time of the invention, owned by, or
subject to an obligation of assignment to, Pranalytica, Inc. as
contended by Appellants?
Analysis
Appellants contend that “the reference [Patel] is disqualified under 35
U.S.C. § 103(c) as prior art in a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).” App.
Br. 16. This contention is based upon Appellants’ statement that the Patel
patent was assigned to Pranalytica, Inc. on July 11, 2001, and the assignment
was recorded in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office at reel/frame
012009/0207 and that, likewise, the present application was assigned to
Pranalytica, Inc. on October 31, 2007, and the assignment was recorded in at
reel/frame 020161/0133. Id. We note that the present application has a
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filing date of Oct. 21, 2005, with a claim for benefit under 35 U.S.C.
§ 119(e) to provisional application US 60/621,099 filed on Oct. 22, 2004.
In response, the Examiner states:
Applicant's arguments on page 16 regarding the rejection
of claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Patel
et al. U.S. Patent #7,004,909 is not persuasive. Simply stating
that at the time of the invention of the current application, the
application and Patel U.S. Patent #7,004,909 were owned by or
subject to an obligation of assignment to Pranalytica, Inc. is not
sufficient evidence of the fact. Upon review of the assignment
record, the examiner confirms that assignment of the current
application was given to Pranalytica, Inc. on October 31, 2007
and assignment of Patel U.S. Patent #7,004,909 was given to
Pranalytica, Inc. prior to that. However, it must be shown, with
evidence, not mere allegation to the fact, that application at the
time of invention (i.e. time of filing unless otherwise shown)
shared a common assignee with Patel U.S. Patent #7,004,909.
Ans. 15. We agree with Appellants, and disagree with the Examiner’s
findings regarding qualification of Patel as prior art under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(c). In particular, it appears that Appellants have met the threshold
evidentiary burden for establishing common ownership at the time of
invention of the subject matter in question by their statements to that effect.
App. Br. 16; Reply Br. 8.
The burden of establishing that subject matter is disqualified as prior
art under 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) resides upon Appellants who urge that the
subject matter is disqualified. This burden includes establishing that the
subject matter was commonly owned at the time the claimed invention was
made.
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Based upon assignment recordation information set forth by the
Examiner (Ans. 15), and which remains undisputed by Appellants, it would
appear that Patel and the present application were not commonly owned at
the time of invention of the subject matter of the application on appeal.
However, the question of whether the present Application and Patel were
alternatively “subject to an obligation of assignment to” Pranalytica, Inc. has
not been addressed directly either by extrinsic evidence or argument, except
by Appellants’ statement to that effect. App. Br. 16; Reply Br. 8.
We find that, since Appellants or the representative(s) of record have
the best knowledge of the ownership of their application and reference, their
statement of such ownership, notwithstanding the apparently contradictory
assignment recordation information cited above, is sufficient evidence to
overcome the rejection because of their paramount obligation of candor and
good faith to the USPTO.5 If such statements are not made in good faith, the
enforceability of any patent that might issue could be called into question
during a subsequent proceeding. Thus, we find that Appellants have met
their burden in removing Patel as prior art against the claimed subject
matter.
Accordingly, having found at least one error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Patel, we do not sustain
the rejection.

5 Appellants’ and the Examiner’s attention is invited to “Guidelines Setting
Forth a Modified Policy Concerning the Evidence of Common Ownership,
or an Obligation of Assignment to the Same Person, as Required by 35
U.S.C. 103(c),” 1241 O.G. 96 (December 26, 2000).
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CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner did not err with respect to the rejection of claims
12-16, 18-27, and 36 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
the combination of Kreuzer and Bibbero, and the rejection is sustained.
(2) The Examiner did not err with respect to the rejection of claims
17, 18, 28, 29, and 37 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
the combination of Kreuzer, Bibbero, and Schüth, and the rejection is
sustained.
(3) The Examiner erred with respect to the rejection of claim 12
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Patel, and the rejection
is not sustained.
DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 12-29, 36, and 37 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011).
AFFIRMED

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