Ex Parte Partridge et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJan 29, 201812949666 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 2018) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/949,666 11/18/2010 Kurt E. Partridge PARC-20100217-US-NP 6222 35699 7590 PVF - PARC c/o PARK, VAUGHAN, FLEMING & DOWLER LLP 2820 FIFTH STREET DAVIS, CA 95618-7759 EXAMINER CAO, VINCENT M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3688 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/31/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): sy_incoming @parklegal.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KURT E. PARTRIDGE, JAMES M.A. BEGOLE, and MAURICE K. CHU Appeal 2016-007524 Application 12/949,666 Technology Center 3600 Before St. JOHN COURTENAY III, JOHN A. EVANS, and JASON M. REPKO, Administrative Patent Judges. EVANS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1, 3—9, 11—17, 19-24, and 28—30. App. Br. 3. Claims 2, 10, 18, and 25—27 are canceled. Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.2 1 Appellants state the real party in interest is Palo Alto Research Center Incorporated. App. Br. 1. 2 Rather than reiterate the arguments of the Appellants and the Examiner, we refer to the Appeal Brief (filed November 19, 2015, “App. Br.”), the Reply Appeal 2016-007524 Application 12/949,666 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The claims relate to a system to facilitate contextually specific opportunity-based advertising. See Abstract. INVENTION Claims 1,9, and 17 are independent. An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of Claim 1, which is reproduced below with some formatting added: 1. A computer-implemented method for facilitating contextually specific opportunity-based advertising, the method comprising: collecting, by a computer, contextual information associated with a consumer’s activities from a mobile device that generates the contextual information from one or more sensors; analyzing, by the computer, the contextual information including consumer location and consumer motion to determine an activity in which the consumer is engaged; predicting one or more upcoming advertisement opportunities associated with the consumer based on the determined activities, wherein a respective advertising opportunity represents an opportunity to present an advertisement to the customer while the customer is engaged in the determined activity; generating a set of consumer-specific behavioral rules based on analyzing the consumer’s activities from the contextual information collected from the one or more sensors on the consumer’s mobile device; Brief (filed August 1, 2016, “Reply Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer (mailed May 31, 2016, “Ans.”), the Final Action (mailed May 21, 2015, “Final Act.”), and the Specification (filed November 18, 2010, “Spec.”) for their respective details. 2 Appeal 2016-007524 Application 12/949,666 generating, by the computer based on the set of consumer-specific behavioral rules, an advertisement- receptivity score that indicates a likelihood that the consumer’s attention is receptive to a yet to be selected advertisement that is to be presented while the customer is engaged in the determined activity; and providing the predicted opportunities and the advertisement-receptivity score to one or more advertisers to receive a bid amount from one or more advertisers for presenting an advertisement at the predicted opportunities. Rejections Claims 1, 3—9, 11—17, 19-24, and 28—30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea, such as a fundamental economic practice. Final Act. 2—3. Allowable Subject Matter The Examiner indicates that the claims on appeal are otherwise allowable over the prior art of record. Id., at 3^4. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the rejections of claims 1, 3—9, 11—17, 19-24, and 28—30 in light of Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner erred. We have considered in this Decision only those arguments Appellants actually raised in the Brief. Any other arguments which Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). We are not persuaded that Appellants identity reversible error. Upon consideration of the arguments presented in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief, we agree with the Examiner that all the pending claims 3 Appeal 2016-007524 Application 12/949,666 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth in the rejections from which this appeal is taken and in the Examiner’s Answer, to the extent consistent with our analysis below. We provide the following explanation to highlight and address specific arguments and findings primarily for emphasis. We consider Appellants’ arguments seriatim, as they are presented in the Appeal Brief, pages 13—20. Claims 1,3-9,11-17,19-24, and 28-30: Non-Statutory Subject Matter Appellants argue all claims as a group. App. Br. 13—20. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section 101 provides that a patent may be obtained for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has long recognized, however, that § 101 implicitly excludes “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” from the realm of patent-eligible subject matter, as monopolization of these “basic tools of scientific and technological work” would stifle the very innovation that the patent system aims to promote. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Ass ’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294-97 (2012); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 4 Appeal 2016-007524 Application 12/949,666 Mavo-Alice Step 1. The Supreme Court has instructed us to use a two-step framework to “distinguish[] patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. At the first step, we determine whether the claims at issue are “directed to” a patent-ineligible concept. Id. Appellants contend the claims are not directed to abstract ideas under step 1 of the Mayo-Alice test. Id., at 13. Appellants further content that, assuming arguendo the claims are directed to abstract ideas, that the claims are patent-eligible because they recite significantly more under Mayo-Alice step 2. Id. With respect to Mayo-Alice step 1, the Examiner concludes the claims are directed to the concepts of collecting user information and creating user profile data, providing user profile data to advertisers to facilitate bid interactions, and presenting advertisements to the user based on the facilitated bids. Final Act. 2. The Examiner finds collecting user information and generating user profiles are fundamental market research practices and that providing user profile information, facilitating bids, and presenting advertisement are fundamental practices in the art of online advertisement sales. Id., at 2—3; see Ans. 2—3. With respect to Mayo-Alice step 1, Appellants contend the claims do not recite any of the case law examples of fundamental economic practices such as creating a contractual relationship, hedging, or mitigating settlement risk, therefore the claimed invention is not a fundamental economic practice. App. Br. 14. Appellants argue, moreover, the claims do not recite examples 5 Appeal 2016-007524 Application 12/949,666 of organizing human activity analogous to those found abstract under prior case law. Id. Appellants analogize their claims to Enfish to argue the claims focus on an improvement to computer because they are directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate in modeling human behavior to predict a human response. Reply Br. 8. Claim 1 recites, inter alia, “generating, by the computer based on the set of consumer-specific behavioral rules, an advertisement-receptivity score.” Appellants contend this limitation, similarly to Enfish3, is directed to a specific improvement in the way computers operate. Id. The Federal Circuit contrasted claims “directed to an improvement in the functioning of a computer” with claims “simply adding conventional computer components to well-known business practices,” or claims reciting “use of an abstract mathematical formula on any general purpose computer,” or “a purely conventional computer implementation of a mathematical formula,” or “generalized steps to be performed on a computer using conventional computer activity.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1338. We find the specification describes, and the claims recite, “a desired function or outcome, without providing any limiting detail that confines the claim to a particular solution to an identified problem.” Affinity Labs. Of Tex. LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Contrary to Appellants’ arguments on appeal, we find the present claims are not directed to a specific improvement to computer functionality. Rather, 3 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed.Cir. 2016). 6 Appeal 2016-007524 Application 12/949,666 similar to those of TLI, “they are directed to the use of conventional or generic technology in a nascent but well-known environment, without any claim that the invention reflects an inventive solution to any problem presented by combining the two.” TLI Commc ’ns LLC v. A VAuto., L.L. C., 823 F.3d 607, 612 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Therefore, we conclude all claims on appeal are directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, i.e., a fundamental economic practice, as found by the Examiner (Final Act. 2). Alice Step 2. Where, as here, the claims are found to be “directed to” a patent- ineligible concept, we then “consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298). This analysis has been characterized as the search for an “inventive concept”— something sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to “significantly more” than the abstract idea itself. Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294). With respect to Mayo-Alice step 2, the Examiner notes the claimed invention includes additional elements directed towards computer implementation of the method, but finds the claims merely recite generic computer components and methods. Final Act. 3. Appellants quote Enfish for the proposition that “[s] oft ware can make non-abstract improvements to computer technology just as hardware improvements can. Reply Br. 15. 7 Appeal 2016-007524 Application 12/949,666 We disagree with Appellants’ analogy to Enfish because the specification and claims describe the claimed invention at such a high level of abstraction that the public is not taught how the desired functions are achieved. Therefore, we conclude that none of the claim limitations, viewed “both individually and as an ordered combination,” amount to significantly more than the judicial exception in order to sufficiently transform the nature of the claims into patent-eligible subject matter. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of representative claim 1, and claims 3—9, 11—17, 19-24, and 28—30 (not argued separately) which fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). DECISION The rejection of claims 1, 3—9, 11—17, 19-24, and 28—30 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is AFFIRMED. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation