Ex Parte Parkinson

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Sep 25, 2008

10939142 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 25, 2008)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte WARD D. PARKINSON
____________

Appeal 2008-3464
Application 10/939,142
Technology Center 2800
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Decided: September 25, 2008
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Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ROBERT E. NAPPI, and KEVIN F.
TURNER, Administrative Patent Judges.

TURNER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Final Rejection of
claims 1-38. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm.
Appellant’s claimed invention relates to phase change memories
which use phase change materials that may be switched between different
detectable states. (Spec. 1:2-13).
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Application 10/939,142

Independent claim 1 is illustrative of the invention and reads as
follows:

1. A method comprising:

forming a one time programmable chalcogenide phase change
memory.

Also, as discussed below, Appellant has raised arguments against
only certain claims, where claims 3, 4, and 11 are representative thereof:

3. The method of claim 2 including forming an open circuit at
said cell.

4. The method of claim 2 including forming a cell containing
phase change material and a conductor and causing said phase
change material and said conductor to mix.

11. The method of claim 10 including packaging said memory so
that said write pin is inaccessible to the user.

The Examiner relies on the following prior art references to show
unpatentability:
Purdham US 5,450,426 Sep. 12, 1995
Madurawe US 5,898,630 Apr. 27, 1999
Lung US 6,579,760 B1 Jun. 17, 2003
Fricke US 6,643,159 B2 Nov. 4, 2003

Claims 1-38 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Fricke, Madurawe, Lung, and Purdham.
We note that Appellant states explicitly that claims 1-38 are the
subject of the instant appeal, (App. Br. 5), discusses the subject matter of all
pending claims, (App. Br. 7-10), and requests that “each of the final
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rejections be reversed.” (App. Br. 14). However, as the Examiner notes,
(Ans. 7), Appellant has not offered any convincing arguments regarding
claims 1, 2, 5-10, 12, 13, 16-19, 21, 22, 25-28, 30, 31, and 34-37.
Appellant’s arguments discuss claims 3, 4, and 11 as a group, claims
4, 14, 24 and 33 as a group, and claims 11, 20, 29, and 38 as a group. As
Appellant’s arguments have not specifically addressed 1, 2, 5-10, 12, 13, 16-
19, 21, 22, 25-28, 30, 31, and 34-37 we construe Appellant’s arguments as
having grouped these claims with claim 3. Accordingly we will discuss the
rejection of claims 1-38 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as directed to three
groups. The first group of claims consisting of claims 1-13, 16-19, 21, 22,
25-28, 30, 31, and 34-37 with claim 3 as representative, the second group
consisting of claims 4, 14, 24 and 33 with claim 4 as representative of the
group, and the third group consisting of claims 11, 20, 29, and 38 with claim
11 as representative of the group. Arguments which Appellant could have
made but chose not to make in the Briefs have not been considered and are
deemed to be waived [see 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)].

ISSUES
1. Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), with respect to appealed claim 3, do
Fricke, Madurawe, Lung, and Purdham teach or suggest forming an open
circuit as recited in claim 3?
2. Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), with respect to appealed claim 4, do
Fricke, Madurawe, Lung, and Purdham teach or suggest causing a phase
change material and the conductor to mix as recited in claim 4?
3. Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), with respect to appealed claim 11, do
Fricke, Madurawe, Lung, and Purdham teach or suggest packaging the
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memory so that he write pin is inaccessible to the user as recited in claim
11?

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Specification details that a one time programmable (OTP)
memory includes a variable resistance memory array. The variable
resistance memory array consists of a plurality of cells including phase
change memory elements. The memory also includes a read sense amplifier
and an OTP write interface, where the write interface may be coupled to a
pin to enable the interface and can be made inaccessible after shipping of the
memory. (Spec. 3:8 – 4:14; Figs. 1 and 2, elements 10, 12, 20, 22, 23, 50,
and 56).
2. Fricke is directed to a cubic memory array made up of memory
cells having storage elements and controls elements using wordlines and
bitlines. The storage elements may include OTP memory, but no particulars
of that OTP memory are provided in Fricke. (Col. 2, ll. 59-61; col. 6, ll. 18-
37; Fig. 1, elements 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, and 30).
3. Fricke also describes that storage elements in the memory may be
left unprogrammed and thus open circuited for an antifuse. (Col. 10, l. 65 –
col. 11, l. 4).
4. Fricke refers to local heating that occurs in the storage material
during the process of programming which sufficiently heat the fusing site.
(Col. 8, ll. 9-18).
5. Madurawe describes a dynamic nonvolatile memory cell which is
reprogrammable. The programmable memory elements that make up the
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memory cell can be fabricated using OTP devices such as fuses or antifuses.
(Abstract; Col. 9, ll. 2-3).
6. Lung describes a self-aligned, programmable phase change
memory where the phase change material may be chalcogenides. (Abstract;
col. 2, ll. 12-15).
7. Purdham is directed to continuous error detection in a memory
device using duplicate core memory cells. The memory device includes a
write interface coupled to a decoder, where the address signal is generated
using known circuitry by decoding the user access request. (Abstract; col. 3,
ll. 33-59).

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is incumbent upon the
Examiner to establish a factual basis to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In so
doing, the Examiner must make the factual determinations set forth in
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). “[T]he examiner bears
the initial burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of
presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d
1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Furthermore,
“. . . .there must be some articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness’ . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out
precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the
challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences
and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would employ.”

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KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007)(quoting In
re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
During examination, the claims must be interpreted as broadly as their
terms reasonably allow. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Center, 367 F.3d 1359,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). When the specification states the meaning that a term
in the claim is intended to have, the claim is examined using that meaning,
in order to achieve a complete exploration of the applicant's invention and its
relation to the prior art. In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

ANALYSIS
Appellant argues, with respect to claim 3, that the claim recites
forming an open circuit in the cell and that “Fricke does not teach how to
make an open circuit,” and that Lung “does not suggest how to do it and,
specifically, does not suggest forming an open circuit.” (App. Br. 13). The
Examiner finds that the combination of Fricke, Madurawe, and Lung would
render obvious a process of how to create an open circuit by no
programming of a storage element. (Ans. 8). We agree.
Given that Fricke provides that the storage element may be left
unprogrammed, (FF. 3), and thus open circuited for an antifuse, we do not
see how the process of “forming an open circuit” is not rendered obvious.
Appellant makes several arguments that embodiments in Fricke which use
the phase change material are not antifuse and Fricke only details that they
encompass a resistance change. (Reply Br. 1-3). But the rejection proffers
the combination of Fricke, Madurawe, and Lung, and Appellant has
provided no argument as to why embodiments in Fricke could not be altered
based on Madurawe and Lung, as indicated in the rejection of claim 3. As
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such, we are not persuaded that one of ordinary skill in the art would not
have formed an open circuit in the cell in view of the cited references.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3 and the claims
grouped with claim 3, claims 1, 2, 4-13, 16-19, 21, 22, 25-28, 30, 31, and
34-37.
With respect to claim 4, Appellant argues that none of the references
teaches the intermixing of a phase change material and conductive line to
form an OTP structure. (App. Br. 13). The Examiner suggests that Fricke’s
discussion of changing germanium telluride from a semiconducting state to a
metallic state is equivalent to causing the phase change material and the
conductor to mix. We do not agree with the Examiner’s reasoning, as
supplied in the Answer. (Ans. 8-9).
Rather, we agree with the Examiner formulation as found in the
rejection of claim 4 and other like claims. (Ans. 6). Fricke refers to local
heating that occurs in the storage material. (FF 4). Such heating would
necessarily cause the mixing of the phase change material and the conductor,
at least at the interface of those materials. And while Appellant is correct
that the Specification provides for a much greater degree of mixing, (Reply
Br. 3), such as illustrated in Fig. 4 of the Specification, claim 4 is broader
and provides for nothing more than some degree of the mixing of the phase
change material and the conductor. Thus, based on a reasonable
interpretation of claim 4, we find that that the combination of Fricke,
Madurawe, Lung, and Purdham renders that claim obvious. Accordingly,
we sustain the Examiners rejection of claim 4 and the claims grouped with
claim 4, claims 14, 24, and 33.
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With respect to claim 11, Appellant argues that “[n]one of the cited
references suggest packaging a write pin to make it inaccessible.” (App. Br.
14). The Examiner finds that Purdham teaches that a write interface may be
inaccessible to the user, except via known circuitry, and that this is the
equivalent to making the write pin inaccessible to the user. (Ans. 9).
Appellant argues that Purdham teaches that a write pin is accessible to user
access. (Reply Br. 4). We agree with the Examiner.
We do not find persuasive Appellant’s argument that just because
special circuitry is needed, that does not make the write pin inaccessible to
the user. (Reply Br. 4). The Specification makes clear that “[t]he pin 23
may still be contacted by the manufacturer before packaging but cannot
readily be contacted or used by the user after packaging.” (Spec. 4:7-9). We
find that the need for certain circuitry (FF 7) would make write access of
Purham inaccessible to the user, as the terms found in claim 11 are discussed
in the Specification. We find that the combination of Fricke, Madurawe,
Lung, and Purdham renders claim 11 obvious as provided in the rejection of
that claim. Accordingly, we sustain the Exminers rejection of claim 11 and
the claims grouped with claim 4, claims 20, 29, and 38.

CONCLUSION
In summary, we find no error in the rejection of the representative
claims and sustain their rejection and the rejection of the remaining claims
that fall with the representative claims.

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DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-38 before us on appeal is
affirmed.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

eld

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