Ex Parte Pala et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 12, 2018

12751634 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 12, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/751,634 03/31/2010 Silviu Pala 4041A-000098/US/CPA 1979
127334 7590 03/14/2018
Harness, Dickey & Pierce, P.L.C.
(DENSO International America, Inc.)
P.O. Box 828
Bloomfield Hills, MI 48303
EXAMINER
TAYLOR JR, DUANE N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2626
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/14/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cassie_poe@denso-diam.com
michele_bradley@denso-diam.com
troymailroom @hdp. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SILVIU PALA, JUSTIN McBRIDE, CHRISTOPHER A. ARMS,
BO SUN, CAROLINA M. GIANNOTTI, DANIEL P. TRAN,
NHI VAN PHAM, and MARTIN E. NESPOLO
Appeal 2017-009328
Application 12/751,634
Technology Center 2600
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, NABEEL U. KHAN, and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.
MacDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2017-009328
Application 12/751,634
STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1, 3, 4, 6-12, 15, 17, 18, and 21-23. Claims 2, 5, 13, 14, 16, 19,
and 20 have been cancelled. App. Br. 16-21. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Representative Claims
Representative claims 1,3, and 23 under appeal read as follows
(emphasis, formatting, and bracketed material added):
1. A control interface system in a vehicle comprising:
[A.] an input device that receives input of a user to control a
plurality of systems of the vehicle;
a plurality of dual function sensors disposed along a surface of
said input device, each of the dual function sensors having a first
circuit that is sensitive to contact of the user with the surface of said
input device and a second circuit sensitive to pressure exerted upon
the surface of the input device exceeds a predetermined threshold,
wherein the dual function sensor generates a first signal indicating
contact of the user with the surface of the input device and generates a
second signal indicating that pressure exerted upon the surface of the
input device exceeds the predetermined threshold;
[B.] a processing unit which receives the first and second
signals and controls the plurality of systems within the vehicle based
upon the received signals; and
[C.] a display unit that presents an icon representing an
executable function corresponding to one of the plurality of systems
of the vehicle, at least one of the plurality of dual function sensors
maps to the icon;
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[D.] wherein:
[i.] the input device is spaced apart from the display unit,
and is a touchpad on a rear surface of a rotatable steering wheel,
the touchpad controls a virtual cursor displayed on the display
unit in response to a user input in the form of a touch and
movement of a finger along the touchpad;
[ii.] each of the plurality of dual function sensors further
comprises a haptic feedback circuit that vibrates upon
receiving a voltage signal from the processing unit, thereby
causing the dual function sensor to vibrate, wherein the
processing unit transmits the voltage signal to the haptic
feedback circuit of a particular dual function sensor when the
processing unit receives at least one of a first signal or a second
signal from the particular dual function sensor; and
[iii.] the processing unit refrains from receiving an
additional set of first and second signals as inputs, and refrains
from executing any function corresponding to the additional set
of first and second signals, while the haptic feedback circuit
vibrates the dual function sensor in order to not provide a false
sensor signal caused by the haptic feedback circuit.
3. The control interface system of claim 1 wherein the
processing unit is configured to transmit a first voltage signal to the
haptic feedback circuit of the particular dual function sensor upon
receiving the first signal from the particular dual function sensor and
to transmit a second voltage signal to the haptic feedback circuit of the
particular dual function sensor upon receiving the second signal from
the particular dual function sensor, whereby the haptic feedback
circuit vibrates at a first frequency upon receiving the first voltage
signal and vibrates at a second frequency upon receiving the second
voltage signal.
23. The control interface system of claim 3, wherein the
processing unit is configured to vary the first frequency of the first
voltage signal depending on which one of the plurality of dual
function sensors is activated by the user.
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Application 12/751,634
Rejections
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3, 4, 9-12, 15, 17, 18, 22, and 23
under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the
combination of
Dai et al. (US 2010/0053087 Al; Mar. 4, 2010),
Sullivan et al. (US 2006/0262104 Al; Nov. 23, 2006),
Burrough et al. (US 2010/0156818 Al; June 24, 2010),
Breed (US 8,032,264 B2; Oct. 4, 2011), and
Weber et al. (US 7,441,800 B2; Oct. 28, 2008).1
The Examiner rejected claims 6-8 and 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over various combinations of Dai, Sullivan, Burrough,
Breed, Weber, and other prior art references.2
Issues on Appeal
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 1 as being obvious?
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claim 23 as being obvious?
DEFINITIONS
Haptic (adjective): Digital Technology, of or relating to tactile
sensations and the sense of touch as a method of interacting with computers
1 We select claims 1 and 23/3/1 as representative. Separate patentability is
not argued for claims 3, 4, 9-12, 15, 17, 18, and 22. Except for our ultimate
decision, claims 3, 4, 9-12, 15, 17, 18, and 22 are not discussed further
herein.
2 Separate patentability is not argued for claims 6-8 and 21. Thus, the
rejections of these claims turns on our decision as to claim 1. Except
for our ultimate decision, these claims are not discussed further herein.
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and electronic devices. Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com Unabridged.
Random House, Inc. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/haptic (accessed:
March 3, 2018).
Haptic (noun): Digital Technology, a vibration or other tactile
sensation received from a computer or electronic device. Id.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments (Appeal Brief and Reply Brief) that the Examiner has erred. We
disagree with Appellants. We concur with the conclusions reached by the
Examiner.
A
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
The proposed combination of the Dai, Sullivan, Burrough,
Breed, and Weber references {a tenuous 5-way combination) is
improper because the Examiner is inappropriately relying on
speculation, unfound[ed] assumptions, hindsight reconstruction,
and “common knowledge without evidentiary support in the
record.” In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017, 154 U.S.P.Q. 173,
178 (C.C.P.A. 1967); MPEP § 2144.03 (citing In re Zurko, 258
F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
App. Br. 12 (emphasis added).
First, Appellants fail to elaborate why they believe the Examiner has
relied on speculation, unfound assumptions, hindsight reconstruction, and
common knowledge. Appellants’ unsupported assertion is insufficient to
convince us that the Examiner erred.
Second, we disagree with Appellants’ assertion the Examiner
combination of reference is “tenuous” merely because it uses five references.
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The criterion for an obviousness rejection “is not the number of references,
but what they would have meant to a person of ordinary skill in the field of
the invention.” See In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
When the references are all in the same or analogous fields, knowledge
thereof by the hypothetical person of ordinary skill is presumed, and the test
is whether the teachings of the prior art, taken as a whole, would have
rendered obvious the claimed invention. See id.
B
Appellants also contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under
35U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
[T]he modifications are not obvious because the prior art failed
to suggest their desirability. In re Mills, 916 F.2d 900, 902, 221
U.S.P.Q. 1125, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
App. Br. 12-13 (emphasis added).
Appellants overlook that the Supreme Court has rejected the rigid
requirement of demonstrating a teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the
references to show obviousness. SeeKSR Int’l Co., v. Teleflex Co., 550 U.S.
398, 415-16 (2007); see also In re Ethicon, Inc., 844 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (“KSR directs that an explicit teaching, suggestion, or motivation
in the references is not necessary to support a conclusion of obviousness.”).
Instead, “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known
methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable
results.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 416.
Appellants further contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a):
Because the Office Action failed to establish any objective
evidence or any convincing line of reasoning to combine the
cited references, Applicant respectfully submits that the cited art,
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either alone or in combination, fails to teach or suggest the
claimed invention, and thus the Examiner has failed to establish
a prima facie case of obviousness. . . . “[Tjhere must be some
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support
the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977
at 988; 78 USPQ2d 1329 at 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The support
given in the Office Action for the proposed combinations, which
is set forth above, consists of merely conclusory statements that
are insufficient to establish a prima facie rejection because no
articulated reasoning with rational underpinning was given for
the proposed combinations, and no explanation as to how the
combinations could have been made was provided.
App. Br. 13-14 (emphasis added).
In the Final Action, the Examiner concluded it would have been
obvious “to include” the known feature of Sullivan with the processing of
Dai. Final Act. 5 (explaining with particularity the how and why of the
modification of Dai based on Sullivan (citing Sullivan 4)). The Examiner
also concluded it would have been obvious “to include” the known feature
of Burrough with the modified processing of Dai and Sullivan. Final Act. 6-
7, bridging paragraph (explaining with particularity the how and why of the
modification of Dai as modified by Sullivan based on Burrough (citing
Burrough Abstract)). The Examiner further concluded it would have been
obvious “to include” the known feature of Breed with the processing of Dai.
Final Act. 7-8, bridging paragraph (explaining with particularity the how
and why of the modification of Dai based on Breed (citing Breed 36:9-64,
Abstract). Finally, the Examiner concluded it would have been obvious “to
provide” the known feature of Weber with the processing of Dai. Final
Act. 8, third full paragraph (explaining with particularity the how and why
of the modification of Dai based on Weber (citing Weber 7:60-63)).
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We disagree with Appellants’ assertion that the lengthy analysis by
the Examiner fails to present a convincing line of reasoning. We conclude
the Examiner’s rejection sets forth adequate non-hindsight reasoning for
making the proposed combination. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“[I]f a
technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the
same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is
beyond his or her skill.”).
C
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 23 under
35U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
It is a longstanding rule that to establish aprima facie case
of obviousness of a claimed invention, all of the claim
limitations must be taught or suggested by the prior art. In re
Royka, 180 U.S.P.Q. 143 (CCPA 1974); MPEP §2143.03.
Furthermore, when evaluating claims for obviousness under 35
U.S.C. § 103, all of the limitations must be considered and given
weight. Ex parte Grasselli, 231 U.S.P.Q. 393 (Bd. App. 1983),
MPEP § 2144.03.
App. Br. 10 (emphasis added).
Appellants’ citations to the MPEP are unhelpful as we do not find
where these citations align with the version of the MPEP at the time of
Appellants’ Appeal Brief (March 14, 2017). We note that Appellants’
particular reliance on Royka is ill-founded subsequent to KSR. Royka is
based on the limited pre-KSR teaching-suggestion-motivation theory of
§103 rejection. Appellants fail to acknowledge the modifying effect of the
Court’s Decision in KSR on Royka. The appropriate rule subsequent to KSR
is more correctly that to establish a prima facie case of obviousness of a
claimed invention, all of the claim limitations must be taught, suggested, or
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rendered obvious by the prior art. We evaluate Appellants’ argument and
Examiner’s rejection on this basis, rather than the prQ-KSR Royka-basis set
forth by Appellants.
Appellants further contend the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 23
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because:
[T]he Dai reference merely discloses that different haptic
feedback patterns “provided due to the predetermined pressure
being applied may be the same or different for all piezoelectric
elements.” The Dai reference is completely silent with respect
to varying haptic feedback frequency based on which particular
dual function sensor is merely contacted (i.e., touched but not
depressed), as is claimed by Applicant in dependent Claim 23.
With respect to the present application, each one of the
Dai, Sullivan, Burrough, Breed, and Weber references fails to
disclose or suggest “varying] the first frequency of the first
voltage signal depending on which one of the plurality of dual
function sensors is activated by the user,” as set forth in
Applicant’s Claim 23.
App. Br. 10 (emphasis omitted; emphasis added).
Appellants acknowledge Dai discloses providing different haptic
feedback patterns due to the predetermined pressure sensing. Appellants
then state that Dai is “completely silent” as to providing different haptic
feedback patterns due to contact sensing. Appellants then conclude that
varying the feedback patterns due to contact sensing is not rendered obvious
by the teachings of Dai. We disagree.
First, Appellants overlook that Dai explicitly teaches providing
varying haptic feedback due to contact sensing.
The driver, after receiving the signal from the processor,
provides a voltage to the piezoelectric element corresponding to
the capacitive pattern sensing the contact. The piezoelectric
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element, in turn, provides haptic feedback to the individual key
being contacted through flexing motion of the bonded touchpad
structure and thereby provides tactile feedback to a contacting
finger.
The haptic feedback provided to the user is dependent on
the particular key and function. This is to say that the same key
may provide a different tactile feedback pattern dependent on the
key function. The key function may be changed by a selector on
the touch pad, via a signal from a remote operator, or by the user
entering a code on the touch sensor prior to entering personal
information. Accompanying the haptic feedback in one
embodiment is an associated sound, which helps distinguish the
area of the touch sensor being contacted. The sound may be
provided by the flexing and unflexing of the layers in the touch
sensor due to actuation of the piezoelectric elements or may be
provided by integrated or separate sonic or vibrational devices.
Individualization of the haptic feedback permits a user to
tell which portion of the touch sensor has been contacted (or is
about to be contacted) without viewing the touch sensor.
Dai 22-24.
Although the varying haptic feedback for contact sensing in Dai is in a
different context (same key with different functions), we deem it to be a
sufficient suggestion to use varying haptic feedback for contact sensing
(different keys-different functions) as set forth in Appellants’ claim 23.
Separately, even if Dai lacked the explicit contact sensing teaching
cited above, Appellants acknowledge Dai discloses providing different
haptic feedback patterns due to the predetermined pressure sensing. We
deem this predetermined pressure sensing teaching by Dai to also be a
sufficient suggestion to provide different haptic feedback patterns due to
other forms of sensing such as the claimed contact sensing. This is the
combination of familiar elements according to known methods that does no
more than yield predictable results.
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CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner has not erred in rejecting claims 1, 3, 4, 6-12, 15,
17, 18, and 21-23 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
(2) Claims 1, 3, 4, 6-12, 15, 17, 18, and 21-23 are not patentable.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 3, 4, 6-12, 15, 17, 18, and 21-
23 are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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