Ex Parte Pagliari et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jul 12, 2006

10215877 (B.P.A.I. Jul. 12, 2006)

The opinion in support of the decision being entered today
was not written for publication in
and is not binding precedent of the Board.

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
___________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
___________

Ex parte DANIAL PAGLIARI, CAROL YORK, DANIEL SALVATORE
and KELLEY EVERETTS
___________

Appeal No. 2006-1128
Application No. 10/215,877
___________

ON BRIEF
___________

Before LEVY, NAPPI, and FETTING, Administrative Patent Judges.

FETTING, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. §134 from the examiner's final rejection of
claims 1 and 3 to 27, which are all of the claims pending in this application.

We AFFIRM.
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Application No. 10/215,877

BACKGROUND

The appellants’ invention relates to a method and system for managing the
delegation of investigating disputed transactions. An understanding of the invention can
be derived from a reading of exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced below.
1. A method of providing information relating to a disputed payment
transaction, said method comprising:
receiving a disputed payment transaction;
storing data relating to said disputed payment transaction in an
electronic memory;
establishing a case identifier for said disputed payment transaction;
associating said case identifier with a queue of cases to be worked;
generating a second queue for working by an investigator of said
disputed payment transaction;
disposing said case identifier in said second queue of cases;
forming said second queue of cases with at least two cases to be
worked by said investigator;
regulating execution of a workload of said investigator via displaying
only a partial listing of said second queue of cases for viewing by said
investigator so as to prevent said investigator from selectively avoiding
cases to work.

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PRIOR ART & REJECTIONS
The prior art references of record relied upon by the examiner in rejecting the appealed
claims are:
Bissonette et al. (Bissonette) 6,343,279 Jan. 29, 2002

Lynn et al. (Lynn) 6,606,710 Aug. 12, 2003
(filed October 5, 1998)

Caulfield et al. (Caulfield) WO 02/05123 (PCT) Jan. 3, 2002
In addition, we place the following prior art reference into the record.
J. Leon Zhao and Edward A. Stohr, Temporal Workflow Management in a Claim
Handling System, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Work Activities
Coordination and Collaboration, International Conference on Work Activities
Coordination and Collaboration, ISSN: 0163-5948, pp. 187-195, Feb., 1999 (Zhao).

The examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claims 1, 7, 13, 19 and 24 under 35
U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, and that rejection is accordingly moot. [Answer p. 2].
Claims 1-6 and 24-27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
as obvious over Bissonette in view of Lynn.
Claims 7-23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable as
obvious over Caulfield in view of Lynn.
Rather than reiterate the conflicting viewpoints advanced by the examiner and
appellants regarding the above-noted rejection, we make reference to the examiner's
answer (mailed October 7, 2005) for the reasoning in support of the rejection, and to
appellants’ brief (filed July 25, 2005) and reply brief (filed November 18, 2005) for the
arguments thereagainst.
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Application No. 10/215,877
OPINION
In reaching our decision in this appeal, we have given careful consideration to
appellants’ specification and claims, to the applied prior art references, and to the
respective positions articulated by appellants and the examiner. As a consequence of
our review, we make the determinations that follow.
We initially note that, of the two references applied in each of the rejections, one
(Bissonette in the first rejection and Caulfield in the second rejection) is directed to
dispute transaction processing in particular, and the second, Lynn, is directed to generic
workflow management. Therefore, the references are applied as a combined teaching
of workflow management of dispute processing transactions.

Claims 1-6 and 24-27 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable as
obvious over Bissonette in view of Lynn.

We note that the appellants argue claims 1-6 and 24-27 as a group. Accordingly, we
select claim 1 as representative of the group.
Bissonette describes receiving and storing a disputed payment
transaction [See col. 7 lines 32-43];
Lynn shows establishing a case identifier [See col. 12 lines 45-54]
and associating it with a work queue of cases to be worked [See Fig. 5
Ref. 122]; generating a second queue for working by an investigator and
disposing the cases in it [See Fig. 5 Ref. 126]; at least two cases to be
worked by said investigator [See col. 7 lines 55-61 – “The next case can
be retrieved…]; regulating execution of a workload of said investigator via
displaying only a partial listing of said second queue of cases for viewing
by said investigator so as to prevent said investigator from selectively
avoiding cases to work [See col. 1 lines 49-56 and col. 7 lines 55-65
describing a FIFO queuing discipline to control what a worker can work
on].
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We note that a FIFO queuing discipline is (1) a notoriously well known
management tool, and (2) is the typical workflow control in claim handling
systems, such as that of Bissonette, as evidenced by Zhao, p. 187, right
hand column, bottom paragraph.
The appellants argue that neither reference describes a second queue of cases with
a case identifier. [See Brief at p. 11 and Reply Brief pp. 2-5]. The examiner responds
that a case identifier is non-functional descriptive material and therefore given no
weight. [See Answer at p. 21]. This set of arguments by the appellants and examiner is
moot given that Lynn describes moving transactions from a first to a second queue and
assigning a case identifier.
When an event is detected, as indicated by Event Trigger 120, the
Events Processor determines how the work item(s) 122 associated with
the event should be started through the workflow and what data to start in
the workflow. The workflow dictates the work step 124. The Queue
Assignment module then determines to which work division 126 the
work item(s) 122 should be assigned. [See Fig. 5 and col. 12 lines 22-
29]
The Case table (BL CASE) is the main processing table. It stores a
record for each case per work type in the system. It is accessed by
BLCase 64. There can be multiple case tables in the system. The table
structure is always modified for each system implementation. Below is one
example.
BL_CASE (SCASEID VARCHAR2(16) not null, SWORKTYPE
VARCHAR2(16) not null, SSTATUS VARCHAR2(16) not null, SOWNERID
VARCHAR2(16) null, DCREATED DATE not null,
SLASTUPDATEUSERID VARCHAR2(16) null, DLASTUPDATED DATE
null, SACCOUNTNUM VARCHAR2(32) null, ) [See col. 12 lines 37-54]
The appellants also argue that at least two cases in the second queue are not
described. Lynn shows prefetching a second case in a queue, thus describing at least
two cases in a queue.
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BLCaseWorkList 62 retrieves a prioritized worklist for a user when a
worker starts a session with a workflow processing system according to
the present invention. The next case can be retrieved while
simultaneously processing the current case by user interaction through a
client/server GUI environment. Ordinarily a user will require a few minutes
to process the work item. During that interval BLCaseWorkList prefetches
the next case to the client workstation of the user. This limits the idle time
of employees between and during cases and increases the output of the
employee. [See col. 7 lines 55-65]
None of the appellants’ arguments are found persuasive. Accordingly, we sustain
the examiner’s rejection of claims 1-6 and 24-27 as rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable as obvious over Bissonette in view of Lynn.

Claims 7-23 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable as obvious over
Caulfield in view of Lynn.

Claims 7-12
We note that the appellants argue claims 7-12 as a group. Accordingly, we select claim
7 as representative of the group.
Caulfield describes receiving payment disputes and getting related
data; putting that data into computerized rules and processing the data
and rules and outputting to the next stage. [See page 1 line 29 to page 2,
line 13];
Lynn shows associating workflow transactions with a work queue of
cases to be worked [See Fig. 5 Ref. 122 &126]; at least two cases to be
worked by said investigator [See col. 7 lines 55-61 – “The next case can
be retrieved…]; regulating execution of a workload of said investigator via
displaying only a partial listing of said second queue of cases for viewing
by said investigator so as to prevent said investigator from selectively
avoiding cases to work. [See col. 1 lines 49-56 and col. 7 lines 55-65
describing a FIFO queuing discipline to control what a worker can work
on].
We note that a FIFO queuing discipline is (1) a notoriously well known
management tool, and (2) is the typical workflow control in claim handling
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Application No. 10/215,877
systems, such as that of Caulfield, as evidenced by Zhao, p. 187, right
hand column, bottom paragraph.

The appellants argue the absence of a queue let alone designating a payment
transaction dispute to such a queue [See Brief at p. 13] Lynn shows multiple queues
and designating a transaction into one of the queues based on a decision regarding the
current transaction in Fig. 5. Caulfield shows multiple queues and designating a
transaction into one of the queues based on a decision regarding the transaction on
p. 10 line 10 through p. 13, line 9 describing a queue of transactions for chargeback
clearing, retrieval request fulfillment, representment, et al. Accordingly, the appellants’
argument of the absence of a queue let alone designating a payment transaction
dispute to such a queue is unpersuasive.

The appellants argue there would be no motivation to combine a highly automated
Caulfield process with Lynn’s workflow process as there would be no need for an
investigator. Caulfield describes the active participation of an investigator within the
operation of the system at p. 15 lines 16 to 18. Further, each of the outcomes
described on pp. 10 through 13 either explicitly or implicitly require some definite or
potential intervention by investigators. Further, nothing in the claim describes whether
an investigator is a person or a machine process. We also note that the claim never
introduces the investigator initially into the claim, and never characterizes the
investigator by personal attributes, but refers to an investigator as “said investigator” in
all instances of the word “investigator” in the claim, and therefore there is sufficient
ambiguity to encompass whatever form of investigator is reasonable in the context of
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the process being performed. Certainly, Caulfield’s automated processes may be
characterized as investigators in that they carry out the process of investigation.
Accordingly, the appellants’ argument there would be no motivation to combine a highly
automated Caulfield process with Lynn’s workflow process as there would be no need
for an investigator is unpersuasive.

None of the appellants’ arguments are found persuasive. Accordingly, we sustain the
examiner’s rejection of claims 7-12 as rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable as obvious over Caulfield in view of Lynn.

Claims 13-18
We note that the appellants argue claims 13-18 as a group. Accordingly, we select
claim 13 as representative of the group.

We note that claim 13 essentially combines some limitations from each of claims 1 and
7, and we have noted above how Caulfield in view of Lynn meets those claims, aside
from the receiving and storing a disputed payment transaction, which Caulfield shows p.
2 col. 1-5.
The appellants argue that the references fail to show a queue of a plurality of cases
for resolution by a user. [See Brief at p. 15]. Lynn shows prefetching a second case in
a queue for a user, thus describing at least two cases in a queue.
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BLCaseWorkList 62 retrieves a prioritized worklist for a user when a
worker starts a session with a workflow processing system according to
the present invention. The next case can be retrieved while
simultaneously processing the current case by user interaction through a
client/server GUI environment. Ordinarily a user will require a few minutes
to process the work item. During that interval BLCaseWorkList prefetches
the next case to the client workstation of the user. This limits the idle time
of employees between and during cases and increases the output of the
employee. [See col. 7 lines 55-65].
Thus, the argument that the references fail to show a queue of a plurality of cases
for resolution by a user is unpersuasive.
The appellants next argue that because an output has already been performed in
Caulfield, it cannot communicate a set of possible actions to a user [See Brief at p. 16].
To the contrary, we note that for each of the major actions indicated by Caulfield on pp.
10-13, there are several minor actions that may be taken in response to presentation of
those choices, referring to the user as the “acquirer” and further, interactive
communication in response to intermediate choices is shown at p. 15 lines 15-18.
Thus, the argument that because an output has already been performed in
Caulfield, it cannot communicate a set of possible actions to a user is unpersuasive.
None of the appellants’ arguments are found persuasive. Accordingly, we sustain
the examiner’s rejection of claims 13-18 as rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable as obvious over Caulfield in view of Lynn.
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Claims 19-23
We note that the appellants argue claims 19-23 as a group. Accordingly, we select
claim 19 as representative of the group. The appellants argue these claims the same
as they argued claims 13-18 and are therefore unpersuasive for the same reasons.
None of the appellants’ arguments are found persuasive. Accordingly, we sustain the
examiner’s rejection of claims 19-23 as rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable as obvious over Caulfield in view of Lynn.
We have above sustained the examiner’s rejections of claims 7-12, 13-18 and 19-
23. Accordingly, we sustain the examiner’s rejection of claims 7-23 as rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable as obvious over Caulfield in view of Lynn.
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CONCLUSION
To summarize,
• The rejection of claims 1-6 and 24-27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable as obvious over Bissonette in view of Lynn, is sustained.
• The rejection of claims 7-23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable as
obvious over Caulfield in view of Lynn is sustained.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may
be extended under 37 CFR § 1.136(a) (1)(iv).
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AFFIRMED

STUART S. LEVY )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
)
) BOARD OF PATENT
ROBERT E. NAPPI ) APPEALS
Administrative Patent Judge ) AND
) INTERFERENCES
)
)
)
ANTON W. FETTING )
Administrative Patent Judge )

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Townsend and Townsend and Crew,
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ANF/ki

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