Ex Parte Olivier et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 14, 201713706151 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 14, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/706,151 12/05/2012 Michael Olivier 3080.095US1 6661 45839 7590 11/16/2017 SrTiweaman T linHhera Rr Wnesisiner / T inkeHTn/Miornsinft EXAMINER PO BOX 2938 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402 LINDSEY III, JOHNATHAN J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3629 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/16/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): USPTO@slwip.com slw@blackhillsip.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MICHAEL OLIVIER, RACHEL SANDERS, and ALEX VAUTHEY Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,1511 Technology Center 3600 Before THU A. DANG, ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, and JOHN D. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judges. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants file this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—21. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Linkedln Corporation. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 THE CLAIMED INVENTION Appellants’ claimed invention relates to data processing systems, including systems for scheduling job interviews for candidates, conducting interviews of job candidates, and evaluating interviewers of job candidates. Spec. 11. Claim 1 is reproduced below. 1. A system comprising: a computer processor configured to: store in an interview computer storage device one or more modules of questions for use in connection with an interview of a job candidate for a particular type of job; store in an interviewer computer storage device data associating each of a plurality of interviewers with a particular module of questions that an interviewer is trained in and qualified to use in the interview; provide the particular module of questions to the interviewer that the interviewer is trained in and qualified to use for use in the interview; and capture and store responses of the job candidate during the interview and capture and store comments and ratings of the interviewer during the interview. REJECTIONS ON APPEAL (1) The Examiner rejected claims 1—21 under 35U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. (2) The Examiner rejected claims 1—10, 13, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Cordero (US 2004/0186743 Al; published Sept. 23, 2004), Hartmann (US 2008/0172284 Al; published July 17, 2008), and John E. Reid, “Note Taking During an Interview,” Police Link 2 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 http://policelink.monster.com/training/articles/1915-note-takingduring- an-interview (June 19, 2010) (hereinafter “Reid”). (3) The Examiner rejected claims 11, 12, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Cordero, Hartmann, Reid, and Money et al. (US 2007/0088601 Al; published Apr. 19, 2007) (hereinafter “Money”). (4) The Examiner rejected claims 16—21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Cordero, Hartmann, Reid, Money, and Official Notice. (5) The Examiner rejected claims 1—21 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failing to comply with the written description requirement. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’ contentions that the Examiner erred. We disagree with Appellants’ arguments with respect to the § 101 rejection and § 103 rejections, and we incorporate herein and adopt as our own the findings, conclusions, and reasons with respect to this rejection as set forth by the Examiner in (1) the May 21, 2015 Final Office Action (“Final Act.” 2—31) and (2) the March 14, 2016 Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.” 2—19). We agree with Appellants that the Examiner errs with respect to the § 112 rejection. (1) f101 rejection Appellants contend the Examiner improperly rejected claims 1—21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See App. Br. 10-19; Reply Br. 1—3. Appellants argue the rejected claims as a group. Thus, we decide the appeal of the §101 rejection on the basis of representative claim 1, and refer to the 3 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 rejected claims collectively herein as “the claims.” See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986). According to Appellants, the claims do not concern an abstract idea, and even if they did, the claims would be patent eligible because the claims amount to significantly more than an abstract idea. See App. Br. 10-19; Reply Br. 1—3. We find Appellants’ arguments unpersuasive. Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “[wjhoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has explained that this provision is subject to a long-standing, implicit exception: “[ljaws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). The Court has set forth a two-part inquiry to determine whether this exception applies. First, we must determine if the claim at issue is directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. Second, if the claim is directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts, we must consider the elements of the claim “both individually and as an ordered combination to determine whether the additional elements transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012)). (i) Abstract idea We first consider whether the Examiner properly concluded the claims are directed to one or more abstract ideas. For example, the 4 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 Examiner concluded that the limitations of claim 1 broadly describe a method of organizing human activity. Ans. 3. The Examiner finds that the claims are directed to the type of organizing human activity (i.e., “[cjoncepts relating to interpersonal and intrapersonal activities, such as managing relationships or transactions between people . . . and sales activities or behaviors”) that have been identified as abstract ideas. See Ans. 6 (citing Office’s July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (hereinafter “2025 Update”)). More specifically, the Examiner finds the claims are directed to a method for managing interactions between people (i.e., “[organizing a job interview by associating questions with particular evaluators for use during an interview and conducting the interview by capturing interviewee responses and evaluator ratings and comments”). Ans. 7. Appellants argue the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, including not be directed to “a method of organizing human activity.” Reply Br. 1. Furthermore, Appellants argue that the controlling case law “did not state that all methods of organizing human activities are abstract.” Id.', see also id. (citing Ans. 6—7 (arguing that the Examiner admits that only certain methods of organizing human activities are abstract ideas)). Moreover, Appellants argue the “claims recite a computer system that associates with an interviewer modules of questions for which the interviewer is trained[, and that] such association by a computer system is not a human activity.” Reply Br. 1. Appellants also argue the claims “only involve[] the interviewer, and as such cannot be the management of an interaction between persons.” Reply Br. 2. Appellants have not persuaded us that the Examiner errs. The Federal Circuit has explained that the abstract-idea inquiry requires “looking at the 5 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 ‘focus’ of the claims, their ‘character as a whole,’” to determine if the claims are directed to an abstract idea. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed to an abstract idea of organizing human activity (i.e., managing interactions between people). In this regard, the claims of the instant application are similar to the claims in buySAFE which were directed to creating a contractual relationship and were found to be an abstract idea. See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ argument that the claims only involve the interviewer, and thus, cannot concern interactions. For example, the claims contemplate interactions at least between an interviewer and a job candidate, as well as whoever is to review the captured responses, comments, and ratings. See, e.g., App. Br. 27 (reciting claim 1). Furthermore, our reviewing Court held that “analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds . . . without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.” Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1353—54 (citations omitted); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (footnote omitted) “[Computational methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind are the types of methods that embody the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work’ that are free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”). The claims of the instant application likewise can be viewed essentially as mental processes using paper (e.g., storing interview questions for a particular, storing which interviewers are trained to use which questions, providing the 6 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 proper questions to the proper interviewer, and capturing and storing a job candidate’s responses and interviewer’s comments). These cases are sufficiently analogous to establish that the instant claims are directed to an abstract idea. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that when determining whether claims are directed to an abstract idea, “both this court and the Supreme Court have found it sufficient to compare [the] claims at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in previous cases”). Moreover, we are unpersuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner fails to sufficiently address claims 2—21. The Examiner finds that these claims “are also patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the additional limitations only further describe the abstract idea in the independent claim and do not recite limitations that quality as significantly more under the Office's current guidance on subject matter eligibility.” Ans. 5. Appellants fail to persuasively address substantively this finding. (ii) Inventive concept We next consider whether the Examiner correctly concluded the claims do not include an “inventive concept—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 12—IS). The Examiner explained the claims “merely use[] conventional computer equipment capable of performing generic computer functions to implement the abstract idea recited in the claims.” Ans. 4 (citing Spec. ^fl[ 58—59). The Examiner concludes that “neither the claims 7 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 nor the [Specification teaches the generic computer provides an inventive concept or limits the recited method steps to be performed by specific hardware.” Ans. 5. The Examiner also finds Appellant’s reliance on Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) misplaced because “Diehr sought to improve upon conventional practice by continuously measuring temperatures inside a mold cavity and automatically feeding the data into a digital computer programmed to repeatedly calculate a cure time using the Arrhenius equation in order to determine when to open the mold press.” Ans. 7—8 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 179). Diehr found those claims “sought to patent an improved process and system that transforms raw rubber into cured product using the mathematical formula.” Ans. 8 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191). In contrast, the Examiner finds that the instant claims are “not directed toward improving another technology or technical process.” Id. Appellants contend that the claims add significantly more to the abstract idea. App. Br. 16—19; Reply Br. 2—3. More specifically, Appellants argue that the claims “recite[] more than simply instructing a practitioner to implement an abstract idea of conducting an interview on a generic computer.” App. Br. 16. Rather, “[t]he claims recite specific steps in associating a particular module of questions that an interviewer is trained in and qualified to use in an interview and providing the particular module of questions to the interviewer for use in the interview.” App. Br. 16; see also Reply Br. 2 (arguing the claims “recite a computer system that functions in a new manner different than any prior computer system”). Appellants also argue a “computer programmed with Appellants’] claimed subject matter would function in a very practical and particular manner, as did the 8 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 computer in Diehr” — Diehr involved an improved process for evaluating the curing stage of synthetic rubber. App. Br. 17. Appellants, thus, contend the claims are patent eligible subject matter, as the claims were found to be in Diehr. App. Br. 17. We agree with the Examiner that the claims do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Appellants fail to refute sufficiently the Examiner’s finding, with which we agree, that the claims perform functions that are “well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry,” rather than being an inventive concept. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357) (finding using known elements to perform “conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality, which is insufficient to supply an inventive concept”). Furthermore, the claims do not specify a special purpose computer (as Appellants argue the claims’ limitations create), but rather describe routine and conventional steps to be carried out by the equivalent of a generic computer (i.e., “apply it with a computer”), and, thus, fail to provide an inventive concept. See Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358) (finding an inventive concept “requires more than simply stating an abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it’ or ‘apply it with a computer’”). The fact that a generic computer requires relevant programming does not change the programmed generic computer into a special purpose computer. See id. We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ reliance on Diehr. Diehr involved a transformative manufacturing process involving “constantly determining the temperature of the mold [and] constantly recalculating the 9 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 appropriate cure time through the use of the [mathematical] formula.” See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187. Appellants have not provided persuasive evidence of any similar or sufficient transformative use. We also are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the claims pose no risk of preempting the abstract idea itself. A lack of preemption does not make a claim patent eligible. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362—63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (2) Arguments relating to § 103 rejections (i) Associatins interviewers with questions Appellants argue the combination of Cordero, Hartmann, and Reid fails to teach or suggest “storing] in an interviewer computer storage device data associating each of a plurality of interviewers with a particular module of questions that an interviewer is trained in and qualified to use in the interview,” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 20—21; Reply Br. 4. More specifically, Appellants argue Hartmann teaches instead “a list of a job applicant’s skills and attributes that can be discussed in an interview.” App. Br. 20 (citing Hartmann || 65—66, Fig. 2). Appellants contend “neither Cordero nor Hartman teach associating a module of questions to an 10 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 interviewer for which the interviewer is trained and qualified.'1'’ App. Br. 20; Reply Br. 4. Appellants also argue the Examiner errs in the additional finding that the phrase “that an interviewer is trained in and qualified to use in the interview” is not entitled to patentable weight. App. Br. 20—21; Reply Br. 4. The Examiner finds, and we agree, that the combination teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Final Act. 8—9; Ans. 13—15. As to Hartmann, the Examiner finds, and we agree, it teaches or suggests having administrators assign skills and attributes to particular interviewers. See Ans. 13 (citing Hartmann || 66—67, Fig. 7). Hartmann’s paragraph 66 recites: FIG. 7 further shows an attribute assignment process 708 accompanied by user input 710. Process 708 comprises the assignment of the attributes of list 706 to a set of interviewers, such that each interviewer is assigned at least one attribute against which to interview. In an embodiment of the present invention, the attribute assignment process 708 involves a user, such as administrator 106, logging onto a Web site or other online facility, selecting interviewers on a Web page from a list of interviewers and then assigning attributes to each interviewer from the list 706. The output of process 708 is an attribute/interviewer list 712 wherein each attribute is matched with an interviewer. Hartmann | 66 (emphasis added). Although the Examiner finds that “the references do not explicitly state or disclose that the particular questions assigned are those that an interviewer is trained in and qualified to use in the interview,” the Examiner also finds “it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to further specify that the interviewer is qualified to ask certain questions.” Ans. 14—15 (italics emphasis added). We agree that one of ordinary skill in 11 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 the art would have found it obvious over Hartmann’s teachings to have the administrator who is assigning attributes to interviewers for which to question a job candidate on, to choose those assignments so that qualified interviewers for those attributes are doing the questioning. See Hartmann 1 66; KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (“[T]he [obviousness] analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”); In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968) (“[I]t is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the references but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.”). Furthermore, having the administrator chose qualified and trained interviewers to question job candidates is a highly predictable course of action. KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.”). In light of finding of obviousness, we do not reach whether the disputed limitation should be given patentable weight. (ii) During the interview Appellants argue the combination of Cordero, Hartmann, and Reid fails to teach or suggest “providing] the model answers to the interviewer during the interview,” as recited in claim 3. App. Br. 21—22. More specifically, Appellants argue “Cordero is primarily directed to providing recommended answers to a person who is practicing being interviewed (that is, an interviewee) by an interview simulation program with a computer generated interview character.” App. Br. 22 (citing Cordero Abstract). 12 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 Appellants further argue that because “Cordero relates to a potential interviewee viewing interviews that have been recorded, the viewed interview at that point is over.” Id. The Examiner finds that the combination teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Ans. 15—16. The Examiner finds Cordero teaches “providing recommended answers to users during simulated interviews.” Ans. 15 (citing Cordero 130). The Examiner finds that even if this is deemed to be after the actual interview, “there are only three possible time periods when an interviewer may obtain and review model answers (e.g., before, during and after)” and that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious to try providing the answers during the interview. Id. We find that the disputed limitation would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combination’s teachings. See Cordero Tflf 28, 30. We agree there are only a finite number of times (i.e., before, during, or after the interview) to provide the model answers to the interviewer (it would have been obvious to provide model answers to the interviewer in addition to the interviewee), and picking one of a finite number of known solutions to a known problem would have been obvious here. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (“When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that is was obvious under § 103.”). 13 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 (Hi) Not presented by more than one interviewer Appellants argue the combination of Cordero, Hartmann, and Reid fails to teach or suggest that “the computer processor is configured to present the one or more modules of questions to the plurality of interviewers such that a particular question or module of questions is not presented to the job candidate by more than one interviewer,” as recited in claim 7. App. Br. 22—23. More specifically, Appellants argue “the system must keep track of what modules of questions have been presented to which interviewers. Such a tracking system is not merely a description of a module of the questions, but how the system operates and functions.” App. Br. 22. Appellants contend that “none of the references disclose this functional feature.” App. Br. 23. The Examiner finds that the combination teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Ans. 16—17. The Examiner finds that Hartmann teaches or suggests “an online facility that may automatically send an email to each interviewer, wherein the email includes interview templates, the time of the interview and resume for the job candidate.” Ans. 16 (citing Hartmann 11 69-70). The Examiner finds it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art to provide unique questions to each of the interviewers. Ans. 17. We are not persuaded of Examiner error. We agree that one of ordinary skill in the art would have found it obvious in light of Hartmann’s teachings (e.g., providing interview templates to each interviewer) to provide unique questions to interviewers, including so as to make more productive use of the collective interview time. See Hartmann H 69-70. See, e.g., Preda, 401 F.2d at 826 (“[I]t is proper to take into account not only 14 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 specific teachings of the references but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.”). Moreover, avoiding duplicative questioning (particularly when templates are provided to each interviewer) by the interviewers is a predictable course of action. KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (“If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.”). (iv) Receive feedback on an interviewer’s evaluation Appellants argue the combination of Cordero, Hartmann, Reid, Money, and Official Notice fails to teach or suggest that “the computer processor is configured to . . . receive feedback on an interviewer’s evaluation of the job candidate; and send the feedback to each of the interviewers,” as recited in claim 20. App. Br. 23; Reply Br. 5. More specifically, Appellants argue “[t]he cited portions of Cordero only relate to providing feedback or analysis of job candidates.” Id. (citing Cordero 145). Appellants also argue “that it is not obvious to try to receive feedback on an interviewer’s evaluation of a job candidate. Rather, interviews are meant to evaluate job candidates, not interviewers.” Id. The Examiner finds that the combination teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. Ans. 18—19. The Examiner finds that Money teaches or suggests displaying, for a particular job candidate, (i) a list of the interviewers, (ii) a rating for the job candidate by each interviewer, and (iii) notes taken by the interviewer during the interview. Ans. 18 (citing Money 25, 28—29). The Examiner finds “[i]t would have been obvious to try, by a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, to apply the same feedback input method taught by Money in order to receive feedback about interviewers.” Ans. 18. 15 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 We are not persuaded of Examiner error. We agree that it would have been obvious to try, by a person having ordinary skill in the art, to apply the same feedback input method taught by Money in order to receive feedback about interviewers. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (ruling that when there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp). Money teaches a feedback system which would be obvious to try to use for other classes of persons (e.g., interviewers) for which feedback is desired. Money 25, 28—29. (3) Arguments relating to § 112 rejection Appellants argue the Examiner errs in rejecting claims 1—21 —the Examiner focuses on independent claim 1 and claim 7 — under the written description requirement of § 112, first paragraph, because the Specification discloses the disputed limitations of these claims. See App. Br. 24—25; Reply Br. 3. (i) Claim 1 Claim 1 recites a processor that is configured to “store in an interviewer computer storage device data associating each of a plurality of interviewers with a particular module of questions that an interviewer is trained in and qualified to use in the interview.” App. Br. 27. Appellants argue paragraph 7 of “the [Specification provides as an example that an interviewer can be associated with an application development module or a mobile services module.” Id. at 24. Appellants also cite paragraph 25 of the Specification as “disclosing] several ways that it can be determined that an interviewer is qualified to use a particular module of questions in an 16 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 interview, such as the number of years of work experience, the number of years of training, and/or the number of years of education in a particular job type.” Id. at 25. Appellants, thus, contend that the Specification “supports the claimed feature of associating interviewers with question modules based on interview training and qualification.” Id. The Examiner finds the Specification fails to meet the written description requirement of § 112 as to claim 1. Ans. 10—12. More specifically, the Examiner finds “[t]he [Specification simply does not provide enough information for how the system generates the association data prior to storing it in memory. The [Specification at most discloses the system is capable of creating such association data.” Ans. 10 (citing || 7, 25). We agree with Appellants’ arguments, and we find one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably conclude that Appellants had possession of this aspect of the claimed invention at the time the Specification was filed. See In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Spec. H 7, 25. For example, paragraph 7 recites that “[t]he data stored in the database associate each of the persons or interviewers in the database with one or more modules of questions that can be used in an interview of a job candidate.” (ii) Claim 7 Claim 7 recites that “the computer processor is configured to present the one or more modules of questions to the plurality of interviewers such that a particular question or module of questions is not presented to the job candidate by more than one interviewer.” App. Br. 28. Appellants argue that the Specification discloses this limitation. App. Br. 25. The Examiner finds “[t]he [Specification does not provide an algorithm or adequately describe a subcomponent for tracking question 17 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 assignments. The [Specification only states that such features can be built into the system.” Ans. 10-11 (citing Spec. 137). Paragraph 37 of the Specification recites, inter alia, “Block 2710 illustrates that modules of questions are presented to several interviewers such that a particular question or module of questions is not presented to the job candidate by more than one interviewer.” Spec. 137. We agree with Appellants’ argument, and we find one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably conclude that Appellants had possession of this aspect of the claimed invention at the time the Specification was filed. See Gosteli, 872 F.2d at 1012. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s § 112 rejection of claims 1—21. CONCLUSION Based on our findings and reasoning above, we sustain the Examiner’s (i) § 101 rejection of claims 1—21; (ii) § 103 rejection of claims 1, 3, and 7, as well as claims 2, 4—6, 8—10, 13, and 14, as Appellants do not provide separate, substantive arguments for their patentability; (iii) § 103 rejection of claims 11, 12, and 15, as Appellants do not provide separate, substantive arguments for their patentability; and (iv) § 103 rejection of claims 16—21, as Appellants do not provide separate, substantive arguments for their patentability. We do not sustain the Examiner’s § 112 rejection of claims 1—21. 18 Appeal 2016-005656 Application 13/706,151 DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of claims 1—21. We affirm the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 1—10, 13, and 14. We affirm the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 11, 12, and 15. We affirm the Examiner’s § 103 rejection of claims 16—21. We reverse the Examiner’s § 112 rejection of claims 1—21. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 19 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation